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INTRODUCTION

In 1923 B. C. Forbes, like a latter-day Horace Greeley, pro­
claimed that the twentieth century belonged to the West. The region's un­
tapped natural resources guaranteed a predominance much like the 
industrial leadership of the East in the preceding era. Blessed with an abun­
dance of minerals, timber, and oil, the western states, and especially Cali­
fornia, called forth a new generation of entrepreneurs. And by that time a 
number of western pioneers had already made it into the top ranks of the 
nation's business elite.1 
One of the most successful of these empire builders was Edward L. 
Doheny, who was credited with having discovered more oil than any other 
living person. Doheny opened the Los Angeles oil district to commercial 
production in 1892 and helped develop every major oilfield in Southern 
California by the end of the decade. In 1900, he went to Mexico and re­
peated his success on a vast scale. Thereafter, based on his California and 
Mexico operations, Doheny built up the largest fuel oil business in the 
world. 
Despite these achievements, very little is known about the development 
of Doheny's career and the methods by which he succeeded. A major rea­
son for this dearth of information has to do with Doheny's part in the 
Teapot Dome oil scandal of the 1920s, which came at the end of a long 
career and fixed his reputation as a scoundrel in the public mind. Then, 
the continuing ideological battles between the United States and Mexico 
over the role of foreign oil companies, which led to the nationalization of 
the industry, cast Doheny into further disrepute. 
My interest in him began with a study of Mexican history, in which 
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Doheny was presented as the consummate capitalist exploiter. In seeking a 
more balanced appraisal, however, I discovered that no biography of him 
had yet been written and that only a handful of articles about him had 
appeared since his death in 1935. Hoping to locate his personal papers for 
the other side of the story, I turned to the Doheny Memorial Library at St. 
John's Seminary in Camarillo, California, only to learn that none existed. 
St. John's housed Mrs. Estelle Doheny's extensive book collection, which 
consisted of medieval manuscripts on religious topics, American classics, 
and some valuable art work and furnishings from the Doheny mansion in 
Los Angeles which had been left in the hands of the Catholic Church. Sadly, 
because the collection was never made available to scholars in any con­
certed way and was very expensive to maintain, the Church decided in the 
late 1980s to sell the contents of the library, relegating the remains of the 
Doheny estate to the auction block. 
Fortunately, a few items remain and now make up the Estelle and Ed­
ward L. Doheny Collection at the Archival Center of the Archdiocese of Los 
Angeles in San Fernando. The collection includes several letters between 
Edward and his second wife, Estelle, written during the early years of their 
marriage, a couple dozen pieces of business correspondence, and some 
photographs of Mexico. Most of this material survived purely by accident, 
after Estelle incinerated the bulk of her husband's papers in the basement 
of their Chester Place home. Apparently, she did this just after he died, in 
accordance with his wishes, succumbing perhaps to a combination of loy­
alty, shock, and desperation. For someone as devoted to the preservation 
of books and historical documents as she was, Estelle could not have been 
comfortable with such an irrevocable act. However regrettable, she saw it 
as the only way to halt the negative attacks on Doheny's character which 
had chased him to his grave and to thwart the future efforts of biographers 
and historians.2 
Of course, her action only made things worse by giving free rein to 
everything but the truth. In the end, the lack of documentary evidence 
polarized the interpretations of Doheny's life. His family, friends, and close 
associates have been excessively laudatory, while his detractors have found 
nothing good in anything he did. The most frustrating thing about both 
of these approaches is that neither one is based on more than a handful of 
facts. And the material written about him while he was still alive is hardly 
more informative.3 
Although the local newspapers in California and Mexico and the fi­
nancial press in New York followed the development of Doheny's compa­
nies in detail, the first articles about Doheny himself did not appear until 
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he was over sixty years old and almost twenty-five years into his oil career. 
Mostly, they consisted of propaganda pieces touting his Mexican oil busi­
ness. Clarence Barron's The Mexican Problem, for instance, is a compilation 
of articles written for the Wall Street Journal in 1917 which emphasized the 
strategic value of Mexican oil for America and the Allies during the war in 
Europe. In the few pages devoted to Doheny's personality, Barron empha­
sized his experiences as a young man, when he worked on a government 
survey of Indian Territory, broke and sold government horses, and pros­
pected throughout the Rocky Mountains. Those western roots, Barron 
contended, accounted for the success of the nation's most powerful inde­
pendent oil producer.4 
In California, the first popular article appeared in Sunset magazine in 
1918. Like Barron's articles, Wilbur Hall's "How Doheny Did It" portrayed 
the oilman's life as the culmination of the ideal western experience. In par­
ticular, Hall contrasted Doheny with his boyhood friends back in Fond du 
Lac, Wisconsin, who were either too timid or too unimaginative to follow 
their destiny to the frontier. In making this presentation, Hall intended to 
use Doheny's life as an inspirational example for others to follow, but he 
was frustrated by a lack of material. "Doheny says he dislikes publicity," 
Hall lamented, "and from his actions I believe him. He is a hard man from 
whom to glean first-hand information of value to the young and striving." 
To compensate for Doheny's silence, Hall embellished the few facts at hand 
and presented an attractive image of Doheny as a poor prospector turned 
millionaire by dint of hard work and sacrifice.5 
The next effort to capture Doheny in print came from B. C. Forbes in 
his 1923 book Men Who Are Making the West. Like Hall, Forbes followed 
Doheny around for days trying to dig information out of him, and like­
wise he came away empty-handed. Doheny put up an impenetrable front, 
leaving Forbes to elaborate on a paltry number of facts. But knowing his 
audience, if not his subject, Forbes wrote Doheny up as a sure-fire western 
hero. In his account, Doheny was a "dare-devil" westerner who rolled 
through one bonanza after another, always looking for new worlds to con­
quer. Contrary to Hall, who dwelt on Doheny's early failures, Forbes 
claimed that Doheny had been a fabulously successful miner who gave 
away fortunes just for the challenge of winning them back again. According 
to this account, Doheny single-handedly discovered several mining dis­
tricts, settled towns, fought wild Indians, and faced down armed despera­
does in the street. Although there was a grain of truth in some of these 
stories, others were pure fabrication.6 
Unfortunately, when the public demanded more information about the 
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men involved in the oil scandal in 1924, journalists from the major news­
papers and magazines followed Forbes's lead, perpetuating this dime-novel 
interpretation of his life. By this time, Doheny was encouraging the myths, 
because he hoped to benefit from the public's attention. This was particu­
larly evident in his testimony during the official hearings and trials related 
to Teapot Dome, in which he and his attorneys relied on these superficial 
frontier images to establish his character and honesty.7 
In all of his remembrances, Doheny never elaborated on what his early 
life was really like. He especially avoided any discussion of his childhood, 
his siblings, and his parents. The biographer, therefore, is left with barely 
a hint of the kind of influences and examples that propelled Doheny 
through his formative years and must, instead, deal with the impact of his 
environment, his associates, and his experiences as an adult. The rest is 
simply conjecture. 
On a few points, however, I have been able to fill in basic information 
not covered before. In particular, Doheny's experience in New Mexico dur­
ing the 1880s turns out to be a far different story than the one related by 
Forbes and subsequent writers. Nevertheless, no amount of sleuthing can 
make up for Doheny's reticence to talk about his past. Doheny's ambition 
was self-evident in his work, and many aspects of his personality were 
equally well defined, but his private side remains closed. This leaves us with 
a sketch rather than a detailed portrait. 
In tracing out Doheny's life as I do, I have deliberately chosen not to 
burden the reader with a lengthy discussion of Teapot Dome. In the first 
place, the legal issues behind the case have been sufficiently outlined in 
other works and will not benefit from another treatment. More important, 
the basic facts of the case were never in dispute. What was at issue was the 
intent of the individuals involved. And that has remained a matter of polit­
ical interpretation, over which debate swirls to this day. A recent biography 
of Doheny, written from the political left, charges him not just with Teapot 
Dome but with every crime imaginable from adultery to murder and polit­
ical assassination. As the apotheosis of the negative tradition, the book 
presents Doheny as the personification of evil. Few historical figures out­
side of that other oilman John D. Rockefeller can still generate this degree 
of hatred so many years after their deaths.8 
My goal is to put the leasing of the naval oil reserves in its proper per­
spective from Doheny's point of view—particularly within the context of 
his business interests. Until now, the tendency has been to assume the 
worst about Doheny's role in the oil scandal, despite his eventual acquittal 
on all charges, and to work backward, imputing similar motives to all of 
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his earlier activities. In reality, Doheny's interest in the Elk Hills petroleum 
reserve resulted from a series of events in the early 1920s that combined 
personal, political, and financial considerations. From this perspective, the 
decision to develop the reserve was secondary, and possibly detrimental, 
to his larger goals. And it was certainly not the culmination of some immu­
table destiny as others seem to suggest. Obviously, my own conclusions 
about Doheny's guilt or innocence as related to Elk Hills come out along 
the way. But more than anything else, I believe that Doheny's long and 
productive career should not be lost, overshadowed, or deliberately dis­
torted because of an infatuation with political intrigue. 
This book opens, then, with an outline of Doheny's early years, before 
he entered the oil business, along with a discussion of his lengthy stint as 
a prospector in New Mexico. This is the one place in the narrative where 
we get a glimpse of Doheny's personal life and some possible insight into 
why he never discussed it later on. The second chapter covers his domina­
tion of the Los Angeles oil industry in the early 1890s and details his part­
nership with the Santa Fe Railroad as he moved out of the city. Here, we 
begin to see the entrepreneurial genius of Doheny at work and get a taste 
of his ultimate ambition. What disappears at this point, however, is all 
discussion of his family, for reasons that become apparent along the way. 
Taking momentum from his work in California, chapter 3 examines the 
growth and development of the Mexican oil industry and explores the full 
range of Doheny's methods of operation at the time. Thereafter, chapters 
4 through 6 alternate between his work in California and in Mexico, as he 
built up his extensive oil holdings and put together one of the largest petro­
leum companies in the world. 
Once his business has been fully established, chapters 7 and 8 turn to 
the political side of Doheny's activity as it related to the First World War 
and, especially, to the Mexican Revolution. Doheny was an active lobbyist 
for the industry in the United States and worked to blunt the edge of radi­
cal reform in Mexico. His efforts on both fronts were impressive, if not 
wholly successful, and represent the extent of influence open to business 
leaders of the day. Chapter 9 outlines Doheny's political life after the war: 
his role as a prominent Democrat, his work on behalf of the civil war in 
Ireland, and his concerns about protecting the Pacific Coast from a per­
ceived Japanese threat. The final two chapters deal with the peak years of 
Doheny's career in the early 1920s, as he worked to put his oil companies 
into full competition with the largest organizations in the United States, 
only to find himself embroiled in the political scandal that led to a reversal 
of fortune and brought an extraordinary career to a bitter end. 

1
 EARLY YEARS IN THE WEST

Although Doheny came to be identified with California and 
the West, he grew up in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. His father, Patrick, had 
been born in Ireland in 1808. His mother, Ellen, was an Irish-Canadian 
born in St. John's, Newfoundland, in 1818. As a young man, Patrick emi­
grated to Canada and worked as a seal fisherman before he married Ellen, 
a schoolteacher, in the mid-1840s. Sometime later, the couple moved to 
New York State, where Edward's older brothers were born in the early 
1850s. Patrick's occupation during these years is unknown, but for lack of 
better prospects he moved his family to Wisconsin around 1855. Edward 
was born the next year, on August 10, 1856, followed by a sister and one 
more brother. 
Most of the Irish families who migrated to Wisconsin during this pe­
riod were searching for cheap farm land. Patrick, on the other hand, chose 
to settle in Fond du Lac, an industrial city at the southern end of Lake 
Winnebago and about thirty miles inland from Lake Michigan. Apparently, 
he did not have any agricultural experience and looked to the sawmills or 
the railroads for employment. The census records for 1860 and 1870 listed 
him simply as a laborer, but whatever he did, it provided enough to sup­
port a modest home and a growing family. 
From what he later remembered, Doheny had a relatively normal child­
hood, with a few exceptions. Most notable was his education, which started 
sooner and lasted longer than was usual for the time. With his mother's 
blessing, no doubt, Doheny begged for permission to start school at the 
age of four. His father relented, as much to keep him "out of the way at 
home" as anything else, but Edward proved to be an adept student who 
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moved easily through his courses. As a teenager, Doheny stayed in school 
when most others dropped out to take jobs, although he worked part-time 
at one of the local sawmills for a time before he almost lopped off a couple 
of his fingers running a knot saw. Such accidents were common, and Do­
heny bore the scars on his right hand with pride as a permanent reminder 
of his working-class roots.1 
He proved far more skillful in the classroom and finished high school 
in 1872 at the age of fifteen. His education, however weak by the standards 
of the established eastern schools, was still a rarity in the late nineteenth 
century and included instruction in geography, geology, chemistry, and 
university-level algebra. As one of only two graduating seniors for the year, 
Doheny delivered an honorary speech at the convocation. According to a 
local reporter, Doheny's talk on the subject of success impressed the audi­
ence with "bold assertions, solid facts and good sense." Mr. Doheny, the 
reporter concluded, was "no ordinary thinker;... he don't search through 
libraries to see if his thoughts—his ideas, conflict with those of great men, 
but gives them expression in plain, unmistakable language. Mr. D will be 
a leader—not a follower. We need more such. Some of his sentences were 
not as smooth as oil, but the meaning was there, and need not be misun­
derstood . .  . that man will make a creditable mark."2 
Living in Wisconsin's "second city," a place with a business college, a 
growing economy, and a population of over thirteen thousand, Doheny 
could surely have found a route to success at home. Instead, he left town 
the day after his graduation, intending to join a federal surveying party 
leaving from Atchison, Kansas. This plan no doubt came out of the pages 
of the Fond du Lac newspapers, which at the time featured articles on the 
geological surveys, published items on lost Aztec gold mines in Arizona, 
and ran advertisements from the Burlington Railroad offering information 
on "How to go West."3 
Overcome by the lure of the frontier, Doheny departed on July 2, 1872, 
still a month shy of his sixteenth birthday. An older brother bet him that 
he would get so homesick that he would never make it on his own. And 
when he got to Kansas and discovered that the survey party had already 
been gone for several weeks, he almost turned back. Over fifty years later, 
Doheny remembered this incident as one of the greatest disappointments 
of his life. But he stuck it out, doing everything from selling books door-
to-door to working in a hotel—just to keep from returning home and 
proving his brother right. Ultimately, his perseverance paid off, and he 
found new opportunities that took him into the mining regions of the 
Rocky Mountains where, by the mid-1870s, he was hunting for silver and 
gold. 
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In 1880, after a long period of wandering throughout the West, Doheny 
arrived in New Mexico at the age of twenty-four. During this time, he truly 
lived up to B. C. Forbes's romantic claim that "rarely did Prospector Do­
heny sleep under other ceiling than the wide heavens. Each night he lay 
down with his faithful rifle at his side, his six-shooter ready for action and 
a hunter's knife at his belt."4 Based at the silver camp at Lake Valley, in the 
southwestern corner of the territory, Doheny continued his search for 
wealth. 
And there were opportunities to make money, especially when Doheny 
was among the first contingent of miners to head into the Black Range 
Mountains north of Lake Valley. As early as November 1880, he and four 
other men located two of the most promising mines in the area: the Moun­
tain Chief and the Miner's Dream. These properties sat alongside the Iron 
King mine, located about a week earlier by H. W. Elliott, from which the 
Kingston mining camp got its name. In the beginning, Doheny made a 
respectable profit, but hardly a fortune, from his efforts, giving his mining 
claims names that epitomized the dreams of the prospector: the Brilliant, 
the Old Reliable, and the Phoenix. At this point Doheny was strictly a pros­
pector, not a miner, and his goal was to sell the locations for profit, not 
work them for ore. But when the average claim sold for about $100, local 
prospectors rarely covered the cost of their operations and needed to keep 
churning up properties just to stay alive.5 
Finally, though, Doheny had two good years, in 1882 and 1883, when 
he located and sold several mining claims for a substantial sum of money. 
His run of luck began in May 1882, when he and a partner located the 
Phoenix and the Old Reliable. Two months later he bought out his part-
ner's share for $150, held the claims for almost a year, perhaps doing a 
little development work to improve their value, and sold them for $6,000. 
Doheny also filed claims on the Brilliant and the Maud Muller mines in 
August 1882 and sold a two-thirds' interest in both mines for $1,000 a few 
weeks later. The buyer returned shortly and bought out Doheny's re­
maining interest for another $4,000. In a promotional brochure published 
by the Kingston Tribune in 1883, the editor wrote that the ground around 
the Brilliant was covered with large chunks of silver-bearing ore and specu­
lated that, if it was "intelligently developed," it would prove equal to its 
6name.
That Doheny would immediately sell out his share of such a potentially 
profitable investment illustrated the psychology of the prospector who was 
always searching for the elusive bonanza. In these early years, especially, 
Doheny repeatedly sold good properties for an initial payoff and rarely 
settled down to work any of them for a steady income. Just a week after 
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selling the Brilliant, Doheny also sold the house and lot he owned in Lake 
Valley for $600 to the local blacksmith. He made another quick profit by 
purchasing two more town lots for $125 and selling them four days later 
for twice what he had paid. Between July 1882 and July 1883, then, Doheny 
earned a total of $12,575 from the sale of his various properties.7 
In the fall of 1883, Doheny moved to Kingston, which had become the 
center of activity for the region. At the time, as one of his friends later 
recalled, Doheny was a good-looking man with "regular features, ruddy 
complexion, and blue eyes." He was obviously well educated and suppos­
edly even took a job for a while teaching school in the area. Since the forty-
dollar-a-month salary was nothing in comparison to his income from 
prospecting, taking a regular job must have been an attempt to settle down 
for a while. Perhaps he needed the stability while he courted Carrie Lou 
Ella Wilkins, one of the few eligible young women in town.8 
Doheny and Carrie became acquainted when he stayed at the Occiden­
tal Hotel, an informal gathering place for Irish-American miners where 
her mother, Mariah Brophy, worked. As a well-known leader among that 
group, Doheny was probably a frequent boarder, if not a permanent resi­
dent. Apparently, Mariah and Carrie had been among the first inhabitants 
of the camp back when, as one observer noted, "the brush on Main street 
was so thick that no person could ride through it." How, or why, they 
ended up in Kingston is unknown. Carrie's father, Dr. Wilkins, had been an 
Army surgeon who was killed during the Civil War. Presumably, Mariah's 
maiden name was Brophy, or she must have later married a Mr. Brophy, 
but nothing much is known about her before she came to Kingston. Ac­
cording to the Territorial Census, compiled in 1885, Mariah was forty-
three, was originally from Ohio, and had lived for a time in Kansas, where 
Carrie was born. Carrie was twenty years old and Doheny was just shy of 
twenty-seven when they were married on August 7, 1883, at the Catholic 
Church in Silver City.9 
An interesting side issue to his marriage concerned Doheny's relation­
ship with his family in Wisconsin. Apparently, he had not written to his 
parents during the eleven years since he left home. Tragically, when he 
finally did write home to tell them about Carrie, there was no one there to 
receive the letter. His father, who would have been sixty-four, had died a 
few months after Doheny left home. His mother and sister passed away 
several years later. As for his brothers, the oldest one was unaccounted for, 
and the youngest had died while Doheny was still at home. His one re­
maining brother was living in Chicago and either did not receive the for­
warded letter or chose not to answer it. In any case, when he did not hear 
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Occidental Hotel, Kingston, ca. 1885. Carrie Doheny, holding her daughter, Eileen, 
is sitting on the balcony rail. Mariah Brophy, Carrie's mother, is sitting in the chair. 
Photo by J. C. Burge, courtesy of the Museum of New Mexico. 
back from anyone in Fond du Lac, Doheny waited another thirteen years 
before Carrie persuaded him to go back and see what had happened to 
his family. Doheny's lack of interest in his Wisconsin roots indicates the 
possibility that, rather than succumbing to wanderlust in 1872, he may 
have been running away from a difficult life at home.10 
When he and Carrie headed back to Kingston to begin their own fam­
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ily, Doheny was forced to reconsider a number of things about his life. In 
particular, it seemed that his days as a footloose prospector had come to 
an end. Few prospectors were married, and even fewer brought their fami­
lies to the mining frontier. Almost by definition, family responsibilities and 
the demands of a mining career pulled men in opposite directions, and 
Doheny suffered under the strain during his remaining years in New Mex­
ico. His predicament paralleled that of his future oil partner, Charles Can-
field, who arrived in the Black Range in the early 1880s with his family in 
tow and moved his wife and child into the camp at Chloride, in the north­
ern end of the district. When his plans failed, Canfield sent his wife back 
to Nebraska to live with her relatives while he returned to prospecting. 
Although Canfield eventually became a local legend when he made a major 
strike on the Comstock mine in Kingston, he endured several years of 
lonely deprivation before his circumstances changed. And he was one of 
few prospectors who actually succeeded in making a small fortune from 
his labor. Most just hung on until debt and depression forced them back 
home or on to the next mining area.11 
As one of a handful of family men in Kingston, Doheny did not have 
to endure the extended periods of loneliness and isolation so common to 
a miner's life, but he still had to deal with the frustration of mining, itself. 
And during the worst times, with Carrie and baby Eileen (born in 1884) 
beside him, Doheny faced the immediate consequences that Canfield 
avoided when he sent his family back home. With such an obvious motiva­
tion to succeed, Doheny worked diligently over the years, but he never 
struck it rich. Most of the time, he barely made any money at all. 
During the Dohenys' early years of marriage, Kingston was a classic 
western boomtown. According to its 1883 promotional pamphlet, Kings­
ton "grew as by magic." But like all the boom towns that preceded it, Kings­
ton rose out of the wilderness on the collective dreams of its new 
inhabitants. A reporter for the Mining and Scientific Press described the 
camp in its heyday: "The town extends about a mile and a half along the 
creek; contains about 1,500 people and over 200 houses, principally board 
houses covered with canvas. The dust is about a foot deep. There are 
no churches, but about 30 saloons. Restaurants by the dozen. I noticed 2 
hardware stores, 3 assay offices, 5 real estate offices, house and sign painter, 
contractor and builders."12 
Another writer later asserted that it was from this location that "the 
prospector sallied forth a poor man in the morning, returning a million­
aire in the afternoon for he had 'struck it rich.' Here fortunes grew in a 
single day to vanish as quickly by games of chance, under the shadow of 
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pines, at night." B. C. Forbes observed that stories claiming that silver 
could be effortlessly scooped up off the ground "spread like wildfire" and 
brought thousands of people, "mostly daring gentlemen of fortune," into 
the camp. Hoping to equate his subject with that adventurous breed, 
Forbes falsely reported that "riches poured into Doheny's lap by the tens 
of thousands of dollars."13 
Despite all the excitement Kingston generated, a reporter for the Silver 
City Enterprise concluded that, in actuality, "there are a few of what can be 
called good mines around Kingston, although the value of most of them 
cannot be determined until more work has been done." While this ap­
praisal was probably intended to deflate the hopes of Silver City's latest 
rival, it proved accurate in portraying the situation in Kingston over its 
short life as a mining center. There were always good properties to be 
found in the area; the problems were filtering out the hyperbole and secur­
ing the financial backing to make the mines pay.14 
As the history of western mining has shown, profits came only with 
intensive capital investment. The individual prospector sometimes worked 
a mine for himself, hoping for that one-in-a-million chance to strike it 
rich, but could go only so far without money from outside investors de­
spite years of backbreaking labor. Unfortunately, this meant that someone 
other than the original locator very likely would be the one to reap any 
reward. The result for the mining camp as a whole was a constant battle 
between the local journalists and merchants, who tried to lure in outside 
capital through extensive advertisement, and the miners, who hesitated to 
invite in another set of fortune hunters.15 
Replaying a scene common to the mining regions of the West, the man­
agement of Hillsboro's Sierra County Advocate stated that its aim was to 
"bring our resources prominently before the country at large" and to 
"boom the town and develop the country." But the local mining papers 
usually descended to the level of shameless huckstering that has made the 
reality of mining camps so hard to discover. Along these lines, the Kingston 
Tribune stated that papers "crowded to the margin with spicy locals and 
well-timed editorials" were "equal to two 40-stamp mills in the way of 
developing the mines around them." Unfortunately, the spice was almost 
always intended to make up for a lack of other ingredients.16 
Kingston, then, was a camp where prosperity was always within sight 
but just out of reach. The local press celebrated each successive boom and 
lamented the equally frequent depressions, up one month down the next, 
in a constant search for signs of hope. In reality, Kingston remained a poor 
man's mining camp, a place where the mines "pay from the grass roots."17 
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After surviving the frenzy of a mining boom in 1882 and 1883, Kings­
ton settled into an existence as a quasi-stable community. Although the 
initial boom did not thrust the camp into the ranks of the major mining 
towns, it was clear that the area had the mineral potential to attain some 
stability. To that end, Kingston pinned its hopes on the arrival of two 
forces, the Santa Fe Railroad and the eastern capitalist, and on the elimina­
tion of a third, the Apache Indians. The Apaches harassed the local popula­
tion for a time before they were driven out, and a few capitalists, mostly 
from Britain, eventually found their way to the camp. But the railroad 
never did arrive, thus depriving the camp of an essential element of suc­
cess. Early in 1880, the Santa Fe Railroad had moved southward from Col­
orado into New Mexico, under the energetic direction of A. A. Robinson. 
Thereafter, it continued south into the Rio Grande Valley and turned west 
to make a connection with the Southern Pacific at Deming. Investors from 
Silver City, the only stable mining town in the area, banded together and 
built their own connection to the line as early as 1883. The next year, in 
Sierra County, the Santa Fe made a spur to Lake Valley, thirty miles shy 
of Kingston.18 
Throughout this period, the miners at Kingston pleaded for a rail con­
nection, either at their camp or at nearby Hillsboro, as their only salvation. 
Although the initial strikes that put Kingston on the map occurred in rare 
pockets of high-grade silver, the local mines produced large quantities of 
refractory ore that had to be transported to smelters as far away as Denver. 
But that required a long wagon trip to Deming or Silver City, and conse­
quently the ore piled up unprofitably alongside the mines because it cost 
more to haul out than it returned in silver. Several companies built pro­
cessing plants in both Kingston and Hillsboro to relieve the burden tempo­
rarily, but a lack of funds and local mismanagement kept these smelters 
from operating steadily enough to eliminate the problem. Over time, the 
growing piles of low-grade ore sat as visible reminders of a bright future 
cut short for lack of a railroad. Eventually, the Santa Fe sent an engineer 
out to investigate the Kingston area in the early 1890s, but by then it was 
too late; the combination of widespread economic depression and the satu­
ration of the silver market had put the camp out of its misery.19 As one of 
Kingston's long-time residents, Doheny saw this process through almost to 
the end. 
When he and Carrie settled into married life in Kingston in 1883, the 
camp had already evolved from the raucous boom town it had been at its 
founding. While the population fluctuated with the fortunes of the camp, 
the Dohenys were among the 300 to 400 residents who lived there year 
16 CHAPTER 1 
round. In June 1885, according to the Territorial Census, they were living 
with Carrie's mother at the Occidental Hotel, among the other families 
and small businesses at the center of town. Along the periphery, only a few 
blocks away, this core group of a dozen or so families gave way to a less 
stable population of single miners, and this section quickly faded into the 
isolated prospector's cabin or rancher's house only a few miles out. Because 
most of the major mines lay within a mile or two of the camp, the miners 
were able to commute from town each day, while the prospectors still spent 
a good deal of time away from home. 
Mostly, Edward tried to stay put and develop his existing claims. He 
also tried to extend himself by working as a manager for several mining 
outfits, a job that required some degree of administrative skill and organi­
zational ability. He also joined a group, fronted by St. Louis investors, that 
started a new mining company. By 1886, Edward and Carrie had purchased 
two lots and a house for themselves on the south side of Main Street, and 
in March of that year, Doheny also purchased the Occidental Hotel, com­
plete with furnishings, for $650. Two stories, roughly ten to fifteen feet 
across the front, and probably no more than thirty feet deep, the hotel 
mirrored the ramshackle appearance of the camp itself. Three months 
later, Edward sold the hotel back to his mother-in-law for $350, apparently 
absorbing a $300 loss on the property. If these were the flush times, they 
were short-lived, since Doheny was soon strapped for cash. 
County records reveal that, from the fall of 1886 until December 1889, 
when they left Kingston, Carrie and Edward's resources continued to dwin­
dle. Several times over this period, circumstances forced them into debt. 
These were not the strategic business loans of someone with the resources 
to sustain them, but the recurring small loans of people living on the edge. 
This process began in September 1886, when Doheny mortgaged a quarter 
interest in the Mountain Chief claim to the Percha bank for $200 on a 
ninety-day note. The next month he and Carrie deeded over their house 
in Kingston to the local banker for $500. In December, Doheny borrowed 
another $272.50, secured by the quarter interest in the Mountain Chief 
plus a quarter interest in the Mammoth claim, located the month before. 
By the next July, Doheny was able to pay back the house loan and cancel 
the debts on his mining claims. But in late August, he again turned the 
house and lots over to the bank for $300 in gold coin. This time the bank 
kept the note for over two years. The day he and Carrie left Kingston in 
December 1889, they sold their house for $750.20 
Considering his windfall from Lake Valley, an obvious question is, how 
did Doheny go through the $12,000 he started with in such a short time? 
 V Early Years in the West
The answer touches on the major obstacle for prospectors like himself. 
Mining, even on the smallest scale, took an inordinate amount of money. 
In 1882, for example, one mining expert, using a New Mexico mine as a 
hypothetical case, estimated the cost of locating and developing a mine for 
a one-year period at $10,000. This sum included the time and labor of the 
prospector, food and supplies for the year, recording fees, and the extrane­
ous expenses necessary to promote the property. Given these development 
costs, it was no wonder the prospector could not exist for long without 
financial support. An 1885 article in the Kingston newspaper described the 
pathetic circumstances that led many a "starved miner" to spend his last 
cent developing his claim.21 
The prospectors who were most likely to make money were those who 
worked their claims when they could afford it and labored for somebody 
else when they were broke. Under the best circumstances, such a prospec­
tor might be able to sustain this process by selling the ore from his dig­
gings, as many Kingston miners tried to do. Unfortunately, except for the 
rare pockets of rich material, most of the low-grade ore from the Kingston 
mines was simply too costly to handle. From all indications, Doheny fol­
lowed this same path. Although he located and sold a number of mines in 
his early days at Lake Valley, he spent years working on the Miner's Dream 
and the Mountain Chief to no avail. His was the typical case of hard work 
and sacrifice meaning nothing without a large measure of good luck. On 
this score, one Kingston correspondent wrote, in April 1885, that the Min-
er's Dream was particularly "unfortunate" because, even though the mine 
had one of the best showings in camp, neither Doheny nor any of his les­
sees ever seemed to "get on to the pockets." At the time, the mine was being 
worked on a lease, and the commentator was unintentionally prophetic 
when he noted that the bond holders had reluctantly "quit work on the 
Dream."22 
While it took Doheny a few more years before he gave up on his dream, 
he had been carrying the seeds of doubt and depression for a long time. 
He expressed these thoughts clearly in a letter written to a former mining 
associate in July 1886. His tone of resignation speaks volumes about the 
prospector's life: "You know I lost on every partner I had, that I could have 
sold time and again without them. But there is no use of complaining 
about what we have missed. The Comstock claim which we gave to Johnnie 
Roach and Dan Ferguson has turned out $400,000 in three months, but it 
is petered out now and neither the Miner's Dream or Mountain Chief have 
produced a dollar, such is luck."23 
The next year started off better when Doheny joined with three other 
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Kingston men to form the Satisfaction Mining Company. Like many of the 
mining operations in the district, the company depended on its St. Louis 
office to promote the property and generate the necessary investment in­
come. The Kingston representatives who filled the administrative positions 
at the mine were R. C. Troeger, a druggist and mine operator, who put up 
the largest share of local money; F. A. Urban, the owner of a hardware store 
in Kingston, who became the president of the company; and Doheny, who 
served as the mining superintendent.24 
Initially, the mine produced well, and by early March the local paper 
reported on a strike in a "magnificent" body of ore three feet wide. Myste­
riously, little more than a week later, the Satisfaction shut down operations. 
No public information was forthcoming to explain what had gone wrong, 
except for a report that thirteen local miners had lost their jobs and were 
owed three months' back pay. It was possible that the story about the new 
strike had been a last-ditch effort to secure funds from local investors and, 
failing that, the Satisfaction Mining Company collapsed.25 
Although the Kingston newspaper added nothing more, the mining 
investors' section of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat followed Kingston prop­
erties in some detail. While the Satisfaction Mining Company was either 
too small or too new to receive direct attention, an adjacent mine, the 
Lochiel, had its story played out for St. Louis investors, and that account 
sheds some light on Doheny's situation. The Lochiel, the Satisfaction, and 
two other producing properties sat along an independent vein of high-
grade ore. When the Lochiel company collapsed in early April, the stock­
holders blamed their losses on gross mismanagement by the mine superin­
tendent, but responsibility lay further up the management hierarchy. The 
properties were being mined for stock investors rather than minerals. In 
particular, one of the Lochiel's directors, a St. Louis mining investor named 
Charles Greene, staged a fight among the members of the board, which 
drove the stock price down from sixty cents to twelve-and-a-half cents per 
share. Neither Greene nor his principal opponents on the board had any 
of their own money in the mine, having received their stock free of charge 
when the company was organized. After they boomed the property and 
sucked in the unsuspecting stockholders, they either wasted the funds on 
unproductive development or simply pocketed the cash. Either way, when 
the company ran out of money, they walked away unharmed, free to re­
open the mine once the original investors pulled out. Since Charles Greene 
was one of the seven directors of the Satisfaction Mining Company, he 
probably employed the same scheme with that operation. And as superin­
tendent, Doheny was probably blamed for the disaster just like his counter­
part was at the Lochiel.26 
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While Doheny had little invested in the business besides a few months 
of his own labor, the experience took its toll on his outlook. For the next 
two years, Kingston continued to experience the false booms and harsh 
depressions that had plagued it from the beginning. The local reporters 
still saw capitalists getting off every stagecoach, ready to turn fortune 
around, even though this always seemed to result in the best mining prop­
erties ending up in the hands of English investors. None of that made much 
of a difference to the camp as a whole. The decline in the profitability of 
silver and the high cost of shipping ore to the smelter kept Kingston at a 
standstill, while each successive downturn in the local economy let loose 
another handful of miners who could not hang on any longer. 
A few large companies provided jobs for the miners who stuck it out, 
and Doheny might have traded in a chance to make a big strike for a steady 
income, since working for wages in between prospecting trips was a com­
mon practice. For example, when Albert Fall, the future secretary of the 
interior and Doheny associate, came to Kingston in 1886, he spent a good 
deal of time working "on the hammer" for someone else. Doheny was still 
prospecting on a lease when he and Fall first met, and he later recalled that 
Fall had the better deal because he was at least getting paid. Still, Doheny 
could not hold out forever, and his situation continued to deteriorate. Cer­
tainly, times were desperate during the summer of 1889, when he was 
forced to paint the new drug store in Hillsboro just to make ends meet— 
perhaps the final indignity that led him to pack up and leave in December.27 
Having made that decision, however, and perhaps to stay close to Car-
rie's mother, he and Carrie went only as far as Silver City. The Kingston 
paper reported that "Mr. Doheny will study law under Mr. Pickett, a well 
known lawyer of this district." Whether Doheny was really serious about 
this or was looking for any reason to move on is unclear. Silver City had 
several times Kingston's population, sat at the center of a well-developed 
mining region, and was a logical place to search for greater opportunity. 
Following his stated plans, Doheny went to work for H. L. Pickett as a 
mining consultant and presumably hoped to study law as he worked.28 
There are few references to Doheny's efforts on behalf of Pickett's cli­
ents, which consisted primarily of making diagrams and models of mining 
claims for evidence at trial. As for his study of the law, there is no other 
information. What is certain is that Doheny did not stay with Pickett very 
long, and contrary to one of the cherished myths about his life, he never 
passed the territorial bar, never became a partner in a Silver City law firm, 
and never practiced law in the same judicial district as Albert Fall. Neither 
did he, as one story claimed, undertake his legal studies from a hospital 
bed after falling down an open mine shaft and breaking both legs.29 
2 0 CHAPTER 1 
While Fall became a noted attorney in the region before he went on to 
Washington as a New Mexico senator, Doheny secured a commission as a 
notary public and set up an office in May 1890 to file mining claims and 
patents. He advertised his services and the extent of his legal training in 
the Silver City Enterprise with the following notice: "Edward L. Doheny, 
Reports on Mines and Mining titles. To Mine Owners: The undersigned is 
prepared to examine and report on mining propositions and titles to min­
ing claims, and to do the necessary legal and clerical work connected with 
obtaining United States Patents for mining locations, guaranteeing the 
greatest possible dispatch, and giving advice in regard to the most econom­
ical and expeditious manner of procuring patents to mineral lands. Call 
on or address, Edward L. Doheny, Silver City, N.M., Office over Crawford's 
store."30 Doheny ran this notice for almost a year, even though he never 
concentrated on the notary business. 
Besides the difficulties of earning a living, mounting concern over Car-
rie's health was also troubling Doheny at this time. Apparently, she had 
been suffering from some unnamed malady for several years. On at least 
one occasion in Kingston, Doheny had to borrow money to take her to 
El Paso for treatment. Described by a longtime resident as "excitable" 
but deserving of help, Carrie received the reluctant support of Doheny's 
friends. Several generations later, there are rumors in the family that Carrie 
might have been an alcoholic.31 
As reported in the press, however, Carrie suffered from the altitude 
of the mining camps and had been seriously ill for most of October and 
November. In March 1891, Edward took her to El Paso for treatment once 
again, and she was contemplating a convalescent trip to San Diego. In the 
meantime, Mariah made repeated trips to Silver City see her and to take 
care of Eileen. Perhaps because of Carrie's weakened condition, Mariah 
held her marriage to Martin Barber, another Kingston miner, at the Do­
heny home in Silver City in January 1891. Although Mariah continued to 
live in Kingston, she was able to relieve Edward of some of the responsibil­
ity of caring for his wife and daughter.32 
Worried about his financial circumstances and the need to provide for 
his family, Doheny let the notary business fall by the wayside and plunged 
back into the mining business in November 1890, when he joined up with 
J. C. Carrera, another part-time consultant for Pickett. Carrera was one of 
the best-known mineralogists in the Southwest and was a professor at the 
Agricultural and Mechanics College at Mesilla Park, New Mexico.33 Carrera 
had acquired an interest in some lead mines in the Pinos Altos mountains 
at the end of October and offered Doheny a partnership in the operation. 
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Initially named Carrera & Co., the outfit was recognized as Carrera & Do­
heny by December. The exact business relationship between the two men 
is unclear, but their collaboration brought compliments from one mining 
reporter who saw new fortunes on the rise: 
The skill employed in the opening up of the Alpha and Omega mine, be­
longing to Huston & Thomas, west of Pinos Altos is meeting with unprece­
dented success. The Messrs. Carrera 8c Doheny since the inception of their 
management have uncovered lead riches which hitherto have had an ex­
istence only in the imagination of the owners. The daily tonnage keeps a 
dozen or more ox teams employed, and the transportational facilities of 
the Silver Branch of the A. T. & S. F. railroad are at the moment, inadequate 
to move the accumulations of a single weeks product from this wonder­
ful property.34 
The Alpha and Omega Mine was one of the oldest properties in the 
area and one of the best lead-bearing mines in the district. It had fallen 
victim to the poorly written tariff provision of 1873, which imperiled the 
lead mines of the western states by allowing direct competition with simi­
lar ore from Mexico. Under pressure from lead miners, Congress eventu­
ally included a duty on Mexican lead ore in the McKinley Tariff of 1890. 
Doheny and Carrera, in taking advantage of the new situation, made the 
Alpha and Omega an enviable possession once again.35 
For several months, Carrera controlled the lease on the mine, and Do­
heny served as manager of the property. This arrangement fell apart in 
February 1891, when a disagreement between the men forced them to close 
down and stop production. Speculation about a change in the manage­
ment of the mine in early March was confirmed when Doheny bought out 
Carrera's share and became a one-third owner of the lease. At that point, 
the mine was still productive, and Doheny was shipping out a carload of 
ore a day. By July, everything seemed to be going so well, a local reporter 
wrote, that Doheny and the owners of the property were clearly "in 
bonanza."36 
For eight months before July 1891, the Enterprise printed no fewer than 
a dozen notices on the mine, beginning with one that claimed that the 
immense quantities of ore contained in the Alpha and Omega would "soon 
give New Mexico a good name abroad, and will greatly assist in restoring 
confidence in this county with the mining world." Suddenly, however, 
there was no further mention of the mine or Doheny's connection to it. 
Apparently, Carrera left Pinos Altos in May to become the purchasing 
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agent for the International Smelter of El Paso, the same processing plant 
to which Doheny delivered his ore. But in late June, the smelter was 
"knocked out by floods" and taken over by its creditors. Although Doheny 
was still shipping out large quantities of ore in July, the lack of smelting 
capacity forced him to abandon his work on the mine by the end of the 
37 summer.
Given this latest predicament, Doheny decided it was time to make a 
bigger move than the one that had brought him to Silver City. He decided 
to head to California, where a number of his old friends and partners had 
already started in again. Despite his repeated failures, or perhaps because 
of them, Doheny left New Mexico with some invaluable skills that were 
readily transferrable to the oil business. His knowledge of geology and his 
understanding of mining claims, leases, and land titles were obvious assets. 
The hard lessons learned about corporate finance, stock investments, and 
business relations were more subtle but no less important credentials.38 
Beyond all that, Doheny's experience as a prospector and miner cer­
tainly entitled him to call himself a western pioneer. But the reality of his 
life was nothing like the fanciful stories written about him in his later years, 
and the need to substantiate his frontier character did not make it neces­
sary for him to dredge up the painful details of his past. In fact, given what 
his life had really been like, Doheny told Albert Fall at one point later on 
that he was glad there was no actual record of their years in New Mex­
ico. Without a doubt, if one had been available, it would have shaken him 
out of his nostalgia for what he recalled as a time "when all the world 
seemed bright, and the future held nothing in store that seemed to be 
unconquerable."39 
OIL AND RAILROADS IN 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 
1892-1902 
Supposedly it was a chance encounter with Charlie Canfield 
that turned Doheny toward California. Canfield had been one of the lucky 
few to leave Kingston a wealthy man in the mid-1880s, but he had squan­
dered his fortune on a string of bad investments in real estate and race 
horses. By the fall of 1891, he was out on the prospector's trail once again 
when he and Doheny met, accidentally, on a train platform in Victor, Cal­
ifornia, now known as Victorville. There were many other former New 
Mexicans working in the Oro Grande Mountains near San Bernardino. 
T. R Chapman, one of Doheny's old neighbors and one of the most suc­
cessful Kingston miners, had a mine and mill set up in Victor, and F. A. 
Urban, Doheny's former partner in the Satisfaction Mining Company, had 
gone there as well. So when Doheny's lead mining business at Pinos Altos 
fell apart, he had a number of friends ready to welcome him to the West 
Coast.1 
Before Doheny decided to make a permanent move to California in 
October 1891, he had already become involved in a legal fight over an 
abandoned gold mine that sat next to one of Canfield's claims. Apparently, 
Canfield had been acting as the agent between the landowner and a poten­
tial purchaser at the time Doheny came on the scene. After that, the two 
worked to scuttle the deal by disputing the markers and the deeds of the 
previous owners so that Doheny could file a new claim. In the end, after 
threats of gunplay and charges of fraud from both sides, the case fell apart, 
leaving Doheny and Canfield to try their luck elsewhere.2 Their next ven­
ture involved a group of investors who wanted to set up a company to test 
a new smelting process to treat low-grade ore. This deal involved two Los 
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Angeles real estate brokers, M. M. Morrison and Joseph A. Chanslor, along 
with J. B. Rentchler, Canfield's old partner from Kingston who had obvi­
ously done a much better job of handling his money. Together, these three 
put up $9,997 of a $10,000 investment, leaving Doheny, Canfield, and an­
other miner to throw in a dollar apiece and all of the labor. This too, fell 
apart for unstated reasons.3 
By the fall of 1892, Doheny was flat broke and looking for another 
opportunity. He found it in Los Angeles. Although he would later claim to 
have stumbled into the oil business by accident, there is ample reason to 
believe that he was not as ignorant of the industry as he let on. As an 
educated miner interested in smelting and extraction processes, Doheny 
would have kept up with the literature and news on the subject through 
the pages of the Mining and Scientific Press, a standard in every camp and 
mining town in the West. And even a casual review of that journal would 
have revealed numerous accounts of oil production in Southern California. 
If Doheny had been paying any attention at all in January 1892, he would 
have seen the following notice reprinted in several local papers: "The Brea 
Mine: The Herald has alluded to the recent discovery of a large deposit of 
petroleum products near the city's west limits.... A shaft was sunk on the 
hill which gave a surprise in the shape of a ledge of bituminous rock . .  . 
[then] another fine vein of asphalt was uncovered . .  . and a small stream 
of oil commenced to flow out of the face of the bluff. This week the com­
pany will put their cheap fuel on the market. Those who wish to see one 
of the curiosities of Los Angeles . .  . should not fail to take a trip to the 
brea mine. It is just a quarter of a mile west of Westlake Park."4 
Thus, despite the apocryphal stories of total ignorance, Doheny prob­
ably knew more than he let on. But his role as the founder of the Los 
Angeles oil district is nonetheless unique. He was not the first person to 
extract oil in the city, and he was certainly not the first to experiment with 
the petroleum he found near Westlake Park, but he was the first person 
who managed successfully to promote its use at the precise moment that 
the railroads and other industries recognized oil as a viable fuel. In marked 
contrast to his experiences in New Mexico, Doheny was finally in the right 
place at the right time. 
Oil exploration had been going on in Southern California for at least 
thirty years before Doheny began digging in the oil seeps of Los Angeles. By 
the late 1880s, there were almost one hundred producing wells operating 
in the hills surrounding the city. At its peak this business represented a 
financial outlay of several million dollars in what was already a capital-
intensive industry. Within the city of Los Angeles, itself, there had been 
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numerous attempts to drill for oil going back as early as 1863, when one 
budding entrepreneur supposedly spent $65,000 trying to prove the value 
of the city's oil resources. There was also a well-publicized report by the 
California State Mining Bureau in 1888 listing every known oil well and 
petroleum exude in the state, including the ones in Los Angeles.5 Years 
later, Doheny praised the value of this report, if not its author, W. A. Good­
year: "It can scarcely be credited that he knew the significance of the infor­
mation which his annual report conveyed to the experienced prospector. 
That report, made some years before I went into the oil business, was really 
my best guide in the discovery of the various oil districts which it was my 
good fortune to open up in that state."6 
Obviously, Doheny made good use of the information available to him 
and did not succeed on luck alone. The real challenge was not to find the 
oil but to overcome the prevailing apathy about it. Still, Doheny's "discov­
ery" of oil in Los Angeles was attributed to a stroke of genius that made 
him a legend in the California oil industry. 
As Doheny most often told the story, he was living in a cheap hotel on 
the west side of the city when he saw a wagon loaded down with pitch. 
Curious, Doheny stopped the driver and found out that the material came 
from a spot near Westlake Park and was being used as fuel by the local ice 
plant. Hearing that, Doheny supposedly raced off to see the oil exudes for 
himself. "My heart beat fast," he recalled, as he watched the sticky material 
ooze out of the ground: 
I had found gold and I had found silver and I had found lead, but this 
ugly-looking substance I felt was the key to something more valuable than 
any one of these metals. Without ever having seen an oil district or an oil 
derrick . .  . my natural prospecting instinct told me that these tar exudes 
bore the same relation to the petroleum below that the resin on the outside 
of a pine tree bears to the more limpid sap within . .  . It was almost incred­
ible that the possibilities of this spot had not been recognized by people 
connected with the nearby communities. The whole thing seemed too 
good to be true; yet it was true.7 
Convinced that he could sell the oil, Doheny persuaded Canfield to be­
come a partner in his latest endeavor. While they could not afford a lease 
in the Westlake area, they obtained some cheaper property in central Los 
Angeles which had also been flooded with oil in the past. The saturated 
ground at the corner of West State and Patton had later been cut up for 
fuel, leaving a large hollow along one street. Now, utilizing their min­
ing skills, Doheny and Canfield dug a shaft into the depression hoping to 
26 CHAPTER 2 
locate the source of the oil. Initially, their technique was less a product of 
ignorance than it was a matter of utility and finances. A 4 foot by 6 foot 
miner's shaft allowed for more seepage into the hole than a drill bit and 
cost much less than the $5,000 required for the average well.8 
As they went to work using the miner's method, a witness recalled 
watching Doheny handle a shovel while Canfield ran a windlass to take out 
the debris. They continued on like this for thirty-eight days before they 
struck oil at a depth of 155 feet. Canfield's account of this first well men­
tioned only that the shaft slowly filled with oil as they entered the final 
section. But Doheny recalled that they first hit a pocket of gas at this point 
that "crackled like pop-corn" as it came up through the shale, which con­
vinced them to get out of the shaft before they were asphyxiated. They 
found another way to finish the job after Doheny remembered a method 
used for drilling artesian wells, which he had seen as a boy in Wisconsin. 
Adopting the same technique, he brought in the well by driving the sharp­
ened tip of a sixty-foot log into the bottom of the shaft. Unfortunately, the 
gas pressure was not sufficient to produce a flowing well, so the oil had to 
be hoisted out of the well with the windlass and a bucket.9 
In the days and weeks that followed, the aspiring oilmen were the only 
ones interested in their discovery. By now, Doheny was a full-fledged con­
vert to oil, but Canfield was not. According to Henry Ailman, another 
transplanted New Mexican who worked alongside Doheny, Canfield did 
not like working with the gas and decided to give up and go back to min­
ing. When he did, he traded his interest in the oil well for Doheny's interest 
in some gold claims near San Bernardino. With Ailman as his new partner, 
Doheny resolved to make the oil well a success.10 
Previously, Ailman had owned a mercantile and banking operation in 
Silver City, but he lost the business when a run on the bank forced it into 
receivership. He had tried gold mining in Pinos Altos and in Arizona be­
fore arriving in Los Angeles in May 1892. When he learned of Doheny and 
Canfield's efforts to strike oil, he persuaded them to sublease one of their 
three lots to him. Consequently, there were actually two companies at work 
simultaneously: the original one consisting of Doheny, Canfield, and Sam 
Connon, another acquaintance probably from New Mexico, and a second 
one made up of Henry Ailman, his father-in-law, Ira Smith, and his 
thirteen-year-old son. Ailman's well was about fifty feet, or two weeks, be­
hind the first, and he recalled that both efforts succeeded infinding oil that 
was "far superior to the tar which we expected to be satisfied with." It was 
at this point that Canfield left for the mountains and Connon returned to 
his former job at a local bank. 
Fortunately, with the fledgling company near collapse, Connon rescued 
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the operation after he received an inheritance from his parents. Even then, 
there was no money to spare, and they continued to use primitive meth­
ods: a drilling rig consisting of an X-shaped chunk of metal for a drill 
bit, a makeshift derrick, and a horse for lifting power. This system was as 
precarious to operate as it was cheap, because it did not allow them any 
control over the drilling cable. And Doheny, who Ailman said "elected 
himself driller," had trouble with the rig from the start. On their second 
attempt to position the bit over the well, for instance, Doheny lost control 
of the line, and the men watched helplessly as their 300-pound bit plunged 
150 feet into the hole "as though shot out of a cannon." Unamused, and 
clearly disgruntled at being second-in-command, Ailman had to dig out 
the bit, which was now buried several feet into the bottom of the well. 
With some practice, however, Doheny was able to "make hole" with 
this Spartan outfit and got down another thirty feet in the original well, 
where they reached a promising flow of oil. They began collecting the oil 
in discarded tallow buckets belonging to the Southern Pacific Railway and 
had eight full barrels by the next morning. The only other person inter­
ested in their strike at this point was the property owner, J. F. Turner, who 
showed up to see what was happening. When Turner caught sight of the 
oil, Ailman interpreted the look on his face to mean, "My God, have I let 
a fortune slip through my fingers." Next, looking for an excuse to get the 
oil for himself, Turner "[found] something to kick about, trifling though 
it was, [and] he hopped on Ed about it." Then, Ailman recalled, "Ed's Irish 
and Turner's state of Maine tightwadism locked horns and wordsflew." In 
the end, Turner paid them $900 to get off the property and made them 
agree not to drill within 1,200 feet of his ground. Not one to give up with­
out a fight, Doheny got around this restriction by having Carrie use her 
name to lease an adjacent lot. While not much of a ruse, this allowed them 
to get within a reasonable distance of the original well and continue their 
operation.11 
Within a year of Doheny's initial discovery, the momentum of the in­
dustry had picked up, and the neighborhood surrounding that initial site 
was crowded with nine producing wells and four companies at work. 
Turner had four wells pumping, Doheny and Ailman had two, another 
partnership had two, and a man from Downey, California, had one. Ac­
cording to the Los Angeles Herald, these wells occupied about 150 square 
feet of ground along both sides of State Street. In addition to the increasing 
number of wells, the technology was also advancing; the well-financed 
companies like Turner's were using standard drilling rigs and steam boil­
ers. As yet, however, none of the wells produced much oil.12 
In reality, production was the least of the oilmen's worries. In fact, it 
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was almost a curse when Doheny and Ailman obtained a steady flow of oil 
with no market, which forced them into the street to scramble for custom­
ers among the local businesses. In this early period, there were only two 
big companies and a handful of smaller ones using fuel oil in their opera­
tions, and that supply came under contract from an oil company in 
Newhall, northeast of Los Angeles. Ailman complained that "no one would 
admit that there was anything near the city except thick road stuff." Finally, 
the manager of a small plant that ground up bone for fertilizer seemed 
interested. The fertilizer plant had been getting some light oil from other 
sources but needed a heavier product, and the Los Angeles oil seemed like 
an ideal substitute. 
Now, however, Doheny and Ailman's dilemma changed instantane­
ously when they had to turn down their first large contract for lack of 
production. Luckily, they came up with a way to dramatically step up the 
pace of their operation. According to Ailman, they already had a steam 
burner which was sitting idle because their oil was too thick to use with a 
conventional burner, and they could not afford anything else. A tour of 
the fertilizer plant, however, had given Ailman a chance to see a different 
system—the one that worked with the heavier oil. When he realized he 
could duplicate the design on their equipment, he took Doheny aside and 
said to him, "Ed, we have no oil to sell. We will burn it ourselves." His 
invention worked as planned and enabled them to hook their burner to a 
spudding rig, using a five-inch rubber belt and a thirty-inch pulley, and 
get down to 260 feet in their first well. With a thirty-foot derrick above the 
hole, they were pumping three to four barrels of oil a day, as much as any 
well in the field. 
With the combination of better equipment and a steady infusion of 
experienced drillers from the eastern oil fields, the shallow wells in central 
Los Angeles dropped down as far as 500 feet, and the need for capital grew 
proportionately. This transformation proved the value of the city field and 
brought in a crop of new investors. One of those newcomers offered Do­
heny a much larger engine if he would provide the derrick and the drill 
cable for a new company. Doheny jumped at the chance and found a third 
party to loan him the money for the material. Apparently, in haste, Doheny 
left Ailman out of the deal, although he belatedly offered to make him the 
company's new engineer to smooth things over. 
While this operation clearly represented a step forward, it was still on 
the struggling end of the scale. Whether from inexperience or inferior 
equipment, Ailman recalled, they could not get a straight hole, and Do­
heny wore himself out trying to make the drill "crooked proof." All that 
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Ailman could say in retrospect was that the companies that were drilling 
deeper "wiped out our baby outfit." When that happened, Doheny and 
Ailman went their separate ways. Eventually, Ailman retired from the oil 
business with nothing to show for it except for his unheralded role as one 
of the pioneers of the Los Angeles oil industry. 
All in all during these early years, oil production in the city remained 
an extremely risky proposition. Contrary to the general impression that 
Doheny's first well sparked an immediate oil boom, there was an extended 
period of slow and painful growth before the industry took off. The city 
experienced a roller coaster of activity between 1892 and 1899, and it was 
not until the end of the century that Los Angeles, and Southern California, 
in general, experienced the oil fever commonly associated with Doheny's 
efforts. Far more accurate for the early period was a comment in the Los 
Angeles Times in 1894 reminding readers that Doheny faced "hard work to 
make a start in the oil business at a time when nobody had any confidence 
in it, being forced to scrape together and mortgage everything he owned."13 
That effort paid off, however, as Doheny climbed to the top of the local 
industry by year's end, with nineteen wells out of a total of 155. His com­
pany had a production capacity of 350 barrels a day but averaged about 
half of that due to a lack of demand. Overall, the Doheny Oil Company 
was regarded as "one of the most productive and best equipped groups in 
the district." In fact, Doheny was doing much better than that, since his 
closest competitor, another local partnership, had only nine wells capable 
of producing 175 barrels per day. Those two companies accounted for al­
most half of the oil produced in the city.14 
In addition to the production of his own company, Doheny and his 
partner, Sam Connon, were the principal shareholders in the newly formed 
Metropolitan Oil Company, which had the single best producing well at 
100 barrels a day. Even more remarkable in light of Doheny's previous 
financial straits, he and Connon put up $20,000 apiece to form the com­
pany along with three other investors. Since business was still not that 
good, Doheny had obviously located a source of capital. Whether it was 
from a local bank or a private party is unknown, although it was probably 
the former. Either way, this source made all the difference in the world.15 
Despite this dramatic improvement, the oil industry was still struggling 
to find its way in a community wary of its presence. In particular, there 
were environmental concerns that left petroleum advocates pleading for a 
chance to prove themselves. And for better or worse, Los Angeles had been 
undergoing a fundamental change since the 1880s from being a passive 
seaside resort to becoming a modern commercial and manufacturing 
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Los Angeles Oil District, ca. 1885. Security Pacific National Bank Photography 
Collection, Los Angeles Public Library. 
center. What it lacked was a cheap source of fuel. Doheny's efforts, there­
fore, contributed to the forward movement of the city, as long as the resi­
dents were willing to accept certain changes. "Oil derricks outlined against 
the western sky," wrote the Los Angeles Times, were not as pretty as orange 
trees but they were more profitable. Likewise, the Los Angeles Herald be­
lieved that "the hour of deliverance is at hand."16 
The people living in the oil district were not so sure. Almost as soon as 
the derricks started going up, the nearby residents sought to halt the indus­
try in its oily tracks. Throughout the summer and fall of 1894, especially, 
the homeowners around Second Street Park rose up in rebellion, launching 
one attack after another against the oil producers before the City Council. 
Doheny, among others, met each charge with the same defense: that the 
oilmen were putting ten dollars into the area for every dollar they took out 
and that the citizens of Los Angeles would be the ones to profit from the 
industry. "Smoke, noise, and dirt," said another oilman, "are the three nec­
essary evils to the growth, expansion, and upbuilding of our beautiful city." 
And, he continued, if the aesthetic tastes of every citizen had to be taken 
into account and every nuisance wiped out, "our city of the living [would] 
be turned into a veritable city of the dead."17 
Nevertheless, the oilmen had to admit that concerns about public 
health and safety were warranted even though they considered them over­
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stated. This particular admission came in response to a suit filed in Federal 
Court by eight local residents seeking an injunction against the industry. 
Begun in October 1894, the suit listed every oil producer in the city and 
singled Doheny out from among sixty-one individuals to be the principal 
defendant in the case. The bill of complaint presented a graphic descrip­
tion of living conditions near the wells, emphasizing the "noxious vapors, 
smoke, noisome smells, fumes, stenches and noises which disturb, affect 
and impair the health of.. . [the residents] and deprive them of the com­
forts and enjoyments of life." For these reasons, the plaintiffs demanded 
municipal control of the oil industry, a prohibition on nighttime work, 
and at least $5,000 in damages for their suffering. In the meantime, city 
representatives passed a preliminary curfew on nighttime drilling activity 
and assigned a local police officer to enforce sanitation and safety laws 
within the district, but left the larger issue of control up to the courts.18 
To meet this particular challenge, Doheny took the lead in forming the 
Oil-men's Protective Association in November 1894 as a cooperative at­
tempt to govern the local industry. Focused solely on the problems out­
lined in the citizens' complaint the Protective Association appointed a 
special committee to see that the oilmen controlled spills, cleaned up their 
lots, and reduced the smoke from their boilers. They even offered to grade 
the streets with their own asphalt to make transporting oil by wagon less 
hazardous. The threat of real legislation inspired the producers to seek 
out the worst offenders and "prosecute any oil man who maintains a 
nuisance."19 
This voluntary effort by the oilmen elicited a corresponding compro­
mise from the residents: in January 1895, they offered to drop their suit if 
the oilmen agreed to strict boundaries on the south and west sides of the 
oil field to keep the derricks out of new residential areas. However, this 
was the one thing the oilmen absolutely refused to consider. Without any 
definable limits to the oil field as yet, they wanted the freedom to follow 
the oil no matter where it took them, and despite warnings to proceed with 
caution, some of the producers talked "rather wildly about the power­
lessness of the courts to interfere with their business."20 When the court 
dismissed the nuisance suit on April 30 without explanation, it supported 
the oil industry's wish to have free rein over the city after all. Although 
some regulations were necessary for public health and safety and some 
neighborhoods received protection, the Los Angeles Superior Court struck 
down most restrictions on the geographical growth of the oil industry. 
According to the Los Angeles Times, these were "righteous" decisions de­
signed to ensure the industrial health of the city, if not the environment. 
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And until the city field had been fully explored, there was little anyone 
could do to stop the oil producers from conducting their business, as one 
attorney put it, "as though they were in the middle of the Sahara Desert."21 
In spite of their victory in court, some of the oilmen still wanted to 
come up with a way to drill and pump wells that met everyone's concerns. 
The initial idea was to use electric motors to run the oil machinery. As 
before, Doheny was the first one to put an idea to the test. This time, he 
worked in partnership with A. P. Maginnis, an official of the Southern Cali­
fornia Railway ^ -the western end of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe— 
who was also involved in the oil business. Skilled at public relations in his 
railroad work, Maginnis appealed to the City Council in March 1895 for 
permission to set up a large generator to conduct an experiment, believing 
that "electricity will do away with all the offensive features" of oil produc­
tion. The Council approved the proposal, and Doheny reconfigured one 
of his drilling rigs to operate with an electric motor and used it for sev­
eral months as the public watched with anticipation. Unfortunately, the 
results were never satisfactory, and Doheny abandoned the attempt in 
mid-September.22 
This incident was important because it was one of the first collabora­
tions in a long history of mutual investments between Maginnis and Do­
heny. Maginnis held a number of positions with the Santa Fe Railway and 
its subsidiaries. In 1895 he was the claim agent for the Southern California 
Railway, the manager of the Pacific Land Improvement Company (the real 
estate arm of the Santa Fe), and the community liaison officer of the Elsi­
nore, Pomona, and Los Angeles Railway Company. Outside of his official 
duties, Maginnis operated several oil wells in Los Angeles in partnership 
with K. H. Wade, the general manager of the Southern California Rail-
way.23 These men were Doheny's first contacts with the railroad at a time 
when the prospect of converting coal-burning locomotives to oil-burning 
engines had every oilman in California panting in anticipation. Doubtless, 
his relationship with two railroad executives gave him a decided advantage. 
Wade, in particular, had been instrumental in setting up the first California 
experiments between the Santa Fe, the Southern Pacific, and the Union Oil 
Company to use fuel oil in locomotives. After a successful test in October 
1894, Union Oil thought it had an open field to supply the Santa Fe. But 
the deal fell through in February 1895 when Wade discovered he could get 
cheaper oil from the Los Angeles city field, with Doheny as the principal 
supplier of the Southern California Railway.24 
Although Doheny's precise role in these events is unclear, there is no 
doubt that he had been determined to sell oil to the railroads from the 
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THE MARCH OF THE DERRICK.

The March of the Derrick. Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1900. 
beginning. During a promotional trip to San Francisco in the fall of 1894, 
at the time Wade was working with Union Oil, Doheny met with officials 
of the Southern Pacific in San Francisco about supplying them with fuel. 
Apparently, he made a favorable enough impression that the Southern Pa­
cific set aside a locomotive in Los Angeles and equipped it with oil burners 
to test the local fuel oil. Perhaps this was his part in Wade's campaign, or 
vice versa. It is also possible that Doheny hoped to play the two railroads 
against each other in a bid for his services, convinced as he was that the 
heavy crude oil from the Los Angeles wells would be a much cheaper fuel 
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than coal. In recounting the details of his San Francisco trip, for instance, 
Doheny stressed that he "was prepared to say now that oil can be profitably 
furnished to the Southern Pacific at $1 a barrel, and that this would ap­
proximate coal at $3 per ton," which was much less than what the railroad 
paid at the time. Confident that the oil resources of the city would inspire 
further development, Doheny proclaimed that "one of the greatest indus­
tries on the Pacific Coast is building up right here on Second Street in Los 
Angeles," adding that it would also be easy to get "all the money wanted 
for any kind of oil well proposition." He even suggested a plan for a new 
company that would move oil by pipelines, from the city field to a central 
depot, for easy delivery along spur lines to the various railroads. He also 
envisioned a major pipeline to the coast, "where a huge storage tank could 
be placed on a dock, so that the oil barges may load direct from it." Clearly, 
Doheny could see where the industry was headed as early as 1894 and was 
determined to take a leading role in its development.25 
While Doheny concentrated his efforts on fuel oil, he also promoted 
early attempts to refine heavy crude into lighter products through the Pa­
cific Oil Refining and Supply Company, one of the first companies to try 
to build a pipeline and storage network in the city. The work began with 
E. A. Edwards, a recent immigrant from the Ohio oil fields, who built the 
refinery and designed a system for treating the by-products of asphalt, the 
company's main product. Eventually, Edwards was able to distill the local 
crude into at least four distinct grades, ranging from heavy stove oil to a 
small amount of light material similar to eastern illuminating oil.26 
Despite its success, or because of it, the Edwards refinery, located just 
a few blocks from the central oil district, became the most visible symbol 
of the oil industry's threat to the environment. Acting under increasing 
pressure from the community, the City Attorney drafted an ordinance to 
outlaw oil refineries within the city limits and threatened to close down 
the existing operation. In December 1895, Doheny and Maginnis stepped 
in to save the company with a plan to relocate the refinery to a lot adjacent 
to the Southern California's track along the bed of the Los Angeles River. 
There they intended to make extensive improvements in the plant and ma­
chinery so that Edwards could work the local oil "for all there is in it."27 
As with their earlier bid for an electric franchise, Maginnis lobbied City 
Hall on behalf of the refinery and summarized the continued plight of the 
industry in a letter to the Council: "I am not able to understand why the 
oil men, who have done more for Los Angeles than any other people, 
should be so continually persecuted. We have paid out about $10,000 in 
litigation and have never yet lost a case, which shows that we have been 
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wrongfully accused and annoyed unjustly. The oil men have distributed in 
your city over $600,000 in an effort to give you cheap fue l . . . and in return 
we have been met only by lawsuits and injunctions." Maginnis noted, in 
particular, that the parties interested in the refinery had a monthly payroll 
of over $18,000 and represented a capital investment of over $90,000. In 
conclusion, Maginnis dismissed the local opposition to the refinery as the 
work of a "wealthy and influential member of the Standard Oil Company" 
who feared local competition, and asked the Council not to pass the anti-
refinery ordinance without investigating the situation.28 
Two weeks later the city leaders approved the plan to relocate the re­
finery on a provisional basis "as a test to use the latest improved ap­
pliances." On March 25, 1896, Doheny and Maginnis reorganized the 
company as the Asphaltum & Oil Refining Company, with financial help 
from Sam Connon and H. L. Williams, one of Edwards's original investors. 
Each of them put up $2,500 in return for 250 shares of stock, which ac­
counted for half the capital stock of the company. A fifth investor, Theo­
dore Clark, added $10,000 of his own. Once in operation, the refinery was 
able to process about 330 barrels of oil a day, which placed it second out 
of the five refineries in the Los Angeles area, behind the Union Oil Com-
pany's 400-barrel plant. Presumably, the Doheny-Connon Oil Company 
supplied all of the crude oil.29 
Even as the local industry grew more sophisticated, however, there was 
still the fundamental problem of defining the limits of the field. More pre­
cise information would reduce the hostility of residential groups, but 
definition was even more important from a marketing perspective, since 
many potential customers feared that the local field was nothing more than 
a small pocket of oil that could dry up at any time. To clear up the issue, 
the Chamber of Commerce hired Professor W. L. Watts, a field geologist 
with the California State Mining Bureau, to make a special study of the oil 
fields in Southern California—and the Los Angeles district, in particular. 
As of March 1895, the city field was still confined to a few square blocks 
around Second Street Park radiating out from Doheny's first well. Now, 
some 200 wells were crammed into the area with as many as four or five 
per lot. But with production cut back for lack of customers, Watts hesitated 
to make any predictions about the supply, although he did not believe that 
the field would hold out for long at full capacity. He estimated current 
daily output at 300 barrels and thought that was about a quarter of the 
field's potential. From surface indications, Watts did not hazard a guess 
about geographical boundaries; he merely advised the oilmen to keep 
moving in all directions and see what happened. Contrary to his intended 
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mission, therefore, Watts reinforced the conflict between the oilmen and 
their neighbors and heightened consumers' fears of committing themselves 
to an uncertain supply.30 
As before, Doheny stepped forward with a plan. He organized a new 
company, the Producers Oil Company, to act as a clearinghouse for the 
entire field through a centralized storage and pipeline system. By creating 
a cooperative storage system, Doheny intended to stabilize both the supply 
and the price of oil so that customers would negotiate long-term contracts 
for fuel. According to a report in the Los Angeles Herald, Doheny wanted 
to create a "common reservoir" of oil that could be held or sold depending 
on the conditions of the market. Ideally, this would prevent individuals 
from "selling haphazard" and undercutting the price and would put the 
oil producers "in a position to talk business to consumers." During the 
previous year, for example, the price of oil dropped from $1.40 a barrel to 
$.85, when a dollar a barrel was the accepted minimum to make a profit.31 
Incorporated on January 3, 1895, Producers Oil Company began with 
twenty-seven oilmen from the city field, representing over half of the 
supply. Although many observers hoped that the company would stabilize 
the market, it never operated as advertised. Despite Doheny's claims, many 
small producers were very suspicious of the company from the start, be­
cause almost all of the initial shareholders were Doheny stalwarts. These 
included Charlie Canfield, who had recently returned to the oil business, 
George Owens and Sam Connon, who were Doheny's current partners, 
and Frederic Northrup and Charles Sumner, who were directors of the 
Metropolitan Oil Company. Doheny's overwhelming domination of Pro­
ducers Oil Company left the impression that it was nothing more than a 
scheme to gain control of the whole market.32 
This suspicion appeared to be justified by the activity of the Union Oil 
Company, the largest operation in the state at the time. In response to the 
low prices and turbulent conditions in Los Angeles, which had begun to 
affect sales in the outlying regions, Union Oil tried to exert some control 
over the city. Previously, Union had stayed out of the Los Angeles field, 
believing it to be inconsequential, but by the end of 1894, Los Angeles oil 
was becoming a problem for the company. At the same time that Doheny 
was organizing Producers Oil Company, Union Oil made a direct proposal 
to the Los Angeles oilmen to buy up the local surplus of light fuel oil and 
market it on their behalf. Early the next year, Union officials reached an 
agreement with about twenty producers of light oil, although they ac­
counted for only about 8 percent of the total output of heavier crude. 
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In the course of these dealings, Union Oil representatives let it be known 
that they were willing to drastically cut their own prices "in order to con­
vince local producers that it is useless for them to compete with the big 
corporation."33 
For several months, the price of oil remained at seventy to eighty-five 
cents per barrel, while everyone awaited the completion of the pipeline 
and storage facilities being constructed by Doheny and a few other large 
companies. By the summer of 1895, however, conditions in the field were 
worsening by the day, and the depressed market allowed the financially 
strong companies to feed off of their weaker competitors at will. Under 
those circumstances, an attitude of fear and desperation took hold of the 
small producers, which led them into a drilling frenzy in a futile effort to 
save themselves. Of course, it only hastened their demise. With some 400 
wells pumping and forty more being drilled, the price of oil dropped with 
every additional barrel. At this pace, the oilmen were putting down about 
fifteen wells a week and eating up a new city block each month. The nine 
blocks that now made up the Los Angeles field were so crowded that the 
oil derricks touched at the base. A report on the field for the end of August 
estimated current production at 3,500 barrels of oil per day, when the mar­
ket could not absorb 1,200. Small producers with no storage capacity and 
no financial reserve sold their oil for whatever they could get, which drove 
the price below thirty cents a barrel.34 
To understand this suicidal behavior, we need to know something 
about the "rule of capture," which dominated the philosophy of oil pro­
duction. Essentially, according to legal interpretation, oil could be claimed 
only when it reached the surface: "Whatever gets into the well belongs to 
the owner of the well, no matter where it came from." Thus, as one Los 
Angeles producer explained: "The main reason for the operation of so 
many wells now is that every oil well owner knows that if he doesn't pump 
the fellow next to him will get all the oil in the locality. There isn't a cent 
of money being made, but they are all pumping to prevent their neighbors 
from pumping up what don't belong to them strictly."35 The result was that 
nothing in the market was secure, and companies with long-term contracts 
at fifty to seventy-five cents a barrel watched helplessly as their customers 
reneged on agreements when the price dropped by half. At this point, with 
no stable market price, no firm commitments, and no way to ship oil to 
potential customers outside the city* the local oil producers were, in the 
view of the Los Angeles Times, no better off than a "hungry man on a desert 
island with diamonds in his pockets." Over time, the situation paralyzed 
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the market when the surviving oilmen refused to make any more contracts, 
stopped drilling, and decided to let the surplus play out before they started 
over again.36 
With the complete demoralization of the oil market in the fall of 1895, 
the time was right for another attempt to get the producers to work to­
gether for their mutual benefit. From all indications, the Producers Oil 
Company had not yet done anything to slow down the process of disinte­
gration. In fact, Doheny had aggravated it by soaking up as much of the 
cheap oil as he could get, perhaps feeling no sympathy for the individuals 
who refused his help. By this time, however, there was another organiza­
tion on the rise as an alternative. The new group was the Los Angeles Oil 
Exchange, which was headed by Rufus H. Herron, a recent immigrant from 
the oil fields of western Pennsylvania. Like other transplants from the east­
ern fields, Herron was well-acquainted with the situation facing the Los 
Angeles producers. In particular, Herron had been in Pennsylvania during 
the Great Shut-Down Movement of 1887 to 1888, when the local produc­
ers not only joined a protective association but did it in cooperation with 
their archenemy, Standard Oil. Standing together, if only for a short time, 
they exerted some positive control over the chaos of the oil fields. For a 
full year, the association successfully held back drilling and production, 
eliminated the surplus, and brought the price of oil back up to an accept­
able level. When it was over, the independents and Standard Oil went back 
to fighting each other but not before proving that, under certain condi­
tions, small and large producers could work together profitably.37 
With this background, Herron seemed a more benign benefactor than 
Doheny, and his effort effectively divided the field into competing camps: 
on one side were the pioneer oilmen allied with Doheny, while on the 
other were the rest of the producers, mostly newcomers, who were upset 
at having been "lured on with long yarns of how various firms were going 
to store our oil for us." The conditions of the market, however, made it 
very difficult for the Oil Exchange to promote their brand of cooperation. 
Although the leaders of the Exchange claimed to have at least seventy-seven 
out of one hundred possible producers in their organization, actual partic­
ipation was less than half that number, and even those members were split 
into competing groups. Ideally, each company was supposed to sign a 
three-year contract to market their oil through the Exchange, but as of 
October 1895 only thirty producers had done so. As it happened, the pro­
ducers were never willing to sign binding agreements but merely promised 
to allow the Exchange to handle their oil.38 
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The condition which actually brought the field together was an increas­
ing glut of oil that so overwhelmed the storage system in December 1895 
that it forced a district-wide shutdown. By this time, the Los Angeles Times 
could report that the "climax of defeat" had come to a majority of the well 
owners. With no storage and no market for their oil, producers could keep 
only a fraction of the city's 300 operating wells pumping.39 Now conditions 
were right for the Oil Exchange to have an effect on the market. Over the 
next six months, a combination of production cutbacks and the failure of 
many weak companies stemmed the tide of oil. And using its own tank 
steamer, the Exchange organized several bulk sales of oil to consumers in 
San Francisco. The combined effect of these factors helped turn the market 
around and lift the price up from forty cents in December to $1.25 in 
June.40 
Despite the lack of detailed evidence for these events, it is clear that 
Doheny was able to continue operating throughout this period because he 
had a larger customer base than any of his competitors. By the end of 
1894, he was supplying fuel oil to a number of local businesses, including 
a brewery, a cold storage plant, and a packing company. He also had a 
contract to provide oil for the steam-generating system at City Hall, after 
offering to refit their burners for free and promising them a $500 reduction 
on the annual fuel bill they normally incurred using coal. Ironically, the 
members of the City Council were probably warming themselves on cheap 
local oil while they debated the nuisance complaints against the oilmen. 
Overall, Doheny's success at winning these long-term contracts left him 
vulnerable to any sudden changes in the oil market, especially when his 
aggressive marketing strategy won him a major contract to supply the 
Southern California Railway.41 In this case, Doheny's friendship with A. P. 
Maginnis and K. H. Wade helped him to secure the railroad's business, but 
the work turned out to be a mixed blessing in the end. The contract began 
in early 1895 and called for Doheny to deliver 20,000 barrels of oil a month 
and keep a full month's reserve in storage. The railroad paid him $1.05 per 
barrel. Taking an estimated cost of production of fifty to seventy cents a 
barrel and adding 10 to 15 percent for delivery, Doheny had fashioned a 
contract with the Santa Fe that left him a reasonable, but not excessive, 
profit. 
Not all his arrangements were so rational, however. Hoping to extend 
his domination of the market, Doheny took on additional contracts during 
the oil glut at a much lower rate; this left him desperate to buy oil at thirty 
to forty cents to avoid the prospect of taking a financial loss on every bar­
rel. By March 1896, it would have cost him as much as seventy to eighty 
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cents a barrel for any additional oil to cover contracts he had made at 
half that amount. Those contracts cut deeply into the earnings from his 
arrangement with the railroad. To make matters worse, the production of 
the wells, as Watts had warned, began to drop off as much as 10 percent a 
month as the field started to play out. And with the market price edging 
one dollar a barrel at the well, Doheny's margin of profit was razor-thin.42 
At the end of the oil glut, consequently, with shrinking supplies and rising 
prices, Doheny was hard-pressed to fill the railroad contract and keep up 
with the rest of his obligations. Simply put, Doheny got caught short when 
the price of oil started to rebound. 
Given these constraints, the financial consequences of Doheny's situa­
tion were not long in coming. On the first day of August 1896, the Los 
Angeles Times reported the collapse of the Doheny-Connon Oil Company, 
adding that the "immediate cause of the failure was due to bad business 
management and extravagance." Doheny's largest creditors, especially the 
Farmers and Merchants Bank, forced the move. The following day the pa­
per backed away from their attack on the management of the company, 
citing "unfounded rumors" as the source of the earlier quote. To avoid 
bankruptcy, Doheny and Connon voluntarily assigned their property to 
W. A. Morgan, a representative of the bank, "in order to provide funds for 
immediately suspending development and paying off all labor and other 
claims." The receiver was confident that, by maintaining daily operations 
without the burden of expansion, "the regular production of the property 
will enable its owners to liquidate all liabilities in good time."43 
Obviously, this was not an event Doheny elaborated upon in later years, 
except during one interview in 1905. At that time, he charged that a com­
bination of oil well owners—presumably the Oil Exchange—had been 
formed to "bust [him] up in business" because he had the "temerity" to 
take contracts at rates that were well below the market price for a barrel of 
oil. As far as it went, this explanation is in accord with the facts available. 
What it does not clear up is Doheny's rationale for taking contracts that 
put him increasingly at risk. Either he was supremely confident in his abil­
ity to find oil and did not believe that the field was vulnerable to exhaus­
tion or he simply counted too much on his ability to control the market 
by gathering all the production into the Producers Oil Company. Unfortu­
nately, he attributed the underlying problem to politics rather than man­
agement. Specifically, Doheny considered himself a victim of his political 
sympathies during the 1896 presidential campaign, in which he had sup­
ported the candidacy of William Jennings Bryan. Supposedly, the Farmers 
and Merchants Bank of Los Angeles had been part of a nationwide effort 
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by Republican financiers to "strengthen their position in case of [some] 
commercial and financial disaster . .  . which might occur if Bryan was 
elected, and they were not extending their loans." This program included 
an attack on Democratic loyalists. Thus, Doheny was notified that the bank 
was "able and willing to extend aid to their friends" but could not abide 
those who supported William Jennings Bryan. Hearing that, Doheny told 
the vice-president of the bank that he understood but that he could not 
"change the opinions of a life time after a few minutes conversation." In­
stead, as he recalled, he persuaded the bank "to name a trustee to whom I 
would deed the property in order to fill my contracts." Afterward, he hoped 
to get his company back.44 Thus, by portraying himself as the victim of 
jealous competitors and political enemies—a tactic he would use again— 
Doheny was able to sidestep any discussion of the problems he created 
at the time. Perhaps, given the intense feelings generated by the presiden­
tial election, he was put at a disadvantage because of his political affilia­
tion, but that had nothing to do with what led him into trouble in the 
first place. 
A final note about Doheny's political activity is that he had recently 
joined the Silver Republican Club, a group of pro-Bryan Republicans 
formed in the months before the election—a curious place for a lifelong 
Democrat, unless he was actively recruiting his business associates for the 
opposition. Doheny was also one of thirty delegates chosen to represent 
Los Angeles County at a conference held by the provisional committee of 
the Silver Republicans, and he continued this work despite any conflict it 
caused. In July 1897, for example, when Bryan addressed the Silver Repub­
licans of Los Angeles, Edward and Carrie Doheny were there, along with 
A. P. Maginnis and several other oilmen, seated prominently in front of 
the honored guest.45 
Political sympathies notwithstanding, Doheny's problems in 1896 were 
financial and had resulted from a too-rapid expansion of his organization. 
Afterward, with the company in receivership, Doheny worked in vain for 
several months to turn the situation around. One of the first things he did 
was to move outside the central district in an attempt to find new territory. 
As it was, the central oil district was approximately 800 feet wide, north to 
south, and one mile long, east to west. The wells along the northern and 
southern boundaries had not been good producers while those on either 
end of the field sat along an area where the oil strata dropped off so steeply 
that it cost too much to drill for the deeper oil. Since the bank was unavail­
able as a source of capital, it is not clear who put up the money for the 
wildcat well. Nevertheless, in November 1896 Doheny started drilling 
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three-quarters of a mile beyond the western boundary of the oil zone. Un­
deniably aggressive, he was not known for being careless. Thus, his reputa­
tion as a "cautious exploiter" led many observers to celebrate prematurely 
the expansion of the field. Unfortunately, Doheny missed the oil sand by a 
quarter of a mile and ended up with water instead of oil. He made a few 
more attempts closer in with no more success. Eventually, by the summer 
of 1897, a new flush field had come in on the east side of the old district, 
which sent the market into another period of overproduction. By then, 
however, Doheny had already given up and moved on.46 
In making this decision, Doheny was following the lead of the Santa Fe 
Railroad, which was determined to establish an independent source of oil. 
Apparently, before the new field opened up, some of the strongest mem­
bers of the Oil Exchange, which had broken apart by this time, had stepped 
in to make up the difference between what the railroad needed and what 
Doheny could supply. In doing that, these individuals deliberately raised 
the price of oil as high as possible. When it reached $1.67 a barrel in March 
1897, the Santa Fe balked, converted a number of engines back to burning 
coal, and sent Doheny out to Orange County, near the city of Fullerton, to 
open up a new district. Once established there in December 1897, Doheny 
sold out what was left of his Los Angeles holdings to John A. Connon— 
Sam's brother—for $l,000.47 
Actually, Doheny's decision to move into Orange County had been well 
planned, since he had taken out several oil leases in Fullerton at least a year 
in advance. In June 1895, for example, Doheny obtained a lease for two 
pieces of property in Fullerton from the Olinda Ranch Company; the lease 
included an option to purchase 2,700 acres for $51,000. To maintain the 
lease in the meantime, Doheny had to drill at least one well before January 
1896, suggesting that some of his financial problems in Los Angeles might 
have come from prospecting in Fullerton—that is, if he was working for 
himself at that point. It also seems likely that the Santa Fe was underwrit­
ing his lease hunting in Orange County and perhaps even his wildcat work 
in the city.48 
The only thing that is clear is that Doheny's financial difficulties in no 
way imperiled his relationship with the Santa Fe. Certainly, it made him 
more dependent on their largesse. On the other hand, the railroad seemed 
to need his expertise just as much. Consequently, on December 5, 1896, 
the president of the Santa Fe Railroad approved a contract between K. H. 
Wade and Doheny that extended their arrangement. Essentially, the five-
year contract obligated Doheny to develop the Fullerton leases that he had 
obtained, along with others held by Wade, to supply the Southern Califor­
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nia Railway. The railroad also agreed to pay him to investigate other pros­
pects "with a view of acquiring and developing the same" on their behalf. 
And for the life of the agreement, the railroad expected to have the benefit 
of his "knowledge and experience" at all times and required him to "per­
sonally direct and superintend the work of development and production 
of oil in the lands covered by [the] leases." According to this agreement, 
which was clearly defined as not being a partnership, Doheny was respon­
sible for providing the drilling machinery (engines, boilers, cables, and oil 
and water lines), while the railroad would take care of the well casing, oil 
derricks, pumps, material for storage tanks, transportation facilities, fuel, 
and labor costs. The cost of fuel to operate the equipment would be di­
vided between the two parties, with the railroad paying a two-thirds share. 
After deducting for royalties paid to the landowners, the railroad agreed to 
buy two-thirds of the net from Doheny at one dollar per barrel. Doheny 
received the other third of the oil in payment for his work and had the 
option of selling it, as well, to the railroad for the same price. Because this 
was not a partnership, however, Doheny did not have a proprietary interest 
in any of the leases or materials furnished by the railroad, and if the Santa 
Fe needed to move faster than Doheny's resources would allow, it retained 
the option of bringing in a third party.49 
When Doheny headed to Fullerton in March 1897, therefore, he went 
with the full support of the Santa Fe behind him. But even with that help, 
opening a new field from scratch took time, and it was slow going in Fuller­
ton for many months. Meanwhile, back in Los Angeles, the opening of the 
eastern extension of the field ushered in another period of overproduction 
that forced prices back down below fifty cents a barrel by the end of the 
summer. This situation allowed the railroad to maintain operations and 
buy up a three-months' reserve of fuel oil, about 65,000 barrels, to tide 
them over while Doheny built up their properties in Orange County. More 
than anything else, the continued volatility of the market reinforced the 
Santa Fe's determination to secure its own supply of oil. Seven months into 
the work, when Doheny had two wells producing a total of fifty barrels a 
day and two more ready for the pump, W. G. Nevin, who took over the 
Southern California after Wade's death in March 1897, boasted that the 
railroad was now "practically independent" of any action by the local pro­
ducers and expected to be totally self-sufficient by the spring of 1898.50 
Despite Nevin's confidence, Doheny did not save the Santa Fe from the 
vagaries of the market as early as anticipated, but his work was impressive 
nonetheless. When he completed the first wells in October 1897, they met 
only about 5 percent of the railroad's current demand. By the following 
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August, he had ten wells that produced about 200 barrels a day, or roughly 
20 percent of total consumption. From there the pace of development 
increased steadily until the fall of 1900, when Doheny had nineteen wells 
that produced as much as 100 barrels a day each, bringing the Santa Fe 
close to the independence it desired.51 
Apart from his work in Fullerton, Doheny was also experimenting in 
the western section of the district near the mouth of Brea Canon. In July 
1899, he formed the Brea Canon Oil Company—with a coterie of Santa 
Fe investors, including Maginnis, Nevin, and C. N. Sterry, a Santa Fe attor­
ney from Los Angeles—to handle the properties. Early appraisals of the 
Brea Canon had been enthusiastic and the company's first well produced 
several hundred barrels of oil a day for the first six months, when most of 
the wells throughout Southern California yielded well below half that 
amount.52 
Having fulfilled his primary obligations to the Santa Fe in Fullerton, 
Doheny began to range outside of the Los Angeles Basin and soon mi­
grated to Bakersfield in Kern County. As with every preceding oil discovery 
in California, there were obvious signs that oil existed along the Kern River, 
but for many years, no one cared to look. One person who did was Thomas 
Means, an old rancher whose property sat along a bend in the river about 
seven miles outside of Bakersfield. Most folks considered Means a lunatic 
and a pest on the subject of oil and dismissed his rantings about having a 
fortune in oil at his doorstep. Means did not want to do the work himself, 
but he badgered the locals to come out and take a chance on his property. 
Finally, in the spring of 1899, two local men, Jonathan and James Elwood, 
took him up on the offer and drilled the first well. Having scouted the 
area on his own, Doheny was familiar with Means's story and was quick 
to move in as soon as he heard about the new well. In a race with John B. 
Treadwell, his counterpart for the Southern Pacific Railway, Doheny se­
cured a lease on the Means ranch and bought up additional tracts along 
the river to determine the direction of the oil pool.53 
Then, on May 23, 1899, Doheny incorporated the Petroleum Develop­
ment Company as an independent operation outside the purview of his 
Fullerton contract. With an initial capital stock of $50,000, Doheny was 
the principal shareholder with $20,000. Naturally, several Santa Fe officials 
invested, as well, and most of Doheny's oil went straight into the engines 
of the Southern California Railway. This time, Doheny really did help set 
off the next oil boom, as the Kern River field expanded to include some 
twelve square miles of land, more than forty oil companies, and 134 
wells by the end of its first year. Most of the producing outfits were small 
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operations with three or four wells apiece, but sitting at the top of the list 
were the two companies allied with the railroads. At this point, Treadwell 
had nineteen wells, Doheny had seventeen, and both were drilling as 
quickly as possible.54 
Although the Santa Fe was Doheny's principal customer in Kern River, 
the railroad did not step in immediately and take over the operations as 
they had in Fullerton. In fact, the Santa Fe was still rather cautious with 
respect to the oil situation. Where the Southern Pacific was in the process 
of converting all of its locomotives to burn oil, the Santa Fe decided to 
maintain some coal engines just in case oil production fell off or was delib­
erately withheld. Before making a complete switch to fuel oil, the Santa Fe 
wanted to have an extensive storage system paralleling their lines and a 
headquarters in place at Bakersfield. Thus, the railroad continued to en­
courage Doheny's efforts without making it a new policy.35 
In fact, both the Brea Canon and Petroleum Development oil compa­
nies appear to have operated as independent companies, unlike the Fuller­
ton properties. And there is no indication that the Santa Fe representatives 
who invested in these companies had official funds at their disposal, de­
spite the fact that their efforts clearly fit the railroad's expansion plans. One 
example will suffice. In April 1897, Doheny and several of his associates 
bought some land in Fullerton in their own names, although they intended 
to use it for oil to fill the Santa Fe's contract. In this case, they purchased 
forty acres of land for $2,000, developed it for two years, and then sold it 
to Nevin for $10,000 in March 1899. At that point, it was clear that Nevin 
bought the land on behalf of the Santa Fe Railroad.56 
Although there is room to speculate about the personal involvement of 
the railroad officers, there is no doubt that Doheny was able to take advan­
tage of his work for the Santa Fe. Relying on the income from the Santa 
Fe's oil field in Fullerton and his position as the railroad's oil expert, Do­
heny not only escaped potential disaster in Los Angeles but expanded his 
own operations along with those of his benefactors. Taking full advantage 
of the latitude of his contract, Doheny went into the Brea Canon and then 
moved on to Bakersfield, pulling the railroad along behind him to each 
destination. Once established in Kern River, he relinquished his contract 
in Fullerton and forged ahead into Mexico, using the profits from the Pe­
troleum Development Company to support his latest investments. When 
Doheny decided to close out his Fullerton contract in October 1900, he 
had produced more than 200,000 barrels of oil for the railroad. As of Au­
gust 31, Doheny had been paid $58,846 for the oil he sold to the Santa Fe. 
Out of that, he spent about $14,000 for machinery, leaving the remainder 
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for living expenses and other investments. In the end, the Santa Fe valued 
his share of the two years remaining on his contract, assuming a 23 percent 
annual reduction in output, at $127,126 and offered him a cash payment 
of $67,500. From an initial investment of $300,000, Doheny estimated the 
value of the Fullerton operation at $2.5 million. Sustaining Doheny's devel­
opment work over the first three years meant that the railroad had paid an 
average price of $1.64 a barrel when the market rate was no more than one 
dollar, and often much less. But president E. P. Ripley considered it a vital 
investment since it had protected them from what he described as "combi­
nations formed among the producers to squeeze us."57 
In addition to his work in Southern California, Doheny also had a con­
tract to supply all the Santa Fe's oil for their Mojave-to-San Francisco line. 
Once again, the railroad relied on Doheny's expertise and confidence and 
signed the contract when he had only one small well, producing thirty 
barrels a day, while the railroad needed at least a thousand barrels. While 
waiting for him to build up production in Bakersfield to cover the new 
contract, the Santa Fe shipped its own oil up from Fullerton and bought 
cheap oil in Kern River during the first months of flush production. By the 
following year, Doheny had met the demands of the contract with approxi­
mately twenty wells in production and found himself with enough free 
time to explore for oil in Mexico. As prospects increased below the border, 
Doheny negotiated an end to his relationship with the Santa Fe in August 
1901, when he submitted a proposal to sell the Petroleum Development 
Company to the railroad. The details of his appraisal illustrate just how 
well he was doing in Kern River. He estimated the total worth of the com­
pany at $3,150,100, based on the following assets: 1,500 acres of oil land; 
thirty wells, which produced an average of fifty barrels a day each; 40,000 
barrels of oil in storage; and $225,000 in oil-well machinery, tanks, and 
other supplies. Using the Santa Fe's own estimate of its oil requirements, 
he valued the remainder of his contract for 30,000 barrels a month at 
$900,000. At the time, Doheny was actually producing at least 45,000 bar­
rels a month, out of which the railroad took its 30,000 barrels at $.96 each 
when the market rate was $.38. And since he had only 40,000 barrels in 
storage, he must have been selling the rest of it to the railroad for storage 
depots along their lines. In terms of profitability, Doheny noted that oil 
could be "produced and delivered on board the cars from the Petroleum 
Development Company's wells at less than fifteen cents per barrel." This 
left him with a profit of seventy-one cents per barrel on his contract. Cer­
tainly, once assured of the supply, the Santa Fe was happy to take that 
savings for itself. Finally, based on his own geological experiments, Doheny 
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offered an "ultra-conservative" estimate for the company's oil reserves at 
100 million barrels—enough oil to run the entire Santa Fe system west of 
Albuquerque "for over 50 years." Taking everything together, Doheny 
asked for $1.8 million for the Petroleum Development Company. The 
Santa Fe disputed some of Doheny's calculations and countered with an 
offer of $1.25 million, which Doheny accepted. Even though he now had 
to split the proceeds with five minority stockholders, he was due about 
$850,000 for himself.58 
After having started with nothing but an idea and some determination 
nine years earlier, Doheny left for Mexico a millionaire in 1902. Although 
he had displayed an extraordinary amount of skill and ambition over these 
years, his initiative might not have counted for much had it not been for 
his connection to the Santa Fe Railroad. With that as his safety net, Doheny 
proceeded relatively risk-free into a market that others found inherently 
unstable. Still, his promotional efforts to overcome the railroad's reluc­
tance to convert to oil and his tireless work to open up new fields were 
good indications that he would be equally successful in his later adventures 
south of the border. 
In closing this chapter, before going on to Doheny's work in Mexico, 
we need to take a final glance at his domestic life during these years. For 
lack of information to the contrary, Edward and Carrie must have contin­
ued their married life in Los Angeles much as they had in New Mexico. All 
that is known for sure, aside from Carrie's role in leasing oil property, is 
that they shared the tragedy of losing their daughter, Eileen, in 1892 and 
the consolation of having another child, Edward Jr., the next year. And in 
the summer of 1896, when Doheny was forced to take stock of his company 
and his career, Carrie was the one who persuaded him to go back to Wis­
consin and see about his parents. Once there, learning that everyone but a 
brother had died in the twenty-four years since he had left, Doheny took 
his brother back to Los Angeles to live with him, adding to an already 
extended family that included his in-laws, Mariah and Martin Barber, who 
had come to Los Angeles in 1893. Barber worked for Doheny through the 
1890s and eventually became general superintendent of the Santa Fe's oil 
development in California.59 
It is certain, though, that Edward and Carrie's relationship had been 
deteriorating during these years and reached the point of divorce sometime 
around 1898. At the time, divorce was still a relatively unusual and drastic 
response to a failing marriage, and there must have been a serious and 
justifiable reason for the breakup. Carrie moved north to San Francisco 
and later had a house built in Oakland where she reportedly lived quite 
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well on a $500 per month alimony settlement. Edward remained in Los 
Angeles and became engaged to Carrie Estelle Betzold, known as Estelle, a 
twenty-five-year-old telephone operator. Rumor had it that it was Estelle's 
voice that first captured his attention. However they met, Edward and Es­
telle were married in a civil ceremony in August 1900. The wedding took 
place in Albuquerque, New Mexico, aboard a private rail car belonging to 
A. P. Maginnis, as part of a business trip and train holiday that included 
Mr. and Mrs. Maginnis, Charles Canfield and his wife, and a few other 
guests.60 
Upon returning to the West Coast, however, the newlywed couple re­
ceived the news that Carrie had died. Newspaper accounts of the tragedy 
quoted Miss M. Morgan, who had been Carrie's companion for the preced­
ing ten months. According to Morgan, Carrie asked her to order some fluid 
to recharge the household batteries, along with some medicine, from the 
local drug store. When the supplies were delivered to the house, Carrie 
answered the door, took the package, and disappeared into her bedroom 
upstairs. A short time later, Morgan was startled "by a violent screaming." 
Rushing to Carrie's room, Morgan found her "in terrible agony." Morgan 
said that Carrie was able to tell her that she mistook the battery fluid for 
the medicine and had swallowed some before she realized her error. This 
would have been a curious mistake, however, since the bottle of battery 
fluid had "Poison" written on it in conspicuous red letters. The coroner 
determined that Carrie had actually poured herself a large wine glass full 
of the solution—at least six ounces—and drank all of it, which would have 
required several gulps at least. Because the battery fluid caused her to vomit 
almost as soon as she got it down, her death was not immediate, and she 
suffered for several days before finally succumbing to the toxic mixture. In 
the end, however, the coroner did not challenge the story of an accidental 
poisoning. All that Morgan could add in the way of explanation was that 
"Mrs. Doheny has been a sufferer from nervous troubles for a long time " 
Incidently, there was no mention of Edward Jr. in all of this. Presumably, 
young "Ned," who was then about seven years old, remained with his fa­
ther after the divorce, suggesting that Carrie had either been judged unfit 
for the task, or had chosen to let the child go.61 
Given the circumstances of her death and the likelihood that she delib­
erately took her own life, Carrie Lou Ella Doheny was no longer a subject 
for discussion in the Doheny household. Edward never mentioned her 
again, at least not in public. The Dohenys (Edward, Estelle, and Ned) re­
mained an intensely private family, and none of their closest friends, even 
those who had known Carrie, betrayed their confidence. For her part, 
Estelle and Edward Doheny, ca. 1900-1905. Archival Center, Archdio­
cese of Los Angeles, Papers of Carrie Estelle and Edward L. Doheny. 
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despite some obvious insecurities, Estelle rose to the challenge of managing 
a wealthy household with determination, if not enthusiasm.62 For reasons 
unknown, she would never have any children, although there was every 
indication that she accepted Ned as her own, and most people believed he 
was. Estelle devoted herself to philanthropic work, book collecting, and the 
oil business. From the beginning, she served as a close and trusted adviser 
to her husband and eventually became one of the first female directors 
of a major oil company when she joined the boards of several Doheny 
corporations in the early 1920s. 
i 
THE BIRTH OF THE MEXICAN 
OIL INDUSTRY, 1900-1910 
During the 1890s and early 1900s American business saw 
some of its best opportunities in the development of foreign industry. 
Aptly characterized as a "spillover" into undeveloped areas, this process 
involved heavy investments in mining, agriculture, and railroad construc­
tion to secure raw materials for burgeoning American factories. Creating 
foreign markets for American products was an inherent but less important 
element of this activity. Because of its proximity and seemingly stable gov­
ernment under President Porfirio Diaz, Mexico received an unprecedented 
share of this new American business, and investors operated as though 
there were no firm border between the two countries. 
Doheny began exploring for oil in Mexico just as this process reached 
its height at the turn of the century, and his efforts have been interpreted 
as an extension of his California activities. However, even the proponents 
of the spillover analogy question whether it is anything more than a gen­
eral definition, and Doheny's experience in Mexico challenges some of the 
basic elements of the model and reflects the idiosyncrasies of this type of 
entrepreneurial activity. Since Doheny became involved in Mexico while 
he was still operating in California, he might have been planning to link 
the two sides of the business. Certainly, his intention to supply oil for the 
Mexican Central Railroad, one of the largest and most important Ameri­
can investments in the country, seems to fit the phenomenon described 
above, but once in Mexico Doheny operated altogether differently.1 
First of all, Doheny sold out his California properties in 1902 in order 
to concentrate solely on Mexico. Thus, his move was not the result of excess 
capital and did not stem from the need for additional oil to supplement 
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his California supply; quite the opposite was true. Considering his recent 
success in opening up prolific oil fields in Southern California just as 
the industry was taking off, Doheny's decision to leave is an anomaly. He 
should have taken advantage of his position to dominate the next phase of 
development; instead, he gambled on Mexico. Thereafter, Doheny tried 
to create a Mexican market for fuel oil and did not reenter the Ameri­
can market until massive overproduction forced a spillover back into the 
United States a decade later. Even when he returned in 1908 to oil explora­
tion in California, after establishing his Mexican business, there was no 
connection between the two enterprises. Thus, Doheny's venture in Mexico 
was the inverse of what would normally happen and reflected his desire to 
build a new, large-scale industry virtually free from direct competition. 
The highlights of Doheny's first years in Mexico have been portrayed 
as a relatively straightforward progression. First, he went to furnish oil for 
the Mexican Central Railroad. Then, at a crucial moment, the railroad re­
neged on its contract and left him without a market. Ultimately, he sur­
vived by selling asphalt for street paving until he brought in several large 
gushers in 1910 and began selling oil abroad. Missing from standard ac­
counts is a sense of the dynamic conditions of the Mexican oil industry at 
its inception and the complex work Doheny performed in financing his 
companies, building a market, and defining his long-term goals. Like Cali­
fornia, Mexico had been the scene of periodic attempts to establish an oil 
industry for almost forty years before Doheny arrived. One of the earliest 
reports from the 1860s noted that prospectors were already locating oil 
springs on both coasts as well as in the valley of Mexico. In May 1865, for 
example, several American residents of Mexico, along with a number of 
New York capitalists, obtained oil lands and exclusive refining rights from 
the government and were convinced of the "inconceivable value" of Mexi­
can oil. A few years later, a Pennsylvania oilman exclaimed that the surface 
indications of oil around Juan Felipe, situated along the Gulf Coast in an 
area Doheny would eventually control, were a virtual Niagara Falls com­
pared to anything back home and "must be seen to be believed." An official 
report on the resources of Mexico in 1891 noted the abundant "deposits of 
asphaltum, liquid petroleum, and bituminous coal." What no one realized, 
though, was how challenging the physical conditions of working in Mexico 
could be, where the long distances, hostile climate, and lack of infrastruc­
ture had left the petroleum wealth of the nation relatively untouched.2 
By the early 1890s, however, economic activity of all kinds increased 
dramatically under President Porfirio Diaz, as his tight political rein 
and desire to modernize the country opened the floodgates of capital 
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investment. The foreign business community, aided by a few Mexican in­
vestors, spurred a desire for internal improvements similar to those in the 
United States, including a dramatic increase in the demand for heating and 
illuminating oil. When available, these petroleum products came from the 
United States at a prohibitive cost. But the rising demand for oil, coupled 
with the reports of the prodigious number of petroleum exudes, inspired 
new attempts to exploit the resources of the country. When Doheny and 
Canfield made their first prospecting trip to Mexico in May 1900, there 
were several petroleum companies already hard at work. The largest and 
most well established was the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, which did not 
produce oil but sold refined products on the local market. Under the ag­
gressive leadership of Henry Clay Pierce, the company had been supplying 
processed oil to Mexico for over twenty years through its ties to the Stan­
dard Oil Company in the United States. In this way, at least, by implanting 
a desire for petroleum products, Pierce was perhaps the true pioneer of 
the industry.3 
Eventually, Pierce also turned to importing crude oil from the United 
States and refining it in Mexico to escape the import duties on refined 
products. At this time, using native crude was still considered impractical, 
but Pierce was well aware of the various efforts to discover a suitable supply 
of Mexican oil. In March 1900, for instance, a Waters-Pierce official re­
ported on the progress of two well-funded English companies that were 
exploring the oil deposits in Papantla, Veracruz, as well as a third group of 
investors hard at work in Oaxaca. There were also reports in the Mexican 
Herald, the advocate of American business interests, claiming that the fuel 
question in Mexico was being answered by a "strong combination of lead­
ing Mexican gentlemen," who had acquired a large tract of land on the 
Pacific coast. After receiving a barrage of "bogus reports regarding oil 
finds," however, the paper stopped printing them indiscriminately but 
maintained that the oil supply in Mexico was no longer in doubt.4 
Doheny and Canfield arrived in the midst of this activity in the spring 
of 1900, having been persuaded to examine the oil prospects of the country 
by A. A. Robinson, the president of the Mexican Central Railroad. Rob­
inson had headed up the engineering department of the Santa Fe, then 
became a vice president and general manager of the railroad. In 1893, Rob­
inson had resigned from the Santa Fe to become president of the Mexican 
Central, and based primarily on the Santa Fe's experience, Robinson even­
tually decided to use oil on the Mexican Central, hoping to develop a native 
supply in Mexico. As Doheny recalled, Robinson "knew of my connection 
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with the development of oil in Los Angeles and was anxious for me to 
undertake the discovery of petroleum anywhere along the lines of his rail­
road in Mexico."5 
Apparently, Doheny did not take the proposition too seriously in the 
beginning and asked Canfield to join him on what they assumed would 
be no more than a paid vacation: "Having succeeded beyond our utmost 
expectations, we went to Mexico for a rest, deciding that we could rest 
better while prospecting." But Robinson was serious enough to promise 
Doheny that he would "facilitate in every way possible our efforts to de­
velop [any oil property] and make a contract with us, if we were successful, 
to purchase the oil for fuel for the Mexican Central Railway."6 
Robinson's offer was too good to pass up. Here was a chance to com­
bine raw adventure in Mexico with the promise of the same sort of finan­
cial arrangement with the railroad that Doheny had enjoyed in California. 
Furthermore, having prospected in Mexico during his mining days, Do­
heny did not doubt its potentially vast resources. The first expedition took 
place in the spring of 1900, with the oilmen prospecting from the back of 
Robinson's private car. By this time, they had been joined by A. P. Mag-
innis, who was an old friend of Robinson's and was probably responsible 
for bringing Robinson and Doheny together. When this preliminary scout­
ing trip revealed promising oil exudes along the Central's line into Tam­
pico, Doheny worked for several months buying up as much of the 
surrounding territory as he could lay his hands on.7 Doheny's enthusiasm 
for the project was clearly evident in a September 1900 letter to a prospec­
tive investor: "Without wishing to make it appear that we are extravagant 
in our ideas, we do not feel at all timid about saying that the Mexican lands 
which we have acquired have all the earmarks of containing within their 
limits oil territory equal in oil value per acre, and many times greater in 
extent, than the Bakersfield district in California."8 
Doheny and Canfield incorporated the Mexican Petroleum Company 
of California on December 18,1900, to develop their newly acquired prop­
erties. The list of directors included Maginnis, who would become the first 
superintendent; W. G. Nevin, a director of the Santa Fe's California oil 
properties and the general manager of the Santa Fe lines west of Albuquer­
que; E. D. Kenna, the general solicitor for the Santa Fe and one of the 
Southwest's best corporation lawyers; H. M. Mclntosh, a Chicago capitalist 
who had financial interests in California real estate; and Russell J. Waters, 
a former bank president and a current Republican congressman from Los 
Angeles. The remaining list of directors and investors read like a "Who's 
56 CHAPTER 3 
Who" of Santa Fe officials and Los Angeles businessmen, including Santa 
Fe president E. P. Ripley and chairman of the board Aldace F. Walker, as 
well as a host of financiers, attorneys, and judges. There was even a respect­
able contingent of local oil men that Doheny had fought in the mid-1890s, 
including his old nemesis from the Oil Exchange, R. H. Herron. Typically, 
oil companies used inflated capitalization figures to impress unsuspecting 
investors, but this was a close corporation with no intention of propagan­
dizing its work. Clearly, they were not giving away any secrets when they 
listed the capital stock at just $225, a token $5 apiece for the initial 45 
investors.9 
For the next several years, in fact, Doheny struggled to keep informa­
tion about the company's progress from leaking out to the press, but the 
Spindletop blowout in Beaumont in January 1901 made that almost im­
possible by creating a climate of speculation. In the months that followed, 
Texas oil fever spread as far south as Tampico, Mexico, where the residents 
were convinced that the Mexican Petroleum Company was hiding a for­
tune on its 465,000 acres outside of the city. When drilling began on April 
30 near the Ebano station on the Mexican Central line, there was no deny­
ing the local interest. One Tampico reporter was certain that "oil in Mexico 
means gold, and if one-half of the hopes of the company now in the field 
are realized it means that Tampico and the Gulf Coast of Mexico will see 
an era of prosperity never before witnessed in the history of the republic." 
However, in spite of the number of oil speculators and lease hunters prowl­
ing around town during the summer, the Mexican Petroleum Company 
put up what were described as "immovable barriers in the way of a rubber­
necked public" by withholding information about their work.10 
Doheny was more forthcoming with the Mexican government when he 
sought and received a formal ten-year concession to legitimize his opera­
tion. Under the terms of the agreement, the government would suspend 
the import duties on certain building materials and exempt the company 
from all federal exactions except the stamp tax. In return, Doheny prom­
ised to meet certain development targets and agreed to sell oil to the gov­
ernment at ten percent below wholesale. A few days before this concession 
took effect, on May 14, 1901, Doheny struck oil at Ebano. At fifty barrels 
a day, this was not the gusher Tampico residents had been hoping for, and 
Doheny waited seven months before telling the local press that the com­
pany had a producing well.11 
In the meantime, the foremost problem was to implement the plans 
for selling this oil to the Mexican Central. According to Doheny, he had 
been offered a specific contract with the railroad in August 1900, several 
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months before he incorporated the oil company. Supposedly, the railroad 
agreed to purchase oil from him at $.90 to $1.20 per barrel, depending 
upon its point of delivery, while he agreed to convert the locomotives to 
oil burners at his own expense, maintain them with fuel oil, and cover any 
reconversion costs if he failed to keep pace with demand. But, as Doheny 
recalled, "the first effort on the part of the oil company to put this contract 
into effect was met by the statement of the chairman of the board of the 
Mexican Central that the contract had been abrogated." And in 1901, the 
chairman was none other than Henry Clay Pierce, the only man possibly 
threatened by Doheny's presence in Mexico.12 
Doheny blamed Pierce for scuttling his plans, but the situation was not 
as simple as he made it out to be. There was no question that the Mexican 
Petroleum Company had been formed to sell oil to the railroad, but there 
was some doubt about the nature of that commitment, and Doheny seems 
to have become involved with the Mexican Central at the wrong time. In 
March 1901, a group of American investors linked with the Standard Oil 
Company and including Henry Clay Pierce, started buying up shares of 
Mexican Central and soon controlled 55 percent of the stock. With that 
control, they elected a new board of directors and took over the manage­
ment of the railroad. Apparently, Robinson tried to block the takeover but 
ultimately failed. When it was over, Robinson was still president of the 
company, but ten out of seventeen members of the board had been re­
placed, and Pierce had been elected chairman. To make the line more 
profitable, Pierce noted that his efforts would be directed "to the physical 
betterment of the property and increasing its traffic through the develop­
ment of the resources of Mexico."13 
When the immediate plans of the new management did not include 
the use of Ebano oil on the Mexican Central, Doheny blamed it on Pierce's 
treachery. But if Doheny had actually had an enforceable contract with the 
railroad, Pierce would not have been able to cancel it without some legal 
consequence. Previously, Doheny had never hesitated to go to court to pro­
tect his rights, yet he apparently accepted this devastating turn of events 
without so much as a whimper. Since such a reaction would have been 
uncharacteristic for Doheny, it is probably that his supposed contract was 
not a signed agreement but a long-term objective based on Robinson's de­
sire to use Mexican fuel oil. That understanding might have fallen victim 
to the machinations of Henry Clay Pierce, who was regarded as a brilliant 
but unprincipled businessman who "liked to pull fast ones." But there were 
also larger financial considerations at work. Specifically, a report from the 
Mexican Central in November 1901 revealed that the railroad still planned 
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to use oil but that it had "no way of securing the much desired fuel at a 
moderate cost." From the railroad's perspective, Doheny's production was 
as yet inadequate, and imported oil from Texas or California was too 
expensive.14 
Doubtless shocked to find himself without a guaranteed market for the 
first time in a decade, Doheny singled out Pierce for blame and overlooked 
his own miscalculation. But this episode forced him to widen the net for 
potential customers by becoming more outspoken on behalf of the busi­
ness, reminiscent of his early experience in Los Angeles. In August 1901, 
for example, Doheny explained to the local press that he and Canfield had 
revolutionized the fuel situation on the West Coast by discovering the great 
oil fields of California and proclaimed that "we are going to do the same 
thing for Mexico." Nevertheless, Doheny was still worried that the Mexican 
Petroleum Company might somehow be unfairly associated with unscru­
pulous oil promoters and tried to keep specific information to a minimum. 
As he explained it: 
The Mexican Petroleum Company does not feel disposed to furnish mate­
rial and advertising for professional boomers. On the strength of our de­
velopments many persons attempt floating oil propositions imposing 
bogus stock upon uninformed persons. People familiar with the nature of 
oilfields know that one man might have a valuable claim and another, with 
adjoining land, a claim absolutely without value. When the time comes 
the Mexican Petroleum Company will make a statement to the public as 
to what it expects to do. At present the less given by the newspapers the 
better.15 
Still, he could not stall an eager public for long, and, a few weeks later, on 
his return trip to California, Doheny revealed that the company had no 
fewer than 600,000 acres in its possession in the Tampico area. Obviously, 
his earlier silence had been necessary to keep the oil boomers at bay until 
the company had all the property it needed; with that accomplished, Do­
heny announced that he needed about 600 men to clear the land to make 
way for the drilling crews. To date, the company had more than a million 
dollars invested in the operation, and, Doheny added, "we have not been 
in the habit of using money to no purpose." But he was not yet willing to 
state what it was. Instead, he offered a compromise: the "Mexican public 
will demand that we explain some of the plans of our work, and by Octo­
ber we are confident that there will be something of unusual interest to 
give out regarding what we have found up there."16 
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Doheny missed this deadline by a couple of months, but in December 
he formally announced that Mexico—not just his company—had an oil 
well producing about 400 barrels per day. Actually, the Mexican Herald had 
already published several reports, going back to October, stating that the 
Mexican Petroleum Company had oil in paying quantities, and within two 
weeks of those reports, at least five new companies had formed to develop 
oil prospects. Although none of them was in the Tampico area, Doheny 
was careful not to tip his hand.17 
As before, he also made a point of assuring everyone that, unlike these 
other companies, his operation was not putting any of the public's money 
at risk, and he went out of his way to discredit stories that the company 
had been selling stock in the market: "We have no small investors in our 
company. The men interested in our concern are involved to the extent of 
$5,000 and over, none less. Some of us have invested $200,000 in the enter­
prise. We do not want any man to invest his savings with us. The oil bus­
iness is too uncertain for the laboring man to tamper with." Then, "as a 
way of placing the company right in the minds of the public," Doheny said 
he would repurchase the shares of any stockholders who were dissatisfied 
with their investment and offered to payfifty cents a share for any returned 
stock plus a ten percent profit on the investment up to that point. All of 
this was intended to validate his longstanding claim that the Mexican Pe­
troleum Company had not been using the names of wealthy investors to 
promote a swindling scheme aimed at the unsuspecting public.18 
Why Doheny felt that he needed to allay the fears of people who had 
not been offered shares in his company in the first place seemed inexpli­
cable until he revealed that he had just returned from a lengthy visit with 
President Diaz. At that meeting, Diaz told him that he did not want to see 
Mexico exploited by the kind of stock manipulation taking place in the 
Texas oil fields. With that concern in mind, Doheny directed his comments 
primarily at the capital, where several of Diaz's associates, and eventually 
the president himself, were shareholders in the Mexican Petroleum Com­
pany. Apart from the potential problem of speculators, Diaz was so afraid 
that Standard Oil was interested in producing oil in Mexico that he made 
Doheny promise never to sell his oil holdings to Standard Oil without giv­
ing the Mexican government the first option to buy him out.19 
Thus, even though he knew the situation was more complicated, Do­
heny may have accused Pierce of interfering with his contract with the 
railroad as a way of substantiating his independence from the oil trust. It 
is also possible that Doheny's promise to Diaz kept him from selling the 
company when the Mexican Central postponed its conversion to fuel oil. 
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In later years, Doheny would recall that the loss of his anticipated arrange­
ment with the Mexican Central was so devastating that it scared several of 
his largest stockholders into pulling their money out of the company. This 
was part of the reason that Doheny sold the Petroleum Development Com­
pany in Bakersfield to the Santa Fe in April 1902. But as the situation con­
tinued to worsen into the summer, at least one of Doheny's investors 
suggested that they sell a half interest in the company to either Standard 
Oil or Waters-Pierce to give them the leverage they needed to break into 
the market. Obviously, Doheny resisted, not so much because of his prom­
ise to Diaz but from an increasing determination to find a market in Mex­
ico beyond the railroad.20 
The depth of the company's financial plight during this period is im­
possible to fathom, and the actual number of shareholder defections is 
unknown. But it is clear that the large capital expenditures tested the 
nerves of Doheny's associates and threw him back on his own resources a 
number of times. Nevertheless, he retained a pool of seasoned investors 
who were not likely to run at the first sign of trouble. Typical of this group 
was Richard C. Kerens, the individual who suggested that Doheny cooper­
ate with Pierce. Based in St. Louis, Kerens had been instrumental in pro­
moting a number of western railroad lines, including a partnership with 
Colis Huntington in the Los Angeles, Pasadena, Glendale Railway in 1890. 
Kerens had also invested heavily in mining property, including the Pacific 
Gold Mining Company of Pinos Altos, New Mexico, which had leased its 
mines to Doheny in 1890. The following year, Kerens had been appointed 
by President Benjamin Harrison to an intercontinental railway survey 
commission that conducted a lengthy investigation of the railroad systems 
of fifteen Latin American nations. When he finished that project in 1900, 
Kerens joined the initial group of investors in the Mexican Petroleum 
Company. Kerens's daughter was married to E. D. Kenna, the Santa Fe Rail­
road attorney, who was also on Doheny's board. 
Kerens was perhaps most important, though, for his political influence. 
He had served on the Republican National Committee from 1888 to 1900 
and worked closely with the powerful Mark A. Hanna during the two Mc­
Kinley campaigns. Despite the fact that they had some obvious political 
differences, Doheny's friendship with the "political boss of Missouri" pro­
vided links to prominent Republican politicians and businessmen, which 
accounted for much of his early success. Finally, Kerens also made it his 
mission to meet on friendly terms with Henry Pierce, to the point of invit­
ing him out on a private hunting trip the next time they were both in 
Mexico.21 
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With that kind of support, Doheny had no reason to panic as long as 
he could find a market for Mexican oil. In reality, though, heavy petroleum 
of the type found at Ebano had a limited range of uses: it could either be 
burned as fuel oil or refined into asphalt. Thus, with the collapse of the 
Mexican Central plan, there was only one alternative. The question was 
whether Doheny could break into the asphalt business. As it stood, the 
industry in Mexico was dominated by the Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 
a division of a larger asphalt trust that controlled the paving business in 
the United States and elsewhere. Barber had already done some work in 
Mexico and had just negotiated additional street contracts for several of 
the largest cities when Doheny arrived on the scene. Fortunately, though, 
Barber's position was not absolute. The failure of several companies to 
complete their projects more than ten years earlier had produced an official 
inquiry into how these contracts had been assigned. In particular, plans 
for covering streets in Mexico City had been on hold for ten years—until 
1899—at which time the city council appointed a commission of lawyers 
and engineers to devise stringent guidelines for prospective bidders. With 
the new rules, the paving commission hoped to prevent fly-by-night com­
panies from entering the bidding process altogether. Henceforth, officials 
would accept bids only from companies that were presently engaged in the 
paving business and could prove that they had satisfactorily laid pavements 
in at least two foreign cities.22 
When the council offered new contracts for Mexico City in 1900, there 
were only three companies apparently qualified to submit proposals: the 
Barber Asphalt Paving Company of New York, the Assyrian Asphalt Com­
pany of Chicago, and the Neuchatel Asphalt Company of London. When 
the British company failed to meet the submission deadline, the council 
began an exhaustive review of the two remaining bids, including an analy­
sis of every aspect of each company's previous work. Initially, the commis­
sioners declined both offers. The Chicago company could not substantiate 
its claims about past work, and although Barber Asphalt had documented 
reports on its work in New York, Chicago, New Orleans, and Newark, the 
company had used imported material from Trinidad and charged pre­
mium prices. Lacking an alternative, however, the commission negotiated 
a 15 percent reduction in fees and reluctantly accepted Barber's bid to pave 
seventy-five streets in the capital.23 
These negotiations ended a month before Doheny arrived in Mexico 
and would have been part of his investigation of the local market. Clearly, 
challenging Barber's position in an open contest would be difficult, and 
if other cities adopted the same rules as had the capital, it would be 
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impossible. However, if Doheny could overcome the prejudice against new 
companies, he stood a chance of competing against the established opera­
tors by undercutting the price, and his trump card was his six new wells at 
Ebano. Instead of having to import raw material from Trinidad or even 
California, as Barber had to, Doheny could produce asphalt from Mexican 
oil. By the spring of 1902, the Ebano wells had literally paved his way into 
the asphalt business in Mexico.24 
What really cleared his path, however, was the collapse of Barber's par­
ent organization, the National Asphalt Company. At the time, Barber was 
the leading subsidiary of at least twenty companies that accounted for al­
most all of the asphalt work done in the United States. But after losing 
several big-city paving contracts to independent asphalt companies, the 
trust was placed in receivership in December 1901. The trust also lost a 
protracted legal battle over the possession of a pitch lake in Venezuela, 
supposedly the most valuable asphalt deposit in the world. Despite assur­
ances that the financial difficulties of National Asphalt would not affect 
Barber's work in Mexico, local officials were justifiably worried. And Do­
heny had been given an opportunity that he could not afford to pass up.25 
The first order of business was to find a way to compensate for his lack 
of experience. Knowing that he had price and accessibility in his favor, 
Doheny decided to bring in an established company from California to act 
as a reputable spokesman for the quality of his Ebano material. With that 
arrangement in place, Doheny formally incorporated the Mexican Asphalt 
Paving and Construction Company on June 18, 1902. The investor group 
included the same core of individuals who had formed the Mexican Pe­
troleum Company: Charles Canfield, A. P. Maginnis, Russell Waters, and 
Charles Wellborn, a Los Angeles attorney and long-time associate of Do-
heny's who had taken over for W. G. Nevin after his death in January. Join­
ing them were J. A. Fairchild and E. W. Gilmore, the co-owners of the 
Fairchild & Gilmore Asphalt Company, with offices in San Francisco and 
Los Angeles.26 
Two weeks later, Fairchild & Gilmore wrote up a promotional letter 
touting Mexican Asphalt. Without identifying themselves as directors of 
Doheny's company, they stated that they had been in the asphalt construc­
tion business for over fifteen years and were familiar with every type and 
grade of commercial asphalt. After testing samples from Ebano, they pro­
claimed it "superior to nearly all of the other brands of refined asphaltum 
which are at present offered in the market to contracting firms laying as­
phaltum pavements." While they previously had relied upon California as­
phalt exclusively, they were prepared to switch to the Mexican product as 
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soon as it was available: "We have the utmost confidence in its quality and 
superiority and do not hesitate to recommend its use wherever asphaltum 
pavements are to be laid." Within a few months, officials in Mexico City 
were experimenting with Ebano asphalt, despite a fair amount of interfer­
ence from the established companies.27 
Along with this promotional campaign about his paving material, Do­
heny also released more information about the overall extent of his oper­
ation, much of it coming through A. P. Maginnis. In August 1902, for 
example, Maginnis pulled out all the stops in an interview for the Mexi­
can Herald: 
I am convinced that there is a larger supply of oil in the Republic of Mexico 
than will be found in the states of Texas and California combined.... Ev­
eryone knows what the discovery of large quantities of oil means for the 
future of Mexico.... I tell you I see such a brilliant future for Mexico as 
no man dreamed of a few years ago. I have no fears of contradiction when 
I say that our own property alone will be pumping 200,000 barrels a month 
within a year.... For almost two years now we have worked quietly and 
with as little publicity as possible. We were not in the promoting business. 
We were sure we had a rich commercial enterprise in our hands, and then 
too there were other lands which we had not yet acquired and we didn't 
want to talk too much. But now we have everything fixed up. We have 
found oil. We have the field and the market, and we don't mind taking the 
public into our confidence for the sake of its own information.28 
Doheny gave a more concrete appraisal of the company's assets a few 
months later. At that time, they had eight producing wells at Ebano with 
a combined capacity of 600 barrels per day, or 18,000 per month. With 
the completion of the four wells being drilled, Doheny thought that the 
company could produce 1,000 barrels per day and expected to reach 5,000 
barrels by January 1904, shy of Maginnis's prediction but impressive, none­
theless. In total, the Mexican Petroleum Company had invested $4 million 
in their properties and was about to add another $500,000 to build about 
95,000 barrels of tank storage and a six-mile railroad spur to connect the 
oil camp with the Mexican Central line. To complete the job, the company 
had about 30 American and 350 Mexican laborers working as hard as they 
could. With respect to marketing his product, Doheny acknowledged that, 
although asphalt "adds greatly to its commercial value, our aim is to dis­
pose of the bulk of our oil for fuel."29 
For all of its preparations, however, the Mexican Petroleum Company 
had not yet sold a single barrel of oil. Ironically, the first prospective 
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Drilling Work at Ebano, ca. 1903. Archival Center, Archdiocese of Los Angeles. 
customer was the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, which sent some of their 
managers on an inspection tour of Ebano in January 1903. They were es­
corted around the property by Herbert G. Wylie, another Los Angeles well 
driller, who had been in control of Doheny's operation at Bakersfield and 
who had taken over Maginnis's position as superintendent in Mexico the 
year before. Wylie was proud of the job he was doing at Ebano and told 
Doheny that the Pierce people "were astonished at the progress made here 
during the past few months and at the amount of work now being carried 
on." Having convinced them that "the next six months would be the deci­
sive period in our work here," Wylie expected Pierce to wait until then 
before making any decision. He also suspected that they "had in mind the 
purchase of the property, rather than the production." In the meantime, 
Waters-Pierce requested sixty barrels of test oil for their refinery.30 
In addition to giving promotional tours of the Ebano facilities, Wylie 
was also responsible for explaining the large sums of money spent at the 
camp to the stockholders of the company. Apparently, the grumbling about 
excessive capital expenditures was still a problem, and Wylie was on hand 
at the January 1903 annual meeting to give an accounting of his work. 
Wylie extended the same challenge to the shareholders that he did to pro­
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spective customers: come and see for yourself. He was certain that anyone 
who had been to Ebano in the past and revisited it now would approve 
every penny spent on improvements, and he personally assured Doheny 
that recent investments would "commend themselves to any one who will 
give them consideration."31 
Doheny was thoroughly convinced that Mexican Petroleum had "the 
most complete oil camp in the world." The company's own railroad ran 
from the Ebano station of the Mexican Central line to the company's re­
finery and out to the wells. Their oil-burning engine, the first in Mexico, 
was a working advertisement for the business. The camp also had a twenty-
two-mile water line to the Tamesi River fitted with high-pressure pumps 
and boilers. An existing thirty-barrel-a-day refinery, used to make samples 
of Ebano asphalt, was being replaced by a large asphalt plant that could 
handle up to 12,000 barrels of oil a day. Alongside the refinery, the com­
pany was building a cooperage plant capable of turning out 1,000 bar­
rels a day in which to ship the asphalt to market. In addition, the company 
had all the sundry elements necessary run a self-sufficient operation: ma­
chine shop, blacksmith shop, saw mill, electric plant, ice plant, and ware­
house. The whole camp employed a workforce of 50 Americans and 700 
Mexicans.32 
Clearly, there was a lot going on at Ebano; even if Doheny had not 
begun to promote his activities, it would have been hard to keep his busi­
ness under wraps any longer. In fact, as he laid the groundwork, several 
other companies came in behind him. Although not on the same scale, 
these other efforts were usually tied in some way to one of the competing 
railways in Mexico. In Guerrero, for example, the management of the Mex­
ico, Cuernavaca, and Pacific Railway had experienced oilmen looking for 
oil along its tracks, and the Southern Pacific purchased a number of wells 
in Sonora for its Mexican subsidiary. Among the more outlandish schemes 
was a proposal from a Texas company to run their excess production from 
Beaumont through a three-inch pipe to Mexico City. As impractical as this 
was, it reflected a desire by many businessmen in Mexico to have access to 
foreign oil to make up for the slow pace of domestic production.33 Because 
the duty on imported oil made such plans impractical, businessmen began 
to work for a repeal of the law. 
The campaign to remove the tax originated in 1901 with the American 
Smelting and Refining Company, part of the Guggenheim empire. Ameri­
can Smelting already used oil at its New Jersey plant, planned to burn 
Beaumont oil in a new smelter in El Paso, and wanted to import Texas oil 
for their plants in Monterrey and Aguascalientes. Disclaiming any special 
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privilege, the company's chairman, David Guggenheim, argued that re­
moving the import duty would benefit every industry in Mexico. The 
petroleum age was here to stay, Guggenheim asserted, and the Mexican 
government needed to encourage its use from every available source. Gug-
genheim's appeal was well-founded but failed to account for the nascent 
oil business in Mexico, which had the support of the Diaz administration. 
Besides, there was no guarantee that eliminating the import duty would 
actually lower oil prices in Mexico for other consumers. Most Mexicans, 
especially those in government, believed that the Standard Oil Company 
controlled Texas oil and fully expected the oil trust to take advantage of 
any change in the law. And, according to a former employee, Waters-Pierce 
was already cheating on the duty by importing refined oil that had been 
colored with just enough crude—about 10 percent—to pass inspection. 
After the company had paid the lowest duty rate for this oil, the addi­
tive was removed, at virtually no cost to the company, and the resulting re­
fined product was sold at full price. If this was true, then reducing the oil im­
port duty would simply add another layer of profit for the Standard Oil 
organization.34 
Rather than reducing the oil duty, the Mexican government did all it 
could to encourage efforts to produce oil in Mexico, including the addition 
of a new law in January 1902 which offered the same privileges to any 
producer that Doheny had received in his concession six months earlier. 
The major difference was that, whereas Doheny had asked only for tax 
abatements and a reduction of import duties on industrial materials, the 
new recipients received one-year permits to explore for oil on vast stretches 
of public land. Once they had located and developed an oil prospect to the 
point of producing at least 2,000 liters, or about 12 barrels, of oil per day, 
they would receive an official concession to fully exploit the source. More­
over, the first company to discover oil in a specific territory could establish 
an exclusion zone of up to three kilometers from the center of the well to 
keep out competitors.35 
Needless to say, Doheny was not happy about a law that allowed others 
to come in under better conditions than he had received in 1900, especially 
when he had been promised an exclusive right to the privileges he had 
negotiated. He was particularly irritated with Weetman Pearson, the fa­
mous British contractor, who had come to Mexico on a major construction 
job and ended up rivaling Doheny in the oil business. Whereas Doheny 
and Diaz met cordially on a few occasions, Pearson and the Mexican presi­
dent became close personal friends. And when Pearson received liberal 
concessions to begin exploring for oil in 1901, Doheny resented him for it. 
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Certainly, Doheny was not wrong in perceiving a change of allegiance 
within the Diaz government. In fact, his conflict with Pearson signaled an 
increased friction between American businessmen and President Diaz over 
preferential rights to European investors in Mexico.36 
Initially, Diaz's modernization policy favored heavy American invest­
ments in basic industries and led businessmen to feel that their money and 
property were safer in Mexico than in the United States. But the result 
exceeded Diaz's expectations, as United States investors began to control 
major sectors of the economy. By the early 1900s, American capital made 
up 70 percent of the total foreign investment in Mexico. In the years lead­
ing up to the revolution in 1911, Mexican leaders concluded that this over­
whelming presence of American economic power threatened their nation's 
stability and increased the likelihood of attempted political or military in­
tervention by the United States. The most aggressively anti-American 
among Diaz's advisers was his finance minister, Jose Yves Limantour, who 
not only sought out European investments but seemed to have a special 
antipathy to Doheny's oil business. Doheny recalled that, for whatever rea­
son, Limantour "tried to create an atmosphere of dislike, almost contempt, 
for our efforts."37 
It was also clear to many observers that it was not simply the weight of 
American investment that was cause for concern but the mercenary atti­
tude that came with it. Even the Mexican Herald, the advance agent of the 
American business community, acknowledged a tone in Yankee capitalism 
which was hard to endure: 
If there is in all the Mexican republic one American who makes his home 
there with any other ultimate object than the dollar, he is the exception 
that proves the rule . .  . Americans in Mexico want to make money and 
make it fast... From our early years we have associated Mexico with trea­
sure. Romance, beauty, chivalry, tragedy—all have figured in our imagina­
tion, but first and foremost has been treasure... In general your American 
is for amassing wealth in Mexico and bringing the wealth home. There are 
Americans in Mexico who represent all that is best in Americanism, but 
unfortunately their modest incandescents are too often outshone by the 
sixty-candle arc lights of the bad Americans.38 
Fortunately, except for Limantour, most Mexican officials tended to con­
gratulate Doheny for his efforts to develop the native oil industry. Of 
course, he had been actively campaigning on behalf of his work from the 
very beginning, escorting prominent Mexican and American visitors to 
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Ebano on a regular schedule. On one trip in early 1904, Doheny invited 
the congressional representative from Jalisco, Tomas Moran, to inspect the 
development of the oil field. Moran was duly impressed with the facilities 
and even more so with "the energy, determination, and perseverance of 
Mr. Doheny and his associates." At one point, Moran was accidentally 
splashed with oil from one of the wells and was immediately advised that 
he "had been baptized in oil" and would henceforth be an oilman. If this 
was not a planned event on the tour, it should have been, considering Mor-
an's reaction: "I believe I will be one," he recalled later, "as my experience 
at Ebano has converted me to the belief that we have lots of oil right here 
in Mexico." Moran, who went on to invest in the company, was certain that 
Americans like Doheny would always be welcome in his country.39 
No doubt, many other Mexican leaders received similar treatment and 
came to the same conclusion, and Doheny missed no opportunity to con­
vert officials from outside of Mexico, either. A month before Moran's visit, 
Meredith P. Snyder, the Democratic mayor of Los Angeles, equated what 
he saw at Ebano with what had occurred in Los Angeles a decade earlier, 
and there was no doubt in Snyder's mind that oil had been "the salvation 
of California." In 1906, as the annual convention of the International Insti­
tute of Geologists met in Mexico City, Doheny personally escorted a train­
load of government officials and geological experts on an inspection tour 
of the oil wells.40 
Clearly, Doheny had everyone's attention and was doing everything he 
could to convince them of the practical applications of oil. Apart from its 
use as fuel, it could pave the roads and provide gas for lighting, heat, and 
other domestic purposes. As Doheny incorporated all of these elements 
into his campaign to market Ebano oil, he actually benefitted from the 
temporary shelving of his agreement with the railroad. If nothing else, it 
forced him to concentrate on asphalt and gas production as the most visi­
ble signs of progress in Mexico. Mexico City was the obvious place to begin 
this process, and, in January 1904, Doheny brought in P. C. Smith, another 
California partner, as the chief engineer of the company. Doheny also hired 
an experienced contractor from the Sicilian Asphalt Company of New York 
to oversee paving operations. The latter had directed the paving of Fifth 
Avenue and Wall Street and was expected to put the new company on a 
thoroughly professional level. Finally, in what was one of the best decisions 
of Doheny's career, he picked Harold Walker, a young attorney from New 
York, to become the general manager. Walker was the son of former Santa 
Fe chairman Aldace F. Walker, one of the original investors in Mexican 
Petroleum. After his father's death, Walker went to Mexico in 1903 to in­
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Promotional Visit to Ebano, ca. 1905. Archival Center, Archdiocese of 
Los Angeles. 
vestigate the value of the oil company stock, and that initial contact led to 
a thirty-year association with Doheny. Walker was a graduate of Columbia 
Law School and had worked for a New York law firm before he took control 
of the asphalt company, and he soon became the principal attorney for all 
of Doheny's Mexican operations.41 
By the time Doheny began work in Mexico City in 1904, about 370,000 
square meters of asphalt had been put down by the Barber Asphalt Com­
pany over the previous two years. By February, Doheny's Mexican Asphalt 
Company had contracts for another 100,000 meters in the capital and ad­
ditional work in Guadalajara. As he anticipated, this work proved to be a 
7 0 CHAPTER 3 
bargain for everyone involved. For example, with the four successive con­
tracts Mexican Asphalt had with the city of Guadalajara, the company laid 
a total of 145,000 square meters of paving over a four-year period, for 
which it received approximately $1,140,000 in fees, or $7.85 per square 
meter. Then, in 1908, the company put down an additional 50,000 meters 
of pavement at $9 per meter. By contrast, the Barber Asphalt Company 
had been charging $11.00 to $11.50 per meter.42 
In addition to the cost benefits of having his own oil supply, Doheny 
was able to save even more money because of a new portable asphalt plant 
invented by his partner, P. C. Smith. The Smith Asphalt Preparer, touted 
as the "latest and most improved asphalt plant that has yet been devised," 
was simply a compact asphalt mixer mounted on a freight car, which elimi­
nated the need to set up a temporary site at every job and enabled the 
company to go to work almost immediately. Smith also adapted oil burners 
to the elements used to heat sand and asphalt prior to mixing. Previously, 
it took time to heat up coal, and fuel was wasted as the coal continued to 
burn while it cooled down. Now, using oil, the fire could be lit instantly 
and extinguished at the beginning and end of a paving run. The Smith oil 
burner not only saved time and fuel but required only two men to produce 
800 square meters of two-inch wearing surface per day, well above the pro­
duction of any permanent plant in Mexico City.43 
Given these economies, Doheny continued to win contracts to pave 
hundreds of streets in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Tampico. He sent 
Ebano asphalt to several major American cities, such as New York, New 
Orleans, and Los Angeles. His success using native material even prompted 
the Mexican Congress, in 1908, to pass a law requiring the use of Ebano 
asphalt for any future paving work in the capital as a way to foster sales 
and growth of home products and industries. Asphalt production had be­
come a profitable, if secondary, branch of Doheny's business.44 
Doheny's prospects for the fuel oil business brightened considerably in 
the fall of 1904, when the Mexican Central Railroad finally consented to 
test his product. After three years of financial reorganization, the Mexican 
Central was completing an aggressive development program to modernize 
the road and expand its mileage. The railroad had not kept up with capital 
improvements and found itself falling behind its competitors. In addition, 
although gross earnings had been increasing over the years, the profit mar­
gin had been eaten away by a declining exchange rate between Mexican 
silver and American gold. Although these conditions affected every line in 
Mexico, the Central seemed the hardest hit. Poor performance and the 
failure to pay dividends prompted the 1901 takeover that made Henry 
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Pierce chairman of the board. To pay for the revitalization program, how­
ever, the new board assumed $20 million in bonded debt in 1902 and 1904 
just to make basic improvements in track and rolling stock. With this 
added burden, the declining peso, which dropped in value from $.49 in 
1900 to below $.40 in 1903, became a constant threat. The impact of the 
devaluation was so severe that the Mexican government subsidized the 
interest payments on railroad bonds and even passed a decree in 1903 
allowing all the lines to increase their rates by 15 percent to cover their 
currency losses.45 
In light of these factors, it was no wonder that the Mexican Central 
backed away from a conversion to fuel oil and remained skeptical of Do-
heny's claim that his Ebano wells could produce all the oil it needed. By 
September 1904, however, Pierce anticipated a surplus for the year and 
realized that he needed to complete his program of improvements before 
the first set of bonds reached maturity in 1907. This was the time to make 
the transition to oil.46 
If Pierce needed to justify the decision to proceed cautiously along 
these lines, he had only to point out the experience of the Tehuantepec 
Railroad, a newly reconstructed railway owned jointly by the Mexican gov­
ernment and Weetman Pearson. In 1899, Pearson had won a contract to 
rebuild an existing two-hundred-mile-long railway across the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec in conjunction with a harbor construction project at Coatza­
coalcos. With that work underway, Pearson got interested in oil after an 
unplanned layover in Laredo, Texas, in April 1901. By chance, this was just 
a few weeks after the Spindletop gusher came in, and, catching oil fever 
along with the rest of the population, Pearson returned to Mexico a deter­
mined man. After acquiring oil properties on the Isthmus, Pearson set out 
to duplicate Doheny's recent success at Ebano by supplying the Tehuan­
tepec engines with his own oil. The railroad ordered six oil-burning loco­
motives based on Pearson's assurance that he was certain to find an 
adequate supply of petroleum.47 
Unfortunately, none of Pearson's wells on the Isthmus met his expecta­
tions and never approached the requirements of the Tehuantepec Railway. 
This set Pearson's oil company off on a spate of wildcatting across southern 
Mexico, but to no avail. Although the new engines were a great success, 
the oil had to be imported by tank steamer from Beaumont, and, by early 
1905, Pearson thought he might have to seek out oil lands in Texas to fulfill 
his obligations to the Tehuantepec. Pearson's failure was a good object les­
son for the Mexican Central, as it was considering making the conversion 
to fuel oil, but Doheny claimed to have the oil that his British counterpart 
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lacked. Since he had proved the utility of the fuel on his own engines at 
Ebano, Doheny felt that the Mexican Central was being either overly cau­
tious or deliberately evasive.48 
In the meantime, Doheny hedged his own bets. All the major railroads 
in Mexico were testing his oil simultaneously: the Mexican Central, the 
Interoceanic, and the Mexican Railway, Ltd. Previously, the Mexican Rail­
way Company had been importing coal briquettes from Wales, while the 
Interoceanic and the Mexican Central received almost all their fuel from 
coal fields in the United States. The Interoceanic had actually been experi­
menting with fuel oil since the fall of 1902, when officials requested 100 
barrels of Ebano oil and tested it against a similar amount from Texas. 
Doheny's liaison with the railroad thought that "it [would] be easy to close 
a deal" if the tests proved satisfactory, but for some reason they were still 
experimenting two years later. The Mexican Central began its tests in 1903, 
although it was initially interested in using the oil for heating and rolling 
iron in its manufacturing plant.49 
Curiously, the first engine tests were not made with fuel oil; instead, 
they were made with a combination of coal dust and asphalt, a mixture 
concocted by P. C. Smith of the Mexican Asphalt Paving Company. Because 
the Mexican Central's coal came from as far away as Philadelphia and Balti­
more, it contained a lot of dust by the time it had been jostled all the way 
to Mexico. Smith's solution was simply to mix the coal dust with about ten 
percent asphalt to produce an excellent fuel that, unlike oil, did not require 
any modification of the burners or the fire box.50 
Although Smith's idea was cheap and practical, it left the railroad de­
pendent on imported coal. Unfortunately, the quality of Mexican coal was 
inferior and the cost of producing it prohibitive—a combination of fac­
tors, according to one mining historian, that literally "drove consumers to 
oil or imported fuel." But transporting coal from the United States or Great 
Britain introduced its own set of problems. The 70,000 tons that the Mex­
ican Central imported from the Northeast every month left the railroad 
vulnerable to any number of hazards along the route, from traffic jams to 
labor strikes. Importing was also a major source of financial strain, since 
the company had to set aside a large number of cars to haul the coal and 
had to pay for it in American currency.51 
And yet, the only thing worse than sticking with a bad situation would 
have been a desperate leap into a more precarious one, as the Tehuantep-
ec's predicament showed. That railroad had survived because it was a 
short, two-hundred-mile line with only a handful of oil burners. The Mex­
ican Central, on the other hand, was more than fifteen times as large, and 
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an equivalent miscalculation could have been catastrophic. Doheny, of all 
people, knew the consequences of pressing for large oil contracts before he 
was ready to handle them, and, at one point during the summer of 1904, 
he admitted that the Mexican Petroleum Company was also unwilling to 
make any fuel oil contracts "until it is in a position to carry them out 
without fail."52 
Up to that time, Doheny was producing a small but steady supply of 
oil. It was enough to get the asphalt business started and keep the storage 
tanks full, but nowhere near the thousands of barrels a day that the Mex­
ican Central would require. Doheny made a huge step forward in April 
1904, however, when the company drilled its first official gusher, which 
blew in at 1,500 barrels per day and gave him the proof he needed that 
there was an extensive reservoir of oil at Ebano. If nothing else, it at least 
impressed his stockholders, who tripled a request for $250,000 in bonds 
once the gusher had been flowing for two months.53 
Doheny needed the money to dredge out an existing gully between 
Mexican Petroleum's railroad line at Ebano and the Panuco River, some 
ten miles to the south. The new well actually sat in the middle of this 
gully and was vulnerable to periodic flooding. Doheny wanted to create a 
permanent canal, in part to protect the well, but also so that oil could be 
loaded directly onto barges and steam tugs and sent down the waterway to 
the river and out to the port of Tampico. A system like that would make 
the company completely self-sufficient. With additional storage facilities 
and a fleet of ocean tankers along the Gulf, Doheny believed, they would 
have "free access to the markets of the world."54 
Apparently, it was at this point in January 1905, rather than earlier, 
that Doheny was perceived as a potential threat to the Waters-Pierce Oil 
Company. In fact, there was a great deal of speculation going on that an 
oil war was brewing between the two American companies over the gaso­
line market in Mexico. While it was true that Doheny could manufacture 
gasoline as a by-product of topping fuel oil and making asphalt, it was a 
small percentage of the final product. Nevertheless, to keep him from put­
ting what he had on the market, Waters-Pierce lowered the price of gaso­
line for its industrial customers, mostly mining companies, who might be 
tempted to switch suppliers. One mine owner stated that a Waters-Pierce 
agent made repeated offers to lower his fuel bill if he would promise not 
to sign a contract with Doheny. The mine owner refused to be cornered in 
this fashion and was surprised to receive an unsolicited price cut anyway.55 
Since Ebano fuel oil was usually taken straight from the well, how­
ever, a better alternative would be to tie up Doheny's oil with a contract to 
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supply the Mexican Central as soon as possible. Perhaps that was one of 
the reasons, along with the economic factors discussed earlier, that the 
Mexican Central made its first real test of Ebano oil at precisely this time. 
In spite of his motivation, though, Pierce could not hurry along a review 
process that seemed to take forever. Doheny, at least, was running out of 
patience, as the Mexican Central conducted second and third trials on the 
oil between February and May 1905 and two other railroads pursued simi­
lar experiments.56 Although the tests went fairly well, a lot of foot-dragging 
occurred behind the scenes, as the railroads negotiated the terms of their 
proposed contracts, and Doheny was uncharacteristically pessimistic in 
early May when he vented his frustration to the press: 
There is one great source of wealth down there as to which myself and 
associates have been sorely disappointed. I refer to fuel oil. There is abso­
lutely no demand for it. The railroads won't have it except at a prohibitive 
rate, and they will not use it for power. For the last four years we have been 
producing and storing it, and haven't sold a barrel. A single well belonging 
to us has given forth half a million barrels in a year. There is enough be­
longing to us to supply the demand of the world, and yet it is about the 
most valueless stuff imaginable under existing conditions.57 
Doheny's assertions to the contrary, the railroads still had legitimate 
concerns about the quality, if not the quantity, of the oil. For one thing, its 
high asphalt content made it harder to burn than either California or Texas 
fuel oil. For another, the Ebano oil gave off a tremendous amount of 
smoke. California oil had been a real improvement over coal because it 
was a clean-burning fuel. Mexican oil was just the opposite. This issue was 
an insurmountable problem for the Mexican Railway, because their pas­
senger trains passed through a number of tunnels along heavy grades. Un­
der such conditions, the smoke and gas thrown off by the oil burners could 
be deadly if a train got stuck in one of the tunnels. On flatter routes and 
on freight trains, in particular, the smoke was not a concern.58 
There were also doubts about Doheny's claims that he could meet any 
demand. As it turned out, almost as soon as he committed himself to sup­
ply the Mexican Central, he revised his calculations and notified the other 
railways that he might not have enough oil to supply all three lines after all. 
In September 1906, he cut off negotiations with the Interoceanic Railway, 
forcing it, for the time being, to abandon efforts to convert to oil; in Octo­
ber, he did the same with the Mexican Railway. The latter company turned 
instead to Pearson and agreed to use the residue from his new refinery at 
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Minatitlan, Veracruz, as fuel oil. This material burned more cleanly than 
did Ebano oil and proved an ideal fuel for the Mexican Railway. Curiously, 
the Tehuantepec Railroad continued to burn Texas oil, as part of a larger 
strategy to set aside all of Pearson's production for an assault on the refined 
oil market in Mexico.59 
Doheny's hard-won contract with the Mexican Central was a fifteen-
year agreement that called for approximately 45 million barrels of fuel oil 
and promised a 20 percent reduction in fuel costs from those of coal. At 
the time, Doheny could manage only 2,000 barrels per day, or about a 
quarter of what the railroad would require with all of its locomotives burn­
ing oil. But the Mexican Central planned to convert its engines in stages 
and counted on Doheny to increase production proportionately. Starting 
with twelve operating oil burners in December 1905, the railroad's officials 
hoped to convert an average of seven locomotives per month over the next 
two years, to reach a total of 170 by October 1907. After that, they would 
convert the remainder of their 200 to 300 coal engines at the rate of a dozen 
a month until they were finished. From 1908 to 1910, the Mexican Central 
demanded an average of about 6,250 barrels a day, or enough for more 
than 200 engines using 30 barrels a day. Even at this rate, however, the 
railway ran into supply trouble and had to return to using coal on some 
of the lines.60 
Still, as promised, the Mexican Central posted significant savings on 
fuel costs and operating expenses. Initially, the railroad reported an in­
crease in maintenance repairs per locomotive—from $1,862 in 1905 to 
$2,360 in 1906—attributed to the cost of converting them to burn oil. At 
the same time, the company reported a fuel savings of approximately 
$4,200 per year for each oil-burning engine. Since fuel costs made up about 
a third of the railroad's operating expenses, this was a major improvement. 
The difference between using oil and using coal was clearly shown in a 
detailed report by the Wall Street Journal, comparing the 1907 financial 
statements of the Mexican Central and the National Railroad of Mexico. 
According to this analysis, the Mexican Central reported a 10 percent 
increase in gross earnings and a 16 percent reduction in fuel costs. The 
National, on the other hand, saw a 13 percent gain in gross income, ne­
gated by a 26 percent increase in the cost of coal. So, although Doheny 
could not meet all of their expectations, the leaders of the Mexican Central 
had little to complain about with respect to the benefits of using Ebano 
fuel oil.61 
Another beneficiary of this improved efficiency was the Mexican gov­
ernment, which by this time was a majority shareholder in the largest of 
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the nation's railroads. As part of a plan initiated by Finance Minister Li­
mantour in 1902 to offset financial problems and the threat of bankruptcy 
for the major railroads, the government quietly purchased railroad stocks 
until it achieved a dominant position on the boards of the major lines. 
Then, beginning with the National Railroad and the Interoceanic, the rail­
ways were merged under government supervision. In 1906, the govern­
ment formed the National Railroads of Mexico Company, which held an 
option on Mexican Central stock and integrated it into the national system 
a few years later.62 
Given that the Mexican government's objective was to improve the eco­
nomic performance of the railroads, Doheny's fuel oil contracts were an 
essential element of success. Eventually, he would supply oil for trains run­
ning on 85 percent of the railway mileage in Mexico. Years later, when he 
was accused of monopolizing the profits from Mexican oil, Doheny cited 
the benefits of his fuel oil contract with the government as evidence to 
the contrary.63 
It was precisely the potential for substantial profits, however, that led 
the Diaz government to briefly consider a plan to take control of the coal 
and petroleum industries along with the railroads. Beginning in August 
1905, at the same time the government was buying its way into the railway 
business, a committee of Mexican lawyers and engineers submitted such a 
proposal to the minister of development. At issue was Article 10 of the 1884 
mining code, which stated that coal mines and oil wells were the exclusive 
property of the owners of the surface land. The committee wanted to 
amend the law to allow for expropriation by the government under certain 
circumstances. In particular, they sought to regain control of Mexico's 
petroleum resources by defining oil production as a public utility. There­
after, the property owners would be compensated based on a percentage 
of the value of the oil extracted from their land but would lose direct con­
trol of the oil itself.64 
Questions over the legal merits of this proposal inspired a series of 
debates in the fall of 1905 among the best lawyers in the nation. One of 
the things that was clear from the start was that the argument over oil did 
not necessarily arise from the fear that foreigners would steal away the 
nation's natural resources. More worrisome from the government's per­
spective was that "the owners of the soil [had] not been displaying suffi­
cient energy in exploring for such deposits or in working them when 
discovered." To the surprise of many observers, however, the legal experts 
upheld the existing law and did not sanction any move toward nationaliza­
tion. While this seemed like a definitive answer to the question of subsoil 
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rights, the debate turned out to be a prelude to a more determined attack 
on foreign ownership during the revolution.65 
Nonetheless, petroleum's growing importance as a public utility was 
most evident in the area of manufactured gas. Once again, Ebano oil could 
be run straight from the wells into the fire boxes of locomotives. But when 
it was topped, it yielded a small percentage of gasoline and kerosene, and, 
when further refined into asphalt, Ebano oil furnished another 20 to 30 
percent in gas oil. Having banked a good deal of his future success on the 
asphalt business, Doheny took the next step in deciding to manufacture 
city gas from the residue. Consequently, in the fall of 1906, Doheny ob­
tained a concession from the Mexican government allowing him to manu­
facture and distribute crude-oil gas in Mexico City and its suburbs. Next, 
he organized the Mexican National Gas Company to carry out those plans 
and brought in an experienced manager from Los Angeles, expecting to 
have the Mexico City operation running within a year. Instead, it was al­
most three years from the date of the contract before he began in earnest.66 
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The delay was related mostly to the large capital expenditures necessary 
to construct the plant and install gas lines and meters but also to a change 
in management along the way. When he was finally ready to move ahead 
in the spring of 1909, Doheny purchased the land for the gas plant and 
then went to New York in July to buy $480,000 worth of gas supplies, in­
cluding over thirty miles of gas pipe, oil tanks, gas meters, and appliances. 
At this point, Doheny still seemed confident that gas would be running 
through the lines by the end of the year, but, as one delay led to another, 
the company risked losing the goodwill of the residents who, according to 
a local reporter, were "impatiently waiting for the time when [they] will 
be connected up to the supply." In May 1910, the company promised to 
have the job completed within a matter of days, and Doheny made his 
fifty-second trip to Mexico to supervise the long-awaited connection of the 
gas lines. However, no sooner was the company in business than it was 
overwhelmed by demand, and Doheny once again found himself unable 
to fully support a market he had created.67 
But Doheny had been hard at work on a permanent solution to his oil 
supply problem when he opened up a new petroleum zone in the Huasteca, 
the Indian name for the border area between the states of Veracruz, Ta­
maulipas, and San Luis Potosi, which would be known as the "golden lane" 
in later years. Doheny and Canfield had actually prospected there in 1900 
and were extremely impressed with the number of exudes and the amount 
of visible oil. Although the property was unavailable initially, it was sub­
sequently leased to the Barber Asphalt Company as a potential source of 
paving material; Doheny was able to acquire it in 1906, when Barber sold 
the Huasteca leases to him after having taken possession of a large asphalt 
deposit in Venezuela the previous year.68 
Like many places in Mexico, natural asphalt could be dug out of the 
surface in the Huasteca as a result of constant oil seepage. Unlike the Ebano 
product, however, the oil was a good deal lighter and offered excellent 
prospects for further refining. For this reason alone, Doheny recalled, "We 
made up our minds that we wanted that property, wanted it badly, and 
wanted it right away." Once he had it, Doheny incorporated the Huasteca 
Petroleum Company on February 12, 1907, to develop the area. Four days 
later he organized a new holding company, the Mexican Petroleum Com­
pany, Ltd., of Delaware, to finance the various components of his oil busi­
ness in Mexico.69 
These new arrangements were necessary because developing the Huas­
teca property required another massive capital investment. Where the wells 
at Ebano had been found within easy reach of the Mexican Central line, 
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the initial Huasteca drilling site was twenty to thirty miles inland from the 
Gulf and required a combination of canoe trip and horseback journey to 
get through the jungle. Setting up drilling machinery was an incredible 
undertaking in itself. The best way to get the oil out was to construct a 
seventy-mile-long pipeline that ran from the wells to Tampico. Added to 
that, when Harold Walker negotiated the government concession to de­
velop the Huasteca properties in 1908, he obligated the company to con­
struct another pipeline to Mexico City, about 190 miles to the southwest. 
Walker agreed to the Mexico City pipeline as part of the plan to provide 
oil for the gas company. But many engineers, including some on Doheny's 
staff, thought that pumping heavy crude oil onto Mexico's central mesa 
was impossible; in any case, it could never be a cost-effective operation. 
Doheny disagreed, citing the successful California pipeline that ran from 
Bakersfield to San Francisco. Although that line climbed just 800 feet, Do­
heny believed it was only a matter of adding enough pumping stations 
to lift the oil 8,000 feet onto the mesa. Extrapolating from California, he 
calculated that it would take five to seven percent of the oil moving 
through the line to operate the necessary machinery.70 
In December 1910, the Huasteca Petroleum Company allocated $3 mil­
lion for the Mexico City pipeline and planned to have oil flowing as soon 
as possible. They intended to deliver a minimum of 20,000 barrels a day to 
be used by the Mexican National Gas plant as well as a large number of 
other crude oil consumers. The pipeline was also needed to relieve conges­
tion on the Mexican railways, which prevented them from carrying any 
more than half of the oil traffic. Then, just as these plans got underway, 
the company gave up on the project without offering an explanation. Per­
haps the idea was as impractical as its critics claimed, but the work might 
also have been considered too dangerous to attempt during the opening 
disturbances of the coming revolution.71 
Meanwhile, work on the shorter pipeline from the newfield to Tampico 
had gone ahead out of absolute necessity. While Doheny had been putting 
together the plans for his first well at Casiano, the Pearson company started 
drilling at Dos Bocas, less than fifteen miles to the north. Then, in July 
1908, the Dos Bocas well came in so violently that it caught the drilling 
crew off guard. As the first jets of gas and oil shot from the well, they were 
ignited by the flame under the steam boilers nearby. Instantly, the well 
became a raging inferno, and it burned for the next two months with such 
ferocity that some said a person could read a newspaper by its light sev­
enteen miles away. When the well finally burned itself out, it was still 
churning up 25,000 barrels a day of hot oil and saltwater into what was 
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described as "an immense cauldron in which the water and oil boils up in 
great wave-like upheavals." Supposedly, Pearson lost several million barrels 
of oil in the catastrophe, although many people believed the well had been 
mostly gas. In either case, Dos Bocas put the Mexican oil fields on the map 
and alerted Doheny to the danger that lay ahead.72 
Clearly, he was not going to make the same mistake. But if he drilled a 
well even close to the size of Dos Bocas, which he fully expected to do, it 
was certain to overrun any storage system in a matter of days. Still, because 
he needed the oil as soon as he could get it, Doheny gambled a bit by 
constructing a pipeline and storage system at the same time that the dril­
ling crews started a number of wells. By the end of 1909, he had five drilling 
rigs in operation and two completed wells whose combined production of 
1,200 barrels a day went into one 55,000-barrel tank. At that point, all the 
sections of eight-inch pipe needed to complete the line had been distrib­
uted along the route, but only about ten miles of it were ready for oil. This 
initial stretch was crucial, though, since it ran from the wells toward the 
edge of the Tamiahua Lagoon, an inlet from the Gulf, where the company 
had three steel barges ready to load. Two more 55,000-barrel tanks were 
also under construction at the northern end of the pipeline in Tampico, 
with additional tanks to be added to the three pumping stations along 
the route.73 
With these preparations underway, the company drilled in its first big 
well, Casiano No. 6, on July 26, 1910. The well started producing at 8,000 
barrels a day and reached 14,000 barrels two weeks later when it was com­
pletely shut in. The two 55,000-barrel tanks were full, and the pipeline was 
still a month from being finished, despite some 2,000 workers being 
pressed to the limit. Then, on September 11, the crew on Casiano No. 7 
struck oil. This second gusher came in suddenly at 60,000 barrels per day 
before the crew had cemented the well casing in place. When Herbert Wy­
lie, by now the Huasteca superintendent, tried to close in the well, the 
internal pressure lifted the casing off the bottom, allowing the oil to escape 
and work its way into seepages around the well, which created oil springs 
as far as 300 feet away from the derrick that produced 3,000 barrels a day 
on their own. Fearing another Dos Bocas blowout, Wylie opened the gate 
valve as much as necessary to stabilize the well, which left them with a flow 
of 25,000 barrels a day. By September 17, with the completion of the pipe­
line, a potential disaster had been averted. Nevertheless, the company had 
to shut in production on all of the other wells, stop drilling, and devote all 
its resources to handling the oil from Casiano No. 7.74 
Even at a reduced flow, the big well filled the Huasteca pipeline to 
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capacity from the start, forcing the company to begin a parallel line almost 
immediately to double the volume. In the meantime, Doheny needed to 
move the oil as quickly as possible. He began by signing a larger contract 
with the Waters-Pierce refinery which took a million barrels of oil out of 
storage at once and another 1.5 million over an extended period. Doheny 
also hoped that his sales and gas operations in Mexico City would draw off 
even more oil, but he was still left with a large and growing surplus.75 
Given the market constraints in Mexico, American oil producers had 
been anticipating the inevitable overflow of Mexican crude across the bor­
der for several years. At the time, there was no specific duty on Mexican 
oil except for a countervailing tax against Mexico's import fees. With in­
creasing production, American producers believed that President Diaz was 
planning to remove import duties on foreign oil as a way to force the 
United States to respond in kind. As one fearful oilman put it, "There is a 
flood of oil in Mexico, enough to fill the Rio Grande, ready to be poured 
into this country when that duty is repealed. It is dirty oil but it is danger­
ous." When the United States Congress deliberated tariff reform in March 
1909, the independent oil producers of Ohio went so far as to send a dele­
gation to Washington to lobby against any possibility of Mexican oil being 
put on the free list. In fact, the independents wanted the United States to 
place a formal duty on Mexican oil as "the most dangerous threat" to the 
small producer in America.76 
In response to the outcry against Mexican oil, Doheny wrote a letter to 
the Senate stating that there was nothing to fear since he was still struggling 
to meet his contract obligations. At the time, he was producing 7,000 bar­
rels a day, while he owed the National Railways of Mexico 10,000 and the 
other producers combined did not make up another 1,500. Under those 
circumstances, the only crisis was in Mexico—not in the United States. 
Besides, Doheny continued, "if we should, fortunately, be able to produce 
more than they [the railroads] need or take, it might be sold to the U.S. in 
the east for road-working purposes, [but] it certainly cannot be imported 
into the U.S. for refining purposes." Ironically, Doheny and his fellow pro­
ducers were appealing to the Mexican Congress to adjust the duty on 
American oil to keep Texas oil from flooding south.77 
To settle the argument, the Taft administration sent its chief geologist, 
C. W. Hayes, to survey the situation. After interviewing Doheny and Pear­
son and a taking personal tour of the oilfields, Hayes concluded that, while 
Mexican oil production was bound to increase, "the quality is such that it 
cannot compete under present conditions in the markets of the United 
States or Europe." Furthermore, with almost all of the Mexican oil in the 
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hands of large producers and under contract for years to come, there was 
little chance for small operators to move in and upset the market, as usually 
happened in the United States. Relying on Hayes's evaluation, the Senate 
voted down the proposed duty on Mexican oil in June 1909. But the advent 
of the gusher era in Mexico the next year disproved most of Hayes's as­
sumptions and generated new waves of fear from American producers.78 
However, Hayes was right to see that the Mexican oil industry would 
remain in the hands of a few very large companies for the foreseeable fu­
ture. It was certainly obvious that Doheny's operations literally defined the 
situation from 1901 to 1910, and there was no reason to believe that this 
would change any time soon. In the first decade of oil production, Do-
heny's Ebano wells had accounted for 10.5 million barrels out of a total of 
12,290,775, or roughly 85 percent of the national output. The remainder 
came from the only other companies of any consequence—Weetman Pear-
son's oil company and the Oil Fields of Mexico, a company started by an­
other Englishman, Percy Furber. Between them, they averaged 700 barrels 
a day from 1904 to 1910.79 
If Doheny's dominant position was not enough to discourage imitators, 
the early experiences of the other two companies revealed the obstacles 
awaiting anyone foolish enough to try and come in behind them. Pearson's 
story, in particular, was an object lesson on how to lose a fortune in dry 
holes and disappointing wells. "It is to be doubted," one oil reporter wrote 
in February 1910, "if any corporation in the long and romantic history of 
the oil trade had expended such enormous sums of money to so little ad­
vantage as have the Pearson interests in the Republic of Mexico."80 
Having tried and failed to locate oil in Tehuantepec in the early 1900s 
and having lost Dos Bocas in 1908, Pearson, like Henry Pierce, was still 
getting most of his oil from Texas. Perhaps for that reason, he decided to 
challenge Waters-Pierce for a share of the refined oil market in Mexico. 
At first, to avoid a fight, Pearson hoped to divide the trade by mutual 
agreement, but the two could not agree on a percentage split; supposedly, 
Pearson wanted half the market and Pierce insisted on two-thirds. The 
Englishman retaliated with a direct assault on the market, which touched 
off an oil war between the two companies. In the heat of the battle, Pearson 
tried to force a merger with Waters-Pierce but failed in the attempt. At that 
point, as one reporter noted, "there is little pretense on either side that the 
war is not one of extermination, with no mercy extended or expected."81 
Ultimately, Pearson gained the upper hand when he created a new Mex­
ican company known as the Compania Mexicana de Petroleo "El Aguila," 
S.A. (a Mexican company dealing in the Eagle brand of refined oil). El 
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Aguila, or the Mexican Eagle, assumed control of Pearson's holdings north 
of Veracruz and was devoted exclusively to serving the domestic market 
with native crude and refined oil. Having thus reconstituted itself as a do­
mestic company, El Aguila began to attack the "foreign" character of the 
opposition. It also strengthened its direct ties to the Mexican government 
through its directors, including Governor Enrique C. Creel of Chihuahua, 
Governor Guillermo Landa y Escandon of the Federal District, and Colo­
nel Porfirio Diaz Jr. Next, the company inundated the public with effective; 
and sometimes shameless, appeals to native sentiment: "Down with the 
Trusts," went one advertisement, pointing out Pierce's ties to Standard Oil. 
"Even the Pope has issued orders that only Aguila Oil shall be used," 
stated another.82 
With approximately 20 percent of the retail market in hand by 1909, 
Pearson was still importing oil from Texas and losing money on every bar­
rel. Failing in his efforts to secure oil in the Huasteca, Pearson turned to 
Percy Furber, whose Oil Fields of Mexico Company seemed to be having 
better luck producing oil near Papantla, Veracruz. Furber had started out 
in 1900, at the same time as Doheny, after taking control of a company 
associated with Cecil Rhodes. Several years of legal battles kept him from 
drilling until 1904. Unfortunately, while Furber had a number of active 
wells, he had no large producers. Nonetheless, Pearson was either so con­
vinced of the worth of Furber's property or so hard up for oil that he 
formed a partnership with the Oil Fields of Mexico Company in 1909. In 
exchange for all of Furber's output, Pearson agreed to complete a railway 
and pipeline from the wells to the coast at Tuxpan, which still left him 
loading his oil onto boats and shipping it down the coat to his Minatitlan 
refinery. As with all his experiences to this point, however, Pearson's run 
of bad luck continued, and the Furber wells proved to be of little value.83 
Throughout this process, Doheny played no active role in the battle 
between the retail companies beyond his limited contract with the Waters-
Pierce Refinery. While there had been some early talk about a possible 
three-way contest for the local petroleum market, Doheny had no plans to 
move further into the refining end of the business. But given his com­
plaints about Pearson's relationship with the Diaz administration, he could 
not help being drawn into the contest when he rejected an offer to sell oil 
to El Aguila.84 
In the end, Pearson's position changed overnight when, in December 
1910, he brought in the biggest Mexican gusher to date. The well, known 
as Potrero del Llano No. 4, sat on a separate tract of land between two of 
Doheny's properties, about twenty-five miles south of Casiano. Once 
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again, the well ran wild for almost two months before the company 
brought it under control at an estimated flow of 100,000 barrels per day. 
Now more than ever, this monster well reflected the complete transfor­
mation of the Mexican oil industry. In the nine years from 1901 to 1910, 
Doheny had produced over 10 million barrels from his wells at Ebano. 
In the fifteen months from September 1910 to December 1911, Casiano 
No. 7 produced 10.5 million barrels while flowing at less than half its poten­
tial. If opened all the way, Pearson's Potrero No. 4 could produce the same 
amount in three months. By 1911, Mexico was drowning in oil. Hence­
forth, the full development of the Mexican oil industry would depend on 
the ability of the major companies to transport their growing production 
to as many customers as could be found, no matter how far away (see 
Appendix A).85 
In looking back over the period from 1900 to 1910, which formed the 
introductory phase of the Mexican petroleum industry, it is clear that Do­
heny was primarily responsible for the direction the industry would take. 
As a result of his past experience in California and his financial backing, 
Doheny succeeded where others feared to try. In reviewing his work with 
Canfield, Doheny noted that: 
Our lifetime spent at prospecting and our experience in developing oil in 
the vicinity of the exudes in California, constituted in us the proper frame 
of mind to fully appreciate the evidences of petroleum which existed in 
Mexico, and which undoubtedly had been seen by thousands of natives 
and perhaps a great many intelligent Mexicans and foreigners, who, how­
ever, by reason of not having had the proper experience which we had, 
were not sufficiently impressed to undertake the task of developing oil 
there, which task did not prove light, even though we went into it with 
health, strength, enthusiasm, and practically unlimited cash resources, and 
a great belief in our own judgment and good fortune.86 
Unquestionably, the "practically unlimited cash resources" were crucial 
to success and allowed Doheny to control the fuel oil trade in Mexico, after 
negotiating the nearly insurmountable barriers to entry. By both necessity 
and design, Doheny developed the Mexican Petroleum Company on a 
massive scale when he purchased more than 500,000 acres of oil land and 
invested over $4 million at Ebano in advance of the market. If he had main­
tained his primary operation in California, instead, and only entered Mex­
ico on a limited basis, the development of the Mexican oil industry might 
have looked more like the chaotic scramble that took place in the flush 
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fields of both California and Texas. But it was Doheny's persistent attempt 
to distance himself from the Spindletop phenomenon that set the ground 
rules for entering the Mexican market. It was certainly true, as one Ameri­
can oil reporter observed, that "the individual with a $3,000 bank roll and 
a 40-acre lease would be a piker in Mexico."87 
Compared to Doheny's specialized knowledge and established financial 
backing, Weetman Pearson's perseverance and personal wealth served him 
well. With Doheny dominating the fuel oil trade through native produc­
tion and Henry Pierce controlling the sale of refined products using im­
ported oil, Pearson eventually adopted a combined strategy of using native 
production for the refined oil market. Pearson's decision, like Doheny's, 
evolved as much from the type of oil he found as from any predetermined 
plan. Had Pearson initially located an extremely heavy-grade fuel oil simi­
lar to that from the Ebano wells, he might have used his considerable in­
fluence with the Diaz government to challenge Doheny's position as the 
chief supplier for the National Railways. Instead, he found a higher-quality 
oil at Tehuantepec which could be refined in competition with Pierce's 
imported product. Overall, these three options comprised the only pos­
sible marketing strategies for Mexican oil during this introductory phase 
of the industry. 
The irony was that, once the Casiano and Potrero gushers came in, any 
strategy aimed at dominating a sector of the domestic market was totally 
inconsequential. The story of the growth of the Mexican oil industry after 
1911 is one that centers on the direct competition between Doheny and 
Pearson to move their oil, crude or refined, into an international arena. As 
Doheny concluded in June 1911, "Mexico has reached its market l imit. . . 
We must go abroad to sell."88 
i 
RETURN TO CALIFORNIA, 
1908-1912 
With the Mexican Petroleum Company operating at a steady 
profit by 1908, Doheny turned his attention once again to the California 
oil industry. Despite a six-year absence, Doheny's reputation as one of the 
state's oil pioneers and his intimate knowledge of the region's petroleum 
fields enabled him to quickly re-establish his position as a powerful inde­
pendent producer. There were also new legends about his exploits in Mex­
ico which made him seem almost invincible and his success in California 
the second time around happened so quickly that it was almost as though 
he had never been gone. The reasons why this was so reflect the elements 
that transformed Doheny from a good oilman into a masterful executive. 
Having tested his organizational skills in Mexico, Doheny returned to Cali­
fornia with the confidence that he could prevail under any conditions. 
His development as a businessman progressed incrementally from the 
moment he and Canfield dug out their discovery well in Los Angeles in 
1892. Although he expanded rapidly on his own, it was his work for the 
Santa Fe, as oil consultant and manager of their oil properties, that first 
put him in control of a complex operation. When he went to Mexico in 
1900, Doheny scouted out the initial drilling locations like the veteran 
prospector that he was, but he had to think on a much larger scale than 
ever before. With those properties in hand, Doheny turned over the oil 
camp to his managers, A. P. Maginnis and Herbert Wylie, and assumed the 
enormous responsibilities of securing capital and establishing a market for 
Mexican oil. After he sold out his California company to the Santa Fe in 
1902, Doheny divided his time between bimonthly trips to Mexico and 
promotional activities which took him from Los Angeles to New York. All 
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the while, the operations of the Mexican Petroleum Company expanded 
under a growing contingent of able subordinates. This process accelerated 
dramatically when he returned to California, requiring Doheny to direct 
the affairs of two large organizations, one domestic, and the other foreign. 
Doheny's path to the top rank of American business leaders began in 
the late nineteenth-century—an environment that offered enormous 
monetary rewards for hard work and practical experience. But as the eco­
nomic landscape changed in the early 1900s, many individuals with back­
grounds and educations similar to Doheny's failed to keep up with the fast-
paced world of new management and organizational techniques. Although 
Doheny never relinquished a certain level of autocratic control which typi­
fied the former era, he had to develop a modern corporate structure to 
stay competitive in the new age. Since there are no reflections of his own 
to guide us, we have no clear answer as to how Doheny made this 
transformation. 
Certainly, he learned a great deal from all of his associates over the 
years, but there were also a few key alliances that account for Doheny's 
ability to adapt to the demands of modern business. His long-standing 
relationship with the officers of the Santa Fe Railway, for example, pro­
vided him with a number of excellent tutors. In particular, there appears 
to be a striking similarity between Doheny's cautious, but progressive, poli­
cies and those of E. P. Ripley, the president of the Santa Fe. Because there 
is no evidence of a personal tie between the two men, Ripley's influence is 
a matter of conjecture. But, even watching from a distance, Doheny would 
have been introduced to the fundamentals of big business from a man with 
an unassailable reputation as an executive. Before Ripley assumed control 
of the Santa Fe in 1896, it had fallen into disrepute, and according to one 
railroad historian, Ripley "turned a bankrupt ruin into one of the most 
profitable carriers in the nation through careful, controlled expansion, 
rapid modernization, and a concern for economic development of its 
territory."' 
Doheny's work had been part of this process for its first five years and 
it was for the purpose of modernizing the railroad that he encountered 
Ripley in 1897. After having supplied fuel oil to the Southern California 
Railway for several years, Doheny's position as the Santa Fe's oil expert 
drew him into that corporate environment and made the rest of his career 
possible. In a 1905 interview Doheny acknowledged this relationship, with­
out mentioning Ripley by name, when he noted the critical role of the 
railroad's investments in oil lands and companies in advance of the other 
roads. Without a doubt, Doheny asserted, the Santa Fe had been the "ta­
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ther of the fuel oil business" in California. And it was just as true that 
Doheny succeeded in Mexico by taking that railroad network with him.2 
Another important experience was Doheny's tenure as a director of the 
Union Oil Company from 1902 to 1904, a position that gave him a closer 
look at the inner workings of one of the most well-established operations 
in the state. It was also no small token of his stature among California 
oilmen that Union Oil's board of directors sought his advice in the first 
place and contravened an internal policy against selling any treasury stock 
to get his assent. In doing so, Union's chairman, Lyman Stewart, held no 
illusions about acquiring the services of a powerful and ambitious individ­
ual like Doheny. Stewart did not presume to wield any influence over him 
and recognized that Doheny "was not the type of character to be domi­
nated or dictated to." Nevertheless, Stewart shouldered the responsibility 
for inviting Doheny into his company because he "wanted the benefit of 
his counsel." Doheny must have appreciated the gesture, since his only re­
corded contribution was a resolution he put forth to raise Stewart's salary 
as president to $1,000 a month. The parsimonious Stewart objected to the 
move and asked for $3,000 a year. Doheny persuaded the board to approve 
the larger sum anyway.3 
Doubtless, all of these influences contributed to Doheny's ability to es­
tablish his fuel oil business in Mexico and to his desire to return to Califor­
nia. Notwithstanding the importance of these corporate sources, Doheny 
also succeeded because he had extremely capable partners, beginning with 
Charles Canfield. While Doheny and Canfield went together to Mexico in 
1900, Canfield continued to build up his California interests after Doheny 
sold out to the Santa Fe Railroad in 1902. Over the nextfive years, Canfield 
made periodic trips to Ebano and New York on behalf of the Mexican 
Petroleum Company, but he concentrated his efforts in the Kern River and 
Coalinga oil fields, where he earned a reputation similar to Doheny's as 
one of the most capable independent producers in the state. Canfield also 
honed his executive abilities through close contact with the top officials of 
both the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific railroads. Although Canfield 
was in no way Doheny's proxy during this period, he charted the way for 
his partner's eventual return. 
For that reason, and because they reveal several heretofore neglected 
trends in the historical development of the California oil industry, Can-
field's activities are worth examining in some detail. Of particular note 
were his continuous efforts to establish a united front among the indepen­
dent producers in response to the flush field conditions after 1900, a situa­
tion that mirrored the one that had almost ruined the Los Angeles district 
90 CHAPTER 4 
five years earlier. By 1902, massive overproduction and cutthroat competi­
tion in Kern River sent the price of oil below twenty cents a barrel. At the 
beginning of this downward trend in the summer of 1900, Doheny and 
Canfield joined the first attempt to create an independent organization to 
control the field and protect the local producers from the growing menace 
of the Standard Oil Company.4 
There had been unsubstantiated rumors in the 1890s that the oil trust 
was lurking in the shadows of the Los Angeles oil district hoping to capture 
the local market, but nothing had come of it. Five years later, there were 
better reasons to believe the threat in Kern River. In fact, in 1900, Standard 
Oil acquired the Pacific Coast Oil Company as its official California subsid­
iary and, consequently, was in the market for crude oil across the state. 
Moreover, a Standard Oil agent had been prowling around Bakersfield at 
the same time that the local producers were hashing out the details of a 
cooperative plan. At a crucial moment in the negotiations, the agent an­
nounced that Standard planned to step into the picture, buy up the surplus 
oil, and put it into storage. The agent literally scoffed at the puny efforts 
of the local oilmen to band together in the face of the threat. He claimed 
that the group would "go to pieces" in a matter of weeks, noting that the 
oil trust "had gone up against cooperative societies before and vanquished 
them." The Standard Oil Company, he boasted, "had met fraternal bodies, 
but had never met defeat."5 
Many small producers naturally reacted to this challenge with resigna­
tion, but there were others who believed that they could not only learn 
from past mistakes but take some lessons from the tactics of the great mo­
nopoly, itself. "John D. Rockefeller's brains cannot be concealed," one stal­
wart noted, "and the public will surely take advantage of them." Neither 
Canfield nor Doheny, however, seemed the least bit concerned with Stan­
dard Oil. Canfield took the heretical view that the trust ought to be encour­
aged to come in and set up the storage and pipeline facilities necessary to 
stabilize the situation. Let them "build the tanks, lay the pipe, and find the 
market," Canfield thought, while the independents furnished the oil.6 
In reality, Standard Oil was in no better position to control the Califor­
nia market than any other large company, and the belief in its monopoly 
power came from assumptions that the oil business on the West Coast 
mirrored that of the rest of the nation. Actually, for much of the early 
1900s, the state's petroleum industry remained an isolated market revolv­
ing around the sale of heavy fuel oil instead of refined products. Standard 
Oil was a latecomer to this region, with little opportunity and no inclina­
tion to produce oil for itself. And Standard's national strategy of domi­
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nating the refined oil trade emphasized the weakest segment of the 
California industry. Although the Standard Oil Company of California, 
formed in 1906, would eventually catch up over the years and expand to 
gigantic proportions, the initial decision to hold back from acquiring oil 
lands and entering production cost it a significant share of the market.7 
In 1905, however, prompted by Theodore Roosevelt's "trust-busting" 
campaign and Ida Tarbell's recent expose of Rockefeller's empire, the Bu­
reau of Corporations went hunting for Standard Oil on the West Coast. 
When asked about the situation by federal investigators, Canfield explained 
the unique characteristics of the California market which prevented Stan­
dard Oil from wielding its traditional level of power. No corporation, Can-
field believed, could really control the local industry: 
There are too manyfields easy of access to market that can be developed 
by individuals every day. There are thousands of them in the state today 
which can be opened up and every one of them are a menace to the market 
and you can't stop them. The water ways belong to everybody, and many 
of thosefields are right adjacent to tidewater. Every man that has a piece 
of land with oil on it can drill a well, as they have been doing throughout 
the state. I think there are easily a hundred operators who are ready to sell 
oil on the market, and people are going to buy oil where they can get 
it cheapest.8 
Nothing made that situation more evident than the dismal perfor­
mance of the initial Kern River cooperative, formed in September 1900. 
Known as the Producers' Oil, Storage and Transportation Company, this 
organization supposedly had commitments to handle three-fourths of the 
oil from the field. Unfortunately, fear and self-interest remained the bane 
of any attempt to stabilize the market, and the combined effect of increased 
production, falling prices, and rampant speculation began eroding the 
level of trust within the organization from the start. Although Doheny 
participated in the planning stages of the cooperative, his work in Mexico 
dominated his attention, and he was not an active member. Canfield, who 
was president of the company, was also occupied on several fronts, and 
nothing much came of the attempt to organize.9 
Then, with the local situation almost out of control by the summer and 
fall of 1901, five large independents, including the Canfield Oil Company, 
merged to form the Associated Oil Company, which subsequently took in 
dozens of smaller operators. Canfield was also the first president of the 
Associated and recalled that it was only after running the price of oil down 
to fifteen cents a barrel that the producers took this step. Short of that, 
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Canfield believed, "half of us would have been bankrupt." Instead, the As­
sociated acquired the oil properties and contracts of its members and at­
tempted to regulate production accordingly. This stabilized the market to 
a degree and provided enough oil for the new company to secure a fuel oil 
contract with the Southern Pacific Railroad. Soon thereafter, Canfield also 
brought in the Chanslor-Canfield Midway Oil Company, which had a con­
tract to supply oil for the Santa Fe.10 
By heading up the Associated Oil Company, Canfield took his place 
within the inner circle of businessmen who controlled the development of 
the San Joaquin Valley, and he helped establish one of the major compo­
nents of the oil industry in California. Doheny, on the other hand, disap­
peared from the scene entirely once he sold the Petroleum Development 
Company to the Santa Fe in 1902. The irony of Canfield's position was 
that, through its role as the major supplier of oil to the major railways, the 
Associated Oil Company became as powerful in reality as Standard Oil had 
been in the imagination of the independent producers. While Associated 
Oil never monopolized the West Coast petroleum market, it controlled 
about 70 percent of the fuel oil business in these early years and was able 
to dictate terms to the small producers who joined and punish those who 
refused.11 
Along the way, Canfield found himself caught between the Southern 
Pacific and the Santa Fe as they fought to control the production and trans­
portation of fuel oil. And with both railroads purchasing oil lands and 
forming production companies of their own, the Associated's position was 
never secure. In 1903, for instance, a dispute over shipping charges be­
tween the oil company and the Southern Pacific cost Associated Oil a mea­
sure of control over its own operations. Believing that the railroad charged 
exorbitant rates to ship oil from Kern River to the coast, the Associated 
threatened to build its own pipeline between Bakersfield and San Fran­
cisco. In response, E. H. Harriman, the new head of the Southern Pacific, 
negotiated a long-term contract with the oil company in exchange for ap­
proximately forty percent of its stock. Harriman paid double the market 
price for his shares and received a contract for 10 million barrels of oil at 
twenty-five cents a barrel. Harriman managed to stop the oil company's 
rebellion, but, in doing so, he upset the balance between the two railways.12 
When Harriman assumed control of the Southern Pacific in 1901, he 
started to modernize the road and streamline its finances in the same way 
Ripley had reorganized the Santa Fe. Both efforts naturally included a 
growing interest in petroleum. From the start, the Southern Pacific had an 
advantage with its large holdings of public land in California which cut 
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across the newly opened petroleum district. Colis Huntington had sold off 
a good deal of this in the 1890s, but Harriman knew enough to maintain 
control of strategic oil properties. The Southern Pacific also formed the 
Kern Trading & Oil Company to produce fuel oil in addition to its contract 
with Associated Oil.13 
These moves further strained the relationship between Harriman and 
Ripley over the expansion of their western lines. But given the existing level 
of tension, Harriman hoped to avoid a conflict over oil resources which 
could be mutually harmful. Before he purchased his Associated stock, for 
instance, he tried to assure Ripley that he wanted the oil shares as a wedge 
to keep the Associated directors in line, not as a lever to squeeze the Santa 
Fe out of the picture. In fact, Harriman offered Ripley a chance for the 
Santa Fe to join him as a one-third partner in the stock purchase. Ripley 
was not interested at the moment and said he would need a one-half share, 
in any case, but he left the door open for further negotiations. Then, when 
Harriman went ahead on his own, Ripley started to worry. More threaten­
ing was Harriman's silent campaign to purchase small amounts of Santa 
Fe stock in his own name. Since Harriman's tactics in gobbling up compet­
itors were notorious, Ripley had to respond.14 
With this turn of events, Ripley believed that a significant portion of 
the Santa Fe's oil supply had been put at risk and that his shipping contract 
with the Associated, which generated over $1 million a year in revenues, 
was in jeopardy as well. Apparently, Harriman was not scheming for any 
particular advantage in this case, but Ripley had to be sure that he had an 
impregnable supply of oil. At first, Ripley contemplated a rate war with 
Harriman to divert traffic away from the Southern Pacific, but he decided 
instead to attack the oil issue head on. Specifically, Ripley wanted to pur­
chase an oil reserve large enough to break the market if Harriman moved 
against the Santa Fe. "If we had a surplus of oil which could be put into 
the market," Ripley believed, "we would then have both the oil and the 
transportation, and would be in a position to demand our share of the 
business upon threat of making the business worthless."15 
Ostensibly, the Santa Fe purchased Doheny's old company for precisely 
this sort of contingency. But by 1904, the Petroleum Development Com-
pany's wells at Bakersfield were being invaded by water. The situation was 
not irretrievable, but it required recasing the wells, which drastically re­
duced the company's output, forcing it into the market to purchase oil to 
make good on contract obligations. Doheny had initially estimated that 
the company's property contained 100 million barrels of recoverable oil, 
and the Santa Fe had expected to draw down that supply at one million 
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barrels per year. Now, after correcting for the presence of water, the rail­
road had to cut its expectations by half.16 
To shore up his position, Ripley negotiated a separate deal with Can-
field, outside the purview of the Associated Oil Company, for the Santa Fe 
to purchase half of the Chanslor-Canfield Midway Oil Company's undevel­
oped property in the Midway field. In this way, Ripley would have access 
to prospective oil lands potentially more productive than all of the prop­
erty the Associated had under its control. Canfield thought the Midway 
property contained at least 500 million barrels. Having learned its lesson 
with Doheny, however, the Santa Fe lowered its expectations by more than 
half, estimating that there were about 200 million barrels in the ground, 
120 million of which would be recoverable. This was enough to meet their 
needs for many years to come. And, as Ripley concluded, it "put into our 
hands a weapon which the other side cannot afford to trifle with."17 
With his strategy set, Ripley then threatened to open up the field on 
his own if he did not receive satisfactory treatment from the Associated 
Oil Company. In return for abandoning these plans, the Santa Fe obtained 
a five-year contract for oil at twenty-five cents a barrel and a guarantee 
that its shipping arrangements with the oil company would continue as 
before. Although Ripley's primary objective in gaining control of the Mid­
way property had been to strengthen his hand against the combined threat 
from the Associated and the Southern Pacific, he also saw it as a way to 
secure the field against an invasion by the smaller independents. He 
thought the Santa Fe's strong presence in the field would be "a good thing 
for everyone concerned and a step in the direction of getting the business 
into a comparatively small number of hands." And he had no doubt that 
these undeveloped lands could easily become a "thorn in the flesh of the 
railroads as well as the Associated" if not conservatively controlled.18 
Although this was clearly a boon to the Santa Fe, Ripley's decision to 
use the Chanslor-Canfield Midway Oil Company to bring the Associated 
to heel left the Midway shareholders fuming when they realized that he 
was not going to develop the property after all. And they were particularly 
angry with Canfield, who seemed to be playing both sides of the field. 
Under the circumstances, Canfield and a few other Midway stockholders 
having positions with Associated Oil were persuaded to sell the other half 
of the company to the Santa Fe. In the end, the railroad paid $1.75 million 
for the entire property, giving Ripley everything he wanted. Canfield, on 
the other hand, compromised his relationship with the Southern Pacific 
and ended up on very bad terms with several members of the Associated's 
board. As a result, he resigned as a director in 1910 and filed suit against 
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Associated Oil for interfering with the renewal of the Santa Fe's oil con­
tracts. For Doheny, at least, a large share of the proceeds from the Midway 
sale probably went straight into the pool of capital available for his work 
at Ebano.19 
Interestingly, the effects of having railroad executives as principal 
shareholders of the large oil companies in California were never addressed 
during the federal government's investigation of the state's oil industry. 
The independent producers did their part to focus public attention on 
the issue when they loudly accused the major oil companies of conspiring 
with the railroads. But the federal agents seemed oblivious to any claims 
that were not somehow related to Standard Oil. That the investigators 
were more preoccupied with the oil trust than blind to actual conditions 
was revealed by their observation that "the complicated relations of the 
railroads to the oil business [were] clearly fraught with mischievous 
possibilities."20 
Given the confusing arrangements between contesting parties, it was 
almost impossible to tell who benefitted from any particular piece of busi­
ness. A few sources, however, confirm the collusion between the railroads 
and the large oil companies. During one negotiation, for instance, Ripley 
offered to pay several cents a barrel above the market rate for oil if the oil 
company agreed to make at least 40 percent of its shipments to San Fran­
cisco on the Santa Fe. In this instance, the excess payments on a proposed 
three-year contract for 110,000 barrels a year netted the Associated at least 
$25,000 to $30,000 annually, which Ripley acknowledged, "to all intents 
and purposes," was a "rebate on [the Associated's] freight." Previously, in 
the late 1890s, the government had accused the Santa Fe of having granted 
$400,000 in rebates to the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company in a case 
that led to the resignation of Paul Morton, President Roosevelt's secre­
tary of the navy and a former vice-president of the Santa Fe. Still, 
in 1905, the Bureau of Corporations refused to delve into the relation­
ship between the Santa Fe, the Southern Pacific, and the Associated Oil 
Company.21 
It was clear that, despite its stated goals, the Associated Oil Company 
was not a panacea for the problems of the market. The very fact that there 
were still hundreds of small companies pumping out oil despite the de­
pressed conditions belied the ability of the large companies to handle 
the situation. To protect themselves, the Associated, Union Oil, and Stan­
dard Oil (Pacific Oil Company) all tried to capture and store as much 
surplus oil as they could while a plague of independent producers de­
scended on the district. In fact, California had become a haven for insolvent 
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organizations precisely because oil was so easy to find. According to statis­
tics for 1907,96 percent of all the wells drilled in California produced some 
oil, compared to 79 percent for the country as a whole. And from 
1907 through 1919, about 92 percent of all wells in California struck 
oil, compared to the national average of 73 percent. The result was ram­
pant overproduction by those without the financial resources to handle 
the oil.22 
In the fall of 1904, Pacific Oil finally refused to keep buying heavy crude 
oil when there was no end in sight, thus abandoning its suppliers to the 
market. This decision precipitated another moment of truth in the oil dis­
trict and brought a new organization into existence, the Independent Oil 
Producers Agency. Ultimately, the Agency exerted enough control over the 
situation to sign a new contract with the Associated Oil Company for sev­
eral million barrels of oil at a minimum of eighteen cents a barrel, which 
absorbed the production of seventeen small companies. The Associated 
also agreed to accept up to 90,000 barrels of oil a month in additional 
storage from new Agency members as long as the total did not exceed 
500,000 barrels a month for purchased and stored oil combined. A few 
years later, the independent producers in Coalinga, at the northern section 
of the district, formed a second Agency that contracted with the Associated 
Oil Company to sell at least 14,000 barrels a day between 1907 and 1909.23 
To summarize, the California oil industry after 1902 was shaped by a 
steady process of consolidation, which placed most of the business into the 
hands of several large marketing companies and several regional produc­
ers' agencies that bargained on behalf of many, but by no means all, of the 
smaller independents. Canfield played a major role in this process from 
1902 to 1905, but his direct involvement in the California operations began 
to decline by the latter part of the decade. This was partially due to his 
worsening relationship with the Associated Oil Company, but Canfield also 
deliberately withdrew from the field after the death of his wife in January 
1906, which, according to his son-in-law, took "the joy of planning and 
developing" out of his life. Thereafter, until his own death in August 1913, 
Canfield retreated from much of his previous activity in California, al­
though he continued to make trips to Mexico and elsewhere as the first 
vice-president of the Mexican Petroleum Company. Nevertheless, when 
Doheny returned to the West Coast as a producer in 1908, he entered a 
market shaped by Canfield's efforts. He emphasized this contribution in a 
later tribute to his partner: "If the development of the oil industry has 
meant anything to California and the nation at large, then to Mr. Canfield 
much of the praise for the tremendous work belongs. On that industry our 
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state's prosperity has to a great extent been founded, and in Mr. Canfield's 
life is to be found the big chapters of the story of that industry's growth."24 
To cope with the financial and organizational responsibilities required 
to handle the simultaneous development of his expanding operations in 
Mexico and California, Doheny turned to several other individuals. Two 
of the most important were T. A. O'Donnell, who assumed the primary 
role in California, and Norman Bridge, who served effectively on both 
sides of the border as company treasurer. Thomas A. O'Donnell grew up 
in the Pennsylvania oil fields in the 1870s and was the master of every 
detail of the business by the time he arrived in Los Angeles twenty years 
later. He first went to work for the Union Oil Company, but Doheny soon 
hired him to oversee the drilling operations on his wells in the old Los 
Angeles city field. A few years later, O'Donnell and Max Whittier, another 
pioneer driller, formed their own company and put down more than sixty 
wells by 1897, when they went off in different directions. By 1908, when 
Doheny needed his help once again, O'Donnell had become one of the 
best drilling contractors in the state and a mainstay of the industry.25 
In contrast to O'Donnell, Dr. Norman Bridge did not know a thing 
about oil when he started in the business. While struggling to build up a 
medical practice in Chicago in the 1870s, Bridge occasionally gambled on 
investment schemes that robbed his bank account as well as his conscience. 
Through deliberate restraint, he concentrated on his medical career to be­
come a professor of medicine at Rush Medical College, later associated 
with the University of Chicago, and an attending physician at several local 
hospitals. After contracting tuberculosis, Bridge moved to Los Angeles in 
1891 to recuperate. As one of the city's most influential physicians, Bridge 
directed several tuberculosis sanatoriums and participated in a wide range 
of civic and cultural organizations.26 
When oil fever took hold of Southern California in the late 1890s, 
Bridge succumbed to temptation once again and made some ill-advised 
investments that taught him a lesson: "If one wished to go into the oil 
business," Bridge observed, "it ought to be with people who understood it, 
and who had a reputation for success at it." Adopting this strategy led him 
to put up $5,000 as one of the original investors in the Mexican Petroleum 
Company in 1900. Three years later, he was on the board of directors and 
headed for a prominent role in the oil business. When the stockholders of 
the company blocked Doheny and Canfield's initial plan to expand into 
the Huasteca district in 1906, Bridge helped them form a private syndicate 
to get the project underway. E. P. Ripley was the fourth member of that 
group, although his responsibilities with the Santa Fe kept him a distant 
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and silent partner. Bridge, on the other hand, went into the work full force 
and, at the age of sixty-one, changed careers to become an oilman. This 
was not, he wrote, without some "strain of soul," because he was deeply 
concerned about the unseemly aspects of big business. In the end, he con­
soled himself with the thought that at least in the oil industry he could 
help make a "great addition to the wealth of the world without hurting 
anybody." He felt even better about his partners, "the two masters" of oil 
exploration, and he was soon hacking his way through the Mexican jungle 
with Doheny and Canfield in pursuit of oil lands and leases. On those 
occasions, Bridge made up for his lack of practical experience with good 
humor, intelligence, and reliability.27 
Finally, there were two other men, J. C. Anderson and J. M. Danzinger, 
who made up the core of Doheny's California team. Anderson began by 
acquiring leases for him in 1907 and became the manager of all of Do-
heny's West Coast properties a few years later. Being Doheny's brother-in-
law, he was perhaps the closest of his associates. Similarly, Danzinger had 
been an attorney for the Chanslor-Canfield Midway Oil Company and was 
Canfield's son-in-law at the time he went to work for Doheny.28 
Thus armed with talent, Doheny renewed his California interests when 
he incorporated a series of producing companies between 1908 and 1910. 
These included the American Petroleum Company, centered in Coalinga; 
the Niles Lease Oil Company, located in the Salt Lake field in Los Angeles; 
and the American Oilfields Company, concentrated in the Midway field. 
There were also two subsidiary companies, Midland Oil and Midland Oil-
fields, designed to develop smaller properties in the Midway and Sunset 
districts. All of these companies operated almost exclusively on proven oil 
land, rather than prospects, which virtually assured their success from 
the beginning.29 
The decision to purchase only proven acreage reflected a change in Do-
heny's character which did not go unnoticed among the old hands of the 
industry. In reviewing the development of the new American Petroleum 
Company, one oilman could not help but wonder about the difference: "It 
is noted that E. L. Doheny, who is the principal owner of the company, has 
changed from being one of the rankest wildcatters in the west to one of 
the most conservative operators . .  . It is said that in the early days when 
his fortune was small he was willing to risk it on a single throw, but now 
that he has become immensely wealthy, he is pursuing the policy of making 
investments in only such land as is sure to bring a return much smaller 
than he hoped to be able to obtain when he was operating as a wildcatter."30 
Although this observation overstated Doheny's former exploits, it was en­
 99 Return to California, 1908-1912
tirely correct about his maturation as a businessman and entrepreneur. But 
his more sophisticated approach did not make him any less controversial 
or dangerous to his fellow producers. 
To the contrary, Doheny's reemergence in California upset the delicate 
balance between the big marketing companies and the independents, be­
cause he could afford to pursue his own goals. This was immediately ap­
parent when he made a separate contract with the Associated Oil Company 
in October 1908 which called for an average of 4,200 barrels of oil a day 
over a five-year period, or about one-third of the entire contract for the 
Coalinga Agency. Doheny's advantages angered the Agency's directors and 
made life uncomfortable for T. A. O'Donnell, who was an original member 
of the group. In his own defense, O'Donnell stated that he "tried in every 
way" to stop Doheny's negotiations with Associated Oil but that they were 
too far along to terminate. He was successful, however, in getting Doheny 
to admit that he had been wrong in not joining forces with the indepen­
dent producers. Having "now realized his mistake," as O'Donnell put it, 
Doheny offered to surrender his contract when he joined up. Instead, the 
Agency's directors decided to allow Doheny to keep the contract for him­
self if he brought in all of his excess oil.31 
The Agency based this decision on an improving market that coincided 
with Doheny's return to California. During a profitable interlude between 
1907 and 1909, demand for crude oil briefly exceeded production and 
brought the price up from twenty-five to fifty cents a barrel. Meanwhile, oil 
stocks dropped to their lowest point in the decade. Having stayed abreast of 
the local situation, Doheny entered the market at precisely the right time, 
and his initial production helped shore up the reserves of both the Associ­
ated and the Agency when they needed it most. However, this proved to be 
an illusory benefit when Doheny and a few other well-financed companies 
brought in several large wells in both Coalinga and Midway, again flooding 
the state with oil. The subsequent depression lasted for more than five 
years, until the fuel oil demands of the First World War caused a turn­
around in local conditions.32 
Within a short time, Doheny's large production made him a vital ele­
ment in any attempt to control the market, but, less than a year after agree­
ing to join the Coalinga Agency, Doheny balked at the low price they 
offered him for his oil and refused to sign a long-term contract. Instead, 
he arranged to sell all of his oil to the Associated Oil Company, which 
immediately imperiled those Agency contracts that were based on his sur­
plus. At the time, the oil lands of the American Petroleum Company made 
up one-fifth of all the property under Agency control. Doheny was thus 
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both the most important ally and the most dangerous competitor of the 
independent operators in the San Joaquin Valley.33 
As before, however, there were other self-interested champions willing 
to save the local producers. In this instance, Lyman Stewart came forward 
and offered to make Union Oil the exclusive sales agent for all the oil pro­
duced by both of the independent agencies, prompting the Coalinga and 
Bakersfield producers to merge into one large group. Thereafter, the newly 
reorganized Independent Oil Producers Agency, headquartered in Bakers­
field, signed a long-term contract with the Union Oil Company. Through 
these arrangements, the Agency kept struggling producers in business 
while Stewart transformed Union Oil into one of the strongest marketing 
companies in the state. In particular, he used the Agency's oil to meet the 
demands of a six-year contract to deliver fuel oil via tank steamer for the 
construction of the Panama Canal. In later years, Union continued ex­
porting large amounts of California oil throughout South America and 
the Pacific.34 
Doheny's intentions were more problematic, and speculation about his 
motives spawned numerous unsubstantiated rumors about his plans. One 
supposedly reliable source claimed that Doheny had merely cooperated 
with the Agency so that he could learn about its plans and then trade that 
information for a favorable deal with the Associated. A similarly conspira­
torial theory suggested that Doheny was plotting to take over control of 
the Associated for himself. If nothing else, the situation drew out a vivid 
portrait of Doheny's image among his contemporaries: "It is conceded that 
Mr. Doheny has the nerve force and brain to handle the Associated Oil 
Company's affairs, but it is well known that the temperament of the man 
would forbid success. Mr. Doheny is high strung, a quick thinker, imper­
ious, but he lacks temperamentally, the qualifications of the diplomat, 
his methods are direct and his actions incisive, judging by past actions he 
cannot be politic, suave, ingratiating, and achieve results by those milder 
manners and methods which are certain to be necessary in the future man­
agement of the Associated."35 These strident qualities accounted for much 
of Doheny's success, and he clearly preferred to run things when he could, 
but there was no evidence to suggest that he intended to take over the 
Associated Oil Company. Nevertheless, his aggressive tactics and tough 
reputation were cause for concern among the independents. 
With his companies operating in every major oil field in the state, Do-
heny's influence grew with each new well. This was especially true for the 
American Oilfields Company, which began operations in the Midway dis­
trict in February 1910. Drilling on proven oil land under the best of 
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circumstances led to nearly instant success. Beginning in April 1910 with 
a production rate of 400 barrels a day, the company had increased its out­
put to over 5,000 barrels a day two months later. And Doheny could have 
doubled that amount, since he actually drilled two 5,000-barrel wells in 
May but shut them in and cut back development for lack of adequate stor­
age. Clearly, Doheny had no desire to flood the market with oil if he could 
avoid it, and he hoped to leave the oil in the ground for as long as 
possible.36 
These plans went awry, however, when the Midway-Sunset field pro­
duced several large gushers in the spring and summer of 1910. This devel­
opment began in March, when Union Oil drilled in its famous Lakeview 
No. 1, which produced about 16,000 barrels a day for eighteen months 
before it stopped flowing. Typically, almost half of that oil went to waste 
while drillers tried to control the well. Then, in mid-July, Doheny unex­
pectedly hit a big gusher of his own: American Oilfields No. 79 started at 
10,000 barrels a day during its first two weeks and increased to more than 
20,000 barrels a day through August, with most of the oil going into stor­
age. The next month, Norman Bridge released a statement to the stock­
holders of the company proclaiming that American Oilfields was "now 
producing more oil than any other single oil company in the world," with 
a daily production of over 25,000 barrels for the first week of September. 
Incredibly, that record stood for only ten days, until the Huasteca Petro­
leum Company drilled in Casiano No. 7. At that point, with his California 
and Mexican wells combined, Doheny was producing crude oil at an aston­
ishing rate.37 
The effect of the gushers on the Midway field was instantaneous. A 
four-hundred-percent increase in production, from 2,095,000 barrels in 
1909 to 10,436,000 for 1910, made it the most rapidly growing oil district 
in the state. Doheny's American Oilfields Company accounted for twenty-
five percent of the total, with more than 2 million barrels of its own. Coal­
inga grew at a modest rate of 25 percent, from 14,795,000 to 18,388,000 
barrels, for 1910 but had the largest production of any district in the state. 
The American Petroleum Company produced about 10,000 barrels a day, 
or roughly twenty percent of Coalinga's annual total.38 
Because of Doheny's looming presence in the market by 1910, the Inde­
pendent Oil Producers Agency had to find a way to cooperate with him. 
To do that, the members made an open bid to bring him into the Agency 
on his own terms. What Doheny demanded, and received, was a three-year 
contract for a minimum delivery of 1 million barrels of oil a year at a 
guaranteed price offifty cents a barrel. Initially, the members of the Agency 
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agreed to these special privileges because, as one observed, they saw "too 
many advantages with Doheny in the Agency to complain." Certainly, there 
was an argument to be made for gaining control of Doheny's oil before he 
used it against them.39 
However, Doheny had also been looking for a way to improve the situa­
tion in anticipation of the threatened overproduction from the Midway 
field, and he thought he had found it in a plan to market California oil in 
Arizona. This project began in March 1910 and involved L. P. St. Clair, the 
head of the Agency, and W. L. Stewart, the new president of Union Oil. 
Doubtless, Doheny's assurances that this new venture would be a success 
helped the Agency decide to give him his special concessions. Industry ana­
lysts, at least, regarded the plan as a "master stroke for the future of the 
Independent Agency." As he conceived it, based on his recent experiences 
in the Huasteca, Doheny planned to construct an eight-inch pipeline from 
Kern County to the mines and smelters in Arizona, along with a possible 
extension across the border to Cananea, Mexico. This 700-mile line would 
be built along the tracks of the Santa Fe Railroad to facilitate the transpor­
tation of construction material and labor. To coordinate the work, Doheny, 
St. Clair, and Stewart formed the California-Arizona Pipe-Line Company 
on March 23, 1910. Although Doheny was supposed to handle the market­
ing work in Arizona, it was obvious to most observers that, given his other 
obligations, he was unlikely to devote the necessary time to see the proj­
ect through.40 
Without a doubt, those constraints forced him to abandon the effort, 
especially after 1911, when the political situation in Mexico demanded al­
most all of his attention. Nevertheless, the idea lingered for quite some 
time, and, as late as February 1912, the Agency was still paying Norman 
Bridge's expenses for work "connected with an investigation of the possible 
expansion of the fuel oil business in Arizona." But any concerted effort to 
push the pipeline project must have been unlikely at this point, since the 
Agency was also hunting for customers anywhere it could find them, in­
cluding extensive efforts by President St. Clair to secure long-term con­
tracts in South America in conjunction with Union Oil.41 
In conclusion, given the tremendous increases in production already 
underway in the oil fields, the Independent Oil Producers Agency based 
the special concessions it gave to Doheny and a few other large companies 
on a fundamental misreading of the market. According to an Agency direc­
tor, the contracts had been made at a point when the "conditions in the 
oil business looked rosy" and the Agency "confidently expected to get in 
excess of fifty cents per barrel for all its production." At that point, in 1910, 
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the independent producers had visions of controlling the oil production 
of the entire state. But in the middle of a subsequent oil glut, with prices 
dropping below thirty cents a barrel by 1911, the Agency had to use the 
proceeds from almost half of its sales contracts just to make the payments 
to the companies that had gotten special terms. With no room to grow and 
no desire to renege on its obligations, the Agency pleaded with the large 
companies to adopt a "true Agency spirit" and accept a reduction of their 
contracts instead of insisting on their "pound of flesh."42 
Doheny's response to this plea was not recorded, but there were numer­
ous reports indicating that he was not brimming with the spirit of coopera­
tion. In particular, American Oilfields had been accused of breaching its 
contract with the Agency through various efforts to contract with outside 
parties. Still, Doheny had played a vital, albeit sometimes antagonistic, role 
in the early history of the Independent Oil Producers Agency and kept 
most of his California companies affiliated with the organization for many 
years to come. His direct participation in the Agency lasted for less than a 
year, from May 1910 to April 1911. After that, O'Donnell served as Do-
heny's proxy at all of the stockholders' meetings over the next few years. 
Although Doheny was reelected to the Executive Committee in April 1912, 
he no longer attended the meetings.43 
By this time, Doheny had once again become a significant factor in the 
California oil industry. Furthermore, in contrast to what happened in 
1902, when circumstances forced him to sell out, Doheny's California op­
erations moved forward under separate management even as the Mexican 
side of the business absorbed the bulk of his energy over the next few years. 
Despite the rapid success made in just four years of work, the outlook 
for Doheny's Mexican operations eclipsed even the brightest prospects for 
California oil. Although Doheny's capacity to juggle the financial and stra­
tegic policies of the two separate enterprises showed remarkable vision and 
executive ability, this was only a prelude to future demands that would tax 
the resources of his organization to the limit and require every ounce of 
Doheny's skill. 
i 
CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL 
OIL COMPANY, 1912-1915 
With the advent of the gusher era in Mexico in 1911, every­
one wanted to get in on the action. According to a promotional advertise­
ment in The Oil Age, Tampico had become the "new storm center for oil 
investments and land speculation" and was likely to be the world's leading 
oil port within the next five years. As it was, Tampico had already devel­
oped from a languid, backwater port into a burgeoning distribution center 
for crude oil, if not a full-fledged boomtown. By this time, most of the 
exported petroleum was bound for the new refineries that were springing 
up along the Gulf coasts of Texas and Louisiana, although delivery routes 
reached as far north as Boston and across the Atlantic to London. Without 
question, Doheny and Pearson dominated this business, as they would for 
the rest of the decade, but they were joined by subsidiaries from every 
major oil company in the world along with an increasing number of inde­
pendent operators.1 
According to one report, there were twenty oil companies actually 
engaged in production in Mexico in the fall of 1911 and at least two to 
three times that number operating as promotional fronts to sell prospec­
tive oil lands. Almost all of this activity centered on an area in the Tampico 
district some twenty-five to forty-five miles inland from the city. Specifi­
cally, the new oil zone ran along both sides of the Panuco River near 
the small towns of Topila and Panuco, where producers could send their 
oil out by barge without having to build railroad or pipeline facilities. 
Doheny's 450,000-acre property at Ebano sat like a separate kingdom to 
the northwest of these small lots. The big wells drilled by Doheny at 
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Casiano and by Pearson at Potrero del Llano were in the Huasteca district 
75 to 100 miles to the south. 
By contrast, the companies operating along the Panuco fought over 
small leases of a few thousand acres, and most of the wells averaged less 
than 100 barrels per day. Of the better-run operations, there was the Mexi­
can Fuel Oil Company, controlled by the Texas Company, which had a total 
production of 400 barrels a day, and the East Coast Oil Company, owned 
by the Southern Pacific Railroad, which had an impressive gusher near 
Topila capable of producing 6,000 to 10,000 barrels a day. The problem 
for the latecomers, however, was not the lack of oil but the impossibility 
of securing adjoining tracts around an oil well to protect it from competi­
tors. Consequently, the small parcels of land in the area between Topila 
and Panuco became the bargaining chips of land speculators, and strategic 
properties within a few hundred feet of a producing well became the 
"sweeteners" added to deals for larger properties away from the river. It 
was the revolving trade for these leases that kept the market humming and 
gave the area its notorious reputation.2 
The competition for land in the oil districts south of Tampico was not 
nearly as vicious because of the Herculean efforts required to transport oil 
out of the area. Consequently, the Tamiahua district, west of the Tamiahua 
Lagoon and the port of Tuxpan, stayed primarily in the hands of the Huas­
teca Petroleum Company, except for the tract containing Pearson's Potrero 
well. Farther south, Pearson still held oil lands in both the Tehuantepec 
and Tabasco districts, but he had abandoned his efforts to develop the 
properties. 
Along the Panuco River, however, things moved quickly. By the end 
of 1912, Everette DeGolyer, an American geologist working for Pearson's 
Mexican Eagle Company, counted eighty-nine oil companies at work in 
some capacity. American operators led the list with fifty, followed by the 
British with twenty-one and the Mexicans with thirteen. DeGolyer also 
estimated the total amount of money invested in the oil fields so far at 
$175 million. Once again, the Americans were first with $97.5 million, the 
British second with $75 million, and the Mexicans third with $2.5 million. 
For the most part, this money represented the value of the leaseholds 
rather than direct investments in plant and equipment, since only Doheny 
and Pearson had yet to build up any infrastructure. As it stood, 252 wells 
had been drilled in the Tampico district; sixty-four of those were produc­
ing oil, with the five largest accounting for 90 percent of the total output.3 
Still, the speculators and small operators continued to pour into Tam­
pico over the next few years, pushing the number of oil companies listed 
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in Mexico to almost 200. Of the fifty that were actually producing oil, most 
were either direct subsidiaries of the large companies or independent 
outfits working on their behalf. For the period up to 1913, the list of 
major organizations included the Continental Mexican Petroleum Com­
pany (General Petroleum, California); Corona Petroleum Company (Royal 
Dutch Shell); East Coast Oil Company (Southern Pacific Railroad, which 
sold its Mexican production to the Texas Company in exchange for fuel oil 
in Texas); Interocean Oil Company (U.S. Asphalt Company/Barber Asphalt 
Company); Magnolia Petroleum Company (Standard Oil New York); Mex­
ican Gulf Oil Company (Gulf Refining Company); Penn Mex Fuel Com­
pany (South Penn Oil Company/Standard Oil); and the Tampico Company 
(Texas Company).4 
Doheny not only helped usher in the new age of Mexican oil when he 
drilled in Casiano No. 7 in September 1910, but he completed the process 
when he exported the first load of Mexican crude out of Tampico in May 
1911. And that shipment, 32,000 barrels of Huasteca oil headed to Texas 
for the Magnolia Oil Company, confirmed the growing fear among Gulf 
Coast producers that their days were numbered. Doheny's action initially 
set off another round of complaints about the "Menace of Mexican Oil," 
as one article put it. But this time, before the independent producers could 
mobilize in self-defense, a curious thing happened: Mexican crude turned 
out to have a positive effect on the Texas oil market. Instead of driving out 
local producers, it allowed them to substitute the Mexican product for fuel 
oil, while refining their lighter-grade oil into more profitable products. Be­
fore long, the influx of Mexican oil was "hailed with delight" and demand 
increased dramatically. The problem now was getting it there.5 
By the end of 1911, Doheny was producing about 42,250 barrels of oil 
a day with the output of Casiano No. 7 cut back to less than half its poten­
tial. At the same time, the company's sales contracts called for about 26,650 
barrels a day, equal to the shut-in flow of Casiano No. 7 by itself. These 
contracts were with the National Railways of Mexico, Standard Oil (New 
York and New Jersey), the Waters-Pierce Refinery, the Santa Fe Railway, 
Gulf Refining Company, and the Mexican Petroleum Company's asphalt 
and gas subsidiaries in Mexico City. Unfortunately, without his own ship­
ping facilities Doheny could not take advantage of potential American cus­
tomers waiting for Mexican oil and was in grave danger of drowning in 
his own production. Already, the company's storage facilities were 95 per­
cent full with over six million barrels of oil in steel tanks and concrete 
reservoirs.6 
This was a critical moment for Doheny's Mexican business, since he 
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was turning down large contracts for Mexican oil in Texas and in the East 
for lack of transportation. Yet he desperately needed those sales to soak up 
his vast production and generate revenue for additional capital improve­
ments. Facing a short-term financial bottleneck that limited his ability to 
keep pace with the market and threatened the profitability of his business, 
Doheny had no choice but to take the Mexican Petroleum Company public 
to raise the necessary funds—a decision not easily accepted by the direc­
tors of the company. 
Prior to the rapid development of the Huasteca property in 1909, Do­
heny had operated almost entirely with internal financing. Until 1904, the 
bonded debt of the company had been limited to $250,000, used to finish 
the storage facilities at Ebano. Then, as the plans for drilling the Casiano 
wells took shape in the summer of 1909, the company needed money to 
construct the pipeline to Tampico. To complete that project, the directors 
approved $2 million in Huasteca Petroleum Company, Coast Pipe Line 
bonds, which were only marginally successful despite the attached partici­
pation certificates that returned ten cents for every barrel of oil sent 
through the pipeline. Less than half of the bonds were sold, and those that 
were proved to be an unacceptable drain on the company's cash flow with 
the pipeline operating at full capacity from the moment it opened. 
In the summer of 1910, as both Casiano No. 6 and No. 7 were about to 
be drilled in, Doheny knew he needed additional funds to complete the 
pipeline and build as much storage as possible. To meet these escalating 
demands, the board of directors issued a third series of bonds for another 
$2 million: $250,000 to pay off the first issue and $1.75 million for the 
storage facilities. Up to this point, these bond issues had been aimed at a 
small core of stockholders and investors in California and were lightly 
traded on the Los Angeles Stock Exchange.7 
Fortunately, as Doheny pressed on with the pipeline project, he re­
ceived some unsolicited financial support from Mike Benedum and Joseph 
Trees, former employees of Standard Oil's South Penn Oil Company who 
enjoyed a reputation similar to that of Doheny and Canfield as two of the 
shrewdest oil drillers in the United States. Benedum and Trees had been 
responsible for opening up major fields in West Virginia, Illinois, and 
Oklahoma in the face of stiff opposition from several Standard Oil subsidi­
aries. And in every case, they managed to sell their holdings to Standard 
Oil for a considerable profit.8 
In the early summer of 1910, they earned a multi-million-dollar profit 
from the sale of oil leases in the Caddo field of Louisiana and were looking 
for a new investment. Trees ended up going to Mexico to investigate Do­
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heny's work for two Pittsburgh businessmen who wanted to "take a flyer 
in oil." Doheny arranged for him to go down to the Huasteca field, and, by 
amazing coincidence, Trees was standing on the drilling floor of Casiano 
No. 6 when it blew in on July 26. He was still trying to assimilate the experi­
ence a few days later when he wrote to Benedum and exclaimed, "Mike, 
You've never seen an oil well. Those things we drilled in Illinois and Caddo 
were just little creeks of oil. I tell you these Mexican wells are oceans."9 
From a distance, Benedum hesitated. "I wasn't much for going in," he 
recalled, "but Joe was so anxious he made a deal with Doheny." That ar­
rangement involved a cash payment for $500,000 worth of Mexican Pe­
troleum stock and a seat on the board of directors. Harry Brown, the 
Pittsburgh coal man who had persuaded Trees to go to Mexico in the first 
place, also became a director with a somewhat smaller investment. These 
were sorely needed funds in the fall of 1910, as the company raced against 
the clock to complete the Huasteca pipeline in advance of Casiano No. 7. 
If anything, Benedum understated the situation when he remarked that 
their money must have "relieved Doheny to a certain extent."10 
The financial pressure worsened even more, however, after they 
brought in the well and discovered that they could close down production 
by only one half. This initiated what Doheny described as a period of "very 
active scrambling . .  . for a market for immediate delivery of oil," which 
included sending Benedum to negotiate a contract with Standard Oil New 
Jersey to buy Huasteca crude. Benedum met with Henry Rogers in New 
York, described Doheny's operation in detail, and testified that the oil had 
been thoroughly tested and proven. Knowing Benedum's reputation, Rog­
ers did not hesitate in the least: "If that's true and I know you think it is, 
we want that oil." When he left, Benedum had an agreement with Rogers 
for Standard Oil to purchase 12,000 barrels of oil a day at fifty-two cents 
a barrel. 
At almost the same time, Doheny met with the Mellon interests in 
Pittsburgh, hoping to get a contract with the Gulf Oil Company. When he 
and Benedum met later to compare notes, they apparently got into a 
heated argument over the arrangements with Standard Oil. As Benedum 
remembered it, Doheny was "cursing and sanding to beat the band" be­
cause he thought he could make a better deal on his own. Benedum also 
believed that Doheny wanted to pit Gulf and Standard against each other 
to bid up the price. Regardless, Benedum took the dispute personally and 
telephoned Rogers to say that he was through with Doheny and to warn 
him that he was going to have to fight for the oil with Gulf. "Leave that to 
me," Rogers told him. The next day, according to Benedum, Gulf Oil 
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turned down Doheny's offer and Benedum believed his conversation with 
Rogers had something to do with it. Supposedly, Doheny then had to crawl 
back to Standard Oil and renegotiate a deal at a much lower price.11 
There are several things wrong with Benedum's recollection of events. 
First, Doheny had too much oil on hand to get into a bidding war over the 
price. Second, instead of negotiating for a maximum amount per barrel, 
Doheny apparently wanted something closer to a loan in exchange for oil. 
And for that, he was practically willing to give away the oil. In the end, 
according to Doheny, the "efforts to sell oil at a reduced price in consider­
ation of. .  . large sums of money in advance, resulted in the acquisition 
of $650,000."12 
Specifically, Doheny's deal with Rogers called for 6,000 barrels a day at 
thirty-nine cents a barrel for three years, and it could be renewed for five 
more at Standard's request. In return for these generous terms, Rogers paid 
an undisclosed amount in cash. Next, contrary to Benedum's account, Do­
heny also made a two-year contract with Gulf Oil to provide 2,000 barrels 
a day at forty-four cents a barrel. In addition, he had a three-year contract 
with the Santa Fe Railway for 2,500 barrels a day at forty-six cents and a 
three-year contract with Waters-Pierce for 2,900 barrels at sixty-six cents 
plus an additional 700 barrels of refined oil at ninety-three cents. Waters-
Pierce made an initial payment of $250,000 to Doheny on its first million 
barrels, with the remaining $400,000 in advance payments divided among 
the other three companies.13 
The Santa Fe Railway's interest in Mexican oil presented an interesting 
dilemma because of president E. P. Ripley's personal involvement with the 
Mexican Petroleum Company. Before he contracted with Doheny for Hu­
asteca oil, Ripley explained to the chairman of the executive committee 
that, when he first invested in Mexican Petroleum, there was no thought 
of using the oil on the Santa Fe because of the prohibitive duty on oil 
imports. The recent elimination of the duty, however, made it economical 
to buy Mexican crude, although it put Ripley in the position of asking the 
railroad to purchase oil from which he would personally profit: "We have 
always insisted that none of our officers should occupy this dual relation, 
but in this case it could not be foreseen." To solve the problem, he delegated 
the responsibility for purchasing oil to the officers of the Gulf, Colorado, 
and Santa Fe Railway, who had "no other interest than to buy on the most 
favorable terms possible," since they would actually be using the fuel.14 
From all indications, aside from Benedum's initial meeting with Stan­
dard Oil, Doheny made all of these contracts on his own. In fact, he and 
Benedum parted company immediately after their fight outside of Rog­
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ers's office. Soon thereafter, Benedum and Trees sold out their stock in Do-
heny's company and struck out on their own, taking their profits and the 
first-hand information they had gained about Mexico with them. They 
capitalized on the experience the next year when they put together the 
Penn-Mex Fuel Company. And true to form, they sold a majority of the 
stock to Standard Oil through the South Penn Oil Company. With those 
connections, Penn-Mex advanced rapidly over the next few years to be­
come the third largest oil company in Mexico, behind Mexican Petroleum 
and the Mexican Eagle. In the end, had he not needed financial help from 
all quarters, Doheny might have complained that Benedum and Trees took 
advantage of him from the beginning.15 
The total of the cash advances on the contracts, the sale of preferred 
stock to Benedum and Trees, and an additional sale of over 20,000 shares of 
common stock on the Los Angeles Stock Exchange produced about $1.75 
million, barely enough to complete the Huasteca pipeline and begin work 
on the storage tanks. To make up the shortfall and keep from assuming 
more debt, a committee of the largest stockholders decided to pass the 
dividend on the common stock for the next six months, and possibly for 
the rest of the year, which would generate another $600,000 to $1.2 mil­
lion for expansion. Actually, the bulk of the company's earnings had been 
going back into capital improvements anyway, although they returned 
$3,239,969 on the preferred stock from February 1907 to March 1911. The 
common shareholders bore the burden of expansion, except for $305,241 
paid out in dividends in 1910. Ultimately, however, even these efforts 
proved inadequate.16 
To finally put the company on a strong financial base, Doheny went to 
New York in the spring of 1911 to ask for a $12 million line of credit from 
the investment bankers at William Salomon & Company. The money 
would be used to consolidate the outstanding bonds, buy back the Huas­
teca participation certificates (which cost the company $2,800 a day), and 
purchase a small fleet of tank steamers. To investigate the proposal and 
value the assets of the Mexican Petroleum Company, Salomon sent Ralph 
Arnold, a young consulting geologist from California who had worked for 
the U.S. Geological Survey, to Mexico in June. Arnold and his assistant, 
V. R. Garfias, made a thorough examination of the property and came back 
with an estimate so low that it almost ruined Doheny's plans. Specifically, 
Arnold was unwilling to credit Mexican oil lands with more potential than 
what he could see in front of him. The current state of geological knowl­
edge about the Mexican oil fields was extremely limited, and Arnold had 
little to go on except his observation that "no commercially productive 
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well has been drilled farther than one-fourth of a mile distant from some 
sort of surface evidence such as seepages, asphalt deposits or gas emana­
tions." Arnold did not assume that no wells would be found in the outlying 
areas; he just refused to credit them with anything but nominal value until 
proven. However, he seemed to take caution a bit too far by categorizing 
probable oil land within a quarter-mile of a surface indication as "specula­
tive," making his estimates particularly low. He valued the Ebano and Casi­
ano fields at $1.2 and $2 million, respectively, and credited $9.5 million for 
seventeen other probable sites combined. After accounting for the pipe­
lines, refinery, oil camps, and storage facilities, Arnold estimated the value 
of the company at $20,122,817. 
Doheny was justifiably frustrated, if not angered, by Arnold's "ultra­
conservative" appraisal. And it was certainly true, as he noted, that since 
the Huasteca company made forty-one cents a barrel profit from its cur­
rent sales, the proceeds from Casiano No. 7 alone would exceed Arnold's 
estimate in less than six months. In his rejoinder, Doheny wrote that "we 
not only do not accede to the approximate valuation given to the proper­
ties, but we do not agree with the opinion of the geologist as to the area of 
land, at the different localities, which will prove to be oil-containing." 
Then, Doheny invited the bankers to come to Mexico and judge the prop­
erty for themselves.17 
At least a dozen East Coast financiers accepted his offer and descended 
on the properties of the Mexican Petroleum Company in the fall of 1911, 
with a number of geologists and oil experts in tow. By the end of Decem­
ber, a new appraisal was submitted by Dr. I. C. White, the state geologist 
for West Virginia. Previously, White had earned widespread acclaim as the 
main proponent of the anticlinal theory of oil and gas accumulation, which 
fundamentally proved the value of geological knowledge in hunting oil. In 
Mexico, where the sources of oil were more obvious, White followed the 
same procedures he had used to determine the value of Pennsylvania oil 
lands, where proven oil property sold for $800 to $1,000 per barrel of daily 
settled production—an amount which returned two or three times the 
initial investment. To ensure that his Mexican estimates were "entirely 
within conservative lines," White reduced this figure to $300 per barrel, 
although that still left his numbers four times greater than Arnold's. As for 
the prospective oil lands, White calculated the original cash value of the 
Ebano field at $6 million and used that number as the basis for everything 
else. But to be absolutely certain of his estimates, he assumed that only half 
of the thirty undeveloped properties would prove viable, and then he fur­
ther reduced all of his figures by 40 percent to come up with a final value 
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of $50 million for the probable oil lands alone. Excluding both the Mexi­
can Asphalt Paving and Construction Company and the Mexican National 
Gas Company, White believed that the Mexican Petroleum Company was 
worth $73,624,000. 
For Doheny, the disparity between Arnold's nominal value for prospec­
tive oil land and White's $50 million was the difference between success 
and failure, and the West Virginia geologist was duly enshrined into the 
pantheon of company heroes for his faith in Mexican oil. Incredibly, even 
White's conservative estimates grossly undervalued the potential of the 
company, given that the largest oil well in the world, Cerro Azul No. 4, 
would be located on one of those prospective properties four years later. 
But White at least hinted at such a possibility in the final comment of his 
report: "The Mexican oil fields," he concluded, "appear to be the greatest 
and richest the world has ever seen."18 
White's declaration still did not make instant believers out of all of the 
bankers, but it did confirm the belief of George G. Henry, Doheny's major 
ally. Henry, a former vice-president of the Guaranty Trust Company, was 
Doheny's only friend on Wall Street in 1911. Barely thirty years old, Henry 
was young and ambitious, and he recognized an opportunity in Mexican 
oil when everyone else hesitated. Doheny recalled that, after he had made 
his initial pitch to the young banker, Henry was able "to pierce through 
the veils of ignorance, of novelty, of doubt." Doheny added that, "where 
others had been blind, George Henry saw." For the next six years, until his 
death in 1917, Henry guided all of Mexican Petroleum's financial arrange­
ments as Salomon's representative on the board of directors.19 
For their initial transaction, Salomon 8c Company underwrote a $4 
million bond issue in early April 1912, which paid down the existing debt 
and put a million dollars into Mexican Petroleum's treasury for future 
needs. Then, on April 20, 1912, the bankers placed the company on the 
New York Stock Exchange. As one of the first oil companies to be accepted 
on the exchange, "Mexican Pete" (listed as Mexpet) was an instant success, 
and over the next decade it became one of the most heavily traded stocks 
and a bellwether for oil shares in general. The dramatic political events 
occurring simultaneously in Mexico during this period also made it the 
most volatile issue on the market.20 
This situation began in 1908 when Porfirio Diaz announced that he 
was going to retire after more than two decades of dictatorial rule. Having 
raised the hopes for democratic reform among Mexicans of all classes, Diaz 
dashed them again when he reneged on his promise to allow an open presi­
dential election in 1910. Instead, hoping to cut short an incipient political 
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reform movement, Diaz jailed his chief rival, Francisco Madero, and had 
himself reelected in another staged contest. Madero was released on bond 
and fled north to San Antonio, Texas, where he prepared for an open rebel­
lion against the Diaz government, ultimately forcing the aging dictator 
from office in May 1911. Diaz took refuge in France but left behind a frac­
tured and divisive atmosphere among his opponents. An interim govern­
ment took over after Diaz's departure and held another election in the fall, 
which Madero won by a wide margin. 
When Madero assumed office as the new president of Mexico in No­
vember 1911, his triumph unwittingly set the stage for several years of 
bloody fighting, as an array of ambitious regional leaders, disgruntled mil­
itary officers, and angry peasants rose up against him from all sides. 
Although no single group had the power to overthrow the central govern­
ment, their competing demands robbed Madero of any chance to consoli­
date his position. The oil companies were rumored to be part of this 
process, and the Standard Oil Company, the "Lucifer of the corporations," 
was under suspicion of having conducted an anti-Diaz propaganda cam­
paign because of his opposition to the oil trust. Supposedly, Standard 
hoped to soften up American public opinion to accept a new government 
in Mexico.21 
Although Wall Street avoided taking sides, the political turmoil in Mex­
ico threatened to shake up the market when Mexican Petroleum appeared 
on the New York Stock Exchange in the spring of 1912. While the mixture 
of revolution and profit-taking inherent in Mexpet stock kept some invest­
ors at bay, the added risk made it all the more enticing for others. Ac­
cording to one market analyst: 
If any recent tip has been more widely circulated than the advice to buy 
Mexican Petroleum common I do not know of it. Both in and out of the 
street the advice has been given to "load up," and, judging by the extent of 
recent transactions, that advice seems to have been taken by a considerable 
number of those who have received it. It takes courage in these days . .  . to 
commit oneself to an investment based on property in that country. Not 
only that, it requires an unusual combination of optimism and courage to 
inaugurate a market campaign in a security of this kind at a time when 
holders of some Mexican securities are suffering a loss of income as a result 
of the disturbed condition in that country.22 
Obviously, Doheny had little choice about the timing, but he did not 
believe the situation would last very long or threaten the foreign companies 
operating in Mexico. Like most Americans, he underestimated the level of 
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political disaffection in Mexico and was overly optimistic about prospects 
for peace. Mexpet's record on the Los Angeles exchange reflected this gen­
eral attitude, since the value of the common stock more than doubled over 
the course of the Madero rebellion. And confidence ran so high among 
American investors in the summer of 1911 that many believed the revolu­
tion was "now probably a thing of the past." Other observers attributed 
Mexican Petroleum's continued advance through the beginning of 1912 to 
Madero's ability to "run his government with a firm hand and also to the 
high character of the principal American operators in the field and the 
moral influence of their financial strength." This faith in the Mexican gov­
ernment slipped a bit when Madero's countermeasures proved to be feeble 
efforts in comparison to those of his predecessor. "Madero," wrote the Oil 
Age, "is too gentle a ruler for the turbulent breeds whom Diaz ruled with 
an iron hand; but it is hoped that the federal forces may yet be able to 
bring about peace."23 
More troubling was Madero's intention to tax foreign businesses in 
Mexico, especially the oil companies. Industry spokesmen responded to 
the prospect of reform with preemptive arguments against the need for 
a fundamental change in Mexican society and government. These senti­
ments revealed an underlying fear of the future without the immutable 
rules of the Diaz era: "[The oil companies] are aware that they have ob­
tained valuable concessions in a foreign country without much trouble and 
on liberal terms and they are willing to accede to what is jus t . .  . [however] 
it is by no means likely that the matter of taxation would have come up 
even now had it not been for the revolution. Things had been running 
along smoothly under Diaz, at least as far as the companies were con­
cerned. There had been no need for special taxation on the oil industry. 
With the revolution everything was changed."24 
Even appeals such as this, however, failed to have an impact, and Ma­
dero insisted on a petroleum tax of at least three cents a barrel. The oil 
companies grumbled about the precedent but admitted that any tax up to 
five cents a barrel could be absorbed without effect. In this instance, Made-
ro's halfhearted attack seemed like a prudent decision not to kill "the goose 
that laid the golden egg."25 
Nevertheless, as the reports of chaotic conditions in Mexico grew more 
insistent by the summer of 1912, it was difficult to remain calm. For 
the most part, the oil press dismissed alarmist opinions with assurances 
that Madero would "eventually hunt down the last insurrecto and estab­
lish a stable government." And the oil companies themselves continued to 
"pursue their way calmly and confidently." Although the oilmen did not 
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complain too loudly about the limited demands placed upon them by the 
Madero government, they recognized that the altered political environ­
ment after the overthrow of Diaz contained the seeds of a more forceful 
reaction against the foreign oil companies. For the time being, they were 
thankful for what they had gotten.26 
However, as Madero tried to assume the mantle of power as a moderate 
reformer, he became the first victim of change. Madero lacked both the 
charismatic appeal and the military muscle needed to hold the country 
together, and he was also unable to recognize the political enemies who 
were operating within his own administration, including close advisers, 
military commanders, and even the Ambassador of the United States. 
As one historian concluded, "All, save Madero, must have gagged on the 
stench of treachery." It was not surprising, therefore, that fifteen months 
into his presidency Madero was removed from office by General Victori­
ano Huerta, one of several military holdovers from the Diaz administra­
tion. What was shocking, however, was Madero's assassination outside the 
gates of the federal prison in Mexico City on the night of February 21, 
1913.27 
As so often happens in such circumstances, Madero achieved the kind 
of stature in death that had eluded him in office. As a martyr to the cause, 
his name became a rallying cry for the competing factions to take arms 
against General Huerta and the threat of another iron grip on Mexico's 
political future. Unfortunately, the reaction against Huerta was yet another 
temporary union among predominantly local and often antithetical fac­
tions. When that coalition broke apart, it resulted in a civil war that took 
several years to run its course. 
Although the oil zone sat to the side of the major theater of military 
operations, Tampico and the surrounding oil camps were a financial mag­
net for both the established government and the local rebel groups, who 
needed money and supplies to keep their troops in the field. As the revolu­
tion progressed, the oil companies endured successive rounds of federal 
and state taxes on production and exports as well as random forced loans 
and protection payments extorted by enterprising rebel organizations. 
To head off the "destructive tax legislation," in June 1913 the oil compa­
nies formed the Mexican Oil Association, headed by C. W. Hayes, vice-
president of El Aguila, to negotiate their position with the Huerta govern­
ment. Although the Penn Mex and the East Coast Oil Company joined this 
effort, Doheny was conspicuously absent, perhaps because the Association 
only succeeded in calling greater attention to the industry.28 
Fortunately, the same economic factors that made the oil companies 
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such an attractive target also made them immune to wanton destruction, 
since no Mexican leader could afford to choke off a steady source of in­
come. The United States government also refused to sanction military in­
tervention on behalf of the American oil companies, although company 
representatives used the threat of such action in dealing with the Mexicans. 
Under the circumstances, very little physical damage occurred in the oil 
fields, but they became an important element in the ideological war over 
the role of foreign business. 
Yet the sporadic rebel attacks in the oil zone were not inconsequential. 
They slowed down the growth of the oil industry, frequently interrupted 
field work, and occasionally forced oil camps to shut down for their own 
protection. And each occurrence sent out waves of fear that reached both 
Washington and New York. Naturally, reports of random violence eroded 
the former sense of confidence that the oil zone would be spared the rav­
ages of civil war. This change in attitude was most apparent on the financial 
market, where the fluctuating value of Mexpet shares served as a barometer 
of anxiety about the safety of the oil wells. After reaching a high of $843/4 
in the fall of 1912, Mexpet common dropped to $443/4 a year later. Thereaf­
ter, the stock wavered in response to every crisis but fell to its lowest level 
when Doheny and his directors decided to suspend the quarterly dividend 
in November 1913 because of their own uncertainty about the politi­
cal situation in Mexico. To no one's surprise, Mexican Petroleum stock 
dropped another twenty points in four days of panic selling and continued 
to fluctuate by almost that much in an afternoon, depending on the 
conditions.29 
The first mention of serious trouble in the oil region came in May 1913, 
when anti-Huerta raiders on the Gulf Coast burned the railroad bridges 
between Tampico and Monterrey to cut off transportation links to the 
United States and telegraph lines to Mexico City. Another group tried to 
intercept the pay shipment to Ebano but had to settle for a few hundred 
dollars and a complement of horses, saddles, and rifles taken from the 
camp. Similar incidents occurred across the oil zone, raising fears about 
an impending attack on Tampico. Sure enough, a rebel group infiltrated 
the city on December 10 and fought with federal troops before retreating 
into the countryside three days later. Expecting the worst, about 500 Amer­
ican residents took shelter aboard American warships anchored in port. In 
this instance, the federal troops managed to drive off the rebels without 
incident. While the government soldiers often appeared totally inadequate 
to the task, they were still the only security Americans had against the rebel 
forces, and thus far no foreigner had been harmed, and no oil company 
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had sustained any property damage. But President Wilson jeopardized that 
protection when he made it clear that he had no intention of recognizing 
the legitimacy of the Huerta regime, despite the fact that other nations had 
already done so. His decision came as a major blow to the Mexican Petro­
leum Company and other businesses that were solely dependent on federal 
troops to guard their interests in the field. 
In light of this attitude, the real concern for the oil companies was to 
avoid getting caught on the wrong side of any particular engagement, leav­
ing them to deal with each situation as circumstances warranted. This was 
a strategy for survival, not for making friends, and it often led to simulta­
neous alliances with one group in Tampico and another in the oil fields. 
In March 1914, for instance, Herbert Wylie and his nephew, J. Oswald 
Boyd, the superintendent of the Ebano camp, could not return from a trip 
to California because of unfriendly relations with the rebel troops in Tam­
pico after they allowed government soldiers to stand watch over the com-
pany's oil properties. And this was not the first time Boyd had been advised 
to beat a hasty retreat "as a matter of wisdom." With the formal recognition 
of General Huerta in doubt, the situation grew even more ambiguous. 
Over time, however, the ad hoc policy allowed for a subtle interplay be­
tween contending sides which proved more effective than relying on either 
the Mexican or the American government for protection. Besides, it was 
apparent that any appeal to President Wilson was likely to fall on deaf 
30 ears.
This did not mean that Wilson had no intention of intervening in the 
Mexican situation; he just refused to do so on behalf of American business 
interests. Instead, Wilson based his opposition to Huerta on personal dis­
taste for the general's complicity in Madero's murder. Wilson declared in 
private that he would never "recognize a government of butchers." This 
attitude had a profound effect on American policy over the next year and 
resulted in a diplomatic stalemate between the United States and Mexico, 
as other nations recognized Huerta's de facto control while Wilson waited 
for an opportunity to get rid of the man. From his perspective, Wilson was 
engaged in a type of moral diplomacy which gave him the right to inter­
vene at any point to plant the seeds of democracy.31 
Wilson thought he saw such potential in the reform movement of Ven­
ustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuila, who had assumed nominal 
control of the rebel forces in Mexico. Carranza came from an established 
family, had a good education, and projected a studious persona guaranteed 
to catch the eye of the American president. Wilson was particularly be­
guiled by the "Constitutionalist" banner under which Carranza waged war 
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against the Huerta dictatorship, calling for free elections and a popularly 
constituted government. But Carranza's hold on the rebellion was tenuous 
at best, and his position at the head of the movement was under attack by 
Francisco "Pancho" Villa, the wily guerrilla leader from Chihuahua, and 
Emiliano Zapata, the champion of the peasant rebellion in the central state 
of Morelos. Still, Carranza's success represented the best chance for positive 
change in Mexico, and Wilson was determined to help, despite a warning 
from Carranza that any intervention by the United States, regardless of its 
motive, would be judged a hostile act.32 
Undeterred, Wilson seized upon a minor diplomatic squabble involv­
ing Mexican troops and American sailors at Tampico in April 1914 to man­
ufacture an incident worthy of a military reprisal. Admittedly, Wilson told 
a reporter after the fact, "it was a psychological moment" and not a great 
crisis, but that was all he needed. The American community in Tampico 
at first prepared for an invasion, after the senior naval officer in command 
announced an attack, but then was left confused and frightened when he 
changed his mind and aborted the evacuation of more than a thousand 
Americans from the city. A week later, ostensibly to stop the flow of arms— 
headed to Huerta's forces—into that port, Wilson decided to send troops 
ashore in Veracruz rather than in Tampico. With that campaign underway, 
the Navy ordered its three gunboats out of the river at Tampico to keep 
them free from attack, leaving the American civilians to fend for them­
selves and their property.33 
The worst moment came when a crowd of enraged citizens surrounded 
a local hotel and threatened the 150 Americans holed up inside. They were 
saved by an intrepid German commander who intervened on their behalf. 
With the help of British and German ships, along with the private vessels 
of some of the oil companies, including Doheny's private yacht, hundreds 
of American refugees made it out of the city and onto the American gun­
boats in the Gulf. As if their ordeal had not been bad enough already, the 
refugees were then evacuated to Galveston against their will, where they 
sat in bureaucratic limbo for a month before they were allowed to return 
to Tampico. "The feeling of every American coming out of Tampico," as 
one survivor testified later, "is that he was deserted by his country."34 
When the whole affair was over, Tampico was in the hands of the revo­
lutionary forces, and the Americans were left to deal with a group of people 
whom they alternately feared and ridiculed. The rebel troops guarding the 
Huasteca terminal station, for example, lacking the accoutrements and de­
meanor of trained soldiers, were described in the oil press as little more 
than "comic opera pirate[s]."35 
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On a larger scale, the invasion and occupation of the port of Veracruz 
allowed the United States to take false credit for Huerta's resignation in 
July 1914. But a protracted battle of wills between Wilson and Carranza 
over the ultimate withdrawal of American troops went on for months. By 
the time the marines left in November, the rebel forces had splintered into 
contending factions, leaving Carranza's leadership as First Chief of the rev­
olution in doubt and Wilson's objective of free elections in shambles. Fur­
thermore, the intervention heightened tensions between Americans and 
Mexicans of all political persuasions and threatened to create an anti-
American backlash that had not been present before. Still, there was little 
agitation against foreign business in Mexico and no evidence of any "long 
incubating resentment against American economic interests."36 
Wilson, like most progressives, defined the enterprises he would sup­
port according to his own moral calculus and had no use whatsoever for 
the oil companies. Commenting on the causes of social unrest in Mexico, 
Wilson criticized the foreign business community in general for wielding 
disproportionate power, thereby creating the conditions for revolution. 
But he went out of his way to disparage American interests, in particular: 
"I shall fight every one of these men who are now seeking and who will 
then be seeking to exploit Mexico for their own selfish ends. I shall do what 
I can to keep Mexico from their plundering. There shall be no individual 
exploitation of Mexico if I can help it."37 
In June 1914, Doheny responded to these attacks in his annual message 
to the stockholders of the Mexican Petroleum Company by dismissing 
the allegations of exploitation leveled against the "grasping corporations 
owned and controlled by foreign capitalists." Referring to his initial acqui­
sition of oil land in 1900, Doheny assured his shareholders that he had 
never stolen anything from the Mexicans. On the contrary, he maintained, 
"every land owner who sold us land during the early years of our opera­
tions was the envy of his neighbors, and was convinced that he had made 
a good bargain." Furthermore, Doheny stated that he had paid at least the 
going market rate—and usually a lot more—for every acre of land the 
company owned and that, during those negotiations, the Mexicans had 
been "shrewd traders" capable of dealing sharply on their own behalf. They 
had not been hapless victims of his personal greed. Doheny pointed out 
that his Mexican attorneys, who doubted the success of his oil business, 
thought he paid far too much for the land. Certainly, Ralph Arnold would 
have agreed with them.38 
Doheny also attacked the idea that all foreign companies exploited 
Mexican workers and treated them with contempt. Without denying that 
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such abuse occurred in many organizations, he blamed it on an erroneous 
stereotype of the Mexican as an indolent peon who needed to be pressed 
into service. From his own experience, Doheny considered native workers 
to be very satisfactory employees who performed "with as much fortitude 
and much more good humor" than their American counterparts. And in 
return for their dedication and loyalty, the Mexican Petroleum Company 
paid its Mexican employees twice the standard wage for industrial labor. In 
addition, he continued, the company provided adequate housing, modern 
sanitation and bathing facilities, and schools for the children, and it also 
prohibited consumption of alcohol on company property. Mexican Petro­
leum also maintained a store to provide basic foodstuffs and necessary 
items for the oil workers, and, although such company stores were gener­
ally notorious for overcharging workers and stealing business away from 
local merchants, Doheny emphasized that the Mexican Petroleum outlet 
did not sell goods at a profit and stocked only daily necessities. Wherever 
possible, he wanted his workers to spread their bimonthly wages among 
the local shops and businesses as a boon to the local economy. 
Doubtless, Doheny painted the rosiest picture he could of labor condi­
tions, but there is no denying that his companies provided a relatively 
decent working environment. In particular, the oil company employees 
fared much better than those in the mining industry, where conditions 
ranged from barely adequate to deplorable. But the well-ordered world 
that Doheny described was not the norm, either, for the petroleum indus­
try by 1913. The first generation of oil workers, who had moved from the 
hacienda to the oil camp, did not experience an abrupt change in lifestyle 
or habits. In the beginning, the company was not yet on a rigid work 
schedule, and workers had some control over their daily activities. These 
allowances disappeared, however, as the company put its five oil camps, 
refinery, and loading wharf into full operation to meet the demands of a 
fully diversified industry. Large-scale oil production for export necessitated 
a highly stratified, time-conscious labor system that led to increasing dis­
content from the native work force.39 
At that point, workers chafed under an economic system that gave the 
highest rewards to the foreign employees and a small core of skilled Mexi­
cans. For the most part, the common workers were left with little in 
comparison. Over time, most Mexican oil workers, skilled and unskilled, 
began to see themselves as being caught in an ever-tightening economic 
vise, as the rampant inflation of the oil zone and the precarious nature of 
industrial life combined to erode any sense of security. They eventually 
solved the problem through unionization, which gave the oil workers an 
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opportunity to link up with the larger political elements of the revolution. 
Obviously, Doheny did not concede any of these factors in 1914, and the 
argument over the impact of the foreign oil companies on Mexico has con­
tinued unabated.40 
It is enough to point out that the economic significance of the oil in­
dustry in Mexico became all the more apparent as the corrosive effects of 
the revolution ate away everything else around it. And during the darkest 
days of the conflict, the oil companies represented one of the only bright 
spots in the economy. Incidentally, Doheny received an unusual testimony 
to this effect in a poignant letter from Porfirio Diaz Jr., written from his 
home-in-exile in France in 1915: "Some time ago I wrote to our friend 
Mr. Norman Bridge telling him that owing to the difficult circumstances 
in which I find myself on account of the dreadful condition of my poor 
country, I am now obliged to sell my shares of the Mexican Petroleum 
(preferred). The little I had in Mexico has been either stolen, dreadfully 
damaged or ruined by the bandits, and of what is left, nothing produces, 
and for my living I am compelled to sell the only [thing] that has been left, 
that is my shares."41 
Without question, even under the worst conditions during the initial 
period of civil war, the Mexican Petroleum Company continued to earn a 
reasonable return despite losing much of its domestic business. The rail­
roads, in particular, suffered repeated attacks by rebel bands who tore up 
the tracks and destroyed rolling stock. Internal conditions on the Mexican 
railway system were so bad that the National Railways took as little as 
400,000 barrels of oil on their yearly contract of 3.5 million. The total sales 
of Mexican Petroleum during the first years of the revolution were as fol­
lows: 8,662,700 barrels in 1912; 12,325,228 in 1913; 8,231,348 in 1914; and 
6,287,528 in 1915. The company also experienced a 22 percent drop in 
export sales, from 7,602,058 barrels in 1913 to 5,933,488 in 1914, and a 
further decline of almost 25 percent, to 4,457,147 barrels, in 1915.42 
With the exception of the National Railways, most of these reductions 
in sales came from conscious corporate decisions to curtail activity in re­
sponse to increased disturbances in Mexico. According to Doheny, those 
conditions "caused the management to refrain from extensive contract un­
dertakings," which included not renewing several agreements that expired 
in 1913 and 1914. This was due in part to fears that shipments could be 
cut off at Tampico at any time and also because the company lacked suffi­
cient storage facilities outside of Mexico to ensure a safe supply of oil for 
its customers. It also had to do with the political situation itself, since in 
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April 1915, an unidentified official of Huasteca Petroleum, presumably 
Herbert Wylie, stated that, for the past two years, "we have been marking 
time, so far as taking on any new or large contract is concerned, preferring 
to run along as we were, rather than to direct attention and possibly invite 
hostile attacks by too big a showing of business and earnings."43 
Although these deliberate reductions represented a significant percent­
age of oil sales, the company still earned a profit each year. But the dis­
position of those funds further underscored the extreme caution taken by 
the management after 1913. Net profits for the years 1912 to 1915 
were $2,849,771 for 1912; $5,182,767 for 1913; $2,718,021 for 1914; and 
$2,888,101 for 1915. Of these amounts, the company returned in dividends 
$1,923,545 in 1912 and $2,173,100 in 1913, or roughly 67 percent and 42 
percent of net income, respectively. After suspending dividend payments 
for the next two years, the company had $11,260,808 in total surplus (cash 
and investments) by the end of 1915, or roughly twice the figure for 1913. 
And given the potential for chaos during the civil war, Doheny held an 
ever increasing amount of that money in a cash reserve that grew from 
$167,000 in 1913 to as much as $7 million by 1918.44 
Clearly, Doheny hoped to be able to cover any unforseen disasters and 
to fund the bulk of his expansion plans entirely out of retained earnings. 
As it was, no emergency developed, leaving him with a margin of safety he 
had never known before. In general, these conservative policies won the 
company a solid reputation on the New York Stock Exchange and shares 
of Mexpet common increased in value after the initial shocks in 1912 and 
1913. By employing sound business principles, as one director put it, Do­
heny finally proved "that the stock is an investment, [and] not purely 
speculation."45 
Now was the time to complete the plan for a large-scale transportation 
and storage network that was first begun in 1911. Since that time, there 
had never been enough storage to meet the capacity of the wells or enough 
ships to meet the demand of the Gulf Coast market. This left the major 
companies to fight over the available charter vessels. Doheny's efforts to 
acquire the necessary tankers for the Mexican Petroleum Company were, 
he admitted at the time, "unremitting and unsuccessful." In the first 
months of 1912, for example, there were only six vessels available to carry 
oil out of Tampico: one small tanker belonging to the Texas Company, 
three British tankships, and two tank barges, one each from Germany and 
Belgium. Doheny chartered a British tank steamer to supply the Magnolia 
Petroleum company at Sabine, Texas, and filled a German ship chartered 
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by Standard Oil for deliveries to Perth Amboy, New Jersey. Various smaller 
shipments went aboard another British vessel to the Gulf Refining Com­
pany at Tampa, Florida.46 
In March 1912, Doheny placed his first order for two large tankers for 
the Huasteca Petroleum Company from an English shipyard. Later that 
year, he incorporated the Petroleum Transport Company (of Maine) to 
take over the shipping operations and contracted for more tankers and oil 
barges. The Huasteca Company's first big ship, the Herbert G. Wylie, 2X­
rived at the Gulf Refining Company dock at Port Arthur, Texas, with its 
initial load of oil in February 1913. Wylie, who was on board for the 
maiden voyage, announced that the company was ready to enter the mar­
keting end of the business with full force and was not confining its efforts 
to any specific area: "The Huasteca Company will sell oil and deliver it 
wherever profit is visible. I consider the European market attractive, and 
while I am not saying that our fleet is being assembled for any particular 
line of distribution, yet I will say that the European market for Mexican 
crude is attractive and the Huasteca Company is selling oil."47 
Before Doheny could extend his reach that far, however, he had to com­
plete the existing work on plans for a distribution network in the United 
States, which included a number of sales outlets along the Atlantic Coast 
and an American refinery. He paid for it by selling another 14,660 shares 
of common stock instead of tapping the company's well-stuffed surplus 
account. In searching out potential sites, Doheny and Canfield had investi­
gated the oil terminals along the Texas and Louisiana coasts in 1912 and 
finally settled on the old Destrehan Plantation on the Mississippi River, 
twenty-two miles above New Orleans. As the location for a new refinery 
and storage depot, Destrehan had many advantages. In particular, the 
property had more than a mile of river frontage and extended back far 
enough to reach the tracks of the Illinois Central Railway, providing direct 
access to markets throughout the southeastern and midwestern states. 
Doheny's new 6,000-barrel-a-day refinery specialized in Mexpet (also 
a brand name for Mexican Petroleum's products) road oil and asphalt, 
which were marketed from a southern sales office in New Orleans. Mexpet 
road oil was sold primarily to cities and railway companies that used it to 
control the dust along their lines. The asphalt needed no introduction, 
since it had been used for years on the East Coast with excellent results. 
Within a short time, the company was making deliveries as far north as 
Milwaukee, and in 1915, it added another station at Tampa, Florida, which 
included facilities for bunkering large ships and served as a distribution 
center for rail deliveries from Destrehan.48 
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To promote its operations along the eastern seaboard, Mexican Petro­
leum set up a main sales office in New York City and smaller outposts in 
Boston, Portland, Maine, and Providence, Rhode Island. Since oil was 
cheaper and cleaner to use than coal, this area became a prime location for 
securing industrial customers. In Portland, the largest purchaser was the 
International Paper Company. In Providence, the Jenckes Spinning Com­
pany kept Mexpet's three delivery trucks busy throughout the day. Mexpet 
also had smaller contracts with the American Woolen Company, the Man­
ville woolen mills, D. Goff & Sons textile mill, and the Loutitt Home Hand 
Laundry Company. 
Apart from economy, the conversion from coal to oil provided unique 
benefits to each of these customers. Goff & Sons, for example, ran their 
boilers at full capacity only for half of the day but needed a minimum level 
of steam around the clock. Previously, the coal fires had to be banked at 
night, which consumed fuel during non-production hours. Converting to 
oil allowed the company to shut the burners off completely, except for one 
fifteen-minute interval, and still maintain the required amount of steam 
without any waste of fuel. Abandoning the use of coal at the laundry 
achieved a minor revolution by setting loose for other tasks a large group 
of workers who had been needed to pick the soot off the collars and clothes 
handled at the plant. 
To control these northeastern marketing and distribution centers, Do­
heny organized another subsidiary in 1915, the Mexican Petroleum Corpo­
ration of Maine. That company took over the existing outlets and added 
one more—at Carteret, New Jersey, located along the west side of Staten 
Island Sound. There, they constructed an oil storage depot and a large 
deep-water wharf capable of handling ships of any size. In addition, they 
employed a fleet of tugs and barges to supply Mexpet fuel oil to ocean 
liners at their respective piers anywhere in New York Harbor. By the end 
of the year, Doheny had fuel oil contracts with the International Mercantile 
Marine for its ships going from New York to California via the Panama 
Canal and with the Eastern Steamship Company for several of its lines, as 
well as a large contract to deliver crude oil to the Atlantic Refining Com­
pany in Philadelphia.49 
Negotiations for transatlantic business began in the spring of 1914, 
when Doheny met with Lord Pirrie, Chairman of the Board of Harland & 
Wolff, one of Britain's largest shipbuilding and engineering firms. Pirrie 
headed an investment syndicate representing almost all of the major com­
panies: Cunard, White Star, American, Red Star, Atlantic Transport, 
Dominion, National, and Leyland. And these organizations represented 
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dozens of smaller steamship lines around the world. In April 1915, Doheny 
and Pirrie agreed to form the British-Mexican Petroleum Company to 
handle fuel oil sales in western Europe. This was an incredible opportunity, 
since the British investors involved were linked to a variety of manufactur­
ing and railway enterprises in addition to their shipping interests. Al­
though the first draft of the incorporation papers was ready by the summer 
of 1915, the agreement had to be put on hold when World War I diverted 
everyone's attention, and the company did not begin operations until 
1919.50 
The ability of the war to alter present circumstances was particularly 
evident when Doheny, Herbert Wylie, and George Henry returned from 
England on the final voyage of the Cunard liner Lusitania, before it was 
torpedoed by a German U-boat on May 7, 1915. During the trip, Doheny 
was still conducting business as he and Wylie inspected the Lusitanids en­
gines and boiler rooms in preparation for turning it into one of the first 
commercial vessels to burn oil. Doheny then outlined his plans for the 
British-Mexican company to Leonard Fanning, a well-known journalist for 
the oil press, as the Lusitania steamed into New York Harbor for the last 
time. Fanning wrote that two English companies would be formed: one 
to build tank stations and refineries throughout Europe and another to 
handle oil deliveries from Tampico. The Mexican Petroleum Company had 
a half-interest in the latter and a one-third share of the refining and sales 
operation. Mexican Petroleum would also receive a twenty-five-year con­
tract for crude oil as soon as the parties signed the agreement.51 
Doheny explained these arrangements to his stockholders a few months 
later and gave some specific reasons for taking the company's business so 
far afield. First of all, Doheny believed that they now owned "the greatest 
of all oil properties" in the world, which had already produced 50 million 
barrels of oil from a handful of wells. And since so many other wells were 
either closed in or seriously cut back, production could be increased five­
fold at a moment's notice. This excess capacity demanded an extraordinary 
effort to find outlets for the oil. Ordinarily, Doheny would have preferred 
to push his operations in the United States, but he anticipated that the 
growing production from the mid-continent oilfields would choke off that 
option. The combined effect of these conditions, Doheny continued, 
moved the officials of your Company to seek and develop a market for its 
petroleum-fuel product as largely as possible in an entirely new field, 
where it would not come into destructive competition with the production 
of other regions, but by supplying a new want, create a new and large 
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market for fuel-petroleum . .  . Our new associates who own the patent 
rights for the construction of the most successful internal-combustion en­
gine for maritime uses, and who also are interested in freight carrying ves­
sels which ply the seven seas, have agreed to construct all their new boats 
as oil-users.52 
He characterized the arrangement between Mexican Petroleum and 
the British investors as a coalition between the "most influential fuel-
consuming interests of the world for maritime uses" and the "largest area 
of proven bonanza oil territory under one ownership and control." Barring 
the intervention of "unforeseen insurmountable obstacles," Doheny envi­
sioned the creation of a market that could handle not just the output of 
the Mexican Petroleum Company but the surplus petroleum of the entire 
world. He concluded that the introduction of oil as a maritime fuel "will 
as surely revolutionize the character of ocean travel as did the introduction 
of steam displace, to an enormous extent, the sailing vessels of former 
times."53 
Although dramatic, the impact of liquid fuel on the maritime industry 
was actually a long time in coming, and serious efforts calling for the adop­
tion of oil fuel on both merchant marine and military ships had been going 
on for at least a decade. Russian ships had started using oil in the 1870s, 
and the Shell Oil Company had been operating oil-fired tankers since 1900. 
Yet, by the summer of 1914, less than 5 percent of the world's merchant 
ships used oil for fuel. At the same time, however, under conditions of war, 
the naval forces of both the United States and Great Britain were con­
verting to oil burners as quickly as they could. Fuel oil solved the military's 
need for speed, efficiency, and clean operation, while the continual sinking 
of coal-fired vessels cleared the way for modern oil-burners in the post­
54 war years.
As early as 1904, the United States Navy had released a report based on 
its own extensive experiments which detailed the superior results of fuel 
oil versus coal. But due to the unreliability of the supply, the navy had been 
unwilling to use oil except for "special purposes and in particular locali­
ties." At the time, the navy concluded that the commercial demand for 
petroleum products was so large that only about 3 percent of the world's 
requirements for marine (merchant and military) fuel could be offset by 
using oil. By the early 1910s, however, almost all of the military ships under 
construction had oil burners.55 
The British Navy had been following the same path, and Weetman 
Pearson—now Lord Cowdray—made an aggressive bid to tie up his excess 
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production from Mexico with the British Admiralty. Like Doheny, Cow-
dray hoped that his newly founded Eagle Transport Company would cap­
ture a major share of the oil-bunkering business that was just beginning to 
refashion the maritime fuel industry. The sixty oil tankers under construc­
tion in Britain during the summer of 1912 provided evidence of this 
transformation.56 
Naturally, both Doheny and Cowdray wanted to promote this situation 
with their respective governments. In December 1913, Cowdray even tried 
to get the Royal Navy to invest in the Mexican Eagle Oil Company. But 
British officials had no interest in propping up Cowdray's enterprise at a 
time when Mexico was in turmoil. Furthermore, the Wilson Administra­
tion was hypersensitive about British relations with the Huerta regime 
and looked upon the British government as a pawn of Lord Cowdray. 
Then, when the British acquiesced to American control in Mexico in No­
vember 1913, they had no desire to prove Wilson right by signing an 
agreement with the Mexican Eagle. Given these constraints, the British Ad­
miralty turned to the newly formed Anglo-Persian Oil Company and 
signed a long-term contract for naval fuel in May 1914. In the meantime, 
the British purchased fuel oil from the United States, and especially from 
Texas distributors, to meet their current demand. While heavy Mexican 
crude offset these shipments, it did not meet British fuel oil standards on 
its own.57 
Doheny also understood the importance of tying Mexican oil to the 
fuel requirements of the United States Navy and hoped to fund some of 
the expansion costs for the Mexican Petroleum Company through an ar­
rangement with the government. In 1914, he made a proposal to the Navy 
Department to supply it with 7,000 barrels of Mexican crude per day at 40 
percent below the market rate. In return for this discount, Doheny wanted 
a $2 million loan to purchase oil tankers and storage facilities in Louisiana 
or Mississippi. The navy declined the offer. But having already acknowl­
edged a future dependence on oil, the federal government was also in the 
process of setting aside designated oil lands in the western United States 
for emergency use.58 
In particular, the navy pinned its hopes for a future supply of petro­
leum on the control of public land in California. Unfortunately, the dispo­
sition of this land, withdrawn from the public domain in 1909 and 1910 
and established as a naval reserve two years later, was already being chal­
lenged in federal court by the Southern Pacific Railway and a number of 
oil companies with prior claims to the property. Although the American 
Oilfields Company had a few leases in dispute, Doheny was only margin­
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ally involved in these earlyfights, and there was nothing to suggest his later 
role in the controversy over the Elk Hills oil reserve. For the time being, 
he concentrated on the development of his other properties in California 
and Mexico and redoubled his efforts to promote the use of fuel oil as a 
vital component of both military and industrial efficiency.59 
i 
THE PAN AMERICAN 
PETROLEUM & TRANSPORT 
COMPANY, 1916 
Having completed the marketing arrangements for the Mex­
ican Petroleum Company by the summer of 1915, Doheny was ready to 
push his way into the front ranks of the international oil trade. With the 
eastern half of the organization in place, he needed only to bring his Cali­
fornia properties into the mix. Up to this point, Doheny had been forced 
to set aside his West Coast operations to deal with more immediate prob­
lems in Mexico—a surfeit of oil and an unsettled political situation. But 
as early as 1912, just before Mexico fell into the chaos of the post-Madero 
civil war, he made the first move toward a consolidation of his California 
businesses. Then, a few years later, as the dust of the Mexican revolution 
started to settle, Doheny made a bold move to take control of the Califor­
nia oil market. Although he ultimately failed in the attempt, the episode 
revealed much about Doheny's overall strategy and ambition, in which he 
employed methodical tactics in pursuit of almost limitless objectives. 
He began in the spring of 1912, when he created the California Petro­
leum Corporation to recapitalize his West Coast operation. Although sell­
ing stock in the new holding company generated needed cash for Doheny, 
it also worked as a financial reward for the associates of William Salo­
mon & Company, who had just finished placing the Mexican Petroleum 
Company on the New York Stock Exchange. And because a number of 
investment bankers and stock brokers made a quick profit floating Califor­
nia Petroleum, it received unwanted attention from the start. The details 
of the transaction were made public in a larger government investigation 
of Wall Street practices in 1913. Directed by Arsene Pujo, a subcommittee 
of the House Banking and Currency Committee took up allegations that a 
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"money trust" existed among the members of the nation's financial estab­
lishment. Near the end of those hearings, the subcommittee called George 
Henry to testify about the mechanics of the California Petroleum deal as 
an illustration of the problem.1 
For the most part, Henry's testimony confirmed suspicions that a few 
large organizations controlled and manipulated the stock market and the 
public's money to their own advantage. In the case of California Petro­
leum, an original banking group made up of William Salomon & Com­
pany, Hallegarten, and Lewisohn Brothers paid Doheny $8,215,662 for 
approximately 175,000 shares of stock in the new company: 100,000 shares 
of preferred and 75,000 shares of common. Then, with Doheny out of the 
picture, Salomon distributed the issue in three phases. First, it sold $5 mil­
lion worth of stock (50,000 preferred and 25,000 common) to a syndicate 
in London which listed Calpet (the trade name of the company) on the 
Paris exchange. Next, Salomon sold the same amount to a sub-syndicate 
made up of preferred customers in New York, Chicago, and Detroit, in 
which each participant received a specified allotment of shares to be pur­
chased at $91V2 for the preferred and $40 for the common. Finally, having 
earned $1,784,328 in cash from the preceding sales, Salomon held back 
25,000 shares of common for itself as profit for putting the deal together.2 
With the stock distributed in this manner, Henry directed the brokers 
at Lewisohn to make a market for the new issue on the exchange. They 
began by trading the stock at $40 to $50 a share on the curb market for 
the first week. Then, just before it went on to the big board, Salomon re­
leased an appraisal of the property, conducted once again by Ralph Arnold, 
stating that the stock was worth over $100 a share. Despite his earlier dis­
pute with Doheny over the value of Mexpet properties, Arnold was still the 
leading geologist in California, and his opinion mattered. This time, he 
was genuinely enthusiastic about the new company.3 
With this sort of advance billing, it was no surprise that Calpet had a 
sensational opening on the exchange, and it was all the brokers could do 
to hold back the tide and keep the stock from going up too quickly. As it 
was, it closed out its first day at $72, with a volume of 52,200 shares traded. 
Over the next three weeks, the entire issue turned over three times, with 
362,270 shares traded out of a total of 105,729 shares outstanding. Lew-
isohn's effort to place a floor under the stock accounted for most of those 
trades, and, between October 5 and October 21, the brokers sold 172,000 
shares and repurchased 149,000. According to market experts, a firm could 
expect to buy and sell 100,000 shares of a new issue for every 20,000 it 
placed in the market.4 
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Samuel Untermeyer, a wealthy Wall Street attorney acting as counsel 
for the subcommittee, accused Henry of simply manufacturing a false mar­
ket for the stock. As Untermeyer saw it, the brokers boomed the stock and 
then relied on a series of manufactured trades to drive up the price. To the 
contrary, Henry insisted that they had only been responding to inordinate 
public demand, not creating it, and that they had actually lost money try­
ing to steady the price. To keep the stock in bounds, however, Henry admit­
ted that they had someone on hand everyday to give "buying orders on a 
scale down and selling orders on a scale up." Untermeyer interpreted this 
as a ruse to make the stock appear active; Henry considered it essential to 
"give the stock a real market." In the end, the committee saw it as yet an­
other example of "unwholesome speculation and manipulation."5 
Regardless of the promotional activities of the investment bankers, the 
demand for California Petroleum was not wholly artificial. Certainly, based 
on the previous performance of Mexican Petroleum, a new Doheny com­
pany was bound to attract attention, especially when Mexpet common, 
which entered the market at $623A six months earlier, was trading at over 
$90 when Calpet first appeared. And, except for the Texas Company, whose 
stock was expensive and lightly traded, Doheny had the only oil stocks on 
the market.6 In general, as one writer explained a few years later, investors 
came to expect marvelous things from Doheny and claimed to see a special 
sort of luck where he was concerned: "Mr. Doheny goes in where good 
judgment justifies a reasonable expectation of success and comes out satu­
rated with richness, staggering under a heaped up load of results . .  . A 
truly scientific person would be compelled to define 'Doheny luck' as good 
sound sense plus a gorgeous abundance not anticipated."7 
Doheny's choice of an Irish shamrock for the Mexpet logo suggested 
that he, too, had come to believe in his own good fortune. But such confi­
dence seemed misplaced in the case of the California Petroleum Corpora­
tion, which came together just as the oil market hit another downturn. 
Although it was never in financial difficulty, the company failed to meet 
the high expectations of its investors. A snapshot of the industry in July 
1913 showed that Calpet's producing subsidiaries, American Oilfields and 
American Petroleum, were among the strongest independents in the state. 
At that time, American Oilfields, which operated in the Midway oil district, 
was the largest and most important member of the Independent Oil Pro­
ducers Agency. Of the 129 companies belonging to the Agency, American 
Oilfields alone produced 264,906 barrels of oil that month, or roughly 27 
percent of the Agency's total production. In comparison, the next largest 
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company was Nevada Petroleum, at 75,000 barrels a month, while the re­
maining companies averaged about 5,000 barrels apiece. The situation in 
Coalinga, where American Petroleum produced 186,317 barrels on con­
tract with the Associated Oil Company, was not quite as strong. Still, 
American Petroleum accounted for 12 percent of the Associated's business. 
Overall, for the month under review, the combined production of the two 
companies made California Petroleum—at 451,223 barrels—fifth among 
the seven largest producers on the West Coast, after Union Oil at 843,871 
barrels, Standard Oil at 751,906, Kern Trading and Oil Company (South­
ern Pacific) at 678,302, and Associated Oil Company at 564,840. Santa Fe 
(formerly a combination of Chanslor & Canfield Midway Oil and Petro­
leum Development) and General Petroleum Company were right behind, 
with 397,143 and 362,559 barrels, respectively.8 
Facing another oil glut, however, Doheny used the cash received from 
floating Calpet to build an extensive storage network and cut back produc­
tion to just meet his contract obligations. Planning for the future, though, 
he continued to buy up prospective oil land outside of the San Joaquin 
Valley. In doing so, Doheny was able to open and close various fields ac­
cording to the market and, thus, gain control of a strategic combination 
of proven, but undeveloped, properties. This left him free to rely on his 
long-term contracts to the Independent Oil Producers Agency and Associ­
ated Oil during the bad times, and to open up new "freelance" properties, 
outside the control of either marketing organization, when prices went 
back up.9 
At the other end of the scale, the remaining members of the Agency 
were almost always out of step with the market. They sold oil at a loss 
during times of depression and produced too much when conditions 
started to improve. Although their ability to upset the situation at almost 
any point gave them a negative power, the small independents survived on 
the sufferance and superior market intelligence of the large companies. 
Supposedly, the IOPA had been formed to keep the independents in line, 
but the small producers defied efforts at full control and continued to pose 
a danger to themselves and to the fortunes of the state. For that reason, 
the worsening conditions in 1914 inspired another plan to reorganize the 
independent oil companies into a stronger combination. 
This latest idea came from Mark L. Requa, a San Francisco mining 
engineer and president of the Nevada Petroleum Company. As a frequent 
writer and public speaker on oil issues, Requa was a well-known figure on 
the West Coast. He was also a long-standing critic of the small-minded 
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attitude of the independent producers. In fact, he wanted to get rid of them 
altogether. Outlining the problem to the assembled membership of the 
IOPA in July 1914, Requa was blunt, if not insulting: 
I am telling no secrets when I say that to the average producer of oil a 
continuation of existing conditions spells ruin, nor do I exaggerate in say­
ing that unless conditions are changed, the oil properties in the hands of 
the average small company are, relatively speaking, without value. We are 
exhausting one of the State's greatest assets without any adequate return 
. .. The individual producer, from early ignorance, creates a condition that 
spellsfinancial suicide. He immolates himself upon the altar of his own 
ignorance and short-sighted avarice and blames his troubles, not upon 
himself, where they belong, but upon the marketing companies that 
merely buy his product at prices set by himself in competition with his 
neighbor.10 
The marketing companies, by contrast, stood above the fray and pros­
pered accordingly. The Agency, Requa believed, needed to do the same: "It 
seems to me obvious that we can do no better than emulate the example 
set for us. Let us determine the value of what we have and thereafter so 
weld together the various units . .  . to reap the benefits that are justly ours." 
But instead of relying on cooperative association alone, Requa proposed 
the creation of a new company made up of independent producers who 
would exchange their individual properties for stock in a new corporation. 
By cutting overhead and other duplicated costs, including the salaries of 
the people responsible for the crisis in the first place, the new organization 
would be able to approach Standard Oil, Associated Oil, and Union Oil on 
equal, if not better, terms. Of course, many people thought that it would 
be "utterly impossible" to convince the officers of the existing companies 
to give up their meal tickets for stock in the new corporation, but Requa 
believed they were facing a life or death situation that demanded a dras­
tic solution." 
The first step, to which the Agency members reluctantly agreed, was to 
conduct a thorough appraisal of each member's assets. Requa warned that 
"this valuing will mean a complete investigation of your records and the 
collecting of all available statistics concerning your property." Unfortu­
nately, despite fifteen months of work, Requa discovered that the producers 
did not have anything to reveal but their own incompetence; there was 
no reliable information about the historical development of the various 
California oilfields and almost nofinancial data for any particular organi­
zation. Of the 130 companies under review, no more than a half dozen 
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had adequate records. Despite his own suspicions, Requa was thoroughly 
appalled at the "dense ignorance" of oilmen about basic business concepts. 
Most of the independents did not even know how much it actually cost 
them to produce a barrel of oil, so it was a wonder that they had stayed in 
business as long as they had.12 
In a previous investigation, Requa had determined that most California 
oilmen based their production expenses on the direct cost of pumping oil 
from an existing well, without considering previous outlays for explora­
tion, the price of materials, or additional factors such as interest and depre­
ciation. When those elements were added in, he estimated that the true 
cost of producing a barrel of oil was approximately thirty to thirty-five 
cents—almost as much as the normal bulk price for oil at the wells. Requa 
suggested that, by figuring costs the way they did, some producers were 
deliberately fooling the public about the health of their companies and 
living off of the lie. Thus, to rationalize the production cycle and promote 
the public interest, Requa became an early advocate for mandatory stan­
dards of cost accounting for oil companies.13 
In the meantime, the best he could do was to assemble the accounting 
data and production curves for Doheny's companies in Coalinga and Mid­
way and extrapolate from them to find a suitable base for Kern River, 
Orange County, and a handful of smaller fields for which he had no infor­
mation at all. By its very inadequacy, Requa's valuation of the indepen­
dents' holdings reinforced his call for a massive reorganization of the 
Agency itself. Consequently, in 1915, Requa, along with L. R St. Clair, the 
head of the Agency, and T. A. O'Donnell, vice-president of California Pe­
troleum, met with W. L. Stewart, president of the Union Oil Company, to 
discuss a merger.14 
Up to this point, Doheny had deliberately been absent from these dis­
cussions, although it became clear later on that, from the beginning, he 
and George Henry had been behind the effort to roll the independent com­
panies into a competitive organization. In fact, in 1914, William Salomon 
hired Ralph Arnold to evaluate several potential combinations among 
Union Oil, Associated Oil, General Petroleum, and California Petroleum. 
While Doheny tried to stay out of public view for as long as possible, there 
was growing suspicion within the industry that he was the power behind 
the merger effort in California. 
Thus, in line with Doheny's plans, Requa hoped to purchase a majority 
share of Union Oil on behalf of the Agency. Instead, because of a number 
of intervening factors, he settled for an option on the United Petroleum 
Company, the principal holding company through which the Stewart 
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family controlled the larger organization. But there was trouble from the 
start when Andrew Weir, an English investor who owned a large share of 
the company's stock, opposed the deal. Weir was also a major shareholder 
of the General Petroleum Company, which was in serious financial trouble 
at the time, and his presence made for a messy combination of interests 
and personalities.15 
To complicate the situation even further, a group of disgruntled Union 
stockholders opposed to any merger filed suit in federal court to dissolve 
United Petroleum and wrest control from the Stewart family. The actions 
of this insurgent group, led by John Garrigues, the former treasurer of 
the company, threw a pall over any plans for the future. Garrigues was a 
strident critic of the Stewarts' management decisions and characterized 
Union's arrangements with the Agency as a series of "invidious contracts" 
that imperiled the health of the entire company. 
O'Donnell recalled that Garrigues had repeatedly tried to browbeat and 
intimidate the Agency's executive committee during negotiations with 
Union Oil. And Garrigues was notorious for having made some statements 
about the Stewarts during a news conference that were so libelous that the 
local papers refused to print them. Not surprisingly, Garrigues interpreted 
the proposed sale of the company to Requa as an underhanded way for the 
Stewart family to inflate the value of its stock and cheat everyone else. 
Though the merger documents stipulated that all shareholders would par­
ticipate in the deal equally, Garrigues managed to rattle the nerves of 
Union stockholders by bringing the legality of the holding company itself 
into question.16 
A similar, but less volatile, struggle occurred within the ranks of the 
Doheny organization as his participation in the California merger became 
better known. Doheny first tipped his hand in this regard in September 
1915, when he informed the stockholders of Mexican Petroleum that he 
wanted to form a seven-year voting trust so that the company could take 
advantage of war-time changes in the European market. Ostensibly, a trust­
eeship made up of Doheny, Herbert Wylie, and J. M. Danzinger would 
better serve the interests of the company by being able to take immediate 
action without seeking stockholder approval at every turn. In the context 
of Doheny's simultaneous efforts in California, however, many sharehold­
ers interpreted the move as a possible threat to their capacity to control 
the future of the company. Just prior to the annual meeting in December 
1915, anonymous petitions appeared in New York brokerage houses urging 
stockholders to hold firm against Doheny's proposal. Although these mes­
sages usually wound up in the wastebasket, they raised eyebrows about 
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management's plans. In the end, this short-lived rebellion was inconse­
quential except as an indication that not everyone was comfortable with 
Doheny's ulterior motives.17 
The first public information about Doheny's intentions came to light 
on December 10, 1915, when he announced that he was forming a $100 
million petroleum and transport company and that it would be the greatest 
enterprise of its kind in America. At this point, Doheny's efforts and those 
of the IOPA were finally recognized as one and the same. That revelation 
led to increased speculation among industry analysts that Union Oil, Asso­
ciated Oil, and the General Petroleum Company would all come together 
under the Doheny umbrella, along with the Agency itself. At least W. L. 
Stewart confirmed that Requa's option for United Petroleum shares was on 
behalf of the new Doheny company. By the middle of January 1916, the 
San Francisco Examiner, which had been following Requa's progress in 
some detail, reported that Doheny's Mexican Petroleum Company would 
be the nucleus of the largest oil combination in the world.18 
Apart from that with Union Oil, any direct connection with the other 
companies was less certain and subject to speculation. The clearest state­
ment came from L. P. St. Clair, who confirmed the negotiations between 
the Doheny interests, Union Oil, General Petroleum, and the IOPA and 
claimed that "the situation looks encouraging for a definite conclusion of 
the transaction." The Wall Street Journal was just as certain that the Associ­
ated Oil Company had to be included in any combination.19 
In support of that position, the New York Times reported that Doheny 
held a short-term option on $20 million worth of Associated stock owned 
by the Southern Pacific Railway. But for reasons not stated, Doheny al­
lowed the option to lapse at the end of the January. According to William 
Sproule, the president of Associated Oil, there was "absolutely no truth in 
the report that negotiations are in progress with Mr. Doheny or anyone 
else for a change in control of the Associated Oil Co." Nevertheless, a subse­
quent report noted that Sproule, who also had assumed control of the 
Southern Pacific in 1914, viewed the oil company as an unnecessary bur­
den for the railroad and had been trying unsuccessfully to find a buyer.20 
At the same time, Requa's negotiations with Union Oil ground to a 
halt, after he spent a month in New York trying to work out an acceptable 
arrangement with an investment banking committee. Requa's option 
called for Doheny to make a $1 million cash payment toward the purchase 
of $4 million of United Petroleum stock owned by the Stewart fam­
ily. United Petroleum sat at the top of a pyramided structure, where it 
controlled the shares of the Union Provident Company, which in turn 
1916.21 
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controlled the $34 million of outstanding stock of Union Oil. Perhaps the 
impending stockholder suit against this holding company arrangement 
caused Requa to give up his option before the deadline of February 15, 
By the end of 1915, there had also been a dramatic change in the West 
Coast oil market, which allowed Union Oil to earn a sizable profit for the 
year and quieted many of its critics. To their credit, the Stewarts took ad­
vantage of the situation to voluntarily dissolve United Petroleum prior to 
any court ruling and, hence, regained the support of most shareholders— 
except for Garrigues, of course, who was unceremoniously dumped from 
the board of directors along the way. In October 1916, a Los Angeles court 
formally ordered the liquidation of the holding company as an unlawful 
form of control, but by then the crisis had long since passed.22 
For the first time in five years, oil consumption outpaced production 
on the West Coast, and the contract price rose above seventy cents per 
barrel. These improvements, coupled with the congenitally short memory 
of most oil producers, forced the marketing companies to shelve any 
merger plans for the moment. The members of the Agency, on the other 
hand, stuck with long-term contracts at less than fifty cents a barrel, did 
not see any immediate benefit from these changes. For that reason alone, 
Doheny was still planning to combine the members of the Agency into a 
single entity in order to eliminate the competitive deficiencies of the inde­
pendent companies. But once having renegotiated their contracts at higher 
prices, the recalcitrant producers turned him down and voted to maintain 
the Agency as it was, with California Petroleum firmly ensconced at the 
center.23 
In the light of improved conditions, Doheny's plans were seen as too 
ambitious and threatening to his fellow oilmen. No doubt, he had been 
thinking on a scale that challenged the imagination of his most ardent 
supporters and scared the devil out of his enemies. Had the merger gone 
through as planned, it would have been an amazing accomplishment. As 
of December 1915, the combined assets of California Petroleum, Associ­
ated Oil, Union Oil, and General Petroleum totaled $214,778,310. A com­
pany of that magnitude would have been more than twice the size of 
Standard Oil of California, which had $98,543,332 in assets, and roughly 
three-quarters the size of Standard Oil New Jersey, with $281,903,777. By 
adding the Mexican Petroleum Company to this California combination— 
at $63,051,445—to say nothing of the smaller members of the Agency, 
Doheny would have been able to compete one-to-one with the Rockefel­
ler dynasty.24 
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In retrospect, Doheny might have been able to complete each of these 
mergers by taking them one at a time, but trying to capture three different 
organizations simultaneously was virtually impossible. Yet Doheny and 
Requa took advantage of a particular moment in the development of the 
California oil industry when such an idea was given serious consideration. 
Unfortunately, despite having purchase options for all the major prospects, 
they simply ran out of time before the market turned around once again, 
due largely to the unforeseen consequences of the war in Europe. In the 
end, Doheny accepted the circumstances in California for what they were 
and refocused his attention on Mexico, where he still had an opportunity 
to push his company to the forefront of the industry. 
Even with his California plans falling down around him, however, Do­
heny still needed a way to consolidate his existing operation. To do that, 
he incorporated the Pan American Petroleum 8c Transport Company of 
Delaware on February 2, 1916. Although capitalized at $150 million, the 
company's initial capital stock was approximately $40 million, divided be­
tween $10 million preferred and $30,494,750 common. Acting as a pure 
holding company, Pan American Petroleum derived its income from its 
constituent companies in the following proportions: 45 percent of Mexi­
can Petroleum common; 75 percent of Mexican Petroleum preferred; 97 
percent of the Petroleum Transport Company common; 59 percent of Ca­
loric Company common (a South American marketing subsidiary based 
in Brazil); 66 percent of Caloric preferred; and 100 percent of Buena Fe 
Petroleum, a small California subsidiary.25 
In return for financing this new organization, Wall Street gained a 
sizable constituency on the board of Pan American Petroleum. Doheny 
retained active control of the company's management, with 60 percent of 
the members of the board under his command, but investment bankers 
filled out the remaining positions. The outside directors included Thomas 
Cochran Jr., president of the Liberty Mutual National Bank; Edward R. 
Tinker Jr., vice-president of the Chase National Bank; Eugene Meyer Jr., of 
Eugene Meyer and Company; and two partners from William Salomon & 
Company.26 
In a letter to Salomon & Company at the time of incorporation, Do­
heny justified their faith in the new organization by claiming that Pan 
American Petroleum would soon control "the largest area of proven oil 
territory in the world under one ownership." As it turned out, this was no 
idle boast. In fact, just eight days later, the Huasteca Petroleum Company 
drilled in Cerro Azul No. 4, the largest oil well in the world at the time. In 
this instance, Doheny had literally been banking on the new well coming 
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in when it did, having drilled down to the cap rock the year before. At that 
time, the company suspended operations in the face of increased political 
turmoil in Mexico and did not obtain permission to resume drilling until 
after Carranza received de facto recognition by the Wilson administration 
in October 1915. Meanwhile, after gauging the pressure in the well, they 
knew they had another tremendous gusher on their hands when they went 
to work again in February.27 
Doheny was so confident that the well would be a prize that he had 
a photographer camped out in the jungle with cameras, moving-picture 
equipment, and a portable darkroom to record the event. With everything 
in place, the drilling crew hit a large pocket of gas on February 9, which 
gave further indication of what was to come. Early the next morning, the 
bit plunged through the protective layer of rock, the drill cable went slack 
as the pressure of the gas lifted the tools back up the casing, and the well 
began to rumble and roar with volcanic ferocity. Taking that as their final 
cue, the drilling crew ran for their lives but managed to get only about 
twenty feet away before the well erupted in an explosion of gas that shot 
the 4,000-pound string of tools straight out of the hole. When they came 
down, they were 125 feet away from the well and a mere nine feet from the 
photographer, who, in an understandable moment of panic, missed film­
ing the initial blowout. 
Over the next few days, however, as the well spewed out a column of 
oil 600 feet into the air, the photographer captured the dramatic images of 
Cerro Azul that appeared under the caption "World's Greatest Oil Well" in 
almost every major newspaper in the country. To celebrate the occasion, 
George Henry hosted a lavish dinner in New York in Doheny's honor, fea­
turing a motion picture of Cerro Azul blowing at full strength before it 
was brought under control. As incredible as it seemed, the maximum flow 
of the well was estimated at more than 260,000 barrels a day—more oil, 
as Herbert Wylie pointed out, than was produced by the entire state of 
California.28 
Of course that much production, all at once, again overwhelmed the 
company's infrastructure, despite its best efforts to prepare for a large well. 
In this instance, the crew had a complete valve system installed on the pipe 
before they drilled in the well and had storage tanks set up for a half-
million barrels of oil. But when the gas pressure blew the drilling tools out 
of the well, they ripped apart the valve, the derrick, and everything else in 
the way. As a result, there was no way to shut in the flow, and the well ran 
wild for seven days before the crew was able to screw a new valve over the 
casing and bring it under control. In the meantime, they burned off what 
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Center, Archdiocese of Los Angeles. 
excess oil they could while the rest overran the storage facilities and satu­
rated the ground for two miles around the well. Other preparations paid 
off handsomely, however—especially the twin eight-inch pipelines from 
Tampico. Those lines had been only about fifty feet short of the well when 
the company suspended the initial drilling campaign in 1915 and were 
easily completed once the new gate valve was in place.29 
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Obviously, Doheny had been incredibly shrewd to have all of this work 
come together as it did, and, in his deliberate attempt to showcase the well, 
he even managed to have Dr. I. C. White on hand when Cerro Azul roared 
to life. As before, White had been chosen to appraise the property for 
the investment bankers, and he followed the same procedures that he had 
used four years earlier, allowing $300 a barrel for the settled daily produc­
tion of the Ebano and Casiano properties and $500 a barrel for Cerro 
Azul. He raised the number for the new well because the old figures had 
been proven to be even more conservative than he had intended in 1911. 
Previously, White had appraised the Ebano field at $2 million and Casiano 
at $10,674,000. By 1916, however, those properties had already returned 
net earnings of $2,080,349 and $12,810,861, respectively, and were still 
producing oil at approximately the same rate without any water. 
The prospects for Cerro Azul were even brighter, since White found 
that the basin around the well was ten times bigger than the one around 
Casiano and that the adjacent oil seepages were 100 times as large and 
much more active. Furthermore, White noted that Cerro Azul sat in the 
middle of a 52,000-acre tract of land that the company held in fee, unen­
cumbered by government concessions. This virtually eliminated the likeli­
hood of competitive drilling, since the nearest boundary line was more 
than five miles away. Taking all of these factors into consideration and us­
ing Casiano as a yardstick, White predicted that Cerro Azul would produce 
at least a billion barrels of oil. 
Assuming a settled production of 200,000 barrels a day, White calcu­
lated the value of the new well at $100 million, or just ten cents a barrel 
for oil in the ground. White added $12.6 million to that amount for Ebano 
and Casiano combined and $19,721,000 for the remaining camp property, 
fixtures, and machinery. Because Cerro Azul by itself exceeded the value of 
White's previous estimate for all the undeveloped oil lands, he tripled his 
initial figure to arrive at $162 million for properties held in reserve. Conse­
quently, according to these calculations, which were still relatively conser­
vative, the Mexican Petroleum Company was worth $294,321,000, or four 
times its 1911 value. After a detailed examination of the oil fields, White 
predicted the probable future production of the company at 5,140,500,000 
barrels of oil, or sixty-eight years at 200,000 barrels a day. Given these 
extraordinary numbers, White admitted that his greatest difficulty in 
presenting his estimates was making them "small enough to appear 
reasonable."30 
Just when Doheny hoped to capitalize on this vast productive capacity, 
however, the political situation in Mexico worsened once again. Ironically, 
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Cerro AzuPs fantastic potential made many investors increasingly nervous 
about the situation. In particular, the rebel activities of Francisco "Pancho" 
Villa, who lashed out against the United States for its recognition of Car­
ranza in the fall of 1915, made conditions even more volatile than they had 
been before. Villa believed that the Wilson Administration's decision to 
recognize the Carranza government was based on a secret pact that granted 
concessions to the Americans and compromised Mexico's sovereignty. An 
attempt at such a plan had been made by Mexican and American represen­
tatives, but Villa was mistaken about Carranza's complicity in the scheme. 
Believing as he did, however, Villa tried to compromise the relationship 
between the United States and Mexican governments through various acts 
of terror, including the murder of a number of American civilians and 
businesspeople.31 
By January 1916, the rumors of possible intervention by United States 
troops led many investment houses to discourage customers from buying 
shares of Mexican Petroleum. The best policy, according to one, was simply 
to "lie low and await developments." But tensions increased dramatically 
after the infamous raid at Columbus, New Mexico, by Villa's forces on 
March 9, 1916, and they reached the breaking point when Pershing's Puni­
tive Expedition crossed into Mexico in pursuit of the rebel forces a short 
while later. All of this looked like some sort of bizarre conspiracy to one 
reporter, who noted that the periodic instability in Mexico managed to 
"stifle enthusiasm whenever it seemed likely to creep out." The whole situa­
tion was so fraught with danger that, for a time during the early spring of 
1916, it almost crowded out the war news from across the Atlantic. In 
Europe, according to this same observer, it would take a deliberate attack 
by a German submarine to cause a sudden change of events, "but the case 
of Mexico is entirely different. Any hour may bring forth a crisis."32 
The effect of this situation, combined with the merger-induced specu­
lation about the disposition of Doheny's California operations, ratchetted 
up the activity in Mexican Petroleum common on the New York Stock 
Exchange. The anticipated merger caused both Doheny companies to take 
a dramatic jump in December 1915: Mexpet common went from $96 to 
$125, and Calpet common went from $29 to $39. At the beginning of 1915, 
Mexican Pete had been as low as $51, and California Petroleum had been 
down to $8 in July. In terms of total volume, Mexican Petroleum consis­
tently led the market as one of most active stocks. For example, on the final 
trading day of 1915, 95,700 shares of Mexpet changed hands, a volume 
second only to that of U.S. Steel, and the stock closed at $123. It started 
the new year at $127 with 102,200 shares trading hands, having doubled 
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its opening price from three years earlier. Then, from its high point on 
January 4, the price dropped as low as $95 by the end of February. On 
average, there were over 31,000 shares of Mexican Petroleum traded every 
market day from January through March. California Petroleum also en­
joyed a brief resurgence, when it opened the year with a volume of 36,000 
shares, although at $38, the price was disappointing.33 
Apparently, the Mexican political situation not only tempered the mar-
ket's enthusiasm for the newly formed Pan American Petroleum company 
but commanded much of Doheny's attention. And those constraints, cou­
pled with the failure of the West Coast merger, led him to resign his posi­
tion as president of the California Petroleum Company in April 1916 and 
sell off his stock holdings in the company. Although Doheny did not com­
pletely cut his ties to Calpet, retaining a seat on the board of American 
Petroleum, he reduced his responsibilities as much as possible. Herbert 
Wylie and J. M. Danzinger stayed on as directors for each of the subsid­
iaries, while T. A. O'Donnell became the new president of California 
Petroleum.34 
Doheny did not retire from California as much as he freed himself to 
be more creative and spontaneous in making smaller investments across 
the state, when he had the time, and many of these subsequent acquisitions 
were initiated in partnership with California Petroleum. In that way, Do­
heny was able to assume an entrepreneurial role once again and concen­
trate his efforts in the newest oil districts. To begin, he created the Fairfield 
Petroleum Company to operate wells in Kern County and to hold new 
producing properties in Texas. Next, he formed the Pan American Petro­
leum Investment Company to purchase $2 million worth of oil lands on 
the Bell Ranch in Santa Barbara County, considered by most experts to be 
one of the choicest pieces of oil territory in the state. At the same time, 
in the fall of 1916, he formed the Pan American Petroleum Company of 
California to acquire 6,000 acres and thirty operating wells from the Bard 
Oil and Asphalt Company. Finally, he set up the Doheny Pacific Petroleum 
Company to control smaller holdings from North Midway to Simi Valley. 
Although some of the funding for these purchases came from corporate 
sources, most of the money came directly out of Doheny's pocket. Once 
again, Doheny was taking advantage of changing conditions in the Califor­
nia oilfields, which placed a premium on increased production, rapid dril­
ling, and the acquisition of new territory.35 
For its part, California Petroleum became a corporate orphan within 
the Doheny organization after 1916 and maintained a weak but steady po­
sition in the market behind the Associated Oil Company, Union Oil, and 
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Standard Oil. Over time, the gap between it and the others widened as the 
top three companies developed into fully integrated operations. Appar­
ently, the failure of the merger froze Calpet into position as a large produc­
ing company only. In terms of overall growth for the rest of the decade, 
the total assets of California Petroleum rose by a scant 2 percent, while 
Associated Oil increased by 21 percent, Union Oil by 67 percent, and Stan­
dard Oil by an aggressive 253 percent. For the same period, net earnings 
went up 82 percent for California Petroleum, 314 percent for Associated 
Oil, 429 percent for Union Oil, and 465 percent for Standard Oil. The 
return on assets (net earnings/total assets) averaged just 7 percent for Cali­
fornia Petroleum, 13 percent for Associated Oil, 16 percent for Union Oil, 
and 22 percent for Standard Oil. Having begun in 1913 with such bright 
prospects, investors were left to wonder what had gone wrong. The com­
pany was either incredibly conservative or seriously mismanaged, and no 
one seemed to know which was the case.36 
Initially, the company's poor earnings were a consequence of two fac­
tors: its long-term contracts with the Agency, and a decline in production 
caused by water seepage in Kern River. Consequently, its total monthly 
output, which included several Doheny companies half-owned by Califor­
nia Petroleum, fell slightly in 1914 to 415,055 barrels, dropped sharply to 
a low of 276,041 barrels in 1917, and recovered to 486,400 barrels by 1919. 
Its share of the state's total production varied accordingly: 4.8 percent in 
1914, 3.4 percent in 1917, and 5.8 percent in 1919. Calpet actually had 
considerable capacity tied up in its reserves, and, when those properties 
came on line in the early 1920s, oil production doubled almost immedi­
ately. At that point, one market expert suggested that "the company evi­
dently enjoyed a sagacious management from the beginning."37 
Although California Petroleum's overall position among the large oil 
companies remained about the same, there was a marked consolidation of 
the market into the hands of the top organizations. Primarily, this involved 
the emergence of Standard Oil California, whose share of total production 
went from 13 percent in 1914 to 25 percent in 1919. Standard's rapid 
growth also accounted for the rise in the combined output of the seven 
largest companies over this same period—from 48 percent to 71 percent 
of the total. Calpet remained part of that group but at the lower end of the 
scale. And despite Doheny and Requa's best efforts, the smaller indepen­
dents grew even more dependent upon the marketing giants.38 
In the end, however, the dramatic improvement in the West Coast oil 
market after 1916 helped inaugurate a national role for the California oil 
industry. While the formal entry of the United States into the European 
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war gave the state its first chance to export oil outside of the region, it was 
even more important for giving the leaders of the local industry a national 
forum from which to promote their own interests. In particular, Requa, 
O'Donnell, and Doheny were soon headed to Washington as industry rep­
resentatives, charged with coordinating the nation's petroleum supply dur­
ing the war. While Doheny benefitted most from circumstances that 
highlighted the value of Mexican fuel oil over the California product, local 
oilmen still had a chance to make a case for their state. In this way, at least, 
the preceding few years had been excellent preparation for a situation that 
demanded a cooperative effort on all fronts. And after twenty years in the 
oil business, Doheny got a chance to become one of the titans of the 
industry. 
A

7
 THE VISION OF PEACE:

FUEL OIL FOR THE WAR

By the time Doheny formed the Pan American Petroleum & 
Transport Company in 1916, he was considered to be one of the nation's 
most enterprising businessmen. His reputation on the West Coast, in par­
ticular, had reached legendary proportions. According to one author writ­
ing in 1918, there were hundreds of men in California's history who had 
risen to wealth through mining, real estate, and other ventures, but there 
was "only one Doheny." What made him unique, the author continued, 
was his varied talents as "a manager, an executive, a promoter, a stock sales­
man, a banker, a capitalist, a financier, a diplomat, an expert on manipula­
tion, an authority on transportation, a professor of chemistry, a wizard at 
geology, and a magnate of sorts."1 Apart from the obvious hyperbole, this 
was a reasonable assessment of Doheny's career or, at least, of what he was 
about to make of it. Another writer went further, suggesting that "what the 
name of Rockefeller is to the oil refining industry, the name Doheny is to 
the oil producing industry . .  . It was he who, like a modern Moses, struck 
the supposedly dry sands of California with his rod until the valuable fluid 
gushed forth and it was he who drilled in the tangled jungles of Mexico 
and unloosed 'gushers' such as the world had never seen before."2 
Certainly, after two decades of work, this was not undeserved praise, 
and at sixty years old, Doheny was ready to assume a prominent role in the 
nation's business affairs. But such a position required some fundamental 
changes in his responsibilities and in his outlook. Although he had been 
accumulating power and wealth for some time, Doheny had been com­
pletely absorbed in building his oil companies. But now that he had an 
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empire to protect, he needed to widen his sphere of influence to meet a 
variety of challenges, and Doheny took advantage of the United States' 
participation in the World War to make it happen. 
At the time America entered the war in the spring of 1917, business 
and industrial leaders of all types were becoming vital participants in the 
effort to bring the nation up to full strength. The demands of the war also 
made the security of the Mexican oil industry a primary concern for na­
tional defense and reinforced the strategic value of the California oil fields 
for the future. According to a recent study of the international oil industry 
during this period, there "is no time when business competition is so heav­
ily politicized as in war, which for business means a covert struggle for 
advantage under a publicly emphasized desire to serve the national inter­
est." Without question, Doheny took advantage of America's role in the 
war to propel himself and his company into national prominence. And as 
the next two chapters will show, it was almost impossible for him to draw 
a clear line between duty and opportunity during a national emergency.3 
From the very beginning of the European conflict, there was every indi­
cation that oil would play a prominent role. In the fall of 1914, for example, 
an article entitled "Gasoline and the War" noted that oil had already be­
come more important than food or ammunition. "It has been an axiom of 
war since wars began," the author wrote, "that an army travels on its belly 
. .  . As it is now, an army travels on its gasoline." The possession of oil, 
therefore, was essential to the prosecution of modern warfare. And right 
from the start, the United States served as the principal source of petro­
leum products to the Allied forces, especially for the fuel oil demands of 
the British Admiralty. American refineries along the Gulf Coast were par­
ticularly important in this trade, and heavy Mexican crude was used to 
replace the lighter products needed for the European theater. Mexican oil 
played an even larger role as an industrial fuel for American factories in 
the Northeast, where Doheny's companies dominated the business.4 
The war effort became the perfect advertising medium for fuel oil, and 
Doheny wasted no time taking advantage of the situation. The first issue 
of the company magazine, the Pan American Record, announced the arrival 
of "the century of oil" and went on to explain that every marvel of modern 
technology would be nothing but a "Jules Verne dream" without fuel oil. 
Thus, the primary lesson to be taken from the battlefields of Europe was 
that the current fight was merely a prelude to an even greater conflict in 
the years to come: "Scientific method will be applied more and more in 
every domain of human activity, and in this titanic economic struggle that 
is approaching, only those best equipped will survive the 'storm and stress' 
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period. Quick transportation is the very essence of success, and the highest 
speed is only possible for the consumer of oil. If you are not driving your 
machinery with oil, make the change now; in a few months it may be too 
late."5 
This statement encapsulated the twin goals of Doheny's marketing 
strategy during the period: the industrial application of fuel oil and the 
conversion of the world's shipping fleets to oil. Obviously, as suggested 
above, the emphasis on marine transportation was especially important, 
and Doheny advertised his fuel oil as though it were a tonic for the travails 
of modern commerce. Each succeeding issue of the Pan American Record, 
in fact, repeated the warning that the real contest between nations would 
not begin until the economic competition after the war. "For years we have 
prepared for this development both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts," 
one article maintained, "and our oil in Mexico and California is especially 
suitable for marine fuel." With a new era at hand, according to another, 
"coal will remain for commercial sloths; oil will be the fuel for those who 
observe those clearly defined laws that lead to success."6 
During the preparedness campaigns leading up to America's participa­
tion in the war, the MexPet Record gave the following warning: "End of 
war in Europe will mark the beginning of the world's greatest struggle for 
commercial supremacy. The liberated tonnage of Germany will join with 
war-freed vessels of all the world in searching out cargoes in all seas and 
all countries. The ships that use fuel-oil will be first to every port because 
they will be swiftest on the voyage. The ships that are prepared will get the 
cargoes. Be prepared by having your ships fitted to burn Mexpet Fuel-Oil."7 
Statements of this type were not just simple advertisements for a prod­
uct; they were sophisticated arguments aimed at the political leaders in 
Washington. In this case, the message was clear: the United States and its 
commercial agents could reshape the world by using Mexican oil as their 
source of power. Another example of this approach can be seen in a full-
page illustration entitled "The Vision of Peace," which portrayed a multi-
ethnic group of people gazing heavenward at a bank of clouds shaped like 
the Western Hemisphere. Where California and Mexico would be located 
in these cloud formations, there were oil derricks pouring their contents 
on the troubled waters of the world. The sense of irony in this scene is 
palpable, since oil would do as much to roil those waters as to calm them. 
Nevertheless, from the company's point of view, oil was a commercial and 
civilizing agent that no nation could afford to neglect.8 
An earlier statement in the MexPet Record was even more direct: 
"Transportation is the most important thing in the world and fuel-oil is 
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The Vision of Peace. Pan American Record, March 1917. 
the most important factor in transportation. Therefore the nation that 
controls fuel-oil controls the world." The company even published a re­
vised version of the song "Rule Britannia," rendered as "Rule Petroleum!" 
to dramatize the point: "The Muses, still with Freedom found, Shall to thy 
happy yachts repair; Blest oil! with matchless power crowned, To rule the 
sea and guard the air. Rule, Petroleum! Petroleum, rule the waves! Fuel-Oil 
is not for slaves."9 Taken together, the foregoing statements not only pro­
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vided a marketing outline for the fuel oil business, but they gave Doheny 
a political agenda for the war. In the first place, aside from pushing the 
development of his own transportation network, he had to convince the 
American government of the strategic value of the Mexican oil fields, and 
he had to stop the Mexican government from implementing a nationalist 
attack against the industry. 
He put his plan into effect on the eve of America's entry into the war, 
when he pledged his Mexican oil properties, and his fleet of oil tankers, to 
the United States government. Actually, such offers of personal service and 
business assistance were not uncommon in the spring of 1917, and Do-
heny's motives were unquestioned. In fact, the Los Angeles Times took com­
fort in knowing that one of its citizens, and "one of the country's most 
influential figures in the oil and financial world," would make such a sacri­
fice. Doheny prefaced his gesture by saying that "every citizen of the United 
States should loyally support the President in this crisis, and the world 
should understand that the President has the united nation behind him." 
To that end, he sent a formal announcement to President Wilson on Feb. 
7, 1917, offering the use of Pan American Petroleum's tank steamers, 5 
million barrels of fuel oil stored at Tampico, and any other aid the govern­
ment might need. The New York Times considered it "one of the most grati­
fying offers" made at a time when firms were volunteering everything from 
rubber to steel.10 
On the West Coast, Doheny also led a movement aimed at strengthen­
ing the navy's defensive posture in the Pacific. Specifically, he started a fund 
with $10,000 of his own money to build up the Naval Militia of California. 
Taking advice from naval officers who considered the current fleet in­
adequate and understaffed, Doheny and other like-minded businessmen 
wanted to put 100,000 men into the Naval Reserve and then enlist them 
into active duty with financial inducements from private donations. In this 
regard, Doheny's efforts were similar to the work being done by the Na­
tional Security League, which focused attention on military preparedness, 
expanding the armed forces, and promoting a plan for universal military 
training. The latter organization, "bankrolled by big capitalists," operated 
military training facilities around the country aimed specifically at the 
business class. Although California was one of the last places to catch war 
fever, at least a dozen corporate officers of Pan American Petroleum spent 
time at the preparedness camp at Monterey in the summer of 1916, includ­
ing E. L. Doheny Jr., who went on to serve as a Naval Reserve officer during 
the war.11 
Up to this point, Doheny's efforts had been consonant with those of 
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other business leaders concerned about American security, but soon after 
the United States formally entered the war in April 1917, he made a contri­
bution to the California State Council of Defense that went well beyond 
the bounds of normal activity. In fact, Doheny shocked state officials when 
he presented the governor with $100,000 worth of weapons consisting of 
"nearly a million rounds of ammunition, almost enough high-power rifles 
to arm a regiment and enough modern machine guns to equip three bat­
teries." At first, Doheny stated that the material had been on order for some 
time and had only just arrived, but as it turned out, the weapons had been 
cached somewhere in central California for a much longer period. Do-
heny's previous support for military training facilities lent some consis­
tency to his claim that he had purchased the weapons as a precaution in 
case of war. And, considering that the National Guard and regular army 
units were likely to be withdrawn from the region under that condition, 
the chairman of the Defense Council stated that "the value of Doheny's 
contribution is almost incalculable."12 
The worsening political situation in Mexico suggested another ratio­
nale for Doheny's unusual stockpile, although no state or federal official 
was inclined to explore the possibility. During the first years of the revolu­
tion, the foreign oil camps had been armed for their own protection but 
they quickly discovered that this only made them more vulnerable to ban­
ditry. Then, when Carranza came to power, the oilmen were forced to 
discontinue the practice altogether and rely upon the government for pro­
tection against the rebels. In addition, the Wilson Administration placed a 
formal embargo on all arms shipments to Mexico. It seems likely, therefore, 
that Doheny's gift had been a supply of weapons intended for the oilfields 
before the policy changed. 
According to Harold Walker, there was no inclination among American 
oil workers to have the region turned into an armed camp. In fact, in a 
confidential letter to the secretary of the interior, Franklin Lane, in Novem­
ber 1916, Walker stated that "self protection and national safety demand 
that no American bullets shall go to a country that will misuse them . .  . 
and turn them against Americans.... If the de facto government does not 
get ammunition the bandits will get none." To do otherwise, Walker con­
cluded, increased the likelihood that "one of those American bullets is apt 
to get me."13 
This attitude casts serious doubt on a more provocative interpretation 
that links Doheny's actions with alleged attempts by American citizens to 
instigate a counter-revolution against the Carranza government. For those 
critical of American business interests in Mexico, Doheny's name, like 
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Rockefeller's, become synonymous with such activity. While there is no 
denying that Doheny was actively involved in trying to manipulate the po­
litical situation in Mexico—or at least the North American interpretation 
of it—there is no proof that he was personally involved in direct efforts to 
overthrow the government. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to sort 
out the facts on this issue, even though the State Department was aware of 
the various accusations against the oil companies and military intelligence 
officers had tried to assimilate information from all sources. In one in­
stance in March 1918, a postal censor intercepted a letter from a man in 
Mexico City offering to supply the Mexican News Bureau with "documen­
tary evidence" that Doheny's weapons had been intended for a rebellion 
against the Carranza regime in Lower California.14 
The letter alleged that Doheny promised to give full financial support 
to Esteban Cantu, the insurgent Governor of Lower California, if he would 
start a military uprising on the Mexican mainland designed to "force radi­
cal concessions from the Carranza Government." According to an official 
report, Cantu was well known along the border for having a tight political 
grip on his state and a loose set of morals. Aside from licensing all types 
of vice operations, however, he was seen as a friend and protector of Amer­
ican property owners in Mexico. Thus, Cantu's indiscretions were tolerated 
because of his businesslike efficiency, which, in the opinion of a recent 
historian, allowed him to run Baja California Norte "as if it were a subsid­
iary of General Motors." Furthermore, Cantu's opposition to federal con­
trol from Mexico City made him the subject of incessant talk about the 
possible annexation of Lower California to the United States. In reality, 
Cantu flaunted his relative isolation from the political pull of Mexico City 
for his own reasons and had no intention of playing into the hands of the 
Americans. But he thrived off the annexationist sentiment in California 
and Arizona, nonetheless.15 
Since he had no business interests in the region, it is doubtful that Do­
heny was involved in these plots, although a well-armed rebellion in the 
far West might have relieved governmental pressure on the oil zone. Unfor­
tunately, as will become more apparent with his later activities, Doheny 
fell into the habit of throwing money at almost any project even remotely 
aligned with his interests in Mexico. However, in the absence of factual 
evidence for support, all that can be said for sure is that there was enough 
intrigue among business interests in Mexico to support any number of 
conspiracy theories. 
With America's entrance into the war, however, Doheny did not have 
to resort to promoting armed rebellion to advance his cause. Instead, as a 
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member of the newly appointed committee on petroleum resources, he 
had a legitimate access to power through the Council of National Defense. 
Headed by A. C. Bedford, the new president of Standard Oil New Jersey, 
the committee was charged, by Bernard Baruch, the director of the War 
Industries Board, with managing the nation's petroleum supply. To carry 
out that order, Bedford chose a select group of leading oilmen to help him 
coordinate the industry: Doheny, G. S. Davison of Gulf Oil, J. W. Van Dyke 
of Atlantic Refining, C. R Lufkin of The Texas Company, H. F. Sinclair of 
Sinclair Oil & Refining, and J. H. Markum, an independent producer.16 
Naturally, the members of the petroleum committee relished the op­
portunity to blend their own goals with those of the nation at large. Bed­
ford, for instance, hoped to repair Standard Oil's public image by creating 
a cooperative arrangement between the federal government and the indus­
try in general. According to Mark L. Requa, who had been appointed as 
the Fuel Oil Controller for the United States Fuel Administration, Bedford 
had a vision for a new order within the oil industry which demanded pub­
lic confidence and widespread publicity. "He had seen the old order go 
down before adverse public opinion," Requa recalled, and "realized that 
for better or worse a new order had come and he conformed to it." The 
oil committee, therefore, provided the perfect opportunity to reshape the 
industry and place it on the leading edge of America's war effort. It was 
also a larger reflection of the type of activity that Requa and Doheny had 
been involved in on the West Coast.17 
For Doheny, at least, this was the perfect time to advance Mexican oil as 
an essential resource for the United States, and he anticipated a profitable 
working relationship between his company and the government. "There 
are few corporations in the country," he said, "whose business is more nec­
essary for war-like operations than the Pan American Petroleum & Trans­
port Company." Oil tankers, in particular, were a "sine qua non of success." 
With five of its ships in the service of the British Admiralty by the fall of 
1917 and another five carrying Mexican crude to the Gulf and Atlantic 
refineries, the company claimed a prominent role in the Allied effort. 
Already, its shipments of oil from Tampico had more than doubled, 
from 702,650 barrels in July 1916 to 1,608,305 barrels a year later. And, 
month after month, as the Allies seemed always to be running out of 
fuel, the company stressed the transportation problem: "WE HAVE THE 
PRODUCTION; WE NEED THE TANKERS."18 
From his seat on the petroleum committee, Doheny pressed the issue 
at every opportunity. "The big problem that confronts the government 
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so far as oil is concerned " Doheny told a West Coast reporter, "is that of 
keeping the shipment of the Mexican oil supply up to the maximum": 
The Allies are dependent upon the Mexican output. There would be no 
trouble in giving the Allies all the oil they need if we had the tankers, but 
the government has had to withdraw so many boats for other branches of 
the trans-Atlantic service that there is a threatened shortage of tank ships. 
Our United States supply is on the ragged edge of being just sufficient for 
our needs. Four million gallons of gasoline [are] annually produced from 
the Mexican output of crude oil, and 50 percent of that quantity is ex­
ported to Europe. Our big job now is that of getting the facilities with 
which to convey Mexican oil to a point on the Atlantic Coast from where 
it can be shipped to England by the shortest route.19 
Doheny's comments about his own business highlighted the dilemma 
for the petroleum committee as a whole. Somehow, out of the welter of 
competing companies, overlapping markets, and inadequate transporta­
tion facilities, the leaders of the industry had to provide the necessary fuel 
for the battlefields of Europe without hindering the supply needed for crit­
ical domestic industries and civilian consumption. Initially, the committee 
hoped to use its governmental authority to enforce its decisions, but within 
six months after it was formed, the Wilson Administration decided to turn 
the cooperative committees over to their respective trade organizations. Of 
course, given the independent nature of the business, the oil industry did 
not have one. As an alternative, Baruch asked Bedford if the oil group 
would simply reconstitute itself as a trade organization and continue work­
ing without interruption. Absent official sanction, however, there was no 
guarantee that the nation's oil producers, or any other group, would follow 
along. For that reason, the United States Chamber of Commerce suggested 
that all major industries form War Services Committees, controlled by the 
War Industries Board, to replace the previous committees of the Council 
of National Defense. This alteration allowed the petroleum committee in 
particular to retain its members and its quasi-official status without risking 
an embarrassing revolt from within. To further legitimize the organization, 
the members voted to include representatives from the smaller indepen­
dent companies, and, on December 21, 1917, the new Petroleum War 
Service Committee held the first of forty-one meetings to carry out its 
mission.20 
Aside from handling the existing crisis, the Petroleum Committee rep­
resented a providential development for the oil industry and the beginning 
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of a psychological change among the oilmen themselves. For the first time 
in the industry's history, independents, wildcat drillers, and the big inte­
grated companies sat down to coordinate their efforts. To make the change 
even more startling, the committee no longer met in Washington but in 
Bedford's office at 26 Broadway, the headquarters of the Standard Oil 
Company. For many oilmen, this was tantamount to dancing with the 
devil, but it was also an opportunity to form the sort of association that 
had thus far eluded the industry. Doheny's experience on the committee 
helped him to finally envision himself as one of the industry's leaders. Six 
years earlier, he had gone to New York to beg Standard Oil for a contract. 
Now, the main office of the Pan American Petroleum & Transport Com­
pany was just up the street, and Doheny presented himself at Bedford's 
door as an equal. 
As for the work itself, Doheny sat on the producing and transportation 
subcommittees and was vice-chairman of the group responsible for allo­
cating fuel resources among the Allies. These assignments allowed him to 
promote the tanker routes between Tampico and the Atlantic Coast refin­
eries and to argue that the Mexican trade should receive priority assign­
ments. In addition to Doheny, Herbert Wylie sat on an advisory commit­
tee to study the construction of tank vessels, barges, and other ships, and 
Frederic R. Kellogg, counsel for the Mexican Petroleum Company, served 
on a legal committee to determine the limits of the petroleum group's 
authority.21 
Along with Doheny and Requa, T. A. O'Donnell was the other Califor­
nian who took on a major role as the director of domestic production, a 
separate position that required him to work as a liaison between the gov­
ernment and the independent producers. To convince wary independents 
that he was on their side, O'Donnell resigned as president of the California 
Petroleum Company and from the boards of Mexican Petroleum and Pan 
American Petroleum. Still, he was especially well equipped to comment on 
Mexico and repeatedly emphasized its importance as America's oil reserve. 
"We have a safety valve in Mexico," O'Donnell told a national convention 
of oilmen, "that is going to take care of us in time, but meanwhile we have 
to furnish every barrel of oil where it is."22 
While Doheny and his associates worked to promote their business 
within official circles, the Pan American Record published desperate pleas 
for more tankers to be diverted to the Mexican supply routes and for more 
of the merchant ships to be converted from coal to oil. As it was, most of 
them still burned coal that had to be shipped to the coast by rail. "The 
Allies are crying for help," one article noted, "which we are unable to ren­
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der owing to the clogged conditions of our railways and harbors." With 
inadequate sources of coal and an overextended rail system, hundreds of 
fully loaded ships were left stranded for want of fuel. 
Doheny considered this a criminal waste of resources: "No oil-burning 
vessel need ever be delayed an hour for fuel in a port through railroad 
congestion." Just one Mexican tanker with 10,000 tons of fuel oil could 
replace 600 rail cars of coal and supply a dozen ships with round-trip pas­
sage to Europe. In 1917, alone, it would have taken 55,000 cars to equal 
the company's shipments of 6 million barrels of oil along the Atlantic 
Coast. With an adequate number of tankers, Doheny believed that Mexican 
oil could win the war for the Allies. However, while there was no disputing 
the benefits of fuel oil, there was also no way to make the conversion dur­
ing the war.23 Overall, despite these constraints Doheny was doing a brisk 
business by 1918. By that time, the Mexican Petroleum Company was con­
trolling most of the northeastern industrial market, sending gasoline di­
rectly to Europe, and furnishing almost all the oil going to the South 
American market, where Chilean mines supplied vital raw materials for 
the munitions industry.24 
At the same time, Doheny was waging a constant battle to keep his own 
fleet of oil tankers at a minimum level to meet the demand. When the war 
began, Pan American Petroleum had fourteen ships under construction. 
Of the five vessels built and delivered during 1917, one was immediately 
commandeered by the government, and four went into regular service. 
Construction delays on the remainder ran from five to eight months, and 
Doheny received three large ocean tankers out of an order of five, and one 
small coastal tanker out of four, by the summer of 1918. The schedule 
was so constrained, however, that the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the 
government agency responsible for controlling the shipbuilding industry, 
asked the petroleum committee members if they could build their own 
tankers. Needing every vessel they could lay their hands on, the committee 
members were prepared to do just that when the war ended in November 
1918. 
Doheny was never satisfied with the government's handling of the ship­
ping arrangements, believing that his oil tankers should have received pri­
ority treatment, although he would have settled for having them completed 
according to the terms of his contract, which stated that all of his ships 
should have been finished by January 1918. If not, the yard was supposed 
to pay a $1,000 penalty for every day that the ships remained uncompleted. 
Given the exigencies of the war, the Emergency Fleet Corporation disre­
garded all previous contracts, rearranged the building program, and put 
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many customers on hold for the duration. In the meantime, they refused 
to acknowledge late charges on overdue orders and insisted on adding 
the rising cost of building materials to the agreed-upon price of each 
ship. Feeling as he did about the necessity of his oil tankers, Doheny was 
outraged at the Fleet Corporation's tactics and demanded that the govern­
ment abide by the rules. In the end, he figured the government owed him 
$850,000 in construction penalties and $1,555,000 in excess charges.25 
In light of his complaints, Doheny appeared before a Senate Commerce 
Committee in June 1918 to testify about price-gouging and corrupt prac­
tices at the Fleet Corporation's Hogg Island shipyard. Doheny argued that 
his ships had been held hostage, under the threat of being commandeered, 
until he paid an inflated price to get them. "We allowed ourselves to be 
coerced," Doheny admitted, "in order to get the ships." Several oil compa­
nies had undergone a similar experience, and Doheny was not alone in 
complaining about the situation. F. R. Kellogg, counsel for the Mexican 
Petroleum Company, for example, was on hand seeking compensation for 
industry losses on behalf of the Petroleum War Services Committee. Ulti­
mately, evidence taken at the hearings substantiated Doheny's charges of 
profiteering at Hogg Island, but such abuses had been expected and were 
supposed to be tolerated under the circumstances. Nevertheless, Doheny 
reported in his 1917 annual message to the stockholders that the unpaid 
late penalties and the business lost on account of the shipping problems 
cost the company in excess of $6 million for the first six months of the war. 
The only consolation, Doheny added, was the knowledge that "they were 
providing a vital component of the Allied effort."26 
However, investors did not have to be satisfied with good works alone, 
since the Doheny companies were still doing quite well. Pan American Pe­
troleum had gross earnings of $5,114,628 for 1917 and $8,066,727 for 
1918, although deductions for income and excess profits taxes reduced net 
profits to $4,308,904 and $4,666,727, respectively. Gross earnings for Mexi­
can Petroleum, on the other hand, from which Pan American Petroleum 
derived half its income, increased dramatically over the course of the 
war—from $9,668,464 in 1916, to $18,121,790 in 1917, and $26,320,546 
in 1918. Net profits, subject to both United States and Mexican govern­
ment taxes, were $7,153,060, $4,986,021, and $6,699,444, respectively, for 
the same period. The company sold 7,850,194 barrels of oil in 1916, 
16,736,000 barrels in 1917, and 18,500,000 in 1918. The selling price per 
barrel increased from $.85 in 1916 to just over a dollar a barrel in 1917, 
and reached $1.42 in 1918. Rather than being a reflection of the bulk price 
of crude oil in Mexico, this growth represented increased sales of refined 
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fuel oil and gasoline from the company's topping plant in Tampico and 
the refinery at Destrehan, Louisiana. The 25 percent drop in net profits 
between 1916 and 1917 represented a massive investment in ships and 
transportation facilities, which more than doubled the operating expenses, 
from twenty to forty-five cents a barrel. In 1918, the government's excess 
profits tax reduced proceeds by an additional $5 million. Under protest, 
the company also paid several million dollars a year in taxes to the govern­
ment of Mexico.27 
Although Doheny anticipated an unparalleled growth in the fuel oil 
business for the coming years, he was deliberately cautious in his remarks 
to the shareholders in July 1918, when he reminded them that "the revenue 
received by the stockholders is the result of an investment of large sums of 
money, in a very precarious enterprise, in a foreign country, where success 
depends not only on the good judgment of the management, but upon the 
good will and fair treatment of the Government and people where the 
business is carried on, and of the home Government of the Company 
where the capital originates and most of the facilities for operation are 
produced."28 
Doheny argued that the taxation programs of both the United States 
and Mexican governments needlessly threatened the future of the com­
pany, since both nations received risk-free benefits from Mexican oil pro­
duction. Moreover, because the legitimate investors had not yet recovered 
their initial capital, none of the company's earnings should be taxed as 
profit until the original investment had been paid out. Actually, this was a 
common refrain within the industry in protest to any government tax plan. 
According to Doheny, the oilmen were "only too anxious to support the 
Government in every possible way," but the popular idea that oil produc­
tion could be treated like any other industry with a stable cost structure 
and regular output was completely false. "It is 100 percent wildcatting to­
day, as it always has been," he insisted. "If you cut off the incentive to pros­
pect" through taxation, "you automatically stop the supply."29 
While there were inordinate risks involved in doing business in Mexico, 
there were also enormous profits to be made, as well, as indicated by the 
rise in Mexpet shares during the war years and after. Between 1916 and 
1920, more than 5 million shares of Mexican Petroleum common traded 
hands each year, putting it in league with U.S. Steel, Crucible Steel, and 
Anaconda Copper at the top of the list of industrial stocks. As noted earlier, 
the price fell from $129 to $67 during the political crisis in Mexico ignited 
by the Pershing Expedition during 1916 and early 1917. Thereafter, 
the stock climbed as high as $264 and, by October 1919, was a market 
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sensation. That dramatic increase was an indication of both the financial 
health of the company, as measured by its economic importance during 
the war, and the prospect that Mexican oil would become even more im­
portant in the future.30 
What the company still needed, however, was the clear and unambigu­
ous support of the American government. Certainly, it was not from a 
lack of trying on Doheny's part that the company had not yet secured this 
guarantee. In fact, as we have seen, he used every method he could think 
of to link the American war effort, the nation's future oil supply, and the 
anticipated competition on the high seas after the war to the possession 
and protection of the Mexican oil fields. To supplement the work of the 
War Services Petroleum Committee and the constant editorializing of 
the Pan American Record, Doheny also enlisted the help of Mark Requa, 
the National Fuel Oil director, to request that the government use, and 
protect, Mexican oil as the only means to preserve the dwindling petro­
leum reserves in the United States. 
Specifically, Doheny sent a letter to Requa in March 1918 laying out all 
the arguments in favor of Mexican oil, and he had it privately published 
and distributed around the country as a policy statement. Doheny's main 
point was that the nation's current domestic oil resources were inadequate 
to the demands of the war. Mexican crude was already being substituted 
for shortages on the West Coast and to compensate for the declining pro­
duction of many older fields elsewhere. Although Doheny admitted that 
new fields would be discovered to take their place, he was certain they 
would not be opened up in time to make a difference in the war. To rely 
upon prospective oil lands at the present time, Doheny asserted, "would 
be to invite disaster to our arms in the great impending struggle."31 
A few months later, Requa wrote to Frank L. Polk, Counselor for the 
State Department, to summarize the nation's oil situation as it related to 
Mexico. For the first six months of 1918, Requa reported, United States 
production, excluding that of California, had been approximately 635,000 
barrels a day, with another 40,000 barrels a day withdrawn from storage. 
Imports from Mexico averaged 90,000 barrels of oil a day, and Mexican oil 
also supplied an additional 40,000 barrels a day directly to Europe and 
South America. If the Mexican supply were cut off for any reason, the 
United States would have to make up for it with stored oil out of an avail­
able stock of 100 million barrels, or about an eighteen-month supply. If 
the war lasted well into 1919, as many people anticipated, and the demand 
continued to rise, the government would have to begin rationing oil, some­
thing that had been avoided thus far.32 
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Even without the information gleaned from Doheny, Requa believed 
this situation to be absolutely true as a result of his frustrating attempts to 
purchase oil in the Mid-Continent field. Requa had attempted to purchase 
a few million barrels of fuel oil as a winter reserve for the military. To 
his surprise, he came up empty-handed and concluded that "any surplus 
quantity of fuel oil is apparently nonexistent at the present time." Even if 
he had located the oil, it would have still been impossible to get it delivered 
to its destination on the East Coast, since the pipelines and railways were 
filled to capacity. The situation convinced Requa that conditions were grim 
at best: "We have insufficient transportation facilities; we have insufficient 
refining facilities; and we have not a reserve of fuel oil any place throughout 
the United States upon which to draw in compensation for the loss of this 
Mexican source of supply." That was precisely the point Doheny had been 
trying to make since the beginning of the war.33 
Later critics, knowing that the war lasted only until November 1918 
and that the United States found itself facing an oil glut in the early 1920s, 
have argued that oilmen like Doheny deliberately lied about conditions to 
gain control of foreign supplies and public oil lands in the United States. 
President Wilson's secretary of the navy, Josephus Daniels, perhaps the 
most skeptical of the lot, attributed every argument about the shortage of 
domestic production to industry propaganda. But official estimates of the 
nation's oil supply tended to be very low during these years and were sup­
ported by reports written by both Ralph Arnold and I. C. White for the 
United States Geological Survey.34 
For Doheny, there was more than enough evidence to suggest that the 
United States would be making a major economic blunder if it let the Mex­
ican oil industry slip from its grasp. Doheny reemphasized the scramble 
for oil that was sure to come after the war, a struggle the Wilson Adminis­
tration seemed unwilling to acknowledge. Quoting from the head of the 
British Board of Trade, Doheny pointed out that Great Britain already had 
a stated policy "to acquire as large a control as possible of the world supply 
of petroleum," especially in the Middle East. Consequently, Doheny drew 
a parallel between British interests in the Anglo-Persian oil fields and the 
American presence in Mexico. Clearly, with both Britain and Germany 
scouring the globe for petroleum, Doheny believed that the United States 
"must avail itself of the enterprise and ability and pioneer spirit of its citi­
zens to acquire and to have and to hold a reasonable portion of the world's 
petroleum supplies." America's future as a world leader depended on the 
possession of Mexican oil, and it was up to Doheny to convince the admin­
istration to follow his lead. 
8 PROMOTING AN OIL POLICY 
FOR MEXICO, 1917-1920 
No matter how hard Doheny tried to make Mexican oil a 
vital part of the nation's war effort, he could never be certain of the govern-
ment's protection without a commitment from President Wilson. While 
Doheny tried to create a groundswell of public support for a stronger Mex­
ican policy by advertising the strategic importance of his business at every 
opportunity, he worked even harder to find a way to appeal directly to 
the president. Doheny and his associates already had access to a variety of 
government officials in Washington, including Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing, who were equally frustrated at Wilson's apparent antipathy to the 
plight of American property owners in Mexico. Yet, not even Lansing, 
a consistent friend to business, was willing to allow the Mexican situation 
to interfere with America's obligations in Europe and Wilson's primary 
focus. 
Despite rhetorical comments to the contrary, Woodrow Wilson was not 
antibusiness in any real sense of the term. In fact, a review of his adminis-
tration's economic policies for Latin America reveals a clear determination 
to bolster American influence throughout the region. During the war, the 
Commerce Department, in particular, went to extraordinary lengths to 
have American firms take over the communications, banking, and ship­
ping businesses formerly controlled by British interests. Although these 
policies were criticized for being overly bureaucratic and did not receive 
the full support of the financial community, they were aimed at strength­
ening business ties with Latin America in order to promote economic 
growth and a healthy political environment.1 
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Previously, Wilson had claimed that "there is no man who is more in­
terested than I am in carrying the enterprise of American businessmen to 
every quarter of the globe." Furthermore, he believed that "concessions 
obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the 
sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process." As president, 
however, Wilson had to set aside this conviction in favor of his concept of 
political self-determination, no matter how contradictory it seemed. And, 
as a progressive Democrat, Wilson attacked loosely defined special interests 
at home and abroad. Consequently, he could not risk any policy that might 
make him out to be "a tool of unscrupulous businessmen."2 
Given that the public opinion of oil companies was low, Wilson's politi­
cal considerations were especially sensitive to the Mexican petroleum in­
dustry. Having already been stung by two failed interventions in Mexico— 
in 1914 and 1916—he had no desire to try again, regardless of the reason. 
Still, despite these obstacles, Doheny and others with business investments 
in Mexico continued to approach the State Department with their com­
plaints. But in response to Wilson's apparent indifference to their plight, 
their methods grew increasingly oblique. They relied primarily on the ser­
vices of Chandler P. Anderson, a lawyer and former counselor in the State 
Department, who worked as a business lobbyist in private practice. Ander­
son had served in every administration from McKinley's to Wilson's and 
was a skilled practitioner of international law and dollar diplomacy. After 
William Jennings Bryan resigned as secretary of state in 1915, Anderson 
had stepped in briefly as acting counselor to the new secretary, Robert 
Lansing. Unfortunately, as a Republican, Anderson was never offered a 
permanent post. But he remained close to both Lansing and Frank Polk, 
who became the counselor, and continued to work for the department 
on a limited basis—enough to give him access to departmental files and 
confidential material on Mexico. Thus, Anderson's unique position al­
lowed him to straddle the line between private and public interests, and he 
served as a useful buffer between the two. In particular, he both articulated 
and restrained the opposition to Wilson's Mexican policy.3 
Anderson's first contact with the Doheny organization came in January 
1917, when he met with Harold Walker to discuss the dangers posed by the 
Carranza government. Subsequently, in the spring and summer of 1917, 
Anderson worked to stiffen the State Department's response to Mexico on 
behalf of several oil and mining companies. This was a crucial time, just 
after America's entry into the war, when Wilson was prepared to give up 
the protection of American investments in return for Carranza's promise 
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to resist German efforts to start a conflict between Mexico and the United 
States. Fearing that Carranza would confiscate foreign-owned property if 
given the chance, Walker hired Anderson to persuade the State Depart­
ment to explicitly link the sanctity of American investments with full dip­
lomatic recognition.4 
The threat of confiscation emanated from the Mexican Constitution of 
1917, which represented a sharp break with the past in challenging the 
legitimacy of all foreign-held property and concessions, especially subsoil 
rights to minerals and oil. To review, the Mexican law dealing with this 
issue had followed the traditional Spanish interpretation that gave total 
control of these deposits to the crown. After independence, subsoil rights 
rested with the Mexican government. In 1884, the government of Porfirio 
Diaz adopted a new mining code to attract foreign investment which gave 
control over subsoil deposits to whoever owned, or controlled, the surface 
land. A public legal debate over the issue of nationalizing the oil lands took 
place in 1905 but failed to change the law. Finally, the principle of private 
ownership of petroleum deposits was reinforced once again by a subse­
quent law in 1909, although the legal authority of that decision crumbled 
along with Porfirio Diaz in the opening act of the revolution.5 
With Carranza in power, but not unchallenged, Mexican leaders from 
all sides gathered in 1916 to write a new constitution. Article 27 of that 
document reclaimed ownership of all mineral deposits for the nation. As 
a statement of ideology, the antiforeign elements of the new constitution 
marked the apex of the rebellion against the Diaz era and struck the first 
blows for economic independence. The essence of Article 27 stated that 
the Mexican nation owned all lands within its territory and had the sole 
right to create, or dispose of, private property at its discretion. Existing 
private property was subject to regulation and to possible expropriation in 
the public interest. Henceforth, landowners were to be Mexican citizens by 
birth or naturalization, and only Mexican companies would be allowed to 
acquire land and obtain concessions to develop mines and oil wells. For­
eign enterprises could have access to the same privileges as long as they 
became domestic corporations and waived their right to protection from 
their respective governments. Finally, foreigners would be excluded from 
owning land within 100 kilometers of the frontier and 50 kilometers of the 
coast, an area that encompassed almost the entire oil zone from Tampico 
to Veracruz.6 
Speaking at a conference on international relations in 1920, Frederic 
Kellogg of the Mexican Petroleum Company described the essence of the 
new constitution in this way: 
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The situation was precisely the same as though the State of Massachusetts 
should come to a man who for seventeen years had owned the house in 
which he lived, and which he originally bought and paid for, and in the 
title to which there are no defects, and say to him, "We have decided to 
take over the ownership of your property. If you desire to do so, you may 
still occupy the house, but only upon condition that you pay the govern­
ment such rental as we may now fix, subject to any increase hereafter that 
we may see fit to make, and that you comply with such other conditions 
as we may impose."7 
To American property holders, this idea was so abhorrent that it was un­
thinkable. Foreign investors had been invited into Mexico by the govern­
ment, and the revolutionaries had no right to infringe on former legal 
agreements. Such action was, they felt, an attack against the basic prin­
ciples of civilization. 
In taking up the oilmen's fight, Anderson tried to see the situation from 
their perspective, but he was never as bellicose as most of his clients. In­
stead of calling for war, Anderson wanted the United States to devise a 
legal solution to the Mexican problem in the form of a treaty that would 
bar the retroactive application of the constitution. Secretary Lansing 
agreed with that approach and gave Anderson a free hand to work on such 
a document. In the end, however, Anderson fell back on the standard ele­
ments of dollar diplomacy by drafting a proposal offering Carranza a loan 
to be repaid out of the tax receipts on foreign-owned businesses in return 
for a guarantee of property rights. Additionally, to ensure Mexico's support 
of the Allied effort in the war, Carranza would have to allow American 
military protection of the oilfields. Although Lansing agreed to these ideas 
in principle, he was unwilling to commit the necessary forces to make them 
work and did not want to provoke Carranza into a reaction that would 
require a military response. For these reasons, Lansing also opposed a for­
mal loan to Mexico but said that the administration would not stand in 
the way of any private arrangements made with American bankers. Essen­
tially, in Anderson's words, Lansing wanted property owners to "find some 
way to acquiesce and tide the thing over for the present."8 
For his part, Carranza no doubt needed money to put down local rebel­
lions against the government and rebuild his country, but he refused to 
respond to American ultimatums. During the war, in fact, he deftly played 
the foreign powers—the United States, Great Britain, and Germany— 
against one another, kept his economy afloat by taxing foreign corpora­
tions and their exports, and maintained relative independence despite 
attempts by both Axis and Allied powers to trip him up and grab the oil 
166 CHAPTER 8 
zone for themselves. In not submitting to intervention by any of the major 
powers or making concessions for a loan, the Mexican government "suc­
ceeded in turning the tables and in exploiting their rivalry for its own 
ends."9 
Nevertheless, Lansing's desire to have the oilmen take care of their own 
problems did not mean that the Wilson Administration could afford to 
completely abandon its citizens in the oil zone, so the United States Navy 
maintained two ships in Tampico harbor throughout the period from 1914 
to 1920. Although this was not much of a military deterrent, it gave a psy­
chological boost to the American community and kept alive the hope that 
more was on the way. The ships also watched over the 10 million barrels 
of oil stored along the river and gave limited protection to the oil flowing 
out to the Allies. "Their removal under any circumstances," Harold Walker 
believed, "would jeopardize the whole terminal and supply."10 
In reality, the commander in charge of the naval group was more or 
less an observer charged with evaluating the political situation but without 
the authority to act on what he learned. The confusion and frustration of 
that dilemma were aptly summarized by Captain Louis Richardson in the 
fall of 1917: "I know the foreign business men and their characters; also 
the leading Mexican military and civil officials . .  . I am on most friendly 
terms with all parties. The difficulty of forming a correct estimate is caused 
by the fact that each one tells you things that are not facts with the view of 
getting you excited and influenced in his favor or he tells you as a fact the 
thing that is only a day-dream. My task is to weigh all rumors, the character 
of the man and the personal interest or motive and try to arrive at a correct 
idea of what the situation really is."11 
Richardson's predicament was best illustrated by his relationship with 
William Green, the superintendent for Huasteca Petroleum. Having served 
with the United States Army in the Philippines, Green was described as 
"two hundred and fifty pounds of effective dynamite" who had the nerve 
and cunning necessary to deal with the political factions and petty bandits 
of the oil zone. Harold Walker once described Green admiringly as a con­
summate practitioner of "jungle diplomacy." Certainly, Green was not 
afraid to get his hands dirty in the process and was never far from the 
action. When Richardson pleaded with him on one occasion to "get into 
the attitude of trying to help the Mexican government pacify the oil dis­
trict," Green scoffed back, "The trouble with you, Captain, is that you are 
honest, whereas in Mexico the crookeder you are and the better you get 
away with it, the more you are respected." Though he claimed to seek au­
thority from Doheny for every move, Green admitted there were "incon­
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sistencies" in his reports to the home office. Naval intelligence officers 
considered him unreliable and possibly dangerous.12 
Chandler Anderson faced a similar situation in Washington, where the 
web of activity against Carranza was made up of representatives from an 
array of regional strongmen looking for any signal, and a little money, to 
begin a rebellion. Almost without exception, American business interests 
encouraged this activity to some degree in the hope that a spark might 
catch fire and draw the United States into the conflict. And the Americans 
were not alone in this desire, as Anderson recorded after a meeting in May 
1917 with officials from the British Embassy and the Mexican Eagle Oil 
Company. The "general impression of these men," he noted, "seems to be 
that the great mass of the Mexican people would welcome intervention by 
the United States." Apparently, the British had been working on their own 
plans for a coup and were simply looking for a little support to put it 
into effect. In this instance, they hoped to set up Madero's former finance 
minister as the new president of Mexico. Eventually, Lord Cowdray, presi­
dent of the Mexican Eagle, discouraged these efforts and fell into line be­
hind President Wilson's lead. Afterward, Cowdray hired Anderson to lobby 
for the British oil interests along with his other clients.13 
By virtue of his position, Doheny never publicly advocated a specific 
plan for dealing with Carranza, although Anderson observed that Doheny 
was a "very intelligent and forcible Irishman, who in spite of his demo­
cratic politics is exceedingly outspoken in condemning the administration 
in its Mexican dealings." His preference, Anderson continued, "would be 
to have Carranza eliminated, but he realizes that the president is not likely 
to agree to this." Doheny approved of Anderson's plans to at least force 
Carranza to eliminate the objectionable provisions of the constitution as a 
prerequisite for recognition. In the meantime, Doheny's representatives 
were aware of the various intrigues afoot and did what they could to push 
the process along.14 
With President Wilson's mind fixed on the war in Europe, however, 
the United States granted full recognition to Carranza in September 1917 
without demanding any of the terms that Anderson recommended. After 
hearing the news of this decision, Walker called Anderson to ridicule what 
he called Wilson's "great and good friend" appeal to Carranza. He also 
told him that the Mexican leader had responded to Wilson's favor with an 
announcement that he was going to send federal troops into the oilfields 
to drive out the rebels and bring the area under the control of the govern­
ment. This eventuality was the oilmen's worst nightmare, and they as­
sumed that the radical demands of Article 27 were sure to follow.15 
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Moreover, Wilson's comments implied that, as a way of making up for 
past sins, he was finally ready to acknowledge the right of the Mexican 
government to handle its internal affairs as it saw fit. In a subsequent ad­
dress to an audience of Mexican newspaper editors, Wilson stressed his 
disinterested role in the World War and said he was ready to show a similar 
attitude toward Mexico "by any act of friendship that you may propose 
Some of us, if I may say so privately, look back with regret upon some of 
the more ancient relations that we have had with Mexico long before our 
generation; and America, if I may so express it, would now feel ashamed 
to take advantage of a neighbor." The problem with the Monroe Doctrine, 
Wilson went on to say, was that "we did not ask whether it was agreeable to 
you that we should be your big brother." And although that policy offered 
protection from outside aggression, Wilson noted that it did nothing to 
protect Mexico and its neighbors from the United States. "When you re­
flect how wonderful a storehouse of treasure Mexico is," the president con­
cluded, "you can see how her future must depend upon peace and honor, 
so that nobody shall exploit her."16 
Meanwhile, the situation in the oilfields was growing more chaotic and 
dangerous by the day. To offset the inertia in Washington and to accede to 
Lansing's wishes, the oil companies had been conducting their own foreign 
policy designed to keep the Carranza forces at a distance. Primarily, this 
was the work of rebel troops under the control of Manuel Pelaez, a self-
appointed protector of the oil zone, whose family leased oil lands to the 
Mexican Eagle Oil Company and had as much to lose from Carranza's 
campaign as did the foreign operators. As one observer noted, Pelaez not 
only "took kindly to the oil business, he learned to take from it as well." 
And from the beginning, Pelaez demanded arms and money from the oil 
companies in return for his protection.17 
Initially, the Huasteca Petroleum Company hoped to use Pelaez's occu­
pation of the oilfields as the foundation for direct intervention by the 
United States. In one report, Walker noted that "the company I represent 
has always understood the plan of the United States forces to be the imme­
diate occupation of Tampico and the protection of the oilfields by an expe­
ditionary force of at least 1,000 marines or soldiers" and that "our work 
and agreements with Pelaez have all been made with such an expedition 
in view." A few months later, however, the American consul at Tampico 
warned the State Department that it should not read too much into this 
support, since "Pelaez does not pretend that he will take up arms with the 
United States in case of war or intervention."18 
However, Pelaez said all the right things when he subsequently listed 
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the aims of his rebellion: he opposed the "idiocy" of the new constitution, 
derided the "insane foolishness" of Carranza's supporters, and promised 
to uphold the rights of foreigners by protecting the oilfields. And even 
though Pelaez was committed to keeping Mexico neutral during the war, 
he was not inclined to prevent belligerents from using Mexican oil in the 
fight. This last point was the most important, since Carranza's neutrality 
was predicated upon treating oil as contraband. The oil producers believed 
that this was a clear sign that Carranza had fallen under the sway of Ger­
man agents who wanted to destroy, or tie up, the oil properties in any way 
they could. In June 1917, Walker sent a detailed memo, "The Allies' Oil 
Supplies," to the State Department in an effort to make this point as force­
fully as he could. Domestic oil production in the United States could be 
increased only slightly, Walker stated, while the Mexican Petroleum Com­
pany and the Mexican Eagle could double their output of 50 million barrels 
per year at a moment's notice "if they are only guaranteed protection of 
their governments." This was becoming even more imperative, he thought, 
since "we have to count on the real hostility of the de facto government 
of Mexico, which is notoriously playing with the Germans." Somehow, 
Walker concluded, they had to "make the American and British Govern­
ments see it."19 
In the interim, the oil companies acquiesced to Pelaez's demands with 
the full knowledge and approval of Robert Lansing. Financially, Pelaez kept 
himself in the field through a series of forced loans against the oil compa­
nies, which they supposedly paid under duress, but there was a dispute 
over whether the oil companies should, or did, supply the weapons and 
ammunition that he requested. Although this was not a policy anyone 
wanted to publicize, Lansing told Chandler Anderson in April 1917 that 
he was entirely willing to have Pelaez supplied with weapons "so long as 
the matter was not brought to the attention of the government." Moreover, 
Lansing told Anderson that he "could rest assured that the Administration 
would not prosecute anyone who was assisting Peleyas [sic] so long as he 
remained friendly to the foreign interests in that region."20 
For obvious reasons, the oil companies denied that they provided Pel­
aez such support, although the possibility that they did provides another 
speculative explanation for the previously mentioned stash of arms that 
Doheny had hidden away in the California desert. Walker at one point 
made this admission: 
It is within the knowledge of the Counselor of the State Department that 
in the month of February, 1917, pressure was brought to bear upon the 
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Huasteca Petroleum Company from important sources, to make a ship­
ment or shipments of rifles and cartridges to the Pelaez forces; and that 
the [company] would have nothing to do with such procedure without the 
request and consent of the State Department, and opposed the proposal 
for reasons then explained, principal among which was the evil effect of 
strengthening any Mexican rebel faction with military supplies. It did not 
then; it did not before; it has not subsequently, ever delivered arms 
or munitions of any sort to forces in rebellion against the Carranza 
government.21 
Nevertheless, just two months later, Doheny handed over his stockpile of 
rifles and ammunition to the governor of California. 
Naturally, Carranza's supporters in Mexico and the United States ac­
cused the oil companies of trying to overthrow the government. But the 
oilmen protested that they were only giving what money was necessary to 
protect the oil supply, and they denied giving weapons. Doheny's position, 
as cabled to William Green, was to "pay only what is unavoidable to save 
property of the company and lives of employes [sic]" The congruence of 
interests between the oilmen and Pelaez, however, left the lines of authority 
open to political interpretation.22 Harold Walker, for example, conceded 
that this was an "anomalous" situation but defended Pelaez to the State 
Department whenever possible. He even remarked to one official that he 
had Manuel Pelaez to thank for the fact that he could buy gasoline for his 
car in September 1917 at the same price as he had in March. Still, he had 
no illusions about Pelaez's ultimate loyalty: "While Pelaez has a chance to 
keep on living, he will of course protect the oil for his own interest; but if 
he is beset and his life endangered (there is of course a price on his head 
now) he will do what every Mexican has always done with the Golden 
Goose—kill it, to leave his enemy a dead goose. You or I would do the 
same."23 
Taking all of this into account, it seems unlikely that the oil companies 
made a deliberate business decision to live with this level of uncertainty. 
At the very least, with Article 27 hanging over their heads, Pelaez's actions 
kept Carranza from asserting control in the district and gave the oilmen 
time to work on the Wilson administration.24 Unfortunately, the presi-
dent's decision to grant full recognition to Carranza completely frustrated 
their efforts, although Doheny refused to abandon his attempts to change 
Wilson's mind. Following on the heels of this defeat, he proposed to form 
a publicity bureau designed to "educate the American people about the 
conditions in Mexico and to bring pressure to bear upon our government 
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in the hope of stiffening up its policy for the protection of American inter­
ests." When he heard it, Anderson shuddered at the thought of a plan de­
signed to publicly flail the president for his position on Mexico; he gave it 
no hope of changing Wilson's mind and was certain that it would force 
Carranza to retaliate. At the same time, Anderson thought the oilmen 
would be burning their bridges behind them and would not be able to go 
back to the State Department for protection. Moreover, Anderson knew 
that such a campaign from his clients would end his already tenuous rela­
tionship with the administration. 
Curiously, Anderson also admitted that he was inclined to give the 
president the benefit of the doubt. In fact, he thought it was possible that 
Wilson's recognition policy had been designed to give Carranza enough 
rope to hang himself, so that the United States could say it had done every­
thing possible before intervening. His analysis was "that the President was 
either sincerely desirous of the ultimate success of the Carranza govern­
ment, or that he was simply waiting for an opportune time to make an 
excuse by its failure for intervention." For the moment, Anderson could 
not decide which way the president was headed. Nevertheless, he clung to 
the hope that Wilson might yet be "planning the acquisition of Mexico by 
the United States." So, as long as there was even the remotest possibility 
of intervention along these lines, Anderson recommended that Doheny 
regulate his activities so as to "assist the President in this policy rather than 
start a campaign of criticism."25 
On September 20, therefore, scarcely a week after this discussion, Do­
heny announced a plan not for a publicity bureau but for an academic 
study of recent Mexican history: "I should like to see a great file of materi­
als relevant to the Mexican problem gathered both from printed sources 
and from interviewing those who are well informed." From such an ar­
chive, Doheny wanted to have two books prepared and published. The first 
book would be "a comprehensive and living statement setting forth the 
fundamental facts and forces [that] would be useful to public officials of 
the United States if carefully supported by verified tables of facts and fig­
ures." The second would be "a human interest story of the industrial and 
social life of the Mexicans [that] might help the American public better to 
understand the special conditions existing in Mexico." Without resorting 
to propaganda, Doheny also thought that "such a story might tell some­
thing of the conditions under which American pioneers entered Mexico 
to engage in various kinds of business, what they have done, and what 
have been the economic and social effects produced by their activities." 
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Ultimately, Doheny hoped that this material, once divided into specific 
subject areas, would support several scholarly monographs suitable for use 
at the university level: 
The time has come, I believe, in the history of our country when it is 
important that our thinking men and women should have actual knowl­
edge of, and give increasing thought to, the relationships of our industrial 
life to those of other peoples, and the influence of those relations upon the 
material life and welfare of our own and other countries. Increasingly the 
pioneers of American industry are reaching out beyond our own bound­
aries to take up work of various kinds. The mass of our people whose 
interests are circumscribed by local and internal matters should under­
stand the meaning of this work upon their own. Otherwise we are all at 
the mercy of the superficial sensationalist and the designing demagogue. 
The truth shall be made to prevail.26 
With this outline as a guide, Doheny donated $100,000 to form the 
Doheny Research Foundation and appointed George Scott, a specialist in 
international law and a former research associate at the Carnegie Institu­
tion, to head the project. Previously, Scott had been working in Washing­
ton with Harold Walker and Norman Bridge to devise a suitable publicity 
campaign. With Scott in charge, Doheny asked only that he be kept ap­
prised of the foundation's progress. In a press release, Scott emphasized 
that, given the current political climate in Mexico, it was Doheny's desire 
to provide President Wilson "with information such as a thoroughly disin­
terested group of investigators can gather."27 
Doheny had actually been involved in a similar project once before— 
in 1915. At that time, he had given $20,000 to organize a committee of 
twelve college presidents to "study Mexico in the interests of humanity." 
Presumably, he had hoped that Wilson would appreciate the effort and be 
receptive to the message. Unfortunately, the project foundered in its early 
stages because it was too dangerous to send researchers into Mexico during 
the civil war. The committee did sponsor one report on the educational 
system in Mexico which called for more humanitarian efforts by the United 
States, although there was an implicit assumption that Mexico could not 
progress politically and economically without submitting to American 
tutelage.28 
It was obvious that Doheny was advancing from a familiar pattern in 
setting up this new research operation in 1917. But it is also true that his 
latest effort emerged alongside a similar one devised by President Wilson 
to study the political situation in Europe. At the same time that Chandler 
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Anderson was convincing the oilmen to adopt a more progressive strategy, 
he was working with Robert Lansing to organize a program to prepare 
United States negotiators for the impending peace talks at the end of the 
war. Anderson had hoped to direct the project, bu t Wilson did not want 
the State Department involved. Instead, the president set up an indepen­
dent group known officially as the "Inquiry," directed by his close friend 
Colonel Edward House and funded by some discretionary accounts avail­
able to the White House. Colonel House briefly considered using Anderson 
for the section dealing with international law, right about the t ime that 
Doheny wanted to start his publicity bureau, but then rejected him on the 
basis of a security check. In that report, the attorney general had character­
ized Anderson as "a bright and shining example of pretty much everything 
you don't want."29 
One of the hallmarks of Wilson's plan was its reliance upon academi­
cians rather than government personnel to provide an independent analy­
sis of the social and political problems associated with a peace settlement in 
Europe. Clearly, Doheny's Mexican project was conceived as a sympathetic 
reflection of Wilson's Inquiry. But what is most interesting is that both 
efforts were taken to be serious and important in the academic community. 
There were no charges, outside of Mexico, of course, that Doheny's money 
and position would unduly influence the results of his survey, and abso­
lutely no indication that the Wilson Administration viewed his project as 
illegitimate. From every indication, the Doheny Research Foundation's 
study of the Mexican revolution fit in as one more component of the work 
being performed by a large segment of the nation's scholars and intellectu­
als. In fact, a fierce competition developed among the wartime agencies for 
their services. Many of the people hired for the Doheny Foundation moved 
to the War Trade Board or some other agency at the end of their contracts 
and regarded the two experiences similarly. And once the Inquiry broad­
ened its focus to include Latin America, the two organizations collaborated 
where possible with information and personnel.30 
South of the border, the editor of a pro-German newspaper in Mexico 
used the Doheny project as effective war propaganda by claiming that Do­
heny and other American capitalists had given a million dollars for a study 
whose "sole object" was to "blacken our country in foreign parts by mak­
ing a false and malicious report." President Carranza believed that the Do­
heny researchers were "trying to find out things that [were] none of their 
business" and that this supposedly impartial investigation would be fol­
lowed by military and political intervention, as had happened in the 
Philippines.31 
174 CHAPTER 8 
While Doheny's motives were certainly not unbiased, there was no de­
nying the legitimacy of the work. And on this score, at least, Doheny did 
what he said he would do: he wrote the checks as Scott requested them, 
gave several interviews about his experiences in Mexico, and was otherwise 
invisible. The research team itself, which numbered as many asfifteen, was 
drawn from the ranks of the best universities and would not have tolerated 
direct interference in any case. To further validate the project, Doheny and 
Scott persuaded the University of California at Berkeley to act as the host 
institution for the work. Berkeley designated each of the scholars as official 
research associates, which gave them access to the library, staff, and office 
space. The president of the university, Benjamin Ide Wheeler, told Doheny 
that he sheltered the project because he was convinced of the "scientific 
disinterestedness" of the foundation and the high caliber of its members.32 
With these arrangements in place, the researchers went to work to an­
swer one fundamental question: What's the matter with Mexico as an or­
derly, self-governing community? Taking that as their guide, the members 
pursued their research from November 1917 through the summer of 1918. 
During that time, they collected the factual material that Doheny requested 
and conducted more than 500 interviews with American businessmen 
working in Mexico and former Mexican officials from the Diaz and Ma­
dero administrations. Surprisingly, these interviews did not reveal any uni­
versal desire for military intervention. But they almost all reflected an 
overwhelming disgust with Wilson's conciliatory policy of "watchful wait­
ing," which seemed to aggravate the conditions under which Americans 
suffered in Mexico. Doheny and his associates were especially blunt about 
their desire to see the country freed from Carranza's radical program. Rob­
ert Cleland, a historian from Occidental College who was put in charge of 
analyzing the mining and petroleum industries, noted that, "almost with­
out exception," the oilmen anticipated direct American intervention in the 
northern section of Mexico to protect their interests.33 
To afford some level of objectivity in their reports, the researchers tried 
to get into Mexico, but the Mexican government barred them from enter­
ing the country. It was clear that Carranza opposed the investigation be­
cause of Doheny's support. In contrast, the government permitted a 
section of George Creel's Committee on Public Information to operate in 
Mexico during the same period. That group distributed American war pro­
paganda throughout the country in an effort to dispel pro-German senti­
ment in Mexico and worked openly without interference. A handful of 
Doheny scholars slipped into Mexico surreptitiously but were unable to do 
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any thorough or consistent work. And, even if they had been invited in, 
the almost complete absence of documentary material on economic and 
social conditions in Mexico would not have changed anyone's opinion or 
the level of analysis.34 
In their finished reports, which covered major topics such as govern­
ment, industry, education, health and sanitation, the researchers were not 
inclined to support military intervention in Mexico. But like most Ameri­
cans, they also believed that the United States ought to play a vital role in 
Mexico's future. Although the resumption of normal commercial relations 
was high on the list of desirable reforms, foreign businessmen were not 
exonerated for their past behavior. Blatant abuse of the Mexican people 
was not to be tolerated, but neither was Mexico's recent attempt to restrict 
the superior talent and skill of American investors. 
In the end, there was nothing in the reports that Doheny could not 
endorse or appreciate. And despite its inherent biases and evidentiary 
problems, the work represented the most thorough study of Mexico to 
date, just as he had hoped it would. Unfortunately, with the end of the 
European war in November 1918, the pressure to keep the Mexican situa­
tion under wraps no longer existed, and there was no need to remain quiet 
about the president's policy. Thus, almost as soon as the researchers con­
cluded their studies, Doheny refused to see the project through to publica­
tion. This decision left George Scott thoroughly disillusioned about 
Doheny's motives but, nonetheless, convinced of the academic quality of 
the work. Scott tried to get the University of California to fund the final 
stage of the enterprise, but the regents turned him down, as well. Over 
the next few years, however, former members of the foundation published 
a half-dozen scholarly monographs on Mexico which partially fulfilled 
Doheny's original aims. But Doheny's unwillingness to pay out a few thou­
sand dollars more to complete his two books, after putting in $120,000 
up to that time, reinforces the conclusion that this had really been little 
more than an elaborate diversion in the larger scheme of oil-related 
propaganda.35 
In December 1918, a new organization, the National Association for 
the Protection of American Rights in Mexico, was formed. This group was 
backed almost exclusively by the large oil companies, and it took an aggres­
sive approach to informing the American public about the latest condi­
tions in Mexico. Like that of the Doheny Research Foundation, the mission 
of the NAPARIM was to collect as much data as possible about foreign 
enterprises in Mexico and to present these data to government officials and 
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the American public. The difference was that the NAPARIM distributed its 
reports in the form of short propaganda pamphlets and newspaper articles, 
with no presumption of academic objectivity.36 
The NAPARIM also sponsored a Senate investigation of the political 
situation in Mexico in 1919, headed by New Mexico Senator Albert B. Fall, 
a consistent opponent of Wilson's ideals. As noted in chapter 2, Fall and 
Doheny both had been in Kingston, New Mexico, in the mid-1880s but 
were not personally close until this collaboration over Mexico. In well-
publicized hearings before a subcommittee on United States-Mexican rela­
tions, Fall delved into the "outrages" inflicted on Americans by the Car­
ranza government. It was obvious from the beginning, as Harold Walker 
noted, that the oil interests were no longer worried about the "danger of 
criticizing the Carranza authorities in public or private."37 
In the months prior to the Fall investigation, the reading public had 
already been treated to numerous stories purporting to reveal the true mo­
tives of the oilmen. In July 1919, L. J. de Bekker, a writer for the New York 
Tribune, produced a series of articles for The Nation entitled "The Plot 
Against Mexico," which charged the oilmen with all manner of evildoing. 
Then, just prior to the start of the Fall hearings, Samuel Guy Inman, an 
American missionary representing a coalition of Christians opposed to an 
aggressive foreign policy in Latin America, published a book entitled Inter­
vention in Mexico, which repeated many of the charges that de Bekker had 
laid out. Inman was the first person called to testify before the committee, 
and he became a political lightning rod for Senator Fall.38 
From Inman's perspective, the Mexican problem in the United States 
sprang from five basic sources: a lack of knowledge about Mexican geogra­
phy and history, ignorance of the internal political currents of Mexico, the 
difference between Anglo-Saxon and Latin psychology, the impossibility of 
separating the Mexican question from American political and economic 
life, and the fact that the American people did not get the truth about 
conditions in Mexico. This was the Doheny program in almost every re­
spect, and Inman even praised Doheny's financial support as a first step 
along the road to understanding. But he also supposed—not incorrectly— 
that the Doheny reports advocated the vocational rehabilitation of Mexico 
through increased contact with American business, and Inman warned his 
readers that nothing would be worse than to turn Mexicans into worship­
ers of "crass materialism." Inman offered a cogent argument for leaving 
Mexico alone. He believed that the country was in the midst of a true social 
revolution and that the situation was not going to be resolved by any action 
on the part of the United States. "We nught as well stop fooling ourselves" 
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Inman concluded, that Americans would wake up one morning to find 
that the Mexican problem had been solved "by a shuffling of the political 
cards."39 
But that was precisely what the Fall Committee hoped to accomplish. 
As a counterpoint, the Committee called Doheny to center stage as the star 
witness for the oil industry and the business community, in general. Dur­
ing his testimony, Doheny explained the plight of American firms strug­
gling to conduct normal business in Mexico in the face of Carranza's 
antiforeign demands. He maintained that radical taxation policies and the 
provisions of Article 27 inhibited profitable oil production in Mexico and 
threatened to eliminate ownership of private property altogether. The real 
problem, from his perspective, was Carranza's belief that he could wipe 
out the contracts and agreements of the last fifteen years with impunity. 
Nevertheless, in spite of his intense dislike for Carranza's policies, Doheny 
stated that he was not an interventionist but stood "in an absolutely neutral 
position with reference to the political affairs in Mexico." All he could really 
do was to complain. On this matter, Doheny's personal preference for a 
new government in Mexico conflicted with the realization that a direct 
military invasion into the oil zone might prompt Carranza or Pelaez to 
destroy the wells as a desperate act of defiance. The oilmen, as one industry 
observer noted correctly, were stuck "between the devil and the deep blue 
sea."40 
Recently, it has been suggested that the oilmen miscalculated the politi­
cal equation in Mexico. Supposedly, they would have been better off join­
ing with the Carranza forces rather than continuing their support of 
Pelaez, since rebel exactions in 1919 almost equaled the tax demands of 
the central government and Pelaez's raids on the oil camps caused consid­
erable damage. Logically, the oilmen had less to fear from Carranza's Ar­
ticle 27, to which he was not personally committed, than they did from 
Pelaez's continued rebellion. And, according to this view, "if the oilmen 
really had a choice of tax men perhaps they would have chosen Carranza," 
suggesting that Pelaez never gave them the luxury of choosing.41 
Yet, there was an ideological component to the oilmen's case that defied 
logical explanation. The only thing that was clear, even under the most 
chaotic circumstances, was that the oilmen understood Pelaez and his basic 
desire for money and power, whereas they were never sure about Carranza 
and Mexico's "confiscatory" constitution. Therefore, they resisted his phys­
ical possession of the oilfields with every means at their disposal. Certainly, 
this was a fundamental misreading of Carranza's intentions, which were 
nationalist but not anticapitalist. Likewise, the oilmen misunderstood 
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Woodrow Wilson's support of the Carranza government and viewed it as 
a basic disavowal of their rights. Overall, the situation worked to defeat 
the bottom-line pragmatism of business, which would have had the oil 
companies settle for what they could get out of the new government and 
move on. 
In the background, the specter of the Bolshevik Revolution rampaging 
across the world stage confused the issue even more, and suggesting a link 
between the revolutions in Mexico and Russia was an effective argument, 
even if it tended more toward hysterical fantasy than proven fact. This was 
a current theme during the Fall Committee hearings and the subject of 
many NAPARIM pamphlets. In "Plow With Petroleum," for example, pub­
lished in 1920, the "Argonauts of oil" referred to the attack on their legal 
rights by the "Bolshevistic-Carranza government" in Mexico and asked 
readers if they were in favor of having their government declare "a firm, 
definite policy toward the protection of American citizens, whether they 
be in Mexico, Siberia, or Keokuk."42 
Perhaps because of the extreme rhetoric from all sides, the ideological 
contest in Mexico produced a political stalemate between 1915 and 1919. 
While it is true that the oilmen could not remove Carranza or his obnox­
ious constitutional policies, they did not acquiesce to them, either. They 
paid what taxes and duties they could not avoid and held firm against 
Article 27. Needing money, Carranza compromised to the degree that he 
did not insist on implementing what he could not defend, and he suc­
ceeded in gaining United States recognition and enough tax revenue to 
successfully keep Mexico out of the hands of the foreign powers. Pelaez 
waged a successful guerilla war in the Huasteca district, which earned him 
a share of the oil wealth and kept the central authorities out of his home 
territory. 
Overall, the one who benefitted most was Woodrow Wilson. More than 
anyone else, Wilson understood that the best strategy was simply to leave 
the situation alone. By not adding the United States military into the equa­
tion, a mistake he had made earlier at Veracruz and with the Pershing Ex­
pedition, he forced the three other groups into a rough balance of power, 
with definite limits on how far any single group was willing to push its 
agenda. This was a noisy, sometimes destructive, and occasionally deadly 
stalemate, but it left Wilson free to try his hand at settling the European 
conflict. That he ultimately failed in that endeavor should not obscure the 
fact that it was his Mexican policy that gave him the opportunity to try. 
These were short-term gains, however, made possible by the enormity 
of the German threat. Afterward, the scorecard looked drastically different 
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for the contenders in Mexico. In the spring of 1920, Carranza was forced 
from office and ultimately assassinated by his political opponents under 
the leadership of Alvaro Obregon. Pelaez, who rose briefly with the 
Obregon regime, failed to develop the political vision necessary to survive 
on a larger field and was eventually forced back home to an involuntary 
retirement. Only Doheny and the oil companies were left to fight for, and 
profit from, another day. Yet that was more a victory for oil, itself, which 
because of the World War had become a strategic commodity valuable 
enough to ensure its own survival. Mexican oil, in particular, was about to 
enter the period of its greatest influence—the early 1920s. 
i 
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
IRELAND AND JAPAN, 1920-1921 
With the increasing size and importance of his oil holdings 
in Mexico and the United States, Doheny found his political influence 
growing in proportion to his economic power. Although he did not emerge 
as a figure of national importance until 1920, he had been a prominent 
Democrat on the West Coast since the late 1890s. From the beginning, 
Doheny's devotion to the party was rooted in his Irish-American heritage, 
faith in the Catholic church, and his long years on the Western frontier, 
which had made him a sympathetic follower of William Jennings Bryan. 
Over time, however, his financial success eroded the logic, if not the senti­
ment, behind those positions, and, by the early 1920s, he found himself at 
a political crossroads. Had his ideas been totally mercenary, Doheny would 
probably have given up on the Democrats in 1916, when Republican presi­
dential candidate Charles Evans Hughes emphasized the Mexican crisis as 
a major campaign issue in opposition to Woodrow Wilson. Instead, Do-
heny's significant financial support in California helped Wilson achieve an 
improbable victory in his bid for reelection. 
At the end of the war, however, Wilson's internationalism and his re­
fusal to entertain the Mexican question at the Paris Peace Conference an­
gered Doheny to no end. Thereafter, although he played a prominent role 
at the Democratic convention in 1920, he broke with the party on a num­
ber of fronts. Much of his disaffection came from his growing friendship 
with Albert B. Fall, one of Wilson's harshest critics and the newly ap­
pointed secretary of the interior under Republican Warren Harding. As an 
intensely private individual, Doheny did not aspire to elected office, but» 
in the early 1920s, he allowed himself to be seduced by the idea that he 
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could play a large role in shaping national and international events beyond 
his immediate interests in Mexican affairs. And it was his own patriotic 
commitment to Ireland and the United States, coupled neatly with his fi­
nancial interests, which led him along a circuitous path into the contro­
versy over the naval oil reserve in California. Ironically, when the details of 
those supposedly corrupt dealings became public knowledge in 1924, both 
political parties abandoned him. 
Prior to 1920, Doheny was known for having "strong convictions on 
the questions of the day," but he usually kept them to himself, and his only 
forays into the political limelight were brief and largely ceremonial. For 
instance, in 1912, Doheny tried unsuccessfully to become a presidential 
elector for Woodrow Wilson after supporting conservative Democrat 
Champ Clark through the state primary. Then, in 1916, Doheny was cho­
sen as an elector and earned the praise of state officials for pushing the 
Wilson campaign to victory in California. There was even a brief mention 
of Doheny as a suitable candidate for the Senate in 1916. Apparently, be­
lieving that the next Senator would come from the southern part of the 
state, northern California Democrats suggested Doheny as a compromise 
candidate. But, as one political observer pointed out, Doheny's only real 
qualification for the job was a "pocketbook [that measured] up to Bourbon 
expectations." Whether Doheny had such aspirations is doubtful, but his 
wealth made him an attractive, if unlikely, prospect nonetheless.1 
A few years later, after having spent almost all of his time in Washing­
ton and New York during the war, Doheny enjoyed a solid reputation 
among many admirers. In 1920, he went to the Democratic national con­
vention in San Francisco as a delegate at large from California and served 
as a member of the resolutions committee. And in return for his previous 
efforts, Doheny was nominated as the state's choice for vice-president. Ac­
cording to Isidore Dockweiler, California's representative on the national 
committee, this was intended as "a graceful tribute by the party in return 
for California's electoral vote in 1916, when Doheny headed the ticket."2 
More than a favorite son, however, Doheny had support from a num­
ber of state delegations, and, according to a party leader from Missouri, 
his name had "been persistently mentioned in Washington" as a candidate 
for the office. One unnamed Californian in Washington, most likely Frank­
lin Lane, Wilson's former secretary of the interior who had gone to work 
for Doheny after leaving the cabinet in 1919, believed that "the Presidential 
campaign with Doheny on the ticket would doubtless develop the fact that 
during the war he was one of the world's most useful citizens." This in­
dividual also predicted that both national conventions would be full of 
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surprises and considered it "within the realm of probability that this many­
sided man . .  . might emerge from the San Francisco convention as its 
nominee for president of the United States."3 
At the convention, itself, rather than basking in the glory of past 
achievements, Doheny became involved in a struggle over the issue of Irish 
nationalism, which compromised his position among many delegates. At 
the center of this controversy was Eamon De Valera, the newly elected pres­
ident of the Irish Republic, formed in January 1919 after Irish nationalists 
declared their independence in defiance of British control. Shortly thereaf­
ter, as the situation in Ireland erupted into another civil war, De Valera 
fled to the United States seeking financial and political support for the 
cause. He found an overwhelmingly receptive audience almost everywhere 
he went, especially among the Irish-American community in California. 
Having been a major financial contributor to the nationalist movement all 
along, Doheny also supported De Valera's mission in America.4 
During the summer of 1920, De Valera presented proposals to both 
political parties for a plank in their respective platforms recognizing the 
Irish Republic. Not surprisingly, the Republicans turned him down, but he 
hoped for better luck in San Francisco. Appearing before the resolutions 
committee, De Valera asked for a straight vote in favor of Irish recognition, 
but the members rejected the Irish plank by thirty-one votes to seventeen. 
Initially, no one among the group who voted for the measure, including 
Doheny, was willing to take up the issue as a minority statement to be 
presented to the full convention. But after a meeting of Irish supporters 
outside the convention hall got so heated that the police had to be called 
in, De Valera accepted a compromise resolution that stood some chance of 
success. Although seven members of the committee signed the amended 
plank as a minority report, Doheny was the only one willing to present it 
to the delegates.5 
Under the circumstances, this was a brave act, since Doheny not only 
faced an unsympathetic audience but had to speak on the heels of the ven­
erable William Jennings Bryan himself. Having never before addressed a 
mass audience, Doheny showed his nervousness as he proceeded haltingly 
into his speech and even forgot part of the text. He began by asking the 
members to indulge his "weak voice and inexperience," but he made no 
excuse for his intention to speak in favor of Ireland's struggle for freedom. 
One sympathetic observer thought he did better than that when he re­
ported that Doheny "went through like a Sinn Fein soldier and proudly 
marched up to the speaker's platform and presented the document." The 
task at hand, Doheny said, was to firm up the party's weak statement of 
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sympathy for the "aspirations of Ireland for self-government." The revised 
plank read that "mindful of the circumstances of birth of our own nation," 
the party would support "recognition without intervention in all cases 
where the people of a nation have by the free vote of the people set up a 
republic and chosen a government to which they yield willing obedience." 
In the end, the delegates refused to endorse the Irish cause and voted down 
the minority plank 665 votes to 402. For Doheny, however, the experience 
at the convention took him deeper into the Irish nationalist movement, 
where he started to see himself as a statesman as well as a businessman.6 
And so, Doheny must have felt an even greater sense of accomplish­
ment in his subsequent nomination as a vice-presidential candidate. After 
choosing James M. Cox of Ohio to be their standard-bearer, the convention 
accepted suggestions for the second place on the ticket, and Lorin Handley, 
a delegate from Los Angeles, offered Doheny's name for consideration. Still 
boasting of the state's role in the last election, Handley remarked that Cali­
fornia was "perfectly willing to yield the Presidency to Ohio, but not the 
glory of electing the last Democratic President of the United States." Their 
reward, Handley asserted, would come through the vice-presidency, since 
California wanted not only to elect Governor Cox but "to elect with him 
a great patriot to stand by his side to make humanity's fight." Because Do-
heny's life was "a typical romance of American improved opportunity," 
Handley believed that it was an example of success that every citizen could 
appreciate. Thus, Doheny was put forward as "the man out of the West 
who can reach the hearts and the souls, not only of the Democrats of the 
West, but of the great free-thinking people of the West." When Handley 
finished, a representative from Massachusetts came forward to second the 
nomination, believing that, if the party wanted to win in November, it 
needed to balance Cox's political record with Doheny's success in business, 
and portraying Doheny as "a self-made man . .  . who is needed in this hour 
of reconstruction."7 
As far as political parties and their conventions are concerned, there 
was really nothing exceptional in Doheny's nomination; scores of other 
individuals—of greater and lesser utility—had been given similar mo­
ments of glory. Certainly, there was limited support for putting a sixty-
four-year-old oil magnate on the ticket; the prize ultimately went to the 
much younger, and far more charismatic, Franklin D. Roosevelt. For Do­
heny, however, this was another indication that he had some unique quali­
ties to offer and that there were people willing to make use of his potential 
in both subtle and overt ways.8 
One of the most influential of these was Franklin Lane, who now 
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worked as a legal advisor for the Pan American Petroleum & Transport 
Company. As the head of the Interior Department, Lane had been a lonely 
voice for private enterprise among a choir of strict conservationists. And 
because of internal conflicts and the inadequacy of his government salary, 
Lane had contemplated resigning his office several times during the war 
years but promised Wilson he would see the crisis through. Then, having 
been "literally forced out of public life by my lack of resources," as Lane 
put it, he accepted a $50,000-a-year position with Doheny, hoping he could 
at least make enough before retirement to get out of debt and remove the 
financial burden from his family. 
As it turned out, Lane had little more than a year to live and spent 
most of his months on the Doheny payroll seeking treatment for a heart 
condition that ultimately caused his death. He also spent time in the Pan 
American Petroleum offices in New York and at Doheny's home and ranch 
in Los Angeles getting to know his benefactor. Although Lane had always 
been a staunch advocate of the oil industry and wanted to see the federal 
government give the oilmen free rein to manage the nation's petroleum 
resources, he was an ambivalent cheerleader for big business. As his career 
revealed, he gave little thought to personal wealth and admitted to having 
spent the years since his boyhood fighting "Wall Street rascals." But for 
some reason, he felt that Doheny was different, if no less wealthy, than his 
Eastern counterparts.9 
Lane, who described himself as a "wild cross between a crazy Irishman, 
with dreams, desires, fancies, and a dour Scot," was not an active member 
of the Irish-American community and often lamented the less charitable 
aspects of the Irish temperament. But he understood the power of the Irish 
independence movement in the United States and almost certainly had a 
hand in supporting Doheny's appearance at the Democratic convention 
on behalf of the cause. Sometime later, Lane presented Doheny with an 
Irish flag, noting that it stood as a symbol for the divine aspirations of a 
people "to whom most of the arts were known when England and America 
were forest wastes, whose women have made the world beautiful by their 
virtue, and whose men have made the world free by their courage." No 
doubt inspired by Lane's faith and encouragement, Doheny seemed more 
willing than ever to live up to that ideal.10 
At the same time, during the fall of 1920, De Valera broke with the 
leading members of the Irish nationalist movement in America, the 
Friends of Irish Freedom, to form his own group called the American Asso­
ciation for the Recognition of the Irish Republic. The divisive issue was 
whether the money collected in the United States ought to be used to in­
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fluence American politicians to support a diplomatic solution for Ireland 
or whether the funds should be sent directly to Ireland to support the revo­
lutionaries in the civil war. De Valera advocated the latter strategy and 
forced the break with the existing nationalist party. On November 17, the 
members of the AARIR elected Doheny national president of the new 
organization.11 
Lane obviously paid a good deal of attention to the Irish situation and 
must have been alarmed at Doheny's prominent role in the more radical 
organization. Within a few weeks of Doheny's taking office as the head of 
the AARIR, Lane wrote him with a plan designed to put some distance 
between Doheny and the armed struggle in Ireland. Lane claimed to see 
an opportunity for Doheny to bridge the ideological gap between the Irish 
and British leaders by offering to mediate a peaceful end to the conflict. 
Lane began by claiming that the time was ripe "for some practical man, 
preferably an outsider, to do something for Ireland—and why should you 
not be that man?" Then he continued: 
You have made a great fortune and achieved a great name in the business 
world. You would have done great things for Mexico, altogether unselfishly, 
if the chance had come—and may be it will come yet. But there is no 
reason why you might not do something internationally for your Father's 
land which you love so dearly. Service for Ireland cannot be rendered by 
stirring up the Irish here or embittering our people further against En­
gland. Hatred will not solve this problem . .  . Lloyd George is willing to 
talk terms now. There must be a go-between. He must have the confidence 
of the Irish. You have that. He must also have access to the British Ministry. 
You have that, or easily can get it. Isn't it worth trying?... You would have 
to speak to Lloyd George as a known partisan of the Irish cause, but not 
as one committed to a program. You would be the vehicle through which 
the Irish would learn the best they could hope for, this side of war. You 
would go on oil business. No one in the world would have the slightest 
idea, either here or there, what you were trying to do until something was 
done. It would be fatal to the English and to Irish pride to have it thought 
that they could not speak together. But we know that they cannot. Both 
need a friend.12 
The effect of this kind of an appeal can hardly be overstated. And Do­
heny seemed to be heeding Lane's advice when, over the next few months, 
he subsidized a national fund-raising drive for the relief of Ireland. In 
this instance, Doheny advanced the group $250,000 to set up collection 
committees across the country, and he contributed heavily thereafter. 
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Ultimately, the effort generated over $5 million to alleviate suffering in 
Ireland caused by the ongoing political conflict. As the state chairman for 
the American Committee for the Relief of Ireland, Doheny appealed to the 
citizens of Los Angeles to meet their quota. He asked them to forget politics 
and religion for the moment so that they could see the real situation in 
Ireland, where thousands of "hungry, naked, sick women and children and 
old people . .  . [looked] to the United States as their last hope." Any who 
had the means, but was unwilling, to help would have "no excuse to give 
his conscience for turning a deaf ear to weak humans in terrible distress."13 
While the move to provide humanitarian relief to Ireland produced an 
unqualified success in the United States in the spring of 1921, there were 
also secret, high-level talks, of the type Lane envisioned, going on between 
De Valera and Lloyd George to put an end to the fighting. Soon after form­
ing his new American organization in December 1920, De Valera had re­
turned to Ireland and was eventually arrested by the British authorities in 
June 1921. The British, however, knew that there was no way to sue for 
peace with the Irish leader in jail, so De Valera was granted an unexpected 
release and an invitation to meet with Lloyd George. Over the course of 
several months, the two men hashed out their respective goals for Ireland, 
with De Valera holding out for something more than dominion status.14 
Doheny's link to the truce between the combatants in July 1921, and 
the subsequent signing of an Anglo-Irish Treaty in December, can only be 
surmised. Certainly, there is no evidence to suggest that Doheny partici­
pated in any of these talks. But if he followed Lane's advice to act discreetly 
as a bridge between the two leaders, there is room to speculate about his 
influence. If nothing else, Doheny must have had some method of con­
tacting De Valera because of his position as president of the AARIR. Along 
those lines, Lloyd George's biographer notes that, in the early months of 
1921, the prime minister "secretly attempted, through several intermedia­
ries, to reach some common ground with De Valera," although the effort 
failed at the time. And in at least one instance, the British ambassador 
to the United States, Sir Auckland Geddes, wrote to the foreign office on 
December 8, 1921, two days after the signing of the treaty, that Doheny 
"was attempting to take credit for creating the conditions which made it 
possible."15 
The Anglo-Irish Treaty and the subsequent creation of the Irish Free 
State granted a degree of independence and self-determination for Ireland 
great enough to satisfy the desires of most of the moderate nationalists. 
Indeed, the principal leaders of the AARIR, especially Doheny, considered 
the Irish Free State to be as close to a republic as Ireland was going to get 
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for some time and celebrated its creation as the logical end of their own 
movement in the United States. Upon hearing the news of an agreement, 
Doheny noted that Ireland's friends in America had been working to "get 
them not to be too extreme.... The accomplishment of the Irish Free State 
is what I have hoped for. I have had the utmost faith that the conference 
would result in it. I have believed that Lloyd George and his Ministry were 
sincerely working for a settlement, and knew that the aims of De Valera 
and his associates were the same."16 
In the days that followed, however, Doheny's position led De Valera to 
make an angry and permanent break with him. Once having negotiated 
the truce, De Valera would have nothing to do with the treaty, which he 
considered a weak-willed surrender to the British Government. Instead, 
De Valera called for a resumption of the civil war in Ireland. Believing that 
the treaty was the right solution, Doheny resigned his position as the head 
of the AARIR early in 1922, in a clash with a more militant faction within 
the organization.17 
On a completely different level, the negotiations over the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty introduced other issues concerning American security in the North 
Atlantic and the naval rivalry between Britain and the United States. In 
fact, while the Irish question was being negotiated, the world's major naval 
powers prepared to meet in Washington, D.C., at a disarmament confer­
ence to determine the balance of naval power for the postwar decade. In 
advance of that meeting, in September 1921, the executive committee of 
the AARIR met in Chicago to discuss a proposed clause in the Irish treaty 
giving Britain the right to install naval and air force stations in Ireland. 
Seeing a hidden agenda in the British plans, the committee sent a letter to 
President Harding, with a copy to be delivered to the members of the 
American delegation, warning them of the danger. The committee saw no 
defensive component to these demands and believed that recent comments 
by British military and government officials indicated that the North At­
lantic would be the battlefield of the future. "Against what nation or na­
tions," the committee asked, "are these aggressive naval and aerial plans 
and provisions directed?" In their minds, the British scheme for Ireland 
constituted "a menace to the security of the United States."18 
It is interesting to note that the head of the anti-De Valera faction in 
Boston wrote a letter to the secretary of state claiming that Doheny's share 
of the British-Mexican Petroleum Company made him a partner, and co­
conspirator, with the British Government. And his large fuel oil contracts 
based on Mexican oil production made him a vital link to any British naval 
operation in the Atlantic. "Undoubtedly" the letter continued, "through 
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Mr. Doheny's activities, England has been given an advantage over Amer­
ica," which constituted a "serious menace" to American security. The 
writer even called for a congressional investigation of this relationship so 
that, in case of war, the United States could nullify Doheny's contract with 
British shipping companies.19 
The American government had, in fact, been using the Irish situation 
as a wedge to achieve concessions from Britain all along, but this had little 
to do with any planned military installations in Ireland. Rather, the State 
Department used the civil unrest in Ireland as a lens to focus attention on 
their desire to force Great Britain to relinquish its strategic alliance with 
Japan. The real potential threat to American security came from the direc­
tion of the Pacific Ocean not the Atlantic. Thus, Secretary of State Hughes 
linked the Irish question to the latter issue and told the British ambassador 
that a resumption of the Anglo-Japanese alliance would bring together 
anti-British elements in the United States calling for the support of the 
insurrection in Ireland and possible congressional action to recognize the 
Irish Republic. Looking years into the future, the British were unwilling to 
gamble against America's rise as the preeminent Western power, and they 
acquiesced to Hughes' demands.20 
Doheny's role as the head of the AARIR and that organization's con­
cerns over British naval policy also provided him with an indirect link to 
the larger issues of American security beyond his concerns with Mexico, 
and his position as a prominent Californian carried him into the debate 
over various plans to offset the Japanese threat in the Pacific. All of these 
elements converged after the election of Republican Warren Harding in 
1921 as the new president of the United States. Despite having been briefly 
considered as a possible member of the opposing ticket, Doheny was 
warmly received by the new administration, with Secretary of the Interior 
Albert Fall being the most conspicuous of his Republican friends. Two days 
after the election, Doheny wrote to Fall that "it is in sackcloth and ashes 
that I come to your feet to beg forgiveness and admission among the ranks 
of the sane people of the Country." He asked Fall to understand, "as most 
of my friends do, why I thought it best to remain regular." What those 
reasons were Doheny did not say, but he had obviously come to despise 
the Democratic candidate, James Cox. According to Doheny, Harding won 
because he "undoubtedly convinced the people that he was a safe man to 
be the country's president." On the other hand, Doheny continued, "the 
vituperative and dastardly dishonest campaign of Cox surely had the re­
verse effect."21 
Doheny was referring here to an incident that happened late in the 
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campaign, when one of Harding's nastier critics dredged up an old rumor 
about the Republican candidate's ancestry. Essentially, the claim was that, 
several generations back, the Hardings had come from the West Indies and 
that Warren Harding was, therefore, a mestizo. Although Cox and the 
Democratic National Committee denounced the information as slander­
ous, pamphlets detailing the race issue found their way by the thousands 
underneath voters' doors, onto commuter trains, and into hotel lobbies 
through the efforts of energetic, and anonymous, volunteers. Having stated 
that he "never heard a dirtier argument," Doheny gave $25,000 to the Re­
publican party to have the pictures of Harding's parents printed in all of 
the New York City newspapers to dispute the claim.22 
Aside from the underhanded tactics, Doheny noted that the voters' de­
cision was also a reaction against "the fallacies and fatal consequences of 
Wilson's League of Nations." And Fall, as Doheny reminded him, was owed 
a debt of gratitude from the American people for his work as a member of 
the "Senate oligarchy" responsible for defeating the League. When it was 
over, Doheny believed that the election of 1920 "was a greater cause for 
rejoicing than the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, or of 
any other event or day since the eventful day in 1776 which gave birth to 
this Republic.... The United States must, and now will be preserved, as 
the inspiration to progress for all the world by maintaining an independent 
and tolerant individualism among its citizens, and nationalism among the 
nations of the world, rather than promoting socialism with all its degrad­
ing effects, and internationalism with its danger of complete annihilation 
of Americanism."23 
Once in office, the Harding Administration used the Washington Dis­
armament Conference in November 1921 as the first test of its ability to 
handle foreign policy in a new era. And given the climate of opinion at 
that time, recent appraisals have given the president high marks for prag­
matism in negotiating a realistic treaty between the naval powers which at 
least temporarily reduced tensions around the world. In brief, the United 
States, Great Britain, and Japan agreed to stop all major ship construc­
tion at current levels, established a 5:5:3 naval ratio among the powers, 
negated the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and made mutual concessions not 
to fortify islands and outposts in the western Pacific to reduce the 
possibility of an unintended confrontation. All in all, this seemed like 
a simple, cost-effective strategy, and it was extremely popular at a time 
when the American public refused to sacrifice tax relief to pay for 
additional military obligations. Nevertheless, modern scholars, knowing 
what came later, have characterized the debate over the disarmament 
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package as "shallow, cursory, and largely uninformed." Thus, without 
much reflection, the arms agreement was "steamrollered" into law.24 
Another reason for this legislative coup was that a significant contin­
gent of naval officers, primarily those responsible for war plans in the Pa­
cific, were left entirely outside of the process. By and large, this group 
opposed almost every provision in the treaty, but their objections were 
never considered in the rush to push an agreement through Congress with­
out debate. This tactic, and the political mindset behind it, made it quite 
clear to naval officers in the field that they could not appeal to Congress 
or to the public for additional support. In particular, the head of the Gen­
eral Board of the Navy, recently returned from the Asiatic Fleet, was abso­
lutely "convinced of the Japanese menace," but his views, along with those 
of the War Plans Division, itself, were ignored because they deviated from 
what the politicians wanted to hear.25 
As we know now, however, the fears about Japan were not mere il­
lusions used to prop up the military budget. In fact, Japanese-American 
relations were at such a low point in 1921 that, one British naval ex­
pert concluded, "the situation in the Far East was so ominous that well-
informed observers believed war between the United States and Japan to 
be only a question of time, and no long time at that." A memo on Japanese 
preparedness in April 1921, from the Office of Naval Intelligence, also con­
cluded that "there seems no question that Japan is preparing for any even­
tuality that may occur and that America is the country she has in mind."26 
Without question, the Japanese Navy focused its attention almost ex­
clusively on the United States. But the Japanese were also engaged in a 
similar internal dispute over the need for a strong position at the disarma­
ment conference. Consequently, while the treaty was hailed as a political 
victory for Congress and the president by stopping the call for increased 
military spending, it was also seen as a "godsend" by the Japanese naval 
minister, who knew that his country's economy could not support an arms 
race with the United States. However, the Japanese navy also had a corps 
of officers who reacted violently to the restrictions of the treaty: "As far as 
I am concerned," said Vice-Admiral Kato Kanji, "war with America starts 
now. We'll get our revenge over this, by God!"27 
In hindsight, the conference turned out to be a temporary bandage for 
a festering problem on both sides of the Pacific. As one American naval 
officer noted after reviewing the nonfortification provisions of the treaty: 
"It is thus seen that our statesmen at Washington did not achieve great 
ends without making concessions... [and] our hand is weakened in the 
Far East by this abdication of potential strategic position."28 Although navy 
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leaders had to accept the domestic political decisions made at that confer­
ence, they did not allow them to completely hinder preparations for a Pa­
cific strategy. Recognizing the inevitable limitations placed on President 
Harding, the Navy Department, under Secretary Edwin Denby, "moved 
with circumspection," as one historian put it, to do as much as possible to 
strengthen the Pacific Fleet.29 
Some plans were as simple as sending oil-burning ships to the Pacific 
and coal-burning vessels to the Atlantic to take advantage of the cheapest 
source of fuel in each region. But these obvious moves were actually de­
signed to cover more controversial changes along the lines of creating one 
grand fleet instead maintaining two equally divided forces, as mandated 
by former Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels. For years, critics argued with 
Daniels—to no avail—that one large fleet rather than two inadequate ones 
would be far more intimidating, especially to the Japanese. Once free of 
him, Daniels's opponents implemented their plans for redeploying the 
most powerful ships to Pacific waters. However, this strategy was limited 
by the inadequate shore facilities in the region. Existing plans to fully equip 
and protect bases in the Philippines and Guam had been scuttled by the 
disarmament treaty. For a line of defense against Japan, the navy would 
have to make do with commercial harbors in the western Pacific. Only the 
base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, had the capability of becoming a first-class 
naval station, but it was relatively undeveloped at the time.30 
Although Pearl Harbor was too far away from Japan to replace the need 
for bases farther west, it would be the central staging area for the Pacific 
Fleet and was the key to stopping any Japanese strike against the American 
mainland. Given this anticipated role, an official inspection in 1919 con­
cluded that Pearl Harbor's current facilities were "entirely inefficient" for 
peacetime operations and "totally inadequate" for an emergency. The base 
needed longer piers, deep draft docks, and most especially fuel oil depots 
to meet even minimal standards. Implementing this Pacific strategy in the 
face of public apathy toward defense requirements made it necessary that 
fleet changes and other modifications be conducted as quietly as possible 
to avoid alerting the media and Congress to what was happening, at least 
until it was too late to do anything about it. An essential element in the 
success of this plan was that Navy Secretary Denby, unlike his predecessor, 
encouraged his subordinates to take the initiative in coming up with new 
ways to accomplish these goals.31 
Controlling the navy's oil supply was also an integral part of this pro­
cess. To streamline administrative responsibilities and assure a sufficient 
supply of oil for the fleet, Denby transferred operational control of the 
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naval petroleum reserves in California and Wyoming to the Department 
of the Interior. Since the Interior Department was already supervising pub­
lic oil lands through the Bureau of Mines and the Geological Survey, it 
would save the navy needless duplication to have it administer the reserves 
as well. Along with this exchange of control, Denby authorized the secre­
tary of the interior to use the royalty oil accruing from wells on the reserves 
as payment for the construction of fuel storage tanks at Pearl Harbor. 
Without sufficient funds to bring the base at Pearl Harbor up to opera­
tional standards, and with the certain knowledge that Congress would not 
give him any more, Secretary Fall decided to do the next best thing: trade 
the oil that he had in hand already for the storage tanks and dock facilities 
that he needed at Pearl Harbor. From the beginning, there were critics in 
the Navy Department who questioned both the loss of control over the 
petroleum reserves and the legality of transferring authority to Fall. But 
the utility of the trade could not be denied. The next problem was finding 
someone willing to take the navy's oil in payment for such a massive con­
struction project.32 
In November 1921, as the Washington Conference got underway, Fall 
set to work on the plan. His first move was to ask Doheny if he could get 
an estimate of what it would cost to put up thirty 50,000-barrel tanks at 
Pearl Harbor. As the former head of the Mexican lobby in the Senate, Fall 
knew the extent of the Mexican Petroleum Company's storage facilities in 
Tampico and trusted Doheny's opinion. Furthermore, to protect the gov­
ernment from private wells operating along the perimeter of the naval re­
serve at Elk Hills, Doheny had already been awarded the right to drill 
several dozen offset wells on a small strip lease within the reserve itself— 
contracts won through competitive bids approved by Secretary Daniels 
before he left office. Thus, Fall had reason to believe that, in a similar con­
test, Doheny would win the additional leases necessary to pay for the 
work at Pearl Harbor. Yet, when Doheny reported back to Fall on Novem­
ber 28 with an estimate of $3.5 million, or just under 3 million barrels of 
royalty oil, he stated that he was not interested in doing work that required 
outside construction contracts and complicated negotiations with the 
government.33 
Doheny changed his mind, however, after he received a visit from Rear 
Admiral John K. Robison a few weeks later. During the war, Robison had 
been Edward Doheny Jr.'s battleship commander. Afterward, the young 
Doheny kept in touch with Robison and had spoken many times of his 
father's oil operations in California. With this mutual connection, Robison 
and the senior Doheny had met socially on a few occasions. Then, in Octo­
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ber 1921, Robison was appointed by Secretary Denby to become the Chief 
of the Bureau of Engineering, the office in charge of the naval oil reserves. 
Prior to that, he had been working in the Office of the Chief of Operations 
on wartime plans for the navy's shore stations, where he had spent most 
of the previous year completing a report on the "problem in the Pacific." 
For Robison, therefore, the oil supply was of paramount importance.34 
When the two men met again in December 1921, Doheny mentioned 
that he had been attending some of the sessions of the Disarmament Con­
ference, and Robison let him know that the administration had called the 
conference specifically because of Japanese conduct in the western Pacific, 
"with the idea of trying to bring about a crushing of this Japanese move­
ment toward supremacy." Robison also revealed that the Naval Intelligence 
Department had reports that Japan was prepared for "mobilization along 
the Oriental frontier" and for maneuvers "toward our borders." Knowing 
that Doheny had initially turned down Fall's invitation to bid on a contract 
to provision Pearl Harbor with oil, Robison made it quite clear that, if the 
navy did not complete these preparations in time, the United States would 
be at Japan's mercy. Without that supply, Robison declared, "our navy 
could easily be overcome."35 
Having seen firsthand the result of invasions in Europe, Robison 
warned Doheny that a similar attack by the Japanese along the California 
coast would be just as catastrophic as the German invasion of Belgium, 
producing "a reign of terrorism that would be indescribable." Doheny re­
called that Robison "got me very much worked up over it and told me in 
a very earnest tone of voice that it was up to me to give him such assurance 
that at least one company would bid on this [Pearl Harbor] transaction." 
Then, Robison recounted Lord Curzon's statement that the "armies of the 
Allies float[ed] to victory on a tide of oil." Amending it for the current 
crisis with Japan, Robison insisted that America could only maintain its 
position by "floating to security on a tide of oil on the Pacific."36 
Supposedly, Doheny's previous objections to the project were swept 
away by Robison's dramatic presentation. And once again, as had hap­
pened with Lane during the Anglo-Irish dispute, someone was appealing 
to him to make a great personal commitment not just as a patriot but as 
the only person in America uniquely suited to the task. Nothing in Do-
heny's recent experience caused him to refuse the request. That night, Do­
heny promised Robison that the navy could count on an offer from his 
company to do the work at Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, Doheny told him, 
"we would not figure on any profit in [the] transaction."37 
And so, over the next year Doheny took on several additional contracts 
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for leasing large sections of the Elk Hills Petroleum Reserve to accomplish 
these ends. In addition, Doheny kept his word to give the government its 
best deal for the Pearl Harbor construction job. Without a doubt, the value 
of Doheny's prospective leases on the reserve would be worth a vast sum 
over the next few decades. In return, he was willing to put up millions of 
his own to fulfill the navy's immediate requirements. 
Then, in the spring of 1922, when Congress caught wind of Fall and 
Denby's policies, Robert La Follette, the Wisconsin firebrand, was the first 
to cry foul. Initially, attention fell on the contracts made with Harry Sin­
clair to drill oil on Naval Reserve No. 3 in Teapot Dome, Wyoming. Those 
contracts were not associated with any of Doheny's work at Pearl Harbor 
and seemed particularly suspicious. But recalling the Ballinger-Pinchot 
controversy during the Taft administration, La Follette reminded his col­
leagues that the Interior Department had always been the preferred "sluice­
way" for corruption when private interests wanted to loot the government. 
The "throwing open of the naval reserves" to the oil corporations was obvi­
ously a part of that pattern and they should have seen it coming.38 
Then La Follette cited a communication he had recently received from 
former Navy Secretary Daniels stating that Denby's leasing policy was "out­
rageous and wicked" and risked the "very national existence of the United 
States." The senator added that he had also been "astounded" that the new 
head of the navy would transfer control of the reserves to the Interior De­
partment. In La Follette's opinion, given Albert Fall's longstanding prefer­
ence for the private development of public land, that was nothing but a 
"surrender to the burglars." Moreover, since they had left a "trail of corrup­
tion . .  . in the pages of American history," La Follette insisted that oil com­
panies could never be trusted under any circumstances. Obviously, they 
were at it again, using ruthless means to seize the nation's oil supply with 
one hand while robbing the average citizen through extortionist prices 
with the other. In response to these charges the oil press ridiculed La Fol­
lette as "the most warped man in public life."39 
Admittedly, despite the hysteria, the combination of public servants, 
private businessmen, and government resources seemed like a certain for­
mula for corruption when Congress took up its investigation of the matter 
in 1923. But what about Doheny's role in these transactions? Was the story 
of the Japanese menace nothing but a ruse to gain control of the navy's oil 
for profit? Were Doheny's claims of patriotism just a pathetic attempt to 
explain away his insatiable greed? Or did he take advantage of the naval 
reserves because he needed the oil for his companies? Having determined 
how Doheny could have become involved in the leasing of the Elk Hills oil 
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reserve as a result of his desire to do his part to shore up the nation's de­
fenses in the Pacific, is it necessary for us, today, to assume that his alle­
giance was only as deep as his financial interests? 
In 1923, the public responded to such questions according to whether 
they thought that businessmen were basically honest or inherently 
crooked. Politicians reacted according to their previous association with 
the suspects. Before any of these points can be adequately addressed, how­
ever, a more sophisticated approach must be taken to determine whether 
Doheny's contracts with the government actually sustained or enhanced 
his oil interests, regardless of the other issues. If he was desperate for oil, 
he might have done anything to get it. But if he was not, or had less risky 
options, perhaps his motives were more laudable, if not more altruistic, 
than have been presumed. 
10 SALT WATER AND REVOLUTION: 
MEXICO, 1921-1923 
In the three years between the end of the World War I and 
Doheny's acquisition of his first contract for the large oil properties in the 
Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve in 1921, many people became convinced 
that the Mexican oil supply was all but exhausted. Since Mexican produc­
tion reached its peak at the end of that year and declined thereafter, it is 
logical to assume that Doheny leased the oil reserve to offset a shrinking 
supply in Mexico. But, as this chapter will show, the situation was more 
complex than that, and Doheny never conceded that his Mexican proper­
ties were running dry. On the contrary, he engaged industry pessimists, 
stock market raiders, and the Mexican government in a running battle to 
prove his point. In doing so, he was pulled into an even wider range of 
activity than what has been described previously. 
To begin, the dire predictions about Mexican oil were based on the 
rapid invasion of salt water into some of the largest wells. This process was 
by no means unanticipated in Mexican gushers, since it was the force of 
pressurized salt water beneath the oil that gave the wells their tremendous 
output. But that spectacular production, which had been going on for a 
decade, also meant that even the largest pools of oil could be exhausted 
fairly quickly. There was also the risk that the speed of the oil rushing into 
the well would pull the water layer up high enough to choke off the flow. 
If production were managed properly, this would not happen until most 
of the recoverable oil had been expelled, but there was always the danger 
of ruining a property through overproduction, as was the case in Mexico. 
Unfortunately, all of these issues were twisted out of proportion by the 
contending parties, and reporters played up the seemingly unanticipated 
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demise of wells as the beginning of the end of the Mexican oil industry. 
From the public's perspective, as Herbert Wylie complained, the salt water 
scare "has been pictured like a roaring lion going about eating up all the 
wells."1 But there was no denying the fact that the oldest Mexican fields 
were beginning to run dry. The Mexican Eagle's largest well, Potrero del 
Llano, stopped production in December 1918, and Huasteca Petroleum's 
Casiano No. 7 went to water in November 1919, after producing one 
hundred million barrels of oil. In his annual message for 1920, Doheny 
tried to ease the anxiety of his shareholders over this situation. Losing these 
fields was natural and inevitable, he said, and was no more indicative of 
some alarming condition "than is the death of a nonagenarian or even an 
octogenarian indicative of a lack of sanitary or health conditions in the 
vicinity where he had lived."2 
While this was obviously a correct geological assessment of the situa­
tion, it did nothing to stop various individuals from playing up the crisis 
and circulating rumors about the impending demise of Mexican oil. Some 
gloomily predicted that the loss of cheap Mexican fuel oil would force 
American shipping and industrial interests back to coal. Gulf Coast pro­
ducers, on the other hand, tired of competing against low-priced Mexican 
crude as their own output increased dramatically, were ecstatic over the 
possibility of capturing the fuel oil market for themselves. But those con­
cerned with America's international position worried that the loss of Mexi­
can production would give England a distinct advantage in the global race 
for petroleum, since the British government had been actively supporting 
commercial oil ventures around the world while the United States took 
virtually all of its imports from Mexico. 
To make matters worse, the continuing political battle with Carranza 
and the lack of support from the Wilson Administration had almost forced 
Doheny to sell his Mexican holdings to the British after the war. At that 
time, as the oilmen pointed out during Senator Fall's investigation of Mexi­
can affairs, the real problem in Mexico was not the loss of the old wells but 
the inability to drill new ones in undeveloped territory because of the legal 
conflicts over property ownership and drilling permits. By presidential de­
cree, Carranza had denied those permits to foreign-owned companies un­
less they relinquished title to lands acquired from the Diaz government 
and took new concessions and leases, based upon Article 27 of the consti­
tution, in their place. It was at that point, in January 1919, when Mark 
Requa, who was still in charge of the nation's fuel resources, warned the 
State Department that Doheny was ready to sell out. According to Requa, 
representatives of Royal Dutch-Shell had been interested in the Mexican 
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Petroleum Company for some time, and, were it not for Doheny's promise 
to the government not to sell during the war, he might have done so al­
ready. Now that he was free of that commitment, he was supposedly 
headed to London to make a deal.3 
He was also going to Europe as a member of a committee selected by 
the National Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico 
to discuss the Mexican situation with the American peace delegation in 
Paris. Before he left New York, Doheny told the press that he was going to 
Paris to ask one question only: 
Will the Governments that will be established in the many new states that 
will be formed out of the future great nations of Eastern Europe be permit­
ted to ignore the vested property rights of citizens and foreigners that have 
been established for years; and if not, will Mexico, which is in the same 
category, while not a combatant in the great war, be allowed by the powers 
to issue confiscatory decrees and by overt acts not only to ignore vested 
property rights but to enact legislation that is against all law, equity and 
justice.... Vested property rights in Mexico are inalienable, no matter 
what the Carranza or any other government of that benighted country 
may declare.4 
Despite the fact that this group of American industrial and banking 
interests was denied a forum at the Paris Peace Conference, Doheny gave 
no hint that he was ready to give up the fight. But, according to Requa, the 
very idea that he was thinking about it caused the State Department to 
suggest that either Bernard Baruch, the head of the War Industries Board, 
or John Davis, the U.S. ambassador to Britain, intercept Doheny when he 
got to London and persuade him not to sell his company to any foreign 
interest. And Doheny presumably received a guarantee that businessmen 
with interests in Mexico would not be abandoned after the Peace Confer­
ence in return for another promise to that effect.5 
Because so little of Requa's information can be corroborated, his warn­
ing about Doheny was probably more of a scare tactic than anything else, 
although there was a report from a London correspondent stating that 
Doheny's negotiations with the Shell organization had been broken off at 
the last minute over the terms of the deal. Perhaps the United States gov­
ernment had intercepted him in time after all. For its part, Royal Dutch-
Shell was still interested in Mexican oil and purchased working control of 
the Mexican Eagle Oil Company two months later. This was a tremendous 
boon for the European conglomerate, which produced approximately 27 
million barrels of oil in 1918 and could anticipate adding another 17 mil­
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lion barrels from the Mexican Eagle. (The purchase of Mexican Petroleum, 
on the other hand, would have increased the amount to 21.5 million 
barrels.)6 
Writing from London in March 1919, Clarence Barron, Doheny's close 
friend and editor of the Wall Street Journal, worried over the British gov-
ernment's oil policies. While Doheny had been publicly and privately in­
sulted by the Wilson Administration in Washington, Barron observed that 
he was being "welcomed with open arms by every shipping interest in Brit­
ain." Doheny was in London primarily to complete the arrangements for 
the British-Mexican Petroleum Company, which had been postponed dur­
ing the war. This company, co-owned by English investors and Pan Ameri­
can Petroleum, ultimately signed a twenty-five-year, fixed-rate contract 
with Doheny for Mexican fuel oil, the longest running obligation ever un­
dertaken by an oil company at that time. Clearly, in Barron's opinion, the 
American government was "not alive to the Mexican situation" and had 
allowed itself to be outmaneuvered by the British.7 
Early the next year, Requa, who had since become an engineering con­
sultant for the Mining Bureau and a vice-president of Sinclair Oil, tried 
one more time to get the administration's attention. In a lengthy report to 
the chairman of the United States Shipping Board, Requa offered an exten­
sive appraisal of domestic oil resources, which concluded that fuel oil im­
ports from Mexico provided the only margin of safety given current 
market conditions and anticipated demand. As in his earlier reports during 
the war, Requa maintained that the geographical location of most large 
American oilfields and the lack of transportation facilities prevented an 
easy substitution of Mexican crude. In this case, the fuel oil for American 
shipping, as for the British, had to come from Mexico. But the salt water 
invasion of the old wells and the inability to drill new ones threatened that 
source. For that reason, Requa suggested, Carranza's legal stratagems, as 
well as any other "forcible interference" by Mexican authorities to hinder 
the oil industry, should be seen as an obvious "attack upon the national 
welfare of the United States" and treated as an act of war. Such a policy, 
Requa asserted, should be "as fixed as the Monroe Doctrine."8 
At the same time that Requa was pleading with the United States gov­
ernment to recognize the impending crisis in Mexico, American producers 
were appealing to Carranza for some resolution to save the industry. On 
January 14, 1920, the oilmen sent a telegram to the Mexican president 
outlining the situation: "Within the last few months there has been a steady 
encroachment of salt water.... Numerous wells have ceased to produce 
petroleum; others are failing rapidly, and still others will be lost in the 
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near future.... As a result of what has occurred, the Mexican petroleum 
industry . .  . faces a crisis, and is about to suffer a severe loss which can be 
avoided without prejudice to the rights of either side." Ignoring the issue 
of land titles for the moment, the companies asked Carranza to grant them 
provisional drilling permits to tide them over until the Mexican Congress 
met in September to consider the petroleum law once again. Carranza for­
mally accepted the oilmen's proposition three days later, and news of this 
agreement reached Washington on January 21, the day after Requa had 
delivered his latest report. A few days after that, the United States Shipping 
Board notified the secretary of state that a scheduled conference on the 
Mexican oil supply was no longer necessary. For the moment, at least, the 
crisis had passed.9 
Taking advantage of this lull in the storm to resolve the questions about 
the future of the Mexican oil supply, Franklin Lane recommended that the 
government send a team of oil geologists and engineers from the Geologi­
cal Survey and the Bureau of Mines into Mexico to conduct a definitive 
appraisal of the industry. The State Department endorsed Lane's proposal 
and passed it on to the Mexican ambassador. After some diplomatic wran­
gling, Carranza also agreed to allow a scientific study of the Mexican oil-
fields so long as the Mexican authorities were able to deny any official 
knowledge of the investigation. For some reason, perhaps having to do 
with the upcoming presidential election, the plan was never implemented, 
even though Congress had approved the funds.10 
Lacking such an appraisal, the best that anyone could come up with 
was a report by J. A. Phelan, an investigator for the United States Shipping 
Board who had spent four months during the fall of 1920 evaluating the 
Gulf Coast oil supply in the United States and Mexico. As one of the largest 
consumers of Mexican oil, the Shipping Board found itself squeezed out 
of the fuel oil picture after the major oil companies signed long-term com­
mitments to other organizations. As an alternative, the Shipping Board 
hoped to negotiate a deal for royalty oil from the Mexican government 
based on Phelan's information. While Phelan substantiated the stories that 
the existing Mexican fields were "fast going into salt water," he went on to 
emphasize that "there [were] oil indications in practically every county in 
Mexico, and the possibilities in the state of Vera Cruz [were] almost beyond 
conjecture." On the whole, Phelan gave a fairly accurate and encouraging 
assessment of the situation, concluding that Mexico had "the most promis­
ing oil output of any country in the world."" 
In almost every respect, then, Phelan's confidential report paralleled 
Doheny's efforts to bolster confidence in the future of the Mexican oil sup­
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ply. Contrary to the "dire predictions of the ill-informed" oil experts and 
the "doubting Thomas" geologists, Doheny insisted that the undeveloped 
regions of Mexico were full of "hidden pools" of oil. When the time was 
right, Doheny concluded, the "genius, courage, faith and industry of the 
oil pioneer will put [them] at the service of mankind." The only thing 
standing in the way was President Carranza and his criminal attacks on 
the industry.12 
In the meantime, the Mexican Petroleum Company seemed to be doing 
quite well. Since 1916, the company had averaged about 1.5 million barrels 
of production a year and exported anywhere from 1 million barrels a year 
during the war to over 3 million by the end of 1920. Recent net earnings 
had gone from less than $7 million in 1918 to $12.5 million in 1921. As a 
reflection of this process, the price of the common stock moved up dra­
matically, from an average of $90 a share during the war years to over $250 
in the fall of 1919, and then dropping only to around $180 for most of the 
next year. Yet, during the spring and summer of 1921, the salt water scare 
drove the price below $90 almost overnight and brought the vitality of the 
company into question.13 
Rumors that various investigators thought the Mexican oilfields would 
"soon be a matter of history" started circulating in April 1921, including a 
story that new Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover believed that Mex­
ico would exhaust its oil within eighteen months. Hoover denied it, but 
the effect remained.14 Much more damaging was an article published at the 
same time by Ralph Arnold, a "doubting Thomas" of long standing when 
it came to Mexico, which directly compared the oil resources of the United 
States and its southern neighbor. In particular, Arnold emphasized the 
physical differences between the respective oilfields which accounted for 
the astonishing productivity of the Mexican gushers: proven oil territory 
in the United States was 4,500 square miles as compared to 25 square miles 
in Mexico; oil production for the United States in 1920 was 443,402,000 
barrels versus 185 million barrels for Mexico; the United States had 
258,000 producing wells, while Mexico had just 200; the average daily pro­
duction of an American well was 4.9 barrels, while in Mexico it was 2,600 
barrels; and, finally, the estimated proven oil reserves in the United States 
were 5 to 6 billion barrels, and those in Mexico were 300 to 400 million 
barrels. Under these conditions, Arnold believed, the American fields 
would last for at least twenty years. The Mexican supply, on the other hand, 
was entirely at the mercy of its exploiters and "may be exhausted in a 
few months, or at most in one or two years at the promised rate of 
development."15 
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By presenting this information in the way he did, Arnold hoped to 
convince domestic producers that their oil was a valuable commodity not 
to be wasted. For him, the worsening situation in Mexico was the best 
argument for conservation at home. What he did instead, however, was to 
provide ammunition for another round of attacks on the Mexican Petro­
leum Company. Stock manipulators, in particular, took advantage of the 
situation through well-timed, rumor-fed raids on Mexpet shares, which 
affected the whole market. In the weeks that followed Arnold's story, the 
financial situation worsened as the press hunted for information to corrob­
orate the Mexican situation. In response to repeated requests from report­
ers for an authoritative statement from the government, Stephen Porter, 
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, promised to release an 
official report on the expected depletion of the Mexican oilfields. But in 
his haste to placate the media, Porter never checked to see whether such a 
report existed. When he went looking for it, all he found was Phelan's ear­
lier material written for the Shipping Board.16 
Initially, Porter refused to use the Shipping Board report, after one ana­
lyst from the Foreign Trade Office, W. W. Cumberland, formerly of the 
Doheny Research Foundation, characterized Phelan's work as "loosely pre­
pared, inaccurate and misleading." In fact, because of the explosive nature 
of the topic, Phelan had been under government investigation since Febru­
ary 1921. Incredibly, the special agent in charge believed that certain 
"English-Jewish" financiers were working through Phelan to undercut the 
price of Mexican Petroleum Company stock. But Porter was under the gun 
to live up to his promise, and he ended up delivering an abstracted version 
of Phelan's report to the Associated Press. Not surprisingly, newspapers 
around the country ran a story the next day stating that Mexico had but 
one large pool of oil, which could be exhausted overnight. Phelan's obser­
vation that Mexico actually had an enormous untapped potential for oil 
appeared in a follow-up story several days later—too late to undo the dam­
age. The price of Mexpet common dropped immediately from $130 to 
$101 and continued going down.17 
Overall, for the preceding year, a reduction in the industrial demand 
for oil products since January 1921 and a steady erosion of fuel oil prices 
to their lowest levels in five years had combined with the Mexican crisis to 
depress the value of all the oil shares on the market by about 40 percent. 
But given the special circumstances, the Doheny companies suffered the 
most: Pan American was off by 55 percent and Mexican Petroleum was 
down by 49 percent. Of the remaining petroleum stocks, Sinclair Oil 
dropped 48 percent, Royal Dutch-Shell 39 percent, and Texaco 24 percent. 
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But where Mexpet previously had moved in conjunction with the market, 
it now appeared to be dragging everything else down with it. Just one raid 
in mid-June, for instance, that forced Mexpet down another five points 
supposedly accounted for a paper loss of $40 million on the general list.18 
The big question on Wall Street was how a stock like Mexican Petro­
leum, with just over 100,000 shares outstanding, could trade at a volume 
as high as 90,000 shares a day. With Pan American Petroleum moving with 
it, at about the same level of activity, the two stocks were the most active 
issues for several weeks and accounted for as much as 10 to 15 percent of 
the overall market volume. Suspicion fell on Doheny first, and he was ac­
cused of loaning out treasury stock for speculation. The situation was so 
tense that Clarence Barron, who had been waging a daily battle to prop up 
Mexpet with positive stories in the Wall Street Journal, suggested that Do­
heny take an auditor into the vault at Pan American Petroleum's headquar­
ters in New York to count the number of shares held by the company. 
Clearing himself in this way, though not to everyone's satisfaction, Doheny 
then petitioned the New York Stock Exchange to conduct its own investiga­
tion of the case. Despite their best efforts, officials of the exchange never 
discovered who had been using Mexican Petroleum shares for what they 
described as "pure unadulterated market manipulation."19 
There were some likely suspects, however. One of them, who accused 
Doheny of putting out the stock himself, was Jesse L. Livermore, probably 
the most notorious stock raider of his day. Livermore was known as the 
"Boy Plunger of Wall Street" for some immensely profitable and daring 
short sales in railroad and copper stocks which had made him a millionaire 
at a very young age. In 1921, Livermore told Barron that he had become 
interested in Doheny's company as a result of some privileged information 
he had received about the supply of Mexican oil. After asking him a few 
direct questions, however, Barron was convinced that Livermore "had 
never talked with an intelligent person from Mexico familiar with the Mex­
ican oil field." Nevertheless, Livermore acted on the information and ap­
parently sold Mexican Petroleum short several times when it was trading 
above 160 and bought it back when it bottomed out below 90. The uncon­
firmed estimates of his profits on these transactions ranged as high as 
$15 million.20 
A more pernicious source of trouble was W. C. Moore, the owner of a 
monthly Wall Street investment guide. Beginning in the spring of 1921, 
Moore began publicizing the salt water stories about Mexican Petroleum 
and telling his subscribers to sell the stock short whenever they could. 
Later, Moore bragged that his customers had "made a killing" on the 
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trades. But along with his advice to sell the stock, Moore went on to accuse 
Doheny of "lying about the oil situation" and said that information from 
Mexican Petroleum could not be trusted because there was "a large corps 
of liars on 'Dough-eney's' staff." As it turned out, Moore was interested in 
the company only as a way to prevent Doheny from using his profits to 
support the movement for Irish freedom. As a self-proclaimed "100 per 
cent American," Moore was "dead set against Sinn Fein." His attack on 
Doheny even went so far as to include a letter to Obregon, asking him to 
stick to his plan to increase the export tax on oil. Once Moore's activities 
were discovered, he was indicted for criminal libel by a New York Grand 
Jury. Two years later, after a series of legal confrontations, Moore made a 
public apology in court that the statements in his market letter had been 
"unfounded and untrue," and the judge ultimately dismissed the incident, 
to Doheny's satisfaction.21 
But Mexican Pete's saga on Wall Street made a dramatic turnaround in 
1922, when Doheny decided to end the trouble by having Pan American 
Petroleum buy back shares of Mexican Petroleum to get the stock off the 
market. That tactic, and a continued rise in corporate earnings, sent the 
short traders scrambling to cover their losses when the stock price soared 
as high as $322 by the end of the year. Things got so tight that one desper­
ate trader even attempted suicide in the Mexpet offices in New York. Ulti­
mately, the stock dropped off the market in 1923, with only about 28,000 
shares left in the hands of the public. Afterward, Doheny noted with satis­
faction that "we made the bears get down on their knees and beg for 
mercy."22 
Underlying all of these problems in the early 1920s were the continued 
political attacks launched by the Mexican government against the Ameri­
can oil companies. Aside from the constant battles over drilling rights and 
land titles, oil taxation, as Moore had suggested, became the weapon of 
choice. The new government, under Alvaro Obregon, not only increased 
the rate of taxation but based its new export tax on the value of oil prod­
ucts in the United States instead of at the port in Tampico. Adding this 
export tax to the production tax, stamp tax, bar dues, and the license and 
inspection fees already collected more than doubled the amount exacted 
by the Mexican government. To make matters worse, Obregon announced 
these new tax regulations at the same time as the Phelan and Arnold re­
ports on Mexican oil hit the press. Because he was also worried about over­
production, Obregon wanted to launch a preemptive strike to keep foreign 
governments from raising tariff duties against cheap Mexican oil and to 
stop the oil companies from operating in a manner that was "contrary to 
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a policy of moderate exploitation." Of course, higher taxes were also a 
strategy for chipping away at the "big profits" that Obregon saw leaving 
Mexico.23 
As before, Doheny objected to these provisions because they were pres­
idential decrees that had not been submitted to, or approved by, the Mexi­
can Congress. The existing export tax of over fifteen cents a barrel was, he 
said, uncomfortable but legal. On the other hand, the combined tax rate 
under Obregon's decree, which increased the amount to thirty cents, was 
"so excessive as to be confiscatory." Carranza had tried the same tactic ear­
lier, and the oil companies had successfully challenged the constitutionality 
of his decrees in court. They would have to do the same thing with 
Obregon. Looking for the motive behind that pattern, Doheny stated that 
"the whole thing appears to me to be a monumental bluff on the part of 
the Mexican government and I don't believe they feel they can get away 
with it Apparently, Obregon is trying to do indirectly, by means of 
increasing taxes, what they have been trying to do directly for years—con-
fiscate American property."24 
Doheny also protested the charge that the oil companies made excessive 
profits from their Mexican operations. Obregon justified the new exactions 
because he claimed that, in 1920 alone, the Mexican Petroleum Company 
had sucked $28 million of pure profit out of the Mexican oilfields. In re­
sponse, Doheny cited the published annual report of the company: Mexi­
can Petroleum had made $17,410,000 in profits from operations, out of 
which they had paid $5,695,000 in cash dividends to the stockholders, 
$5,744,000 in taxes to the Mexican government, and $1,898,700 into a re­
serve fund for United States taxes. It was obvious, Doheny asserted, that 
Obregon arrived at his number "by merely juggling the figures and adding 
and overlapping dividends in a way that an American school boy would 
not be guilty." Furthermore, 1920 was also a year in which the company 
expended $7,800,000 in Mexico to construct the largest topping plant in 
the world, including all the roads, pipelines, and support facilities neces­
sary to keep it operating. In conclusion, Doheny chided Obregon for his 
ingratitude as well as his math: "Without the progress that the develop­
ment of petroleum is responsible for, the condition of Mexico would in­
deed be that of vast plains without cattle, of valleys without farms, of 
mountains without operating mines."25 
In this sense, Doheny was right to see the tax hike as a political bluff. 
The Mexican government could not afford to choke off the sale of oil when 
petroleum taxes were the only means of staying afloat and paying off its 
foreign debt. Still, Washington was worried enough about the situation to 
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send American gunboats back to Tampico in early July in case of trouble. 
And sure enough, a military revolt by one of Manuel Pelaez's lieutenants 
on July 12 added another twist to a thoroughly confusing situation. Fortu­
nately, this was not a major upheaval, and Obregon's troops put down the 
rebellion in just four days. The question of its origin, however, was harder 
to solve. Pelaez, of course, was the immediate suspect, although he had 
been traveling in the United States as an agent of the Obregon government 
at the time. And although his complicity in the revolt was never proven, it 
signaled the end of his political career when he was hauled back to Mexico 
City to answer questions. Suspicions also fell onto Doheny and the oil 
crowd, as well. On the day the revolt ended, Doheny wrote to Albert Fall: 
"I note by the morning papers that Green and I are responsible for the 
latest revolt in Mexico. They have not even paid me the compliment of 
associating me with your good self this time, and I am sore about it. It is 
however just as false as if they had said that the U.S. Government was 
behind it all. What won't those fellows charge up to the Huasteca Company 
and its officials?"26 
As the self-appointed expert on Mexican political affairs in Washing­
ton, however, Fall received reports from agents of the Justice Department, 
private investigators, and numerous individuals operating along the politi­
cal fringes in Mexico, and, without a doubt, he knew as much about the 
plots swirling around as anybody. Among the materials in his possession 
were surveillance reports from Los Angeles for the first two weeks of July, 
stating that Pelaez had been seen visiting Doheny's office and meeting 
with Esteban Cantu, the former Governor of Lower California, and a well-
known opponent of the central government. Many of the reports suggested 
that a conspiracy to overthrow the Mexican government was in the offing. 
But part of Pelaez's unofficial mission was also to discuss Obregon's diplo­
matic recognition with American officials and businessmen, especially the 
executives of the oil companies. 
One frequent informant, William F. Buckley, an attorney and indepen­
dent oilman who spoke for the small producers in Mexico, received a letter 
from Pelaez two weeks before the rebellion, stating that he suspected one 
of his men of plotting a coup—"aided he thought by the Doheny crowd." 
Pelaez did not know whether to return to Mexico and warn Obregon or to 
wait and see what happened. Then, as soon as he learned that he was under 
suspicion in Mexico City, Pelaez went back with information that the re­
cent rebellion had been engineered by William Green. The charge implied 
Doheny's approval, if not his active participation.27 
If Doheny wanted to make a decisive show of force, however, he had 
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better and more intelligent ways to do it. And he seemed to be exercising 
one of those options when he decided to virtually shut down his oil busi­
ness in Mexico during July and August, cutting shipments from 2.5 million 
barrels a month to less than 1 million barrels in July and 300,000 in August. 
For these months, Doheny shipped out the minimum amount of gasoline 
needed to fill his contract with Standard Oil of New York and put every­
thing else on hold. Citing the adverse market conditions, aggravated by the 
announcement of new taxes, Standard Oil New Jersey also stopped ship­
ping Mexican crude oil in July and withdrew its fleet of tankers from the 
trade. Overall, the four largest American companies—Huasteca, Transcon­
tinental (Standard), Texaco, and Gulf—reduced their combined exports 
from 8.7 million barrels in June to just over 1 million in both July and 
August. Thus, despite the increased rate of taxation, the total receipts gen­
erated by the Mexican government declined from 5.4 million pesos in June 
to 1.7 million in July and 1.4 million in August. 
Official reports were careful to cite the political turmoil in Tampico, a 
major fire in the Amatlan oil district, and the general depression in the oil 
market—not the tax problem—for the decline. The American vice-consul 
in Tampico was explicit: "Their action in suspending shipments was the 
result of business judgment rather than a desire for retaliation." From Do-
heny's perspective, however, there was no difference. By the end of August, 
both sides wanted the standoff to end and were ready to sit down together 
and hash out their problems. And since Doheny's oil shipments immedi­
ately jumped back to 3,179,163 barrels in September and 3,743,011 for 
October to make up for the previous deficit, retaliation seems to have paid 
off. The combined shipments for the four big American companies re­
turned to 8.5 million barrels in September. Clearly, when 86 percent of the 
government's total tax revenue came from the petroleum industry in 1921, 
the shutdown was designed to get Obregon's attention.28 
However, there were problems with this strategy from the beginning, 
due to the difference between the financial wherewithal of the largest com­
panies and that of the small independents, who had only recently entered 
the market. As Harold Walker explained to an American official, the shut­
down had been only partially successful because the British companies, 
and several other American operators, either refused to cooperate or could 
not hold out long enough to make the effort worthwhile. "The whole situa­
tion," Walker admitted, "was one which certain of the companies could 
endure no longer.... It became necessary for the companies to do some­
thing to help themselves down easy. The Mexican Government was win­
ning and the Companies losing."29 
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That is probably why, as the two sides jockeyed for position, the State 
Department arranged for a committee of the Big Five oil company presi­
dents to go to Mexico at Obregon's invitation. The committee consisted of 
Doheny, Walter Teagle of Standard Oil New Jersey, J. W. Van Dyke of the 
Atlantic Refining Company, H. F. Sinclair of Sinclair Oil, and Amos Beatty 
of the Texas Company. Supposedly, this was to be a chance to solve the oil 
conflict for good, and the only subject forbidden to the committee was an 
official loan from the United States government. Short of that, they were 
on their own. To begin, the oilmen laid out their position in a memo to 
their Mexican hosts on the opening day of the talks: "We are not unmind­
ful of the fact that misunderstandings have arisen and even prejudices have 
been aroused, which thus far have raised a barrier to complete accord 
Our true interests do not conflict. Nay, they complement each other . .  . 
first, to assure the Mexican Government a reasonable yield from the devel­
opment of Mexico's oil resources . .  . second . .  . to afford the companies a 
return commensurate with the large investments made and the great haz­
ards faced."30 
Given the exhaustion of the existing properties, however, this plan re­
quired the government to give the companies access to new fields. Further­
more, to ensure the health of the industry, the committee did not believe 
that "taxes should go upward as the prices go down." With these demands 
clearly stated, the committee turned to the consequences for Mexico: "We 
try to place ourselves in your place.... We at once think of two theories, 
where a commercial or political power is seeking revenue. One is to exact 
all the traffic will stand. The other is a policy of frankness. The trouble 
with the former is that it too often kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. 
The companies have no desire to further curtail their operations in Mexico, 
but with them the rules of economics must prevail." 
Finally, in a complete reversal of earlier arguments made to the Ameri­
can government, the committee explained that most of the companies had 
their own production in the United States and held land in proven reserves 
that could be brought into production at a moment's notice. Thus, if 
pushed too hard, they would abandon Mexico and let the government 
strangle the industry on its own. Already, with the prevailing surplus of 
low-priced oil, they could meet their present contracts by purchasing oil 
in the market and still make money. "You have doubtless seen results in this 
direction since the first of July," the committee observed. But a continuous 
shutdown almost guaranteed that the companies would lose the remaining 
oil in fields already threatened by salt water. In this way, at least, the pro­
ducers had their backs against the wall as much as Obregon.31 
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After a half-dozen meetings to work out the details of a compromise, 
the two sides agreed that the oil companies would pay the full production 
tax imposed by the decree of May 24, 1921, in return for which the Mexi­
can government would suspend the export tax stipulated in the decree of 
June 7, at least until the end of the year and possibly longer. The producers 
also agreed to "use their best efforts" to put together a banking syndicate 
that would underwrite a sale of bonds to settle the nation's debts. 
These actions suggested that, for the first time in years, the oil compa­
nies were adopting a new way to conduct their business in Mexico. Despite 
the implied threats by the company presidents that they would pull out if 
they did not get what they wanted, the 1921 meeting inspired a second 
round of talks to reach a workable arrangement. More than anything else, 
the oilmen wanted a firm decision about the legality of property rights as 
contained in Article 27 of the constitution. When they met again the fol­
lowing year, the oil committee cited the massive investment of over $500 
million in the petroleum industry, not counting the tanker fleets and ter­
minal facilities, and lamented that without some way to expand their op­
erations they faced "a loss of not less than one half of their original 
investment." It was no exaggeration, they claimed, that if the companies 
had foreseen the present conditions in Mexico they would never have in­
vested the capital in the first place.32 
The alternative to the current adversarial relationship was to bring the 
Mexican government into the fold as a full-fledged partner in the oil busi­
ness. To do that, the committee offered to organize a completely new com­
pany, the Petroleum Development Company (Doheny's influence was 
obvious just from the name), under the laws of Mexico to which the ex­
isting companies would pledge their "resources and experience." They 
would start by transferring to the new company the petroleum rights to 
about 700,000 acres of oil lands outside the present producing field. There­
after, new lands would be acquired as necessary. Once the company was 
organized in this way, the citizens of Mexico would have the opportunity 
to invest in its stock, with a guaranteed holding of at least 10 percent of 
the initial capitalization. The company would also be obligated to pay a 
fixed tax on oil to the government—as they sold it, not when it was pro­
duced. In addition, the company would pay the government 25 percent of 
all annual profits in excess of total investment and expenditures. Finally, 
in exchange for the exclusive right to exploit the national lands of Mexico, 
which had been used by the government as a weapon against American 
producers in the past, the Petroleum Development Company would pay a 
fixed royalty on related production. 
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Of course, the committee wanted certain guarantees in return. First, 
"all decrees issued by the Carranza administration with regard to the pe­
troleum industry . .  . shall be canceled and annulled." A corollary to that 
provision stipulated that the new company would receive full and exclusive 
rights on existing lands owned by the partners and on all future acqui­
sitions. Second, they wanted the government to grant the Petroleum De­
velopment Company the right to drill at least 100 wells and to agree to 
additional drilling permits, as requested.33 
For their part, government officials accepted the drilling concessions 
but wanted an expanded range of stock options for Mexican nationals, and 
they absolutely refused to back away from the issue of land titles and sub­
soil rights. In fact, they went so far as to demand that the companies trans­
fer to the new "association" title to all rights and claims on the land in 
return for a government concession to explore those same properties. The 
oilmen responded in kind: "The case in a nutshell is this: Our plan is based 
upon an interpretation of Article 2 7 . .  . which renders it inapplicable to the 
lands we have acquired through private contracts with the private owners 
thereof, and contemplates the Government shall support this position. The 
Government's counter proposal, on the other hand, is, we regret to find, 
based upon an interpretation of said Article which renders it completely 
applicable to our lands... . These basic conceptions are diametrically op-
posed."34 In other words, despite all of the apparent improvement in rela­
tions between the two parties over the past year, nothing had really 
changed. Article 27, as one Mexican newspaper aptly stated, remained the 
"Gordian knot."35 
Still, the two sides had at least become comfortable talking to each 
other, and they met several more times. But these subsequent discussions 
began where they had taken up the year before, with tax relief in return 
for some sort of financial assistance for Mexico, although there was still 
some lingering hope that the Petroleum Development Company could be 
salvaged for the right price. If nothing else, Mexico wanted to use the 
promise to continue the 1921 export tax rate reduction, with an additional 
20 percent off each month, in exchange for a $25 million advance from the 
oil companies on their future tax bill. The State Department advised that, 
since formal recognition of Obregon's government would not occur until 
they were certain that Article 27 would not be used to divest Americans of 
their property, the United States could not approve a loan. But, according 
to the secretary of state, "if the petroleum companies wished to make a 
loan to the unrecognized Obregon regime, for the purpose of arriving at a 
settlement, they were at liberty to do so."36 
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Ultimately, Doheny did just that. In particular, he made loans in return 
for drilling rights at Juan Felipe, a hacienda adjoining his famous Cerro 
Azul property. This land had been leased since 1906, but Doheny had been 
unable to acquire permission to develop the field. Then, in September 
1922, he obtained exclusive rights to the new area when other companies 
were scrambling for production. Earlier, he had offered to make a $3 mil­
lion personal loan to the Mexican government in return for clear title and 
drilling rights on some of his oil properties. Instead, he ended up putting 
$1.5 million on deposit with the government to win a positive decision 
about Juan Felipe. The following year, he loaned the government $5 mil­
lion as part of a larger deal to secure $15 million from his banking connec­
tions in New York.37 
At the same time, in 1923, the United States government negotiated a 
compromise with Obregon that led to formal recognition. Basically, the 
Mexican government agreed that the expropriation provisions of Article 
27 would not be retroactively applied to property acquired before 1917, if 
some "positive act" of development had been undertaken. While this was 
obviously open to interpretation, it did away with the most pernicious as­
pect of the Mexican policy as far as the oil companies were concerned. 
Ironically, Obregon's enemies in Mexico used this supposed capitulation 
to the United States as the pretext for a successful rebellion against him.38 
The important thing to understand about these confusing events, from 
Doheny's perspective, is that they fit into a larger pattern of activity. Since 
the end of the World War, Doheny had been conducting private diplomacy 
simultaneously on a number of fronts. Clearly, his efforts to solve the Irish 
problem and his decision to get involved in the Pearl Harbor project to 
protect America against Japan supported his initiatives in Mexico. Oil 
played a part in each of these decisions, but it was never the sole issue. 
Idealism, patriotism, and nationalism were all intertwined with Doheny's 
worldwide petroleum business by this time, whether his detractors be­
lieved it or not. Doubtless, Doheny considered the fortunes of his oil com­
panies at every turn, but his motivation was not easily discerned—then or 
now. Suffice it to say that Doheny did not doubt his own ability to influ­
ence events at the highest level and believed that his actions should be 
immune to criticism. 
A 
11 THE BARK OF POLITICAL 
WOLVES: DOHENYAND 
THE OIL SCANDAL 
If Doheny was worried about the exhaustion of his Mexican 
oil supply in the early 1920s, he never betrayed his feelings. Even under the 
most trying political circumstances, he did not express any doubts about 
Mexico's petroleum reserves, and he continued to develop new fields as the 
government permitted. Commenting on the new Juan Felipe district, for 
example, Doheny maintained that "before this field is exhausted a lot of us 
will be dead and a lot of others will be broke as a result of bearing the 
prospects of the field." By the end of 1922, however, other companies began 
to pull out of Mexico as their confidence, along with their production, 
steadily dropped off.1 
Among the large companies, the Mexican Eagle fared the worst, suffer­
ing a drastic reduction in operations because of the invasion of salt water 
into their primary fields. La Corona, the other Royal Dutch affiliate, shut 
down its Mexican refinery after spending almost $100 million developing 
its properties in the preceding eighteen months—and considered the in­
vestment irretrievable. Likewise, Standard Oil closed its Tampico refinery 
and claimed that recent losses in Mexico had amounted to about $50 mil­
lion. The remaining American operators, except for Doheny, also started 
scaling back their Mexican business in the latter part of 1922 for the 
same reasons. Ironically, La Corona and Transcontinental (Standard Oil) 
reached peak production in 1923 at 30.5 million barrels and 24 million 
barrels, respectively. Huasteca Petroleum still led with 36 million barrels, 
and the Mexican Eagle came in at 10 million. These four companies ac­
counted for almost 70 percent of the production that year.2 
Looking over the wreckage of his operation in March 1923, A. C. Bed­
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ford, the chairman of Standard Oil, contended that the oil industry in 
Mexico had been brought down because of the opposition of the Mexican 
government. Without a doubt, Doheny agreed, the confiscatory laws of 
recent years had impeded oil development in Mexico, but he added that 
Pan American Petroleum's investments "are and have been satisfactory, 
having yielded and are still yielding excellent returns." Moreover, Doheny 
was sure that at some point the Mexican government would "see the light," 
and until such time the company was "content to continue [its] activities 
in the undeveloped portions of our great Mexican holdings, with faith in 
the eventual prevalence of justice and good understanding in Mexico." Do­
heny also noted that numerous "pencil experts" had been proclaiming the 
demise of the California oil industry for years, yet the state was producing 
at twice the 1921 rate, with a future that looked "as bright or brighter than 
it ever did." And he was willing to gamble that Mexico would do the same.3 
In the meantime, he was shrewd enough to hedge his bet. As early as 
March 1921, Doheny tried to diversify his holdings with a bid to buy the 
Atlantic, Gulf, and West Indies Company. Atlantic Gulf held oil lands in 
Colombia, operated in Mexico, and had a growing fleet of oil tankers. A 
major problem, however, was that Joseph F. Guny, the president of Atlantic 
Gulf, did not get along with Doheny. Guny had been a major critic of the 
conduct of the older companies, and he characterized Doheny as Mexico's 
"implacable enemy." Guffy's strategy had been to accept the government's 
tax and land decrees in order to win concessions on federal lands that ran 
through the developed territory of his rivals. Given their differences, Do­
heny and Guffy negotiated through a third party for three weeks straight 
without being able to strike a deal.4 
Venezuela was another possibility, and it became the destination of 
choice for the major oil companies abandoning Mexico. Gulf Oil and Stan­
dard Oil New Jersey, for instance, had already been there for several years 
by the time Doheny became interested in 1923. Even then, Doheny moved 
cautiously by acquiring a concession from the Maracaibo Oil Company 
and sending Harold Walker and a team of company geologists to scout for 
further prospects.5 
At the same time in the United States, Doheny made a tentative move 
into the Smackover oilfield in Arkansas, where, after spending $3 million, 
he had about 750 acres of developed land and at least one well producing 
20,000 barrels per day, which had been capped off pending construction 
of a 1.7-million-barrel storage tank and a railroad spur onto the property. 
Despite continuing to drill for light oil in Smackover, Doheny concentrated 
his efforts in Southern California. In particular, the new fields in the Los 
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Angeles basin—including Long Beach, Torrance, and Signal Hill—were 
the focus of another oil boom, which flooded the market with low-priced 
oil in 1922. Under those conditions, Doheny's first act was to move in, buy 
up the surplus, and ship it to the Mexican Petroleum refinery at Destrehan, 
Louisiana. And by early 1923, Pan American Petroleum was taking as much 
as 130,000 barrels of oil a day out of Los Angeles, which reduced the de­
mand on Mexican crude and helped stabilize the local market.6 
Because much of the excess California production was light-gravity oil 
that yielded over 30 percent gasoline, the large companies also began in­
vesting heavily in new service stations in the region as a way to expand the 
market. In this way, local conditions fed into a national movement to reori­
ent the industry to supply the automotive trade in the early 1920s. While 
other companies had been headed in this direction for years, this was new 
territory for Doheny, who had carved out his niche in the fuel oil business. 
But he was prepared to move quickly in response to the market. In the 
summer of 1923, he constructed a large refinery in Los Angeles and began 
scouting the city for desirable sites for "Pan Gas" stations. To buttress this 
development, the company triumphed in a contest with more than a dozen 
steamship lines to acquire the property of an old submarine base in Los 
Angeles Harbor, which gave Doheny what was expected to be the "finest 
oil-loading station on the Pacific coast."7 
Although the flush-field production around the city afforded him a 
ready supply of low-priced oil, he still needed the long-term security of a 
stable reserve. Unfortunately, the political climate in Mexico was far from 
certain. And even under the best of circumstances, light Mexican crude 
yielded only about 11 percent gasoline, and the heavy oil from Ebano and 
Panuco yielded almost none. Besides, Doheny already contracted most of 
the product from his topping plant in Tampico to Standard Oil for its retail 
outlets on the East Coast.8 
Consequently, there was no way to get past the need for an assured 
supply of better-grade oil, although Doheny had several options available 
to him. The simplest solution was to regain working control of the Califor­
nia Petroleum Company. As noted previously, Doheny had pulled back 
from the company in 1916 after his failed attempt to consolidate the Cali­
fornia independents. Six years later, California Petroleum was one of the 
nation's strongest independents, based on policies established under Do-
heny's leadership in its early years. With gross assets of $46 million, Calpet 
was expanding rapidly, and its daily production of 50,000 barrels put it 
among the top half-dozen oil companies in the state. In addition, Calpet 
had storage capacity for almost 7 million barrels and substantial proven 
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reserves. Calpet was also doing very well on the stock market. In fact, a 
surge of activity at the end of 1922 suggested that someone was trying to 
get control of the company. Most analysts assumed it was Doheny.9 
Because Calpet was still being run by a group of officers closely associ­
ated with Doheny, including his longtime associate T. A. O'Donnell, who 
was the chairman, there is little doubt that he could have moved back into 
control. In any case, with about 150,000 shares of common stock outstand­
ing, selling at around $65 a share on the New York Stock Exchange, Doheny 
could have bought his way back in for no more than $5 to $10 million— 
a relatively cheap and easy solution if he was really pressed to compensate 
for Mexico and supply his West Coast business with fresh oil.10 
Instead, on December 15, 1922, the secretary of the navy announced 
that the department had just extended its arrangements with the Pan 
American Petroleum Company, based on the original Pearl Harbor con­
tract of April 1922, to include a lease on the eastern half of Elk Hills Naval 
Petroleum Reserve No. 1, consisting of about 16,000 acres of proven oil 
territory. At the time, Doheny's existing California properties totaled about 
25,000 acres. With respect to Elk Hills, the government retained control of 
the western half of the reserve but had the option to have Doheny drill 
offset wells on those lands at its discretion. According to Secretary Denby, 
this additional lease was necessary because of the increasing fuel oil de­
mand of the navy and the continued drainage of government oil into pri­
vate holdings within and alongside the reserve. A report filed in March 
1922 stated that at least 22 million barrels of oil had been lost from the 
reserve because the previous administration had failed to drill offset wells 
when they were needed. At a standard 30 percent royalty, the government 
had lost almost 7 million barrels of oil, or about $9 million at current 
prices.11 
Just as important as the navy's justification was Albert Fall's determina­
tion to open government-held property to commercial development at ev­
ery opportunity, contrary to the strict conservation policies in place at the 
time. Because his appointment to the post of interior secretary promised 
a fundamental shift in this policy, his opponents were ready to take action 
against him. But Fall made no effort to hide his intentions. In fact, in June 
1922, he published an article in the Magazine of Wall Street that summa­
rized his philosophy. "Our unused mineral resources are enormous," Fall 
noted, out of which "we can go for generations turning nature's stored 
wealth into consumable wealth and enjoying sources of prosperity un­
known to older countries." And he believed that "$150,000,000,000 of 
wealth can be extracted from the coal, oil, oil shale, potash and phosphate 
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Naval Reserve No. 1. Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1924. 
deposits of the public lands," which "should pour billions of dollars into 
the public treasuries." With the right policy in place, "there are golden 
years of development ahead of us."12 
In pursuing this strategy, Fall was determined to manage the public 
lands as a business rather than as a conservationist fiefdom, leaving himself 
free to make arrangements for the government as the opportunities arose. 
The public would have to trust him to act independently to make the best 
deal. Thus, when the navy wanted additional storage facilities at Pearl Har­
bor, Fall did not hesitate to favor Pan American Petroleum. Both Standard 
Oil and the Associated Oil Company bid on the work, but Doheny submit­
ted two bids: one met the requirements as advertised; the other went much 
further in offering his services to the navy. The alternative proposal, as 
explained below, ultimately won the award, and the other companies cried 
foul, complaining that if they had been aware of Doheny's second offer 
they would have readjusted their own bids as well. Fall disagreed and char­
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acterized these complaints as the "machinations" of individuals "desirous 
of causing [Doheny] to lose money by making larger bids . .  . which they 
would never have considered making at all."13 
And so, Doheny's lease for the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve ful­
filled Fall's ideal. In return, Doheny assumed what he justifiably character­
ized as "a serious and substantial obligation." First, he would construct 
additional storage facilities at Pearl Harbor for up to 2.7 million barrels of 
oil. Next, in conjunction with plans for a new Los Angeles refinery and oil 
depot, he would provide free storage for 1 million barrels of fuel oil at the 
Los Angeles harbor; he agreed to bunker government ships out of that 
supply at cost and to deliver the navy's royalty oil from the petroleum re­
serve to the refinery at tidewater free of any pipeline charges; he would 
maintain 3 million barrels of fuel oil in storage depots on the Atlantic 
Coast; and he would furnish, at the government's command, a "reasonable 
amount" of crude oil products in storage facilities at locations to be deter­
mined in the future. Finally, he would give the navy a 10 percent discount 
off the market price of any additional fuel oil and refined products coming 
from the reserve. The contract would run for twenty years and "so long 
thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities." Government 
royalties ranged from I2V2 to 35 percent, depending on the size of the 
wells.14 
Initially, Doheny expected to have to advance the government $12 to 
$15 million to complete the facilities at Pearl Harbor and estimated the 
cost of the remaining obligations at $50 million. Although he would even­
tually recover the entire amount, he admitted that it would be many years 
before the company was "on velvet" with respect to the contract. But, be­
yond his own concerns, Doheny saw immediate benefits for the California 
industry, as a whole: "It will mean the systematic development, when and 
as the market situation justifies, of an extensive scope of country and the 
development of a whole additional system of facilities for handling the oil." 
As Doheny envisioned it, therefore, his leasing of the Elk Hills reserve 
would help everybody—the navy, the country, and his own company. And 
despite the grumbling of his competitors, many others agreed with his as­
sessment. The Wall Street Journal, for instance, hailed the lease as "one of 
the most important oil contracts ever closed by any company." Local ob­
servers were not willing to go that far but thought that it was at least one 
of the most spectacular deals ever made in California.15 
Was this the best way for Doheny to diversify Pan American Petro-
leum's supply and market activities? Far from being a government hand­
out, this was clearly a risky and expensive proposition. It provided access 
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to a potentially large supply of oil, more than 30,000 acres for the whole 
reserve, but it put half of the oil under the supervision of the navy and 
interior departments for decades to come. Although some analysts saw this 
as a positive step away from a dependence on Mexico, any plan designed 
to drain one of the navy's oil reserves merely put Pan American Petroleum 
into the hands of another set of politicians. Unless he had some other mo­
tive in mind, Doheny's talent for smart business decisions seems to have 
failed him.16 
According to sources close to the company, Doheny faced a good deal 
of internal opposition to the terms of the deal. In a letter to Admiral Robi­
son, newly appointed head of the Naval Oil Reserve, one attorney noted 
that "no one of importance in the Pan American organization favors the 
agreement except Mr. E. L. Doheny. Mr. Doheny told me that the president 
of the corporation [J. C. Anderson] refused to sign the agreement; and I 
will say in passing other of the officials of the corporation stated to me that 
they wished the agreement could be avoided as you had out traded Do­
heny!" The point the attorney was trying to make was that "some day when 
the influence of Mr. Doheny is not dominant an escape may be sought by 
those who succeed him." Doheny conceded that the royalty structure of 
the contract might be attacked in the future, but he was certain that the 
lease itself would stand. In his mind, the government could not lose. But, 
as the attorney warned, there was always the possibility that a disgruntled 
shareholder might challenge the deal in court.17 
Notwithstanding these disagreements, Doheny moved ahead with his 
plans. Before the December contract on Elk Hills, the Pan American Petro­
leum Company of California had invested almost $21 million in the ship­
ping port, refinery, and associated property. Because all of the funding 
to that point had been on loan from the parent company, Doheny recapi­
talized the operation by creating a new subsidiary, called Pan American 
Western Petroleum, with a capital stock of $20 million and $15 million 
in new bonds. Then, he launched a major assault on the retail gasoline 
trade in both the United States and Mexico to set up the next phase of 
his operation. 
Despite owning locations for service stations in Los Angeles, he moved 
first to the East Coast, where he purchased a 50 percent share in the Ameri­
can Oil Company, which operated the Lord Baltimore filling stations in 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia. Working from this 
base, Doheny hoped to expand American Oil's marketing area throughout 
the eastern states and to make it the sole distributor of Pan-Am products. 
All of this centered on a distribution network radiating out from the Mexi­
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can Petroleum Company's refinery at Destrehan. With ocean shipments 
of California crude oil and distillates from Tampico, Doheny hoped to 
dominate the gasoline sales market in the southern Gulf and Atlantic 
states. And from another outpost in Memphis, taking advantage of Pan 
American Petroleum's ability to ship gasoline by barge, the company could 
use the upper Mississippi and Ohio rivers, coupled with short rail lines, to 
move into the Ohio Valley and as far north as Buffalo, in direct competi­
tion with Standard Oil Indiana.18 
Using Doheny's traditional shamrock logo, already familiar to purchas­
ers of Mexpet fuel oil, the recently formed Pan American Southern began 
selling Panamco gasoline and Panolene motor oil in New Orleans and 
Atlanta in the winter of 1924. To capture the public's attention, the com-
pany's stations were designed in California mission style, with green tile 
roofs and natural stucco exteriors. Doheny also hired a marketing expert, 
T. A. LaBelle, who helped Pan American Petroleum's chemists develop a 
specialized grade of gasoline and laid out the stations using the latest con­
veniences and time-saving devices so that they could offer "superservice to 
the motoring public." As the number of these stations spread throughout 
the Southeast and northern Atlantic Coast, Pan American Petroleum be­
gan a major advertising campaign to introduce its line of products to the 
public, announce Pan Am's commitment to service, and teach some basic 
lessons in auto maintenance. Such an aggressive and sophisticated promo­
tion enabled Doheny to capture a significant segment of the market al­
most overnight.19 
This marketing campaign had actually been inspired by the company's 
recent experiences in Mexico City, where it operated the first service sta­
tions ever seen in that country. While the Pierce Oil Company, the Mexican 
Eagle, and La Corona (Royal Dutch) were still selling gasoline in bulk, 
Mexican Petroleum established retail stations in Mexico City, Tampico, and 
at least a dozen other metropolitan areas. Its most elaborate outlet sat at 
the foot of an exclusive residential area near Chapultepec Park in the capi­
tal and was styled like a palatial arch with hand-carved natural pink stone 
and a canopy of art glass panes over the service bays. All of the working 
parts were hidden behind the walls, with only the solid brass handles and 
dispensers exposed to the public; air and water came from eight solid brass 
lion heads. While nothing in the United States matched this opulent dis­
play, all of the stations reflected the same obsession with distinctive detail.20 
In Los Angeles, Pan American Petroleum ranked fifth among the major 
companies, with twenty-three stations by the summer of 1924; Standard 
Oil California led with 127 stations, Shell had 97, Richfield had 45, and 
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Los Angeles Service Station, Pan American Petroleum Company, 1927. 
Union had 40. As yet, Doheny's operations were only partially based on 
the Naval Petroleum Reserve, although the production from government 
leases doubled over the year, from 3.5 million barrels to just over 7 mil-
lion—at this point, less than 20 percent of Pan American Petroleum's total 
output. Taking Doheny's California production by itself, 24 percent of 
2,061,565 barrels came from Elk Hills in 1921; 71 percent of 4,557,719 in 
1922; 55 percent of 3,502,836 in 1923; 47 percent of 7,172,024 in 1924; and 
59 percent of 6,236,202 in 1925. The total for Pan American Petroleum and 
Transport was 31 million barrels in 1921, 57 million in 1922,40 million in 
1923, 36 million in 1924, and 38.6 million in 1925. For the most part, then, 
Doheny was just getting started in California, and Elk Hills was as yet a 
small part of his business. Looking into the future, he now believed it 
would take a $150 million investment, or 3,000 wells at $50,000 apiece, to 
efficiently develop the reserve.21 
By the end of 1923, however, there was some doubt that he would get 
to carry out this plan, when Albert Fall's federal leasing program came 
under political attack. The year before, Robert La Follette, the progressive 
senator from Wisconsin, asked for a congressional investigation of the 
leases made between Fall and Harry Sinclair for Naval Reserve No. 3 at 
Teapot Dome, Wyoming. Now, Doheny's arrangements at Elk Hills were 
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in for the same treatment. Initially, the investigation revolved around argu­
ments over the severity of the drainage from outside wells as a justification 
for opening up the reserves, but it turned out that expert opinion about 
the viability of underground reserves was more guesswork than fact. Ru­
mors of bribery and corruption were also being investigated but had not 
yet become the focus of the opposition. 
Nevertheless, there was cause for alarm. In fact, because Congress had 
just concluded hearings into rising gasoline prices, at La Follette's urging, 
many observers feared that the investigation of the reserves was the begin­
ning of an all-out assault on the industry. A former editor of the Oil Invest­
ors' Journal attributed all the negative attention to faulty leadership by the 
big oilmen, who were leading the industry astray by their conduct in the 
United States and their fight with the Mexican government. The sort of 
wide-ranging activity that Doheny and others were engaged in, the author 
contended, "will take us just where we do not want to go—into politics; it 
will excite public condemnation and bring the oil industry into serious 
disrepute."22 
Doubtless, industry representatives were right to fear the consequences 
of the impending investigations when the Senate Committee on Public 
Lands and Surveys began public hearings on the oil leases in October 
1923. Led by Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana, an Irish-American 
associate of Doheny's, the committee heard testimony from almost every­
one involved in the leases over the next few months. At the conclusion 
of the hearings, Walsh believed that they had "produced a new sensation 
and [gave] the nation another dismaying and disquieting shock almost 
daily."23 
Initially, Walsh focused on the intent of Congress in opening the re­
serve to private development in 1920. At that time, concessions had been 
granted for certain tracts within the reserve where legitimate private claims 
had existed before the land was withdrawn by the government. In addition, 
Congress had authorized some contracts for offset wells to be drilled along 
the inside perimeter of the reserve to stop private companies from draining 
the pool from the other side. A subsequent extension of that plan, intended 
purely as a conservation effort, gave the Navy Department the right to 
"conserve and develop the reserves by lease, contract, or otherwise, and to 
use, store, exchange, or sell the oil." Supposedly, to safeguard the navy's oil 
supply, Congress deliberately intended "to exclude the Interior Depart­
ment from any general control over the Naval reserves." Nevertheless, Pres­
ident Harding issued an executive order some months later that turned the 
administration of the reserves over to the Interior Department anyway. 
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According to Walsh, the president and the secretary of the navy, Edwin 
Denby, had been duped into this assault on the "sacred Naval oil reserve" 
by Albert Fall. 
Walsh also claimed to have been surprised and shocked when he 
learned that all of Elk Hills "had been secretly leased, or promised, to the 
Pan American Petroleum Company" in exchange for the construction of 
$102 million worth of harbor improvements and oil storage depots in the 
Pacific. Those contracts, Walsh contended, had been set up to allow the 
navy to evade congressional approval, and they left the government "pow­
erless to take oil out of this reserve except through request to Doheny to 
do so." Fall and Denby, on the other hand, claimed that the exchange provi­
sions of the preceding congressional directive gave them full authority to 
proceed as they had. Admiral Robison, whose role was described earlier, 
claimed full responsibility for "the idea of converting oil in the ground into 
tankage and stored fuel oil," but Walsh thought that there was more to it. 
In fact, Walsh was "convinced that [Robison] caught the idea from Do­
heny," who was working under the "presiding genius" of Albert Fall. 
Furthermore, Walsh thought he knew the purpose behind Fall's actions 
when he learned that someone had loaned the secretary $100,000 during 
his negotiations for the Pan American lease. Fall had used the money to 
buy a small property, the Harris ranch, to fill out his larger holdings in 
southern New Mexico. This information, which came through various in­
formants, sent Walsh in search of the benefactor. Initially, when confronted 
with the loan, Fall stated that the money had come from Ned McLean, the 
wealthy owner of the Washington Post, who had, in fact, offered to loan 
Fall money in the past. Walsh was skeptical, if not unbelieving, and fol­
lowed McLean to Florida during the Christmas recess to ask him point-
blank whether the money was his. McLean confirmed the story but was 
not convincing. Finally, when it became clear that Walsh was not going to 
give up, the truth came out.24 
And so, on January 24, 1924, Doheny asked to appear before the com­
mittee and admitted that he was the one who had loaned Fall the money. 
He then made one of the biggest understatements in the history of Ameri­
can politics when he confessed that Fall had been "making an effort to 
keep my name out of the discussion for the reason that a full statement 
might be misunderstood." As Doheny explained it, Fall had been doing 
legal work for him since resigning from the Interior Department in Oc­
tober 1923. In particular, Fall was helping negotiate with the Obregon 
government in Mexico as well as organizing the Pan American Western 
Company. Fall was also planning to accept Doheny's offer of a permanent 
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A M I S U N D E R S T O O  D P A T R I O  T 
—Fitzpat r i r  k in th e Now York W<>rl,I. 
A Misunderstood Patriot. The Literary Digest, July 18, 1925. 
position with the company. Needless to say, with all those deals in the 
works, neither Fall nor Doheny wanted to publicly acknowledge the loan. 
Instead, they laid out the McLean story as a false trail, hoping it would 
satisfy Walsh's curiosity. Unfortunately, when that ruse failed, it was too 
late for the truth to do any good.25 
Apparently, the Harris ranch, which controlled some strategic water 
resources, had been part of Fall's plans for many years, but he had been 
unable to negotiate a sale with the current owner. And Fall was afraid that 
when the property finally came on the market, he would not have the 
money to pay for it. As it was, his existing holdings made up one of the 
largest ranches in the state, but they were not producing as he had hoped. 
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In the meantime, the meager profits from operations and all of Fall's gov­
ernment salary were plowed back into the ranch to try and keep things 
going. For all the years he had been in Washington, Fall had left the care 
of the ranch to his wife and son-in-law, and it had been a constant source 
of aggravation. He knew he was going to have to lease it out, sell it, or 
retire from the Senate and run it full time. In May 1920, Fall wrote to his 
wife Emma that he was sick of politics and was "determined to get out of 
it as soon as my sense of duty will permit me to do so." Unexpectedly, 
however, President Harding chose him for the interior post nine months 
later: "He [Harding] thinks that the Interior Department, is second only 
to the State Department in importance and that there is more opportunity 
for graft and scandal connected with the disposition of public lands &c 
than there could be in any other Department and he wants a man who is 
thoroughly familiar with the business and one he can rely upon as thor­
oughly honest."26 
By the summer of 1921, however, things were not going as planned. In 
particular, Fall worried about Harding's weaknesses as a leader and his own 
inability to advise the president from within the administration. "I would 
have very much more influence with him," Fall believed, "if I were not in 
the Cabinet at all and he certainly needs good, independent and straight 
from the shoulder advice if ever a man did." Emma was visiting the Do­
henys in Los Angeles when Fall wrote to her in July, "Thank God, I am in 
a way to get out of politics and I shall do it at the earliest possible moment. 
If the matter comes up in any of your discussions while there, you may 
truthfully say that you know my mind is definitely and absolutely made 
up." Fall did not elaborate, but if his plan revolved around dealings with 
Doheny one wonders why she would have to say anything at all.27 
Perhaps it was just the knowledge that Doheny and McLean both as­
sured him that he could count on a loan at any time. At any rate, during a 
drought and depression in the cattle market in the fall of 1921, the owners 
of the Harris ranch decided to sell out, giving Fall his chance to fortify his 
own holdings, at the same time that the Interior Department was negotiat­
ing the additional Elk Hills leases to Pan American Petroleum. Almost a 
year later, in August 1922, Fall complained once again to Emma that it was 
almost impossible to get anything done in Washington, that no one knew 
what was happening, and that his plans for the naval reserve were bogged 
down by indecision: "I have been worrying for two or three weeks about 
trades for royalty oil production from our public land, so that we can let 
the Shipping Board, or the Navy, have the amount, by exchange, and at the 
same time so that I can get better prices than have been gotten by my 
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predecessors, but I have to educate the Shipping Board officials, or Naval 
officials, and as yet have got no where [sic]. The President promised this 
morning that he would join me in settling the matter [within] the next day 
or two."28 
Throughout this period, if Fall wanted out of government service, Do­
heny was prepared to hire him. Already, Doheny had employed Frank­
lin K. Lane and a number of other officials retiring from the Wilson Ad­
ministration, including Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory, Secretary 
of War Lindley Garrison, and former Treasury Secretary (and Woodrow 
Wilson's son-in-law) William Gibbs McAdoo. All of these individuals ei­
ther left Washington to take positions at Pan American Petroleum with 
sizable salaries or accepted large retainers from Doheny to help solve his 
legal problems with the Mexican government.29 
So what about the loan to Fall? First, as Doheny told Walsh, the amount 
involved was inconsequential. His oft-repeated comment that it was a mere 
"bagatelle" worth "no more than $25 or $50 perhaps to the ordinary in­
dividual," was pure braggadocio, but it was also true. If it was a bribe, 
as Walsh had implied, he could have "loaned" Fall a million. Certainly, 
$100,000 would have been an insult to a crook holding the keys to an oil-
field reputed to be worth a thousand times that much. Second, the lease 
and the loan were coincidental; one did not depend on the other. Fall went 
into the Interior Department with a deliberate plan to lease out public 
lands wherever possible and wasted no time putting this plan into effect. 
He was also determined to leave office as soon as he thought his reforms 
were secure. And when he got a chance to fill out his New Mexico proper­
ties, he asked Doheny for the money as an advance, intending to pay it off 
from future legal work. Fall's mistake was in the simultaneous pursuit of 
public and private initiatives that, if not patently illegal, were guaranteed 
to catch someone's attention.30 
The most notable thing about the loan, therefore, was the utter stupid­
ity with which it was executed. Surely, two experienced men could have 
come up with a dozen different ways of handling it. Instead, the public was 
treated to stories of $100,000 in cash being carried to New Mexico in a 
"little black satchel," which became the centerpiece of innumerable politi­
cal cartoons about the oil scandal. Since Doheny still held mining proper­
ties in New Mexico that he had acquired back in the 1880s, and had 
recently invested in a Silver City bank, he could also have easily purchased 
a ranch next to Fall's in his own name—and with no public comment. As 
it was, Fall supposedly acted in haste, telephoned Doheny to tell him that 
the ranch was available, and asked for the money outright. Or, did he? 
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Another interpretation, based upon a close reading of Fall's correspon­
dence, suggests a slightly different possibility. In 1925, Fall wrote to his 
attorney about the decision to deceive Walsh with the McLean story and 
recalled an interesting conversation he had had with Doheny. Apparently, 
as Doheny was about to testify for the first time in December 1923, Fall 
asked him what he intended to say if the committee asked him about the 
loan. Without hesitation, Doheny said he would deny it, but he reminded 
Fall that "as a matter of fact, Ned [Edward Jr.'s nickname] let you have that 
money and rested under a cloud with the bankers of having drawn that 
amount of money because of some 'woman scrape.'" Fall gave no indica­
tion that Doheny's assertion was either incorrect or in any way mistaken. 
In fact, one of the more inexplicable elements of the case was the revelation 
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that the younger Doheny had withdrawn the $100,000 from his bank ac­
count and delivered it to Fall at his Washington hotel. Doheny senior ex­
plained it away during his testimony, claiming that, when Fall asked him 
for the loan, he did not have that much in his personal account and that 
his son covered it for him until they could transfer the funds. But from 
what Fall stated above, he may have asked Ned for the money before his 
father knew about it. According to a later comment from Estelle Doheny's 
secretary, Ned suffered from alcoholism and was not completely reliable. 
Putting these two pieces of information together suggests that Ned might 
have given Fall the money ill-advisedly and that his father was left to cover 
it up. In any event, the speed of the transaction belies any conspiracy to 
defraud the government.31 
Doheny's long-standing views on the need to open the oil reserves to 
private drilling demonstrated further the incongruity of a conspiracy the­
ory. Like Fall, Doheny had been outspoken in his criticism of public land 
policy. To substantiate those views with the Walsh committee, he had his 
testimony from the first congressional debate over the Elk Hills reserve in 
1917 read into the record. The navy's oil reserves, Doheny argued, had 
always been subject to drainage along the borders, and, contrary to the 
claims of the conservationists, the oil could not be held in the ground in­
definitely. When Walsh asked him to explain why so many of his calcula­
tions differed from those of the Bureau of Mines, Doheny replied that the 
government's conclusions were often predetermined by political consider­
ations. "Policy is not a fact," Doheny contended, whereas his own views 
were based on solid, practical experience: "No man on earth has access to 
the same information I have, because my information comes from 29 years 
of close study of the proposition, such as no other living man has given to 
the business. That sounds egotistical, I grant you, but that is absolutely the 
truth, since you have asked the question."32 
Doheny was equally certain about his work at Pearl Harbor, where Pan 
American Petroleum rigorously monitored construction bids, took no 
profit from the subcontracted work, and ultimately saved the government 
$1 million over what he might have charged had he done it "on a cold-
blooded basis." At Elk Hills the company's drilling campaign would require 
about thirty years of steady development, with the government receiving 
more than a 50 percent royalty on some leases. "While we didn't squeal" 
about the terms, Doheny added, "we felt like squealing." Yet, he also admit­
ted that the company would "be in bad luck if we do not get $100 million 
profit," depending on the future price of gasoline. And with a total invest­
ment of $100 to $150 million, Doheny needed to sell at least 250 million 
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barrels of oil to meet his goal. While $3.3 million a year profit over three 
decades of work would hardly be seen as extraordinary or excessive, Do-
heny's comment about making $100 million off the deal was misinter­
preted and did more to convict him in many people's eyes than almost 
anything else about the case.33 
If Doheny miscalculated about the effect of that statement, however, 
he was being deliberately assertive when he boasted of his ability to lure 
government officials into his employ. In particular, Doheny singled out 
William McAdoo, stating that McAdoo had been on retainer for the Mexi­
can Petroleum Company since 1919 and had collected $250,000 in fees. 
This comment, which portrayed the latter as a paid lackey of the oil com­
pany, had a devastating effect on McAdoo's position as the leading Demo­
cratic presidential candidate in 1924. Although McAdoo rushed to the 
committee to clear his name, he could correct Doheny's numbers only by 
noting that his retainer had actually been $25,000 a year instead of $50,000. 
It hardly mattered, and McAdoo's campaign suffered accordingly34 
Editorial writers and Republican politicians, especially, fearful that the 
oil scandal would hurt their own chances, gave free rein to their accusa­
tions. The Magazine of Wall Street criticized McAdoo's "success in pock­
eting the fat retainers of predatory wealth." The Wall Street Journal, which 
upheld the $100,000 check to Secretary Fall while he was in office as a 
"genuine loan," accused McAdoo of selling political secrets to the highest 
bidder in private practice. Later, the Journal reconsidered its position but 
still maintained that while "there may have been a far more compromising 
moral aspect in Secretary Fall's relations with Mr. Doheny, it is a matter 
for temperate, judicial... decision." McAdoo's acceptance of Doheny's re­
tainer, on the other hand, "completely unfitted him for the presidential 
office."35 
But McAdoo's dilemma was as much personal as it was political, and, 
several days before Doheny made his statement, McAdoo confessed that 
he was "deeply grieved that Mr. Doheny has become involved in this un­
pleasant situation, not only because he is a client of mine, but more be­
cause he is a friend whom I really like." McAdoo had actually been warned 
to stay away from Doheny at the time he left the cabinet in 1919 when 
Wilson's secretary, Joseph Tumulty, gave him a prophetic piece of advice. 
"I have the highest opinion of Mr. Doheny," Tumulty stated, "but if you 
intend to be a candidate for the presidency, the Mexican question . .  . and 
your acceptance of a retainer from Mexican interests is sure to come up 
and embarrass you." McAdoo, known to be above political cant and thor­
oughly practical, reassured Tumulty that he had accepted the position be­
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cause he was convinced that Doheny had lawfully acquired rights in 
Mexico and that he was under no bond "to advocate any particular govern­
mental policy." In the end, after McAdoo's bid for the presidential nomina­
tion went down amid shouts of "Oil! Oil! Oil!" at the Democratic 
convention, he told Walsh that Doheny intentionally tried to hurt him 
because he had refused to intercede on his behalf to stop the the Elk Hills 
investigation.36 
If McAdoo felt that his former friends were out to ruin his chances for 
public office, though, Doheny was equally dismayed by the conduct of his 
political associates and its effect on his pending business arrangements. A 
few weeks after his final appearance before the Walsh committee, Doheny 
had this to say about the experience: "It reminded me of old times in the 
West when one of our dogs at the mating season joined the wolves. The 
wolves would surround our camp at night and I could hear my own dog 
barking among those wolves as they howled around us. It seemed to me 
when I was on the stand in Washington that I could hear the bark of my 
own friends in the pack of political wolves."37 
Doheny's friends in the oil industry were not as quick to change sides, 
but they reacted to the howls of the politicians just the same. Warren Platt, 
the editor of the National Petroleum News, characterized the capital as "a 
mean, sordid, contemptible, un-American town," where the petroleum in­
dustry "will be tossed to the dogs without a qualm." Platt was not willing 
to pass judgment on Doheny's guilt, but he recognized that the loan to a 
cabinet officer created a serious situation "regardless of how innocent he 
may really be." Thomas O'Donnell, as one of Doheny's oldest California 
partners, was also unwilling to condemn him on the spot. But as the first 
president of the recently established American Petroleum Institute— 
where Doheny was also a director—O'Donnell wanted to make it abso­
lutely clear to the public that "the integrity of the American petroleum 
industry was beyond question."38 
Lost in the headlines over Doheny's personal relationship with Fall was 
the general opinion among industry analysts that the Elk Hills leases had 
been too favorable to the government and should have never been under­
taken in the first place. In March 1924, with the Walsh investigation finding 
every reason to question the validity of those leases, the case was turned 
over to Judge Paul J. McCormick of the Federal District Court in Southern 
California. In the meantime, Pan American Petroleum's operations on the 
oil reserve were placed in receivership. With the court's permission, how­
ever, the company was permitted to continue drilling on undeveloped land 
to offset private wells across the border. Nevertheless, the navy made plans 
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to put the administration of the reserve in the hands of officers who were 
avowed "oil in the ground conservationists," including individuals who be­
lieved that the nation's oil supply would be completely exhausted in less 
than twenty years and who recommended that the onshore use of oil ought 
to be legally restricted whenever it could be replaced by coal.39 
Facing this sort of strident opposition, Doheny took comfort in the fact 
that the issue would be decided in court instead of in Congress: "We have 
no apprehension as to the final outcome of the litigation, because there 
has been no conspiracy and no fraud connected with either the Executive 
Order of President Harding providing administrative machinery for han­
dling the navy's oil, or with our contracts. We have an abiding confidence 
in the result of the litigation started to-day. The case is now taken out of 
the forum of partisan politics into the United States Courts, where every 
citizen is assured of a square deal."40 
Unfortunately, the controversy had already taken a toll on his business; 
as Fall put it, the plans for the Pan American Western Petroleum Company 
"went up in smoke" the moment Doheny confessed to the loan. In light of 
the circumstances, Doheny canceled the new bond issue and withdrew the 
stock offer for the company. Nevertheless, with Clarence Barron running 
interference for him, this announcement did not set off a panic on Wall 
Street. In the days that followed, Barron gave what he described as "splen­
did support" in the Wall Street Journal to head off any short sellers trying 
to capitalize on the situation. In particular, the paper emphasized that, 
even if the company lost the government lease and could not develop the 
reserve, it still had an enormous daily production, large stocks of crude oil 
and gasoline, and growing cash reserves. For his part, Doheny was not 
willing to concede the leases under any circumstances, because, as he told 
the stockholders, they not only protected the oil reserve from competitive 
drainage but "[made] possible the defense of the Pacific Coast and our 
island possessions against hostile attack."41 
Meanwhile, except for canceling the Pan American Western bonds, Do­
heny maintained the construction schedule on his Los Angeles shipping 
depot, the big refinery, and the 140-mile pipeline from Elk Hills. From 
everything that could be seen, Doheny's plans for a major assault on the 
retail gasoline market continued unabated during the remainder of 1924. 
While market analysts celebrated the future prospects for Pan American 
Petroleum, the ongoing litigation over the naval oil reserve was still a cause 
for concern. But the Elk Hills situation was also offset by a turnaround in 
the fuel oil business, where Doheny enjoyed a solid and comfortable lead. 
Whereas fuel oil prices had been below a dollar a barrel in the early twen­
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ties, they had almost doubled—to $1.85 a barrel—by the winter of 1924­
1925. "Every tick of the clock," according to one writer, "registers ten and 
one-half barrels of fuel oil [a million barrels a day] consumed in the United 
States." With the second largest tanker fleet in the country and a total oil 
production ranked first or second in the world alongside the Royal Dutch 
interests, Doheny would, without a doubt, capture the lion's share of the 
business. And that was more than enough, wrote another commentator, 
"for those who believe in the financial genius of E. L. Doheny, and also 
in his reputation as being one of the best if not the best oil man of his 
generation."42 
At the same time, by the summer of 1924, there were rumors that Do­
heny was ready to sell out and retire. Doheny categorically denied every 
report, especially those dealing with a rumored sale to Standard Oil Indi­
ana: "There never has been a time since I have been in business that I have 
not had some individual or organization seeking an option on my stock 
and there never has been a time when I would not have sold if the price 
had been right." This time, however, the talk was more than idle gossip, 
since the Indiana company had been hunting for a producing partner for 
several years. Standard's chairman, Robert W. Stewart, had two possibili­
ties in mind for a merger: Gulf Oil and Pan American Petroleum.43 
In fact, Stewart's interest in Doheny's company began around 1921 or 
1922 and may have been one more reason that Doheny was willing to en­
cumber Pan American—to make it a less attractive target—with a long-
term obligation to the federal government against the advice of his direc­
tors. Regardless, by 1924, Stewart had failed in his bid to capture Gulf and 
was even more determined to make, or force, a deal with somebody else: 
"I am ambitious to get into a bigger field of operations for the Standard of 
Indiana." With its large reserve holdings in South America and Mexico, 
not to mention Doheny's recent invasion of Stewart's marketing area, Pan 
American Petroleum was the logical choice.44 
Negotiations along these lines took place through Blair & Company, 
a successor to William Salomon & Company, which handled all of the fi­
nancing and stock issues for Doheny's corporate interests. Blair operated 
as a small firm specializing in oil company mergers, and it handled several 
large consolidations featuring former California independents, including 
Associated Oil's merger with Tidewater Oil, General Petroleum's purchase 
by Standard Oil New York, and Pacific Oil's absorption by Standard Oil 
California. Blair's managing partner, Elisha Walker, was a former part­
ner with William Salomon and had been on the board of Pan American 
Petroleum & Transport since 1916. So it was, in January 1925, that Walker, 
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Stewart, and E. R. Tinker Jr., a Pan American Petroleum director from 
Chase National Bank, negotiated an "unexpected" sixty-nine-day option 
to purchase all of Doheny's personal stock in the company.45 
According to the most recent government audit of Pan American Pe­
troleum & Transport for June 1922, there were 1,265,152 shares ($50 par) 
of stock outstanding. Doheny held 485,977 (38 percent) shares through 
his family-owned Petroleum Securities Company. Eight other shareholders 
each had 1 percent or more of the stock. Herbert Wylie, Norman Bridge, 
Florence Whitney (Charles Canfield's daughter), and S. M. Spalding held 
a combined total of 92,845 (7 percent) shares. Another 59,812 (5 percent) 
shares were held byfive New York brokerage houses, leaving 626,518 shares 
in the hands of some 3,300 shareholders, at an average of 190 shares 
apiece.46 
Because of this tight financial control, the final negotiations took every­
one by surprise. The Wall Street Journal reported in February that Doheny 
would most likely repurchase the California Petroleum Company. Two 
weeks later, the Journal wrote that Doheny was planning to split Pan Amer­
ican Petroleum 8c Transport into two companies, an eastern and a western 
division, in a move similar to his earlier proposal for a western subsidiary. 
A subsequent Pan American Petroleum press release called this a reorgani­
zation, not a sale, and failed to mention Stewart in any way. "There may 
be changes in the personnel of the two companies," the report noted, "but 
Mr. Doheny will always remain interested and active in the Pan American 
affairs, and he will give special attention to the California end of the busi­
ness." A week after that, the Journal reported that interests related to Stan­
dard Oil of Indiana had been heavy investors in Doheny stock but still did 
not say that they were attempting to buy Pan American. Finally, on April 
2, almost three weeks after the initial report, Doheny announced his resig­
nation from the eastern half of the business, with Stewart taking over "at 
a time of the greatest prosperity thus enjoyed."47 
"This deal," according to the National Petroleum News, "will be, by far, 
the most important event in the oil world since the dissolution of the Stan­
dard Oil Company of New Jersey more than 13 years ago." The Pan Ameri­
can stock included in the sale had a book value of $193 million and a 
market value of $220 million and, in combination with Standard Indiana, 
created an international oil titan big enough rival Standard Oil New Jersey 
and Royal Dutch-Shell as one of the industry's three largest organizations. 
The benefits for Robert Stewart were obvious, since he acquired Pan Amer­
ican Petroleum's Mexican and Latin American properties, the Destrehan 
refinery, Gulf Coast and south Atlantic Coast service stations, East Coast 
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distribution outlets, British and European interests, and the tanker fleet. 
The advantages for Doheny, who retained control of Pan American's West 
Coast properties, including full liability for the oil reserve contracts, were 
not so dear.48 
Perhaps, as many people have suggested, Doheny was just getting too 
old at the age of sixty-nine to keep up the pace after thirty years in the 
business. But keeping Pan American Petroleum intact would have been 
the best way to absorb a potential loss of the Elk Hills production. On the 
other hand, if Doheny had any hopes of maintaining a family dynasty in 
the fuel oil industry, which he had mentioned years before, he must have 
given up on them by this time. Perhaps, as suggested earlier, he had too 
little confidence in his son's ability to handle a major corporation, and it 
would be many years before any of his three grandsons was old enough to 
assume the role.49 
Family considerations notwithstanding, it seems apparent that, once 
Doheny got a taste of the government's intentions for litigating the case in 
the civil trial, he knew he was in for the fight of his life. And looking into 
the future, he may have anticipated that it would take most of his energy 
and resources just to save his name let alone his business. Writing to Albert 
Fall in July 1925, Doheny suggested as much: 
I have come, however, at this late date in my life, to that period when 
substantial returns which nature has so bounteously given do not supply 
that which I seem to want most, the good opinion of the public, or, in 
other words, recognition on its part of real effort made to serve. If there is 
one thing more than another that a man possesses who has followed the 
life of a prospector, it is hope, and I have not yet given up hope that pub­
lic opinion may be greatly changed with regard to both you and I, and 
those who have been reviled with us because of our efforts to serve the 
Government.50 
Doheny was responding, in particular, to the adverse decision in the 
civil trial, handed down two months earlier, in which Judge McCormick 
had found "elements of a criminal conspiracy" behind the Elk Hills con­
tract. Although the government did not have to prove a conspiracy be­
tween Fall and Doheny, McCormick concluded that the intention of the 
defendants was "injurious and pernicious to the public welfare and gov­
ernmental integrity" and "inimical" to the stated purposes of the naval oil 
reserves. With respect to the $100,000 loan, McCormick thought it was 
possible that Fall might not have been influenced by the money—but 
not probable. At the very least, the attempt to keep it a secret suggested a 
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"consciousness of wrongdoing." In the judge's opinion, therefore, Dohen/s 
contract for the Elk Hills reserve was illegal and unenforceable. Neverthe­
less, because McCormick conceded that the work already completed for 
the government at Pearl Harbor was of superior quality and obviously ben­
eficial to the navy, Doheny was entitled to have the $10 million invested in 
the project up to that point refunded by the government.51 
For Doheny, who had just reincorporated the Pan American Western 
company a week earlier, McCormick's decision was disheartening but not 
catastrophic. He could accept the loss of the government leases so long 
as he was not punished financially for reinforcing the nation's petroleum 
defenses. Without oil from Elk Hills, Doheny was still producing about 
11,500 barrels a month from his other properties and could easily purchase 
the remaining 30,000 to 40,000 barrels required to run the Los Angeles 
refinery at capacity. But he was going to need a new source of oil fairly 
soon, since the California company now had sixty-seven gasoline/oil lubri­
cating stations operating throughout the state and was committed to a 
"progressive policy of refining and marketing."52 
In the meantime, he continued to fight McCormick's decision through 
the legal system. On January 4,1926, the Circuit Court of Appeals not only 
upheld the negative decision on the leases but reversed the ruling on the 
money. The Appeals court decided that, once the contracts for the Elk Hills 
project were declared fraudulent, the company was no longer entitled to 
any equity from the government, regardless of the utility of its work. Do­
heny appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. But Pan American Pe­
troleum lost all hope for legal redress in February 1927, when the high 
court agreed that the company should lose its contract on Naval Reserve 
No. 1 and should not be recompensed for construction costs and improve­
ments made to government property. In addition, the court ruled that Do­
heny should have to pay for all of the oil taken from the reserve since 1921. 
In the opinion of Justice Butler, "It was the purpose of those making the 
contracts and leases to circumvent the laws and defeat the policy of the 
United States established for the conservation of the naval petroleum re­
serves." On the civil side, then, Doheny had gone to the limit of the law 
but was unable to recover the money invested in the reserves and the stor­
age depot at Pearl Harbor; furthermore, he owed the government an addi­
tional $9.5 million for all of the royalties, profit, and interest on the oil 
taken out of Elk Hills.53 
One final point about the oil reserve is that recent investigations have 
shown that it was actually the government's subsequent policy of leasing 
out small portions of the reserve to different companies for offset wells 
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that cost the most oil. Fall's idea of giving the whole reserve to one large 
company for systematic development was actually the best thing that could 
have happened to the field.54 
Fortunately for Doheny at least, the criminal cases went much better. 
In December 1926, Fall and Doheny went to trial together in Washington, 
D.C., on the charge of conspiring to defraud the government. As yet, except 
for his appearance before Walsh's committee, Doheny had not taken the 
stand in his own defense. Anticipating a criminal trial, his attorneys had 
advised him to wait before opening himself up to cross-examination. They 
also believed—correctly—that Doheny's testimony would not do him any 
good before a judge but would be a marvelous antidote to the govern-
ment's personal attacks in front of a jury. In particular, Doheny and his 
counsel counted on the public's reverence for the pioneer West as their 
best defense. In addition to playing up Doheny's own frontier days, defense 
counsel called several of his old acquaintances from the mountains of New 
Mexico as character witnesses to testify about his friendship and generosity 
over the years. And it was true that Doheny had kept some of them pros­
pecting for decades and had doled out grubstakes whenever they asked. 
The loan to Fall, his attorneys argued, was just the same, and the jury had 
no trouble acquitting them both.55 
Failing to convict them of conspiracy, the government next tried Fall 
and Doheny on the bribery charge, with an even more controversial result. 
In these cases, because the guilt or innocence of each defendant depended 
on his state of mind, the two men were tried individually. And in October 
1929, just a few days before the stock market crash, Albert Fall was found 
guilty of having accepted a bribe from Doheny. Five months later, however, 
Doheny was acquitted of having ever offered one to Fall. The split verdicts, 
from separate juries, convinced many people that the legal system in 
America was completely worthless. For others, it suggested that it was im­
possible to convict a millionaire of anything. After Doheny's acquittal, Fall 
summed up the opposing decisions as a "puzzle," and they have seemed so 
ever since.56 
It was apparent at the time, however, that the juries had responded to 
the men themselves rather than to the confusing, and often disputed, de­
tails of the case. In that respect, Fall, who was sick during his trial, and 
bound to a wheelchair, appeared old, haggard, and mean-spirited, like 
someone who could accept a bribe. Doheny, on the other hand, with his 
grandfatherly white hair and a hint of a sparkle in his eyes, was an alto­
gether sympathetic witness, someone who always loaned money to his 
friends regardless of their circumstances. 
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Doheny at an anniversary celebration of his first oil strike in Los Angeles, 1929. 
Security Pacific National Bank Photograph Collection, Los Angeles Public Library. 
In the meantime, as the legal history of the oil scandal wound down, 
Doheny's business career also came to an end. But not before he made the 
last, and perhaps shrewdest, deal of his career by selling his interest in Pan 
American Western to Richfield Petroleum in May 1928. When he lost the 
California Appeals Court decision in 1926, there were unsubstantiated ru­
mors that Doheny was still trying to put together another big merger with 
either California Petroleum or Associated Oil, in conjunction with Blair & 
Company. In the end, Blair eventually negotiated mergers with Texaco and 
Tidewater Oil, respectively. In Doheny's case, a former Blair partner was 
apparently in control of California Petroleum and resented his competi­
tion or interference. More to the point, however, assuming Doheny was 
truly interested in such a merger, was that he no longer had enough finan­
cial leverage to be effective.57 
Instead, he negotiated the best deal he could to sell the company. None 
of the details of the transaction, handled again by Blair & Company, were 
made public, but the consensus has been that it was Richfield's greatest 
mistake. Supposedly, Richfield paid Doheny somewhere around $10 mil­
lion to secure 80 percent of Pan American Western stock, $7.5 million of 
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this in cash. In return, Richfield received the unfinished marine terminal 
at Los Angeles harbor, the refinery and pipeline to the Midway oilfields, a 
large inventory of refined products, and a varied portfolio of oil properties 
mortgaged by a $10 million bond issue. Richfield thought it was buying a 
path into the ranks of the major oil companies. Instead, by replicating 
many of its own holdings, the Pan American acquisition sent it into receiv­
ership two years later. Before that happened, though, Doheny made a sec­
ond deal with Richfield to turn over two issues of Pan American bonds 
totaling $24 million and a contract for Richfield to buy the production of 
the Petroleum Securities Company, Doheny's small family-owned produc­
ing company. In the end, Doheny supposedly walked away with $25.6 mil­
lion in cash, proving that he had not yet lost his touch.58 
After his acquittal on the bribery charge, however, Doheny was in his 
mid-seventies, obviously still mentally sharp but physically frail and often 
relegated to a wheelchair. Supposedly, he was still conducting business 
through a number of small operations, but his health was failing fast, and 
the government was refusing to give up its efforts to secure a financial 
judgment against him. By this time, several suits had been filed on behalf 
of Pan American shareholders and the Richfield Petroleum Corporation 
claiming that Doheny's actions in making the naval reserve leases violated 
his fiduciary responsibility to the company and made him personally liable 
for the penalties. 
In the end, attorneys for the federal government fought on for three 
years after Doheny's death on December 8,1935, before they finally settled 
the case, receiving a total of $8.5 million from the Doheny estate. Former 
senator Atlee Pomerene, a Democrat from Ohio, was particularly hostile 
to Doheny after failing to convict him on two occasions and imputed the 
worst motives to everything he did. For Pomerene and his associates, Do-
heny's acquittal was a travesty of justice that could be explained only by a 
pool of stupid, and easily impressed, jurors.59 
It was little wonder, then, that after Doheny died, Estelle followed 
through with his request to destroy his correspondence and business re­
cords, and subsequently refused to discuss the case with anyone. But, as 
has been shown throughout this book, the loss of that information did 
irreparable damage to a full understanding of the details of Doheny's ex­
traordinary life and career. 
CONCLUSION

This study of Doheny's business career began with a state­
ment describing how the indelible effects of the oil scandal have colored 
perceptions of his life. Doheny knew this was going to happen, and after 
exhibiting faith and optimism in the face of innumerable obstacles, he 
spent his last years a bitter and dispirited man, the victim of political forces 
that he could not control. Had he died before 1924, Doheny would have 
left a large void in the front ranks of the oil industry, and his accomplish­
ments would have been duly celebrated. Instead, the oil scandal became 
the motif for his whole career. To his critics, both then and now, Doheny 
was one of the last of a generation of oil buccaneers who symbolized every­
thing that was wrong with the industry. 
The details of his business conduct, however, do not bear out this nega­
tive assessment. Doheny was not a ruthless plutocrat scheming to rob the 
world of its oil, nor was he a simple prospector who lived by the code of 
the West and struck it rich by luck. In reality, Doheny built an oil empire 
at a time when he was forced to bridge the gap between the individual 
wildcatter and the Wall Street industrialist—and he tended toward the lat­
ter almost from the beginning. But along the way, he also stood out as a 
pioneer in almost everything he did. This was especially true with respect 
to his activities in Mexico, where Doheny set the pattern for the expansion 
of the American oil industry abroad. Over the years, he assembled a mas­
sive corporate structure to support the exploration of Mexican oil in an 
era of rapid economic change. In pursuing his objectives, Doheny paved 
the way, and paid the price, for much of the modern oil industry. 
Although part of Doheny's success came from hard work and persever­
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ance, he complemented these prosaic virtues with a vision of the future of 
the oil industry that enabled him to press forward when others hesitated 
or failed to see. In this way, Doheny's career can be seen as an example of 
the entrepreneurial spirit at its best. As a usable concept, the nature of 
entrepreneurial behavior has escaped concise description but encompasses 
what one economic historian calls an "alertness" to heretofore undiscov­
ered, or overlooked, possibilities in the market.1 After having reviewed 
Doheny's business dealings in detail, I find that nothing describes his 
role better than this emphasis on being alert to the opportunities around 
him. As we have seen, Doheny never actually discovered anything that 
had not been known and explored by someone before him. But what he 
recognized, both in California and in Mexico, was the possibility of mar­
keting fuel oil to the railroads, industry, and maritime companies as a cost-
efficient replacement for coal. Doheny was only slightly ahead of his 
competition in most of his endeavors, but he always proved to be more 
strong-willed and determined than his rivals. 
When Doheny "discovered" oil in Los Angeles in 1892, his desire to 
succeed had been fortified by twenty years of frustration, near misses, and 
repeated failure as a mining prospector, but he came away from his years 
in New Mexico with an invaluable education. On the most basic level, he 
had learned the rudiments of practical geology, which were readily trans­
ferable from mineral treasure to oil. More important were the hard lessons 
learned about building a business in a volatile environment. After working 
in isolated places like Kingston or Silver City, Doheny understood the value 
of infrastructure and integration when his lead or silver ore proved to be 
as worthless as the dirt around it without the smelters and railway links 
required to deliver the product to market. And like most prospectors, Do­
heny soon discovered the necessity for external financial support. But, 
from his own experience, he also knew that viable opportunities were often 
wasted through the machinations of stock promoters who cared little for 
the mining business and devoted themselves to quick profits at someone 
else's expense. Outside investors played a crucial role in the early success 
of Doheny's oil companies, but he made certain that they were dependable, 
close relationships that could stand the strain of long-term development. 
Similarly, one of Doheny's greatest assets was his ability to cultivate 
advantageous friendships with influential individuals, from corporate 
heads to Washington officials. Nowhere was his promotional ability more 
impressive than in his initial success in winning the business and financial 
support of the Santa Fe Railway in Los Angeles. Whether Doheny sought 
out the local officials of the Southern California Railroad, whether they 
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approached him, or whether he and the railroad met by accident is un­
known, but he did not hesitate to couple his fledgling oil business to the 
railway. To his good fortune, the Santa Fe wanted to have a secure supply 
of oil, immune from market fluctuations, and it paid Doheny a premium 
for his Los Angeles product. Later, the railroad gave him a free hand to 
expand its oil operations whenever, and wherever, he saw the chance. Thus, 
when he became the railroad's exclusive oil agent in 1897, Doheny held the 
unique position of being a wildcatter with a safety net. Over the next five 
years, Doheny provided the Santa Fe with the oil expertise it required, and 
he gained a first-hand education in how to successfully build and operate 
a large business. The railroad also supplied a core set of investors who 
stayed with him through the first crucial decade in Mexico. 
However, Doheny never intended to rely solely upon the railroad for 
business, and because he had to scour Los Angeles for every conceivable 
customer in the early 1890s, he developed a broad conception of the fuel-
oil market. In particular, he believed that the conversion to fuel oil would 
have its greatest impact on the shipping lines engaged in mass long-
distance distribution. And once the shipping industry adopted oil, Doheny 
knew he would reap the rewards of industrial expansion on an interna­
tional scale. Although this was not a plan he could put into effect immedi­
ately, it was another instance of his alertness to the potential for his 
product. When the opportunity to push the use of oil came during the 
First World War, Doheny was in position to monopolize the business by 
virtue of his large holdings in Mexico. In fact, as we have seen in detail, 
Doheny waged a sales campaign during the war which, in the opinion of 
one analyst, literally created the fuel-oil age.2 
Thus, when Doheny accepted the Mexican Central Railway's offer to 
hunt for oil near Tampico in 1900, he was already aware of the many possi­
bilities for the heavy crude he would find at Ebano. Furthermore, despite 
his putative contract with the railroad, Doheny went to Mexico not simply 
to locate oil but to establish an industry based on domestic consumption. 
After transforming the industrial capacity of Mexico with the use of fuel 
oil, he knew he could move on to a larger international market. In the 
beginning, except for the fear of excessive American control, Doheny's 
plans fit into the economic modernization program undertaken by Porfirio 
Diaz. But after 1911, the foreign-owned petroleum sector, with Doheny in 
the lead, entered a protracted conflict with Mexico's revolutionary govern­
ment over the control of natural resources. Doheny's attempt to build an 
internal market for fuel oil was one of the first casualties of Mexico's civil 
war. Thereafter, the demands of the European war siphoned an increasing 
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amount of Mexican oil into the United States, as the Mexican oil business 
came to resemble other extractive industries. Consequently, as the only 
profitable sector in an economy otherwise devastated by revolution, the 
petroleum industry garnered an unprecedented degree of attention and 
criticism from the Mexican government. 
Nevertheless, because of the political conflict in Mexico and the accom­
panying fight with the Wilson administration over American policy, Do­
heny emerged as a national leader of the oil industry in the late 1910s. 
Throughout this period, his companies accounted for the largest produc­
tion of fuel oil in the world. However, Doheny's success in Mexico and his 
total dominance of one phase of the industry cost him a larger role in other 
areas. In particular, he did not see that it was gasoline, rather than fuel 
oil, which would ultimately revolutionize the transportation industry. For 
several years, therefore, Doheny lagged behind as the other major firms 
expanded rapidly to capture the American gasoline market. Part of his in­
terest in the Elk Hills Naval Reserve in 1921, aside from the issues of secu­
rity in the Pacific, stemmed from the need to jump into the gasoline trade 
in mid-stream. 
Another miscalculation was his abandonment of the California Petro­
leum Company after he failed to consolidate the West Coast independents 
into Pan American Petroleum in 1916. Had he at least maintained some 
financial control over California Petroleum, he might not have taken any 
interest in the Naval Petroleum Reserve as a business proposition in 1921. 
Doheny realized this mistake in the mid-1920s and tried to reacquire the 
company, but he was unsuccessful. Ultimately, California Petroleum, with 
its large production and growing network of distributing stations, became 
a crucial component in the Texas Company's strategy to diversify its opera­
tions in 1928.3 
Thus, by 1925 Pan American Petroleum, with its vast holdings in Mex­
ico, was still the preeminent company in the fuel-oil market, but it was 
only beginning to develop its gasoline business in the United States 
through the purchase of several retail outlets east of the Mississippi. Unfor­
tunately, this lopsided development made it an ideal target for an estab­
lished retail company seeking crude oil reserves, and it did not take long 
before Standard Oil of Indiana set its sights on Pan American. At that 
point, although Doheny was fully engaged in making up ground in the 
hunt for marketing areas on both coasts, he was growing weary of the 
Mexican headache he had been battling for almost fifteen years. Surveying 
his predicament in the early months of 1925, Doheny decided to retain the 
western segment of the company, represented by his investments in Elk 
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Hills, and let Standard Oil have the remainder. In the end, by absorbing 
the bulk of the assets of Pan American Petroleum, which had been the 
nation's ninth-largest oil company for the preceding decade, the Indiana 
corporation vaulted into permanent position as an oil giant. Doheny, on 
the other hand, staked the future of his California operations on the sanc­
tity of his government leases, and he lost. 
An argument can be made that, under different circumstances, events 
could have gone in another direction. Despite its concentration in Mexican 
production, Pan American Petroleum was never in a vulnerable financial 
position and did not have any fatal weakness. In the United States, Doheny 
proved to be an effective competitor in the retail market and was even 
challenging Standard Oil Indiana in its own territory. But in 1925, Doheny 
was also nearing retirement, and the Elk Hills project had become a legal 
and political nightmare. While there was no overwhelming reason to sell 
the company, there was no compelling justification for continuing the 
business along its present lines. 
Despite occasional comments in the press about creating a family dy­
nasty in the fuel-oil trade, Doheny seems to have abandoned any idea of 
maintaining the company for the sake of posterity. The most likely reason 
was that his son had not have proven to be a viable successor. After several 
years as a vice-president, Ned Doheny had not made his role in the com­
pany obvious, and if the information about his alcoholism is correct, he 
was in no shape to assume control of an international oil business. Do-
heny's grandsons were, at the time, just young boys; Doheny may have 
assumed that they would do better inheriting a fortune than a demanding 
corporate obligation. Despite the presence of numerous outside directors 
and a large managerial staff, Doheny retained a controlling financial inter­
est in the company as its founder and chief executive officer, and his deci­
sion to sell out determined its fate. 
In the absence of the litigation surrounding the Elk Hills lease, Doheny 
might have had the energy and the determination to keep the company 
intact and to ensure its future. From a financial standpoint, even the prob­
lems at the Naval Petroleum Reserve were not great enough to force the 
sale to Standard Oil, and the loss of the government leases could have been 
made up without crippling the business. But the oil scandal took such a 
personal toll that it soured Doheny on everything else and made him a 
victim of his own ego. On one level, his proposal to privately develop the 
oil reserve offered genuine cost advantages to the government and guaran­
teed his company a field of expansion far into the future. For all his as­
tuteness, though, Doheny seemed to disregard the political consequences 
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of his actions. Against the better judgment of his business associates, he 
went ahead with his plans, believing that he alone could save the country 
from Japanese aggression. When the details of the Elk Hills arrangement 
became public knowledge, Doheny expected Washington's gratitude, not 
suspicion and hostility. Having succumbed to the blandishments of naval 
officers and government officials, Doheny truly believed that he could en­
sure the nation's military preparedness in the Pacific. And he was not pre­
tending when he appeared genuinely wounded during the oil investigation, 
as critics interpreted his actions in a sinister and self-serving light. He 
never understood why so many of his friends in both political parties aban­
doned him as a liability during the 1924 campaign and thereafter. In the 
end, disillusionment and frustration consumed all other concerns in his 
fight to save his name. Unfortunately, the criminal trials were not con­
cluded until 1930, when Doheny's declining health left him a reclusive in­
valid. And what remained of his public image was inextricably tied to the 
scandal. 
Eventually, it took Doheny's death and Estelle's subsequent rise to 
prominence in her own right to begin to resurrect the family's reputation. 
That process started the day Estelle burned her husband's private papers 
in the basement incinerator of their Chester Place mansion. Over the years, 
Estelle Doheny had given Edward every assistance in his business, accom­
panying him on dozens of shared trips to the Mexican oilfields during the 
revolution. She sat on the board of Pan American Petroleum as one of the 
first female directors of a major oil company. Knowing how much of her 
life had been tied up in the fortunes of the company makes it hard to 
believe that she would willingly destroy the only record of their accom­
plishments. But during his final years, when Edward could no longer talk 
and was confined to a wheelchair, Estelle stood as his protector. The de­
struction of his papers was the final defense of her husband's reputation. 
Still, even though she was only acceding to Edward's wishes, Estelle must 
have come to regret this decision many times during the remainder of her 
life. Her friend and personal assistant, who reluctantly helped burn the 
documents, stated that it was Mrs. Doheny's greatest mistake.4 
In the twenty-three years between Edward's death and her own in 1958, 
Estelle Doheny earned a different reputation than her husband's through 
her philanthropic work in Southern California, large benefactions to the 
Catholic Church, and a late career as a rare book collector with a national 
reputation. And she intended her collection and the Doheny Memo­
rial Library she commissioned to house it as a lasting tribute to Edward, 
hoping that it would grow in value and scholarly importance over time. 
24 4 CONCLUSION 
But in a region which included such institutions as the Huntington Library 
and the Getty Museum, the Doheny collection at St. John's Seminary in 
Camarillo proved to be too isolated and esoteric to attract much attention. 
Ultimately, the Church sold it for over $37 million, a record amount for a 
private library sold at auction.5 
What proved more lasting was Estelle's creation and funding of the 
Doheny Eye Foundation and Eye Bank in Los Angeles. When she discov­
ered in 1944 that she was suffering from glaucoma, Estelle learned that the 
region had no facility to study and treat the disease, and her efforts to 
rectify that situation did as much as anything else to rehabilitate the Do­
heny name. But for Estelle to succeed, Edward and the legacy of the oil 
scandal had to be left behind. The success of her efforts was recently made 
clear when, in December 1991, Town & Country magazine featured a pic­
ture of Mrs. William H. Doheny Jr. on its cover. Inside, the young Mrs. 
Doheny was noted for being the granddaughter of Loren Berry, a pioneer 
of the telephone industry. Her husband, William Doheny, was identified 
as the great-grandson of Carrie Estelle Doheny, known for her endowment 
of the Doheny Eye Institute. Edward L. Doheny, pioneer of the American 
oil industry, was not mentioned at all.6 
APPENDIXA

Oil Production and Sales (in barrels) of the Mexican and Huasteca Petro­
leum Companies, 1901-1914 
PRODUCTION SALES 
(EXPORT/DOMESTIC ) 
1901 18,000 0/0 
1902 40,000 0/0 
1903 40,000 0/16,686 
1904 324,000 0/81,314 
1905 423,059 0/166,313 
1906 1,097,264 0/781,307 
1907 1,717,690 0/1,776,614 
1908 1,847,024 0/2,423,948 
1909 2,398,811 0/2,028,199 
1910 3,435,037 0/3,871,522 
1911 9,202,117 841,648/5,360,952 
1912 9,825,316 4,453,775/4,397,948 
1913 9,624,764 8,078,019/4,083,268 
1914 9,173,618 6,199,797/2,180,166 
Source: Company records as given in the Fuel Oil Journal, Mar. 1915. 
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Oil Production and Exports (in barrels) for the Mexican Petroleum 
Industry, 1916-1924 
COMPANY PRODUCTION* EXPORTS* 
1916 
El Aguila 16,376,293 (40) 9,519,970 (35) 
Mexican Petroleum 12,932,114 (32) 5,279,714 (19) 
Penn Mex Fuel Co. 3,444,490 (8) 3,353,489 (12) 
Brooks 1,728,079 (4) na 
Freeport & Mexican (Sinclair) 1,640,202 (4) na 
East Coast Oil Co. (S. Pac) 1,110,062 (3) na 
Mexican Gulf (Gulf Oil) 886,180 (2) na 
International 644,204 (2) na 
La Corona (Royal Dutch) 557,792 (1) na 
Panuco Boston Oil (Atlantic Ref.) 246,286 (1) na 
Other Companies 981,213 (2) na 
Total 40,546,915 27,268,749 
1917 
Mexican Petroleum 18,450,874 (33) na 
El Aguila 16,922,323 (31) na 
Penn Mex Fuel Co. 4,129,297 (7) na 
Freeport & Mexican 4,076,982 (7) na 
East Coast Oil Co. 3,143,221 (6) na 
Texas Co. (Brooks) 2,315,433 (4) na 
Mexican Gulf 1,160,794 (2) na 
Cia. Petrolera Tal Vez 989,562 (2) na 
Panuco Boston 828,067 (1) na 
National Oil Co. 753,590 (1) na 
La Corona 740,576 (1) na 
International 619,828 (1) na 
Veracruz Mex. Oil Syn. (SONJ) 360,259 (1) na 
Other Companies 801,964 (1) na 
Total 55,292,770 45,256,077 
1918 
Mexican Petroleum 21,632,436 (34) 11,708,539 (23) 
El Aguila 16,910,646 (26) 8,583,573 (17) 
Penn Mex Fuel Co. 6,854,081 (11) 7,008,092 (14) 
Freeport & Mexican 4,119,654 (6) 3,939,899 (8) 
East Coast 3,457,236 (5) 3,398,581 (7) 
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COMPANY PRODUCTION* EXPORTS* 
Cortez Oil Corp. 2,161,757 (3) 1,935,433 (4) 
Mexican Gulf 1,728,190 (3) 1,734,254 (3) 
Island Oil 1,550,869 (2) 1,604,579 (3) 
Texas Co. 1,279,747 (2) 1,256,176 (2) 
Cia. Petrol. Tal Vez 1,152,064 (2) 98,898 (0.2) 
International 609,734 (1) 0 
Tampascas Oil Co. 578,479 (1) 0 
Panuco Boston 531,511 (1) 0 
Transcontinental (SONJ) 382,029 (1) 4,346,837 (8) 
La Corona 337,603 (1) 0 
Other Companies 542,290 (0.9) 6,153,147 (12) 
Total 63,828,326 51,768,008 
1919 
El Aguila 18,798,307 (22) 12,665,824 (16) 
Mexican Petroleum 16,845,139 (19) 15,574,083 (19) 
Penn Mex 8,703,169 (10) 8,390,205 (10) 
Transcontinental 7,172,099 (8) 4,536,543 (6) 
Texas Co. 5,769,507 (7) 6,807,003 (8) 
Mexican Gulf 5,250,890 (6) 4,504,459 (6) 
Freeport & Mexican 4,986,705 (6) 4,752,776 (6) 
Nayarit Pet. Co., S.A. 4,318,813 (5) 0 
East Coast 4,108,200 (5) 2,677,845 (3) 
Cortez Oil Corp. 4,035,279 (5) 0 
Tal Vez 1,632,129 (2) 0 
La Libertad 898,541 (1) 0 
Panuco Boston 836,525 (1) 0 
La Corona 822,648 (1) 0 
International 496,181 (1) 0 
Other Companies 2,271,824 (3) 20,275,682 (25) 
Total 87,045,956 80,184,420 
1920 
El Aguila 32,381,547 (21) 16,166,489 (11) 
Transcontinental 14,411,455 (9) 23,059,630 (16) 
Texas Co. 12,563,918 (8) 11,441,026 (8) 
Mexican Petroleum 12,500,149 (8) 25,433,879 (17) 
International 10,572,682 (7) 0 
Mexican Gulf 9,161,272 (6) 10,279,508 (7) 
Penn Mex Fuel Co. 7,234,718 (5) 6,348,440 (4) 
Atlantic Gulf 6,805,679 (4) 6,549,293 (5) 
Mexican Sinclair 6,669,340 (4) 0 
Nayarit Pet. Co., S.A. 6,350,403 (4) 0 
Freeport & Mexican 4,457,269 (3) 7,750,966 (5) 
La Corona 4,267,377 (3) 3,027,484 (2) 
East Coast 3,020,398 (2) 5,616,177 (4) 
New England Fuel (SONY) 2,977,975 (2) 1,150,504 (1) 
Panuco Boston 1,581,344 (1) 715,072 (0.5) 
Other Companies 22,113,152 (14) 27,970,479 (19) 
Total 157,068,678 145,508,948 
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El Aguila 32,434,576 (17) 
Mexican Petroleum 31,221,119 (16) 
Mexican Gulf 19,057,763 (10) 
Transcontinental 13,709,363 (7) 
La Corona 12,833,192 (7) 
International 12,438,859 (6) 
Atlantic Gulf 8,673,621 (4) 
Texas Co. 6,416,964 (3) 
Freeport & Mexican 6,150,356 (3) 
Penn Mex Fuel Co. 5,184,589 (3) 
Mexican Sinclair 4,309,656 (2) 
New England Fuel Co. 3,882,724 (2) 
East Coast 2,131,304 (1) 
Other Companies 36,311,626 (19) 
Total 194,755,712 
Mexican Petroleum 57,438,425 (31) 
Mexican Gulf 28,240,232 (15) 
International 19,923,953 (11) 
La Corona 17,658,244 (10) 
El Aguila 13,840,397 (7) 
Transcontinental 5,392,141 (3) 
Atlantic Gulf 4,713,487 (3) 
New England Fuel Co. 4,441,338 (2) 
Texas Co. 3,999,981 (2) 
Penn Mex Fuel Co. 2,886,072 (2) 
East Coast 1,918,651 (1) 
Other Companies 24,604,328 (21) 
Total 185,057,249 
Mexican Petroleum 35,188,777 (24) 
La Corona 30,543,711 (20) 
Transcontinental 23,971,932 (16) 
El Aguila 10,120,081 (7) 
Mexican Gulf 7,863,069 (5) 
International 6,233,817 (4) 
Imperio, S.A. 5,643,918 (4) 
New England Fuel Co. 4,981,110 (3) 
East Coast 3,402,418 (2) 
Texas Co. 2,618,099 (2) 
Atlantic Gulf 1,892,465 (1) 
Other Companies 17,122,035 (11) 
Total 149,581,432 
Mexican Petroleum 29,170,596 (21) 
Transcontinental 20,406,320 (15) 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
EXPORTS 
20,772,889 
27,384,446 
12,845,903 
25,903,264 
7,761,407 
9,890,767 
11,042,900 
10,965,055 
7,195,880 
3,567,688 
0 
3,005,714 
5,742,154 
26,223,274 
172,304,341 
39,508,880 
19,791,441 
13,759,671 
20,262,134 
16,018,328 
19,854,433 
7,250,213 
3,544,038 
9,793,956 
3,018,068 
4,675,502 
23,385,575 
180,862,239 
32,152,116 
21,632,708 
16,784,299 
13,212,082 
7,852,919 
3,369,214 
1,959,240 
3,599,465 
8,401,509 
9,053,614 
2,444,394 
15,144,965 
135,606,525 
28,302,207 
30,542,711 
* 
(12) 
(16) 
(7) 
(15) 
(5) 
(6) 
(6) 
(6) 
(4) 
(2) 
(2) 
(3) 
(15) 
(22) 
(ID 
(8) 
(11) 
(9) 
(ID 
(4) 
(2) 
(5) 
(2) 
(3) 
(22) 
(24) 
(16) 
(12) 
(10) 
(6) 
(2) 
(1) 
(3) 
(6) 
(7) 
(2) 
(11) 
(22) 
(24) 
Appendix B 249 
COMPANY 'PRODUCTION* EXPORTS 
International 15,328,390 (11) 1,843,442 (1) 
La Corona 13,516,053 (10) 15,184,205 (12) 
Mexican Gulf 10,786,865 (8) 9,915,650 (8) 
Imperio, S.A. 7,871,195 (6) 0 
El Aguila 5,793,832 (4) 12,345,609 (10) 
Mexican Sinclair 5,194,037 (4) 12,499,897 (10) 
East Coast 3,738,172 (3) 5,069,476 (4) 
New England Fuel Co. 2,474,889 (2) 0 
Texas Company 1,568,650 (1) 3,180,526 (2) 
Penn Mex Fuel Co. 1,486,314 (1) 312,009 (0.2) 
Atlantic Gulf 840,476 (0.6) 746,812 (1) 
Other Companies 21,502,505 (15) 9,757,244 (8) 
Total 139,678,294 129,699,788 
Source: Figures compiled from annual reports of the Boletin del Petroleo and Oil Trade 
Journal. 
* Percentage of total production/exports given in parentheses. 
APPENDIX C

Companies Owned and Controlled by the Pan American Petroleum 8c Transport 
Company at Its Incorporation, 1916 (incorporation dates in parentheses). 
Mexican Petroleum Company, Delaware (1907) 
Mexican Petroleum Company, California (1900, original company based at 
Ebano, Mexico) 
Huasteca Petroleum Company (1907, producing company with its main prop­
erties at Casiano and Cerro Azul, Mexico) 
Compania Naviera Transportadora de Petroleo, S.A. (1912, transportation 
company that owned the small boats and barges used in Mexico) 
Tuxpan Petroleum Company (1912, producing company, Mexico) 
Tamiahua Petroleum Company (1912, producing company, Mexico) 
Mexican Petroleum Corporation (1912, refining and distribution company for 
the United States, with a major refinery at Destrehan, Louisiana, and oil 
storage and sales outlets along the eastern seaboard) 
Petroleum Transport Company (1912, main transportation company, which con­
trolled the oil tanker fleet) 
Caloric Company (1915, distribution company for South America based in Brazil) 
Buena Fe Company (1915, producing company, Midway oilfield, California) 
Pan American Investment Corporation (1916, holding company for California oil 
lands, owned 50/50 between Pan American Petroleum & Transport Company 
and the California Petroleum Corporation, also operated in the Cat Canyon oil 
district, Santa Maria field, California) 
Pan American Petroleum Company (1916, producing company, Ojai oil dis­
trict, Ventura-Newhall field, California) 
Doheny Pacific Petroleum Company (1916, producing company, Casmalia, 
Midway, and Simi Valley, California) 
Fairfield Petroleum Company (1916, producing company, Texas) 
California Petroleum Corporation (1912, holding company) 
American Petroleum Company (1908, producing company, Midway oil district, 
California) 
Niles Lease Company (1910, producing company, Salt Lake oilfield, Los Angeles 
County, California) 
American Oilfields Company (1910, producing company, Coalinga oil district, 
Fresno County, California) 
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Midland Oilfields Company, Ltd. (1910, producing company, Midway, Sunset, 
Lost Hills, McKittrick oilfields, Kern County, California) 
Midland Oil Company (1910, producing company, Midway oilfield, California) 
Petroleum Midway Company, Ltd. (1915, producing company, Midway oil-
field, California) 
APPENDIX D

Relative Sizes of the Largest American Oil Companies by Total Assets 
(in $ 1,000s) 
1917 1921 1925 
Standard Oil New Jersey 574,149 1,115,940 1,369,170 
Standard Oil New York 204,338 333,242 532,961 
The Texas Co. 144,585 335,990 397,638 
Gulf Oil Corp. 142,963 272,774 427,610 
Standard Oil Indiana 126,935 305,676 406,060 
Standard Oil California 126,923 276,733 373,723 
Magnolia Petroleum 122,822 190,858 212,828 
Prairie Oil & Gas Co. 102,605 130,906 154,424 
Sinclair Oil Corp. 93,804 342,424 447,965 
Mexican Petroleum Co. 83,034 101,262 122,009 
Associated Oil Co. 80,688 100,133 124,857 
Union Oil Co. 77,567 104,616 302,454 
Vacuum Oil 76,166 109,664 144,492 
Atlantic Refining 60,772 111,077 134,017 
Pan American Petroleum 
& Transport Co. 52,015 111,213 189,119 
Tide Water Oil Co. 42,712 90,306 111,469 
Source: Moody's, Industrials. 
NOTES

The following abbreviations are used throughout the notes: 
CFC The Commercial and Financial Chronicle (New York) 
COW California Oil World 
DC The Daily Californian (Bakersfield) 
DRF Papers of the Doheny Research Foundation, Occidental College 
Library, Los Angeles, California 
FOJ Fuel Oil Journal (Houston) 
IMA Investigation of Mexican Affairs, U.S. Congress, Senate 
IOPA Independent Oil Producers Agency Records, Taft, California 
KWS Kingston Weekly Shaft (Kingston, New Mexico) 
LAH Los Angeles Herald 
LAMR Los Angeles Mining Review 
LAT Los Angeles Times 
MH Mexican Herald (Mexico City) 
MOB Mining and Oil Bulletin (Los Angeles) 
MSP Mining and Scientific Press (San Francisco) 
MWS Magazine of Wall Street 
NMHR New Mexico Historical Review 
NPN National Petroleum News (Cleveland) 
NYT New York Times 
OA The Oil Age (Los Angeles) 
OGJ The Oil and Gas Journal (Tulsa) 
OIJ Oil Investor's Journal (Houston) 
OTJ Oil Trade Journal (New York) 
SCA Sierra County Advocate (Hillsboro, New Mexico) 
SCE Silver City Enterprise (Silver City, New Mexico) 
SFC San Francisco Chronicle 
SFE San Francisco Examiner 
WP Washington Post 
WSJ Wall Street Journal 
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